THE 

McKINLEY AND ROOSEVELT 
ADMINISTRATIONS 

1897-1909 



BY 

JAMES FORD RHODES, LL.D., D.Litt. 

AUTHOR OF THE HI6T0RY OF THE UNITED STATES FROM THE 

COMPROMISE OF 1850 TO THE FINAL RESTORATION OF HOME 

BULE AT THE SOUTH IN 1877 ; HISTORICAL ESSAYS ; 

LECTURES ON THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR 

DELIVERED AT OXFORD ; H18TORY 

OF THE CIVIL WAR ; FROM 

HAYES TO MCKINLEY 



Nefo gork 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1922 

All rights reserved 



. 



PhlNTID IN TBS L"NITEI> bTATKS Of AMERICA 



COPTBIGHT, 1922, 

By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 



Set up and elcctrotyped. Published November, 1922. 



NortoooU #rr«g 

J. 8. Cu ulth Co. 

Norwood, Ma,.., ; - \ 



CIA' 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

PAGE 

Mark Hanna 1 

Mark Hanna Secures McKinley's Nomination ... 12 

The St. Louis Convention 13 

McKinley and Hanna, Bimetallists 13 

The Resolution of the Convention for Gold . . .15 

Nomination of McKinley 16 

Gold and Silver 17 

Nomination of Bryan 18 

Bryan an Effective Campaigner 20 

Coin's Financial School 22 

Republican Fight against Free Silver .... 23 

McKinley's "Front Porch" Speeches 25 

McKinley's Election 29 

CHAPTER II 

Hanna's Fight 30 

Secretary Sherman 31 

Senator Hanna 35 

The Dingley Tariff 37 

McKinley and Arbitration with Great Britain . . 40 

The Cuban Question 41 

CHAPTER III 

Cleveland and Cuba 44 

McKinley and Cuba 46 

The Maine 49 

The President's Ultimatum to Spain 53 

Spanish Procrastination 54 

v 



CONTENTS 



McKinley Averse to War 

The War Might Have Been Avoided 

Declaration of War against Spain 

CHAPTER IV 

George Dewey . 

Battle of Manila . 

George Dewey . 

German and French Opinion 

German Action 

Progress of the War 

Theodore Roosevelt 

- r Juan Hell . 

Ami.imi w Depression, July 3 

Spanish Despair 

Battle of Santiago . 

Debtbu< nOH 01 mi; Spanish Fleet 

Tin. < ll.ll.M 

Tin. Defeat of Spain- 



page 
60 

62 

66 



69 
73 
75 
76 
79 
81 
83 
,85 
87 
88 
91 
93 
96 
97 



CHAPTER V 



Spain RELINQUISHED CUBA 

Tm. Pbotocoi 

Tin. Piin.'iTr. 

1 I Opinion . 

M< KiM.r.v \m> mi: Pun iitim.s 
Tin. M"-- I I ' i;im. . 

Tin. PHILIPPINE In-i i:i 

Bawad 

.1 P. MOBOAM .... 

[no pbt 
1 i LsoisLi noil . 

I I \ Y 

Hat, '!,ii \u v or State 



99 

101 

102 

101 
100 

100 

111 

112 
115 
117 
L19 
1 21 I 
121 



CONTENTS vii 

PAGE 

The "Open Door" 126 

China — The Boxer Uprising 127 

Peace with China 131 

CHAPTER VI 

The Presidential Campaign of 1900 132 

Theodore Roosevelt, Vice-President 135 

William J. Bryan, Democratic Candidate . . . .136 

The Contest of 1900 139 

Mark Hanna 140 

Roosevelt 141 

The Election of 1900 143 

J. P. Morgan 144 

Andrew Carnegie 145 

United States Steel Corporation 148 

Andrew Carnegie 151 

J. P. Morgan 154 

The Stock Panic of 1901 155 

John D. Rockefeller 157 

The Standard Oil Co 159 

McKinley's Second Inaugural Address .... 169 

Assassination of McKinley 170 

McKinley and the Tariff 173 

McKinley and Civil Service Reform 174 

CHAPTER VII 

Puerto Rico 176 

Cuba 177 

The Philippines 183 

The Anti-Imperialists 188 

The Schurman Commission 190 

The Filipinos 194 

Elihu Root, Secretary of War 195 

The Taft Commission 197 



CONTENTS 



Root's INSTRUCTIONS 

i.i.a Warfare 
tobtube by a.mlrm an soldiers 
Root, Cbeatob; Taft, Administrator 

I and I'ilE SUPBEMB COURT 

Roosevelt and Taft 

The Phiiipi'ines 

Cameron Forbes 

Ki.ihu Root 

Archibald C. Coolidge 

CHAPTER VIII 
Roosevelt as President .... 
Tin. NOBTHEBN SeCUBITIES CASE 
Booker WASHINGTON .... 

The Chableston Exposition . 

?b New England Tour . 

ROOSLYI.U 'fl A< I [DENT .... 



CHAPTER IX 
The Anthracite Coal Stbike of 1902 
EtoosEVELi Banna — Baer 

GbOVEB < 'i.E\ BLAND . 

Plan 

The Shi i eemem 

' ii.HM \\Y Vi m Bl BLA . 

Tin- Ai.v k \ Boi m>\kv Di-it 1 1: 

I hie British Navy 

(HAITI i: X 
The Fib I li • i Paoncbfote Tri \ 1 I 

The Bh< OND BaI PaUNCSFOTB TRI I PI 

•I 

The II w Hi .in: w Tri my 
The 1''-. ".: >. Rj VOI i . 



198 
202 
203 
206 
208 
210 
212 
213 
213 
215 



218 
221 
227 
231 
233 
235 

236 
239 
240 
242 
243 
247 
254 
260 



261 
262 
263 
266 

26S 



CONTENTS 1X 



PAGE 



The Hat-Bunau-Varilla Treaty 275 

Bryce on the Panama Canal 2/6 

CHAPTER XI 

Roosevelt's Extraordinary Ability 279 

Roosevelt — Hanna 281 

The Convention of 1904 288 

Death of Hanna 289 

Character of Hanna 289 

CHAPTER XII 

Record of the Republican Party 292 

Parker's Charges 293 

Result of the Election of 1904 295 

Attack on the Financial Interests 296 

"Our Friends Who Live Softly" 297 

Roosevelt No Demagogue 299 

The St. Louis Fair 300 

CHAPTER XIII 

The Russo-Japanese War 302 

Peace of Portsmouth 307 

Death of Hay 31 ° 

Root, Secretary of State 311 

Morocco Affair ox * 

Algeciras Conference 314 

Roosevelt — The Kaiser 315 

San Domingo 318 

China 319 

CHAPTER XIV 

Railroad Rate Legislation of 1905 323 

The Hepburn Bill 324 

The Senate Bill 325 

Rate Making by Interstate Commerce Commission . . 327 



x CONTENTS 

Meat Inspection Act and Pure Food Law 

Muckraking 

The Brownsville Affray 

Japan 

Third International Conference . 

CHAPTER XV 



PAGE 

334 
337 
339 
341 
342 



The Panic of 1907 


. 344 


J. P. Morgan 


. 348 


The President 


. 348 


Irrigation 


. 354 


The Reclamation Act .... 


. 356 


The Convention of Governors . 


. 360 


CHAPTER XVI 




The Navy . 




The Voyage around the World . 


. 369 


Japan 


. 376 



CHAPTER XVII 

Republican Convention of 1908 
Roosevelt for Taft 
HiNHY CABOT Lodge, Chairman 
Taft, Nomina n;n 
1 : ami TrzbD Ti:km 

r, a Bookish Maw 

Oltvsb P. Morton . 

'I'm. I'hi.-ii.i m \m, High Ftnanci 

Asdiu.u .1 \, KBOM 

Broad-iondbd 

•1 I M 1 1 LBT7I 
; ' TUT, U KA2M 



378 
379 
3S0 
381 
383 
390 
392 
394 



THE McKINLEY AND ROOSEVELT 
ADMINISTRATIONS 



THE McKINLEY AND ROOSEVELT 
ADMINISTRATIONS 

1897-1909 



CHAPTER I 

This volume naturally begins with the political cam- 
paign of 1896 during which three men absorbed public 
attention — McKinley, Bryan and Marcus Alonzo Hanna, 
or, as he was familiarly called and will be known in this 
book, Mark Hanna. Of McKinley and Bryan, up to 
1896, the student of affairs will have had some idea, 
but Mark Hanna deserves an introductory notice before 
the last eight years of his crowded life are related. Called 
an enigma in New York City, he was no enigma whatever 
to his intimates, except that they failed to gauge his 
towering ability. They knew him for a shrewd money- 
getter, able and diligent in business, but they could not 
believe that he would reach a high position in public 
affairs — that during one administration he would be 
known as the "king maker" and during another the 
champion of the financial magnates against Theodore 
Roosevelt — that he would at least divide with Roose- 

l 



2 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

velt the allegiance of the Labor Unions. In all essentials 
except political ability he was no enigma to his friends, 
for he wore his heart upon his sleeve. 

New York City is a good point of survey and from this 
point Hanna's appearance in public life was like that of a 
comet in the sky. Although fifty-nine years old in 1896, 
he had gradually, but with steady ambition, been working 
up to the place from which he was now to begin his 
most important achievements. His restless mind had 
always cast about for a new enterprise and, not being a 
student or reader of books, and having no sympathy with 
a man who devoted his whole ability to the acquirement 
of money, he entered the field of politics. Before he was 
thirty-two he made an informal alliance with an enter- 
prising young man of Cleveland to break up the Repub- 
lican machine that dominated city politics. Botli were 
good Republicans but objected to the manner in which 
city affairs were conducted. Somewhat later when the 
Republican machine nominated one of their representa- 
tive men for mayor, Hanna led a revolt against the 
machine and, with the aid of a number of independent 
associates, nominated a Democrat of excellent business 
ability and elected him 1 although the rest of the Repub- 
lican ticket was chosen. In city and ward politics, he 
was always noted for his independent action and often 
showed no hesitation in supporting Democrats when they 
were better men than the Republican nominees. 

At fche age (, f forty-three lie was reei.inii/ed as i me of the 

prominent business men of Cleveland. His business was 

coal, iron ore and pig iron; in L867 he had been Mailed 
in it by his father-in-law, an iconoclast in Society and 

1 In 1873. 



Ch. I.] MARK HANNA 3 

trade and an uncompromising Democrat in politics. 
Hanna's independence however did not come from any- 
family association ; it was inherent in himself and gained 
for him the dislike of the solid financial men of Cleveland, 
who had built up the city and were naturally the dominant 
figures in its financial circles. In spite of the dislike of 
these magnates, Hanna pushed ahead until in 1880, the 
year of the Garfield campaign, he was known as a reliable 
Republican and had acquired a very considerable local 
prominence. He was head and front of the business 
men's meetings in Cleveland and fully favored making 
the campaign on the tariff and business issue rather than 
on the "bloody shirt." Closely connected with the 
Pennsylvania railroad through business relations, he 
formed a link between that great organization and the 
candidate of his party, afterwards president-elect. From 
that time on he never lost an opportunity to identify him- 
self with any Republican movement. Although he had 
never read Cicero, he shared the Roman's belief that 
he must keep himself constantly before the public. 

Hanna was attracted to the Civil Service Reform 
movement and attended the meeting of local organization 
in Cleveland. 1 He had no hope of being the president of 
the Cleveland association, but he did aspire to the chair- 
manship of the Executive Committee. The organization 
was controlled by men who did not like Hanna and who 
entirely ignored him in their dispositions, not even 
awarding him the consolation of membership on the Exec- 
utive Committee, of which he would have liked to be the 
directing head. From that night, Hanna must have 
argued, there is a ring of reformers as well as a ring 

1 Either in January or February, 1882. 



4 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

of politicians. I think the politicians will suit me 
better. 

His failure to secure election as district delegate to the 
Republican National Convention of 1884 and his sub- 
sequent success in being chosen delegate at large gave him 
an inkling of what was needed for political success. At 
the Convention he was an avowed supporter of John 
Sherman, whose candidacy met with little favor. He 
opposed Blaine, yet when the Convention named him as 
its candidate Hanna gained prominence in his party by 
his earnest and sincere efforts for Blaine's election; but 
no sooner was Blaine defeated than Hanna began to work 
for Sherman's nomination in 1888. Securing the unani- 
mous support of Ohio, a portion of Pennsylvania and 
many delegates from the Southern States, he went to the 
Convention as a delegate confident of success. In my 
last volume I have told how Harrison's nomination came 
to be made but, soon after Sherman's defeat, Hanna real- 
ized that under certain circumstances McKinley might 
have been the man; accordingly he decided no longer 
to put his money upon the wrong horse and became an 
open advocate of McKinley's nomination for the next 

presidency. Between 1890 and 1892 Hanna had serious 
but Iness troubles \\ hich, to a certain extent, distracted his 

Qtion from politics and he was not as powerful a factor 

in the Convention of 1892 as he bad been four years be- 
fore; he might have been thought to be losing his grip 
on politics bul lie was simply biding bis time. After the 
bounding Republican victory in the flection tit' ism, 

he went to bis younger brother, thru a business partner, 

and told him that, for the future, he purposed giving more 
time to politics and le£ to bu ^rrangemente were 



Ch. I.] MARK HANNA 5 

made with this end in view and thenceforward he gave 
nearly his entire attention to securing the nomination of 
McKinley in 1896. 

Boston, apart from a few men in State Street, did not 
like Hanna. His brusque manner, unconventional talk, 
ignorance of literature and art alienated many, and he 
did not always live up to the moral ideals in politics that 
were professed in this city. The general opinion was 
afterwards well stated by Henry S. Pritchett, a true West- 
erner, although at that time living in Boston, the efficient 
President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
"The papers to-day," he said in a speech to the Bowdoin 
Alumni Association on February 16, 1904, "have been full 
of the life of an interesting man, who now lies dead in 
Washington. He was a strong man, a man of noble parts, 
of splendid personal power and of high ability for service 
and he has played a great part as a leader in this country. 
He deserves for all that high praise. And yet we can 
never forget in estimating him as a public man that he 
must be judged, not only for his high personal qualities 
but also for the quality of his public service. One cannot 
fail to regret in looking back over that life that it should 
have carried with it the noble qualities of devotion, of 
energy, of ability and of loyalty to a friend and yet have 
not had with it also a higher level of what public service 
means . . . and a higher estimate of moral and intel- 
lectual force rather than pecuniary force in politics." 1 

New York City and other communities may have had 
their opinions influenced by the prevalent caricatures 
which always have something to do with the formation 
of public sentiment. Hanna once said that, although 

1 Boston Herald, Feb. 17, 1904. 



6 CLEVELAND^ ADMINISTRATION [1*96 

his ancestry was Scotch-Irish there was more Irish than 
Scotch in his composition ; thus with a plausible exaggera- 
tion of his features he was often portrayed as a bloated 
whiskey-drinking Irishman. A much-repeated cartoon 
showed him and McKinley sitting over a bottle of whiskey 
in earnest confabulation. These caricatures caused his 
friends no little amusement, so entirely were they un- 
founded in fact. Hanna drank no wine until he was 
past middle life, did not care for it, and used stronger 
liquors only for medicinal purposes. McKinley pre- 
ferred water to wine at a banquet or dinner or any other 
occasion. Indeed, if the cartoonist had shown McKinley 
and Hanna, sitting calmly together over a bottle of Wau- 
kesha or Poland water drinking to the toast "Here's to 
honest water which ne'er left man i' the mire," he would 
have been much nearer the truth. 

"I shall never forget," said Senator Scott of West Vir- 
ginia, "one morning during the campaign of 1S96" when 
Hanna handed me a New York paper containing a car- 
toon of himself pictured as a huge monster, clad in a suit 
covered over with dollar marks, smoking an immense 
cigar, and trampling under foot women and children until 
their eyes protruded from the sockets and their skeleton 
forms writhed in agony. After I had looked at it for a 
moment he said to me, 'That hurts.' " ■ 

This was a favorite caricature, Banna covered all over 
with the dollar mark, the implication being that he be- 
lieved money could buy anything. The Nation wrote 
during the heated political campaign of 100S: "The 
frankly commercial spirit in which Mark Ilanna man- 
aged the two campaigns in which In* was chairman is no- 

1 Address, April 7, 1904, 39. 



Ch. I] MARK HANNA 7 

torious. A prominent and honored Ohio Republican has 
said of Mr. Hanna that his only notion of political activ- 
ity was 'to go out and buy somebody.' " l This remark, 
born probably of factional hostility, was unjust. Hanna 
paid the penalty of talking too frankly about the use of 
money, but no one knew better than he that money would 
not accomplish everything and, after he had gained power 
and influence, nothing perturbed him more than to be 
looked upon simply as an office-broker. 

Collecting money for a political party must be regarded 
differently from getting means for the support of a church, 
a university or a charitable institution and, according 
to the cynical view of politics that obtains in certain 
quarters, the corruption of voters seems to inhere in the 
use of the party chest. But many voters looked upon 
the Republican party as something sacred, whose control 
was necessary to the well-being and perpetuity of the 
Republic. The man who raised money in order to insure 
its continuance in power was looked upon by them as 
doing holy work. Some such idea must have passed 
through Hanna's mind when, without concealment, he 
continually preached the use of money to save the party. 

His outspoken scorn of bookish men and respect for 
those who had money to contribute lent color to The Na- 
tion's criticism, but in this matter and in others Hanna 
stood in need of a certain hypocrisy which was lacking 
in his nature. Making no bones of confessing his igno- 
rance of Shelley and Pasteur, he loved Shakespeare as he 
saw his plays acted on the stage and took delight in a 
good performance of " School for Scandal," in Joseph 
Jefferson's "Rip Van Winkle," "Rivals" and "Cricket 

1 Oct. 8, p. 328. 



8 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

on the Hearth." During the fifties when the Lyceum 
system was at its height, he was a constant attendant and 
liked above all the lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson. 

It is ordinarily thought that men in active life are apt 
to become victim;-; of wine, woman or play. Judged by 
this standard, ITanna was a severely moral man who 
needed no refuge in the dictum of the preacher, "The 
moral man is he who is not found out." A generous giver 
of dinners, he was a spare eater except for an insatiable 
fondness for sweets to which his corpulence and rheu- 
matism in later life were due. Loving the society of re- 
fined and well-bred women, he might be looked upon as 
a model of chastity. Passionately fond of cards, he pre- 
ferred whist or bridge without a money stake ; he never 
played draw poker except when a party for his favorite 
whist was unavailable and then only in what was known 
as a "small game." He had a pure mind, rarely told a 
smutty story and did not relish hearing one unless there 
was something in it that he thought clever. He was 
nevertheless rather undiscriminating in his response to 
humorous fancies and, though some of his intimates 
found in him an amusing companion, it was mainly his 
whole hearted audacity that made them laugh. He 
\itated toward the society of the best men. Amongst 
those one me1 at his dinner table in Washington were 
Root, Justice White, Taft, Long, 0, II. Piatt, Hobart, 
Allison, Udrich and occasionally Secretary Hay and 
Senator Lod 

Popular knowledge of a man of aotion who lefl few 

letters, did not keep a diary nor write a book depends 

■ ely upon his biographer and, in this respect, Qanna 

was exceptionally happy. Hi- son selected Herbert Croly, 



Ch. I.] MARK HANNA 9 

who made the work a labor of love and has presented the 
real Mark Hanna with remarkable perspicacity and skill. 
Some of Hanna's friends, on hearing of the selection, may- 
have shuddered at the thought of an author with social- 
istic proclivities undertaking the biography of a strong 
individualist; yet the accomplished editor of the Amer- 
ican Statesmen series had chosen Carl Schurz, an avowed 
tariff reformer, to write the life of Henry Clay and the 
wisdom of this selection had been fully demonstrated. 
Even so was the choice of Herbert Croly to write the life 
of Mark Hanna. One may learn from that book what 
manner of man was Hanna when he determined to bend 
all his energies to the nomination of McKinley in 1896. 
Hanna and McKinley were warm personal friends. 
They had first met in 1876 in the Court House at Canton, 
Ohio, where were being tried one miner for assault with 
intent to kill and a number of others for being engaged 
in a riot. Hanna as head of his Coal Company was active 
in prosecution and McKinley was one of the attorneys 
of the Stark County bar who had volunteered for the 
defence. It was a trial in which bitterness developed on 
both sides and McKinley won attention from the prose- 
cution by his personal resemblance to Daniel Webster, 
and by his gentle consideration for the men who had 
deemed it their duty to prosecute the offending miners. 
In the same autumn McKinley was elected to Congress 
and by degrees he and Hanna became intimate acquaint- 
ances. At the National Convention of 1884, they shared 
an apartment at a hotel ; their relations were cordial 
although McKinley was for Blaine and Hanna for Sher- 
man. The Convention of 1888, when they both supported 
Sherman, increased the mutual attachment. Each saw 



10 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

qualities in the other that drew them together and, as 
both were working for the same end, they were now in 
complete sympathy. 

Hanna's admiration for McKinley was profound. He 
shared his belief in the protective tariff as something 
sacred and not to be touched by profane hands. A man 
put forward for the presidential nomination should lose 
no opportunity of seeing influential men in the several 
States and commending himself to them by his personal 
bearing. Once when Hanna had with some difficulty 
secured an assemblage of men to meet the prospective 
candidate in an Eastern city, McKinley sent regrets on 
account of the illness of an invalid wife. This, for the 
moment, irritated Hanna as he thought that the wife 
might in her chronic condition have been left to the care 
of a doctor and nurse, as she was by no means danger- 
ously ill and that McKinley might have kept the engage- 
ment which would have been a signal aid to his candidacy. 
This misfortune seemed to Hanna a considerable obstacle 
in the path of McKinley's advancement yet he was so 
struck with the man's sublime devotion to his invalid 
wife that he could not help exclaiming, "McKinley is 
a saint." 

Hanna "had not a single small trail in his nature," 
declared Roosevelt. "I never needed to be in doubt as 
to whether he would carry through a fight or in any way 
go back on his word." ' 

Hanna's friendship with Ben Butterworth embodied a 
rare unselfishness thai dignified his strenuous and success- 
ful career. Croly prints -"me Letters from Butterworth 
to Hanna that are charming in the devotion shown by 

1 Cr„]y, . 



Ch. I.] MARK HANNA 11 

him who stuck to the lesser man through thick and thin. 
Butterworth was of too independent and impulsive a 
nature to be successful in politics but his honest appear- 
ance and conduct gave him a standing with leaders that 
he seemed unable to acquire with the mass. When he 
was unsuccessful in politics Hanna redoubled his assist- 
ance and when at last he fell fatally ill Hanna watched by 
his bedside in a Cleveland hotel with the same devotion 
that he would pay to a brother. 

The campaign for the nomination was proceeding apace 
when McKinley gave it a set-back through his own finan- 
cial failure. He made himself liable by endorsements to 
help a friend for one hundred and thirty thousand dollars, 
a large sum in 1893 and an enormous one for the Gover- 
nor of Ohio. He had no other idea than that the debt 
must be paid in full and it seemed to him as if the labor 
necessary to this end meant the close of his political career. 
But Hanna, Myron T. Herrick, H. H. Kohlsaat and many 
others came to his aid and saved him from bankruptcy. 
These facts were more or less publicly known and 
McKinley was reproached with having put himself in 
the power of these men by accepting financial favors for 
which they would expect repayment in some way. But it 
does not appear that any of them asked for consideration 
nor that anything was done for the raisers of the fund 
except for Hanna and Herrick who received McKinley's 
support on entirely different grounds. 1 



1 In this characterization I have been helped by Life of Hanna, Herbert 
Croly; Mark Hanna, Solon Lauer, Cleveland, 1901; William Allen White's 
article, McClure's Magazine, Nov. 1900; Murat Halstead, Review of 
Reviews, Oct. 1896 ; the contemporary cartoons ; many newspaper notices 
of Hanna's death in Feb. 1904. My son, Daniel P. Rhodes, was private 
secretary of Mark Hamia for a year and a half covering 1897 and a part 
of 1898 ; to him I owe a careful revision of this whole chapter. 



12 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

Croly has related in sufficient detail Hanna's labor 
in securing the nomination of McKinley. From January 
1, 1895, his whole attention was devoted to the work and 
everything that energy, social entertainment, political 
blandishment and the judicious use of money could ac- 
complish was forthcoming in full measure. He spent, 
said Croly, "something over $100,000" (which would 
not now ' be considered a large amount) obtaining almost 
no assistance from his friends. "Corrupt methods were 
always expressly and absolutely forbidden," wrote Croly, 
but when Hanna put in his own time and energy he could 
make a dollar go a great way, as he did in this case al- 
though he had opposed to him Quay and Thomas C. 
Piatt, adepts in all the arts of political management, as 
well as a hearty New England backing of Thomas B. 
Reed who, by common consent, was well fitted for the 
place. Yet it was not Hanna's work alone that won the 
prize. McKinley, in capacity and manner, was well fitted 
for the White House; moreover, since 1893, affairs had 
been working his way. Tin* panic of 1893 had been fol- 
lowed by a commercial crisis and business was extremely 
bad. Tli' 1 Republicans ascribed the evil condition to 
Democratic sure.-- and to the avowed promise of a re- 
duction of the tariff. The tariff was reduced during the 
summer of L894 and the autumn elections for Congress- 
men showed a Complete change in public sentiment. It 
was natural that a distracted public should turn to the 
arch-protectioni-i for relief. McKinley was reelected 
( rovernor of ( ttuo in 1*'>"> by an increased majority ■ and 

in i graphical anil all other respects was an available 

candidate. 

1 1919. • For M< Kin. I my vol. vui. 374. 



Ca. I.] THE ST. LOUIS CONVENTION 13 

Henry Clay said in the bitterness of his disappoint- 
ment at failing to receive the Whig nomination in 1840, 
"If there were two Henry Clays, one of them would make 
the other President of the United States." l But 
McKinley's and Hanna's relations were so intimate that 
Hanna might be called an alter-ego. What one could 
not do, the other could. McKinley knew the men in 
public life through and through, and Hanna learned how 
to manipulate conventions and secure delegates ; and he 
thought that he was serving party and country well in 
putting to the fore an arch-protectionist. By May 1, 
1896, if not before, Hanna felt that McKinley's nomi- 
nation was assured, but before the Convention met on 
June 16 in St. Louis the question of platform was the 
most important one, and the only portion on which there 
was a marked divergence of opinion related to silver; 
this difference grew as the time for the assembling of the 
Convention approached. When the delegates began to 
come together, the Committee on Resolutions, of which 
Foraker was the chairman and Senator Lodge the Massa- 
chusetts member, had many declarations to consider but, 
out of the confusion and heat of convention days, only 
two resolutions are important for the historian; these 
are the McKinley-Hanna resolution, which Hanna brought 
with him to Chicago, and the resolution finally adopted 
by the Convention, on which the canvass of 1896 was 
made. 

Both McKinley and Hanna were bimetallists. While 
in Congress, McKinley had in 1877 and 1878 voted for 
free silver, for the Bland- Allison bill and for its passage 
over President Hayes's veto ; but in his support of silver 

» Schurz's Clay, ii. 181. 



14 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

he was backed by both senators from Ohio and all the 
representatives except James A. Garfield. In the dis- 
cussions of Garfield's course, which were of daily occur- 
rence among business men in Cleveland, his dissenting 
voice was generally approved, but Hanna vigorously 
opposed his position and endorsed that of the other mem- 
bers, especially of the representative from Cleveland, who 
was a personal and political friend. Thus McKinley and 
Hanna had been favorable to silver for eighteen years 
when it fell to them to decide the issue on which the cam- 
paign of 1896 should be made. And they both, for ob- 
vious reasons to anyone who understands their political 
careers, desired to have the paramount issue the tariff, 
while silver should be relegated to a subsidiary place. 

In 1896 in Ohio it was no disgrace to be a bimetallist. 
It was much easier to favor a single gold standard in 
New York or Boston ; yet in Boston some of the most 
eminent statesmen, authors, business men and politi- 
cians, under the brilliant leadership of General Walker, 
had embraced the doctrine of silver and, though opposing 
the free coinage of the metal, were eager for its adoption 
as a money standard by international agreement. Be- 
tween 1894 and 1896 many of these Bostonians were con- 
verted to a single gold standard although they still held 
to the fiction of international agreement which, as the 
wisest of them knew, was out of th*' que>tion. This con- 
version was undoubtedly due to the great work o! Grover 
Cleveland and while most Republicans would have 
ipurned the idea of having beeD bo influenced yet to the 
historian it appears that they were thus unconsciously 
swayed. 

In the pre-Convention days in St. Louis the Eastern 



Ch. I.] GOLD AND SILVER 15 

men, whose leader may be said to have been Senator 
Lodge, were eager for the mention of gold ; many from 
the Middle West desired a plank which could be inter- 
preted as favoring gold in the East and yet not condemn- 
ing silver in the West. The McKinley-Hanna resolu- 
tion read: The Republican party "would welcome 
bimetallism based upon an international ratio, but, until 
that can be secured, it is the plain duty of the United 
States to maintain our present standard, and we are there- 
fore opposed under existing conditions to the free and 
unlimited coinage of silver at sixteen to one." Before 
these words, it spoke of "maintaining all the money of 
the United States whether gold, silver or paper at par 
with the best money in the world and up to the standard 
of the most enlightened governments." The resolution 
adopted by the Convention, which was agreed to by Sen- 
ator Lodge and his associates, read: "We are opposed 
to the free coinage of silver except by international agree- 
ment with the leading commercial nations of the world, 
which we pledge ourselves to promote, and until such 
agreement can be obtained the existing gold standard 
must be preserved. All our silver and paper currency 
must be maintained at parity with gold and we favor all 
measures designed to maintain inviolably the obligations 
of the United States and all our money, whether coin or 
paper at the present standard, the standard of the most 
enlightened nations of the earth." It is easy to see that 
the controversy turned on a few words. Should the Re- 
publican party "maintain our present standard" or pre- 
serve "the existing gold standard"? To the historian 
conversant with the action of Grover Cleveland, the dif- 
ference does not seem great, but to the framer of platforms 



16 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

and the campaigner it was immense. One resolution 
declared in favor of gold by name, the other did not ; 
hence it turned out that the Republicans were known 
throughout the campaign as the party of gold, the Dem- 
ocrats as the party of silver. It is no wonder, then, that 
the adoption of this resolution is considered so important 
an episode in the history of the Republican party and of 
the country, and that so many lay claim to a paramount 
influence in securing its insertion. 

When Hanna saw that, owing to the sentiment devel- 
oped among the delegates, his own view could not pre- 
vail, he accepted the result gracefully and persuaded 
McKinley to do likewise. The Committee agreed on the 
financial plank and reported it to the Convention, which 
adopted it by a vote of 812| to 110£. Before the adop- 
tion of this plank, Senator Teller of Colorado offered a sub- 
stitute demanding the free coinage of silver but obtained 
only 105£ votes against 818.}; this vote foreshadowed 
the adoption of the financial plank by nearly the same 
majority. After making some pathetic remarks, he, 
with thirty-three others, seceded from the Convention. 
The rest of the platform was then adopted by acclama- 
tion. 1 

McKinley was then nominated by (Ml \ votes, his lead- 
ing opponent, Thomas B. Reed, receiving SU. Garret 
A. Hobart of New Jersey was named for Vice President. 



'Lift- <>f Sauna, Croly; Foraker, Nbtoa of i Busy Life, i. ; Charles 
Emory Smith, PkUaddph P < June 24, L896, cited by Boston Duly 
Adverti-ir; Tin- Autobiography <>f T. C. I'lntt; MS, statement of I 
B Draper, Chairman of the Maea delegation, Jan. 9, 1900; II. II. Kohl- 
oaaf ) /■ Pott, \;.mI 80, 1910; I tl of Frank 8. Wither- 

v | /•■ /• - V'.i i :. 1910; u \ White, M .-('lure'*, Nor. 
lyoo; Balatead In /; . | /. - Od I • I : fc c, Speechei 

and Addreetat, 1900; Stanwood, Slat of the Presidency. 



Ch. I.] GOLD AND SILVER 17 

On June 18 when McKinley was nominated, Republi- 
can success was deemed more than probable. Mark 
Hanna was made Chairman of the Republican National 
Committee but thought of taking a yacht cruise along 
the New England Coast to obtain a needed rest after 
"the great strain" imposed by the work resulting in 
McKinley's nomination. "I would have been glad," he 
wrote in a private letter, "to have escaped the responsi- 
bility of managing the campaign, but there was no way 
out of it and I feel that I am ' enlisted for the war ' and 
must win." This letter was written on July 3 when 
Hanna had no idea that he had an easy victory before 
him; as between June 18 and July 3 public sentiment 
showed that the Republican party in identifying itself 
with gold had run the risk of losing some of the Western 
States. "I must get the work of education started," he 
said, " before I can take my necessary recreation." "The 
fight will be in the Mississippi Valley States," he added. 
"The 'gold' basis is giving us lots of work." 1 

The Democratic Convention in Chicago, meeting on 
July 7, denned the issue plainly between gold and silver 
and changed the hoped-for victory of the Republicans 
into a premonition of defeat. There were many indica- 
tions that the Democrats would espouse the cause of free 
silver. Richard P. Bland of Missouri was their idol, 
leader and probable candidate for the presidency and he 
had publicly said that the Democracy of the West was 
convinced that "the gold standard meant bankruptcy" 
and that the Convention would declare for the "free 
coinage of silver at 16 to l." 2 The delegates who were 



1 Letter from Cleveland. 

2 Twenty Years of the Republic, Peck, 492. 



18 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

known as Cleveland men made a valiant fight, but their 
financial plank was rejected by 303 to 626 and their en- 
dorsement of Cleveland's administration by 357 : 564. 
During the discussion of the financial resolution, William 
J. Bryan leaped into prominence through a speech that 
carried the Convention. "Upon which side will the Dem- 
ocratic party fight," he asked, "upon the side of the idle 
holders of idle capital or upon the side of the struggling 
masses? . . . Having behind us the producing masses 
of this nation and the world, supported by the commer- 
cial interests, the laboring interests and the toilers every- 
where, we will answer their demand for a gold standard 
by saying to them : 'You shall not press down upon the 
brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify 
mankind upon a cross of gold.' " ' The platform as re- 
ported by the Committee on Resolutions was adopted 
by 628 to 301. It declared that, "Gold monometallism 
is a British policy and its adoption has brought other 
nations into financial servitude to London. . . . We 
demand the free and unlimited coinage of both silver and 
gold at the present legal ratio of sixteen to one without 
waiting for the aid or consent of any other nation." 2 
Some of the other resolutions were judged to be "anar- 
chistic" ; they were certainly extremely radical for 1S96. 

Bryan's speech, especially the last clause of the last 
sentence cited above, made him tin' Democratic candi- 
date for the presidency. 

"The Chicago convention ha? changed everything," 
wrote Iianna in a private letter on July 10. It has 
knocked out my holiday and cruise along the New Eng- 
land coast. The campaign "will be work and hard work 

'Bryan, TV First little, 206. ' Stunwood, 542. 



Ch. I.] THE MONEY QUESTION 19 

from the start. I consider the situation in the West quite 
alarming as business is all going to pieces and idle men 
will multiply rapidly. With this communistic spirit 
abroad the cry of 'free silver' will be catching." Both 
Hanna and McKinley felt that the Republican party was 
united on the tariff but divided on the silver question. 
During a conference, probably before Bryan's nomina- 
tion, McKinley said, "I am a Tariff man standing on a 
Tariff platform. This money matter is unduly promi- 
nent. In thirty days you won't hear anything about 
it," when William R. Day 1 remarked, "In my opinion in 
thirty days you won't hear of anything else." 2 Even 
after the Chicago Convention, Hanna expressed himself 
as not wishing to allow the tariff issue to be over- 
shadowed by the financial. 3 But the logic of events 
taught both McKinley and Hanna that a determined 
fight must be put up against free silver in the Western 
States; and in point of fact their belief in bimetallism, 
but only on an international basis, proved as effective in 
the conduct of the campaign as if they had been uncom- 
promising advocates of the single gold standard. 

The Republican secession affected the vote in some of 
the Western States but the Democratic "bolt" was more 
significant. It took two forms : one, the nomination of 
separate candidates for President and Vice President 
known as gold Democrats, and the other votes given di- 
rectly to McKinley as the surest means of beating Bryan. 

There is no question that business was much depressed 
and that many men were out of employment. The Re- 
publicans had hoped to charge this condition to the Dem- 



1 Now Justice of the United States Supreme Court (1919). 

■ Life of McKinley, Olcott, 321. 3 Life of Foraker, i. 492. 



20 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

ocratic administration and to the Tariff bill of 1894, and 
therefore McKinley, who represented protection more 
than any other man in the country, was the logical can- 
didate. He was the "advance agent of prosperity" and 
promised the "full dinner pail"; prosperity was to be 
secured by a return to the protective tariff of the Repub- 
lican party. On the other hand, the Bryan Democrats, 
though agreeing to the Republican estimate of present 
conditions, promised an entirely different remedy for the 
hard times, and proposed a different policy for reducing 
the army of the unemployed. Remonetize silver, coin it at 
the ratio of 16 to 1, stop measuring money by the English 
standard but increase its volume, they averred, and the 
distress of men in legitimate business and of honest la- 
borers out of employment will disappear. The demone- 
tization of silver enhanced the value of the circulating 
medium and was in the interest of the creditor ; restore 
it to its proper place, they argued, and the augmented 
circulation will enable the debtor to pay his debts and 
start all the wheels of industry going. 

Bryan proved an effective campaigner, although his 
first move was not successful. Determined to open the 
campaign in "the enemy's country" lie formally accepted 
the nomination in a speech in Madison Square Garden, 
New York City. But he commit ted an error in reading 
the speech which he had carefully written out. For 
Bryan, though an orator, was a poor reader. Other 
conditions were against him. The weather, even for the 
second week of August, waa extremely hot and the noti- 
fication speech unduly long. The large audience who 
had expected to laiiLih at "his five We-tern sallies and 
audacities" found him "transformed into a Professor 



Ch. I.] WILLIAM J. BRYAN 21 

Dryasdust prosing through two mortal hours. . . . No 
wonder that they fled before his portentous pile of 
manuscript with cries of 'Good-night, Billy.'" l 

New York and other Eastern financial centres breathed 
a sigh of relief. They had been greatly alarmed at 
Bryan's stirring speech before his nomination and his short 
addresses on the way from Lincoln to New York City, but 
now they heard or read a dull economic argument, which 
could not carry conviction to thinking men and which 
utterly failed to rouse the proletariat. Depression at 
the fear that Bryan and his financial fallacies would carry 
the country was succeeded by a momentary and undue 
elation of the conservative forces. 

But when Bryan began his trip through the country, 
his native ability as an orator and his sincere belief in 
the fallacies that he advocated gained him large audiences 
and shaped convictions. Farmers, obliged to accept 
a low price for their products, and laborers, who desired 
work but could not get it, were glad to learn that free sil- 
ver was the one simple remedy for their trouble. The 
distress was indeed grave. If we subtract from Dr. Tal- 
mage's remarks what they contained of rhetorical ex- 
aggeration, an extract from his non-partisan sermon will 
give us an excellent idea. " Never within my memory," 
he said, "have so many people literally starved to death 
as in the past few months. Have you noticed in the 
newspapers how many men and women here and there 
have been found dead, the post-mortem examination 
stating that the cause of death was hunger? There is 
not a day when we do not hear the crash of some great 



1 The Nation, Aug. 20, 134. 



22 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

commercial establishment and as a consequence many- 
people are thrown out of employment. Among what we 
considered comfortable homes have come privation and 
close calculation and an economy that kills. Millions 
of people who say nothing about it are at this moment 
at their wits' end. There are millions of people who do 
not want charity but want work." l 

Goldwin Smith, a keen observer, felt Bryan's " pre- 
ternatural power of clap-trap declamation." 2 The Dem- 
ocratic National Committee cooperated skilfully with 
their candidate and made their appeal for funds in an 
attractive manner. Their pressing need was the hiring 
of speakers and the distribution of documents "for the 
dissemination of the truth." One hundred and twenty- 
five thousand of "Coin's Financial School" were circu- 
lated, a device that showed how clever they were. This 
little book was made up of addresses purporting to be 
delivered daily to large Chicago audiences, that were 
hereby instructed in the science of money by Coin, a 
"smooth little financier." The fascination of his manner, 
his ready argument, apparent fairness, cannot fail to 
charm even the reader of to-day who knows that the 
school was a fiction designed to serve as the subject of an 
attractive book in which fallacious arguments might be 
presented that would otherwise remain unheard. So this 
amiable-looking little man was supposed to deliver six lec- 
tures from the platform of a large hall of the Art Insti- 
tute; and these were attended fictitiously by men promi- 
nent in business and finance, who were argued with and 
either convinced or refuted. This was not a difficult 



1 s.-pt 27. Thi kttli . Bryan, 474. 

■ Sol I 



Ch. I.] "COIN'S FINANCIAL SCHOOL" 23 

task as the opponents were men of straw, and the sym- 
pathetic reader of the book was quite ready to believe 
that "the little financier could not be cornered." 

England cannot always be defended, but it was un- 
merited ill-luck that her work in the cause of sound 
finance should be bandied about in the course of an ex- 
cited political campaign. "Coin's Financial School" is 
illustrated with rude but effective wood-cuts and, when 
Cleveland or Sherman is lampooned, such illustrations 
can be considered only proper game ; but the comity of 
nations is transcended when Uncle Sam is pictured firing 
a cannon to the utter discomfiture of England with the 
amiable little Coin standing by, doffing his silk hat to 
the hurrah, "What our answer to England should be." 
This sentiment he elaborated in his last lecture : "A war 
with England," he said, "would be the most popular war 
ever waged on the face of the earth. If it is true that she 
can dictate the money of the world and thereby create 
world-wide misery, it would be the most just war ever 
waged by man." l 

To no better team could the defence of the financial 
honor of the country have been confided than to McKin- 
ley and Hanna. When they came to appreciate that the 
fight must be against free silver, they wrought like vet- 
erans in the cause. Hanna exerted his wonderful talent 
of organization and threw himself into the contest with 
unstinted energy. He raised the necessary funds. Soon 
gaining the confidence of New York City financial men, 
he obtained from them important contributions to his 
campaign. Some concerns were assessed by Hanna ac- 



1 Coin's Financial School, by W. H. Harvey, 150 pages and 64 illus- 
trations. Popular edition, 25 cents ; Cloth, $1.00. This book sold well. 



24 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

cording to what he conceived to be their financial interest 
in the canvass, a uniform assessment of one quarter of 
one per cent being levied on the banks. He systematized 
the expenditure and had the books kept on true business 
principles. The Republican National Committee spent 
between three and three and a half millions and had also 
in reserve a guarantee fund which was not called upon. 
Hanna early perceived that this was to be a campaign 
of education. Six hundred thousand dollars were spent 
for documents that were printed in German, French, 
Spanish, Italian, Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, Dutch 
and Hebrew, as well as English ; among those which were 
carefully distributed were Sherman's, Carlisle's and 
McKinley's speeches. The New York Evening Post's Free 
Coinage Catechism was much in demand and gladly sup- 
plied. It was written by Alexander D. Noyes, the Post's 
financial editor, and two million copies of it were circu- 
lated. Carl Schurz was induced to enter the canvass on 
behalf of McKinley, and one million and a half copies of a 
clear and convincing speech of his were scattered abroad. 
This speech lent itself to sententious quotations; hence 
the leaflets called Schurz nuggets that wore placed before 
many readers. Innumerable speakers of lesser note pre- 
sented the case against free silver. Men in every county 
of the pivotal Western States wore supplied with sound 
money literature; and, as they could not give their time 
for nothing, they were hired to read and explain the pam- 
phlets and talk to the few or many who might gather at 
the school-houses or other places of resort to hear ex- 
pounded the political issue of the day. Probably the 

most effective speaker in gaining votes was McKinley 
himself. Declining to emulate Bryan in his "whirlwind 



Ch. L] McKINLEY'S "FRONT PORCH" SPEECHES 25 

tour," he spoke from the front veranda of his house in 
Canton to many deputations, some of them spontaneous, 
others arranged for, discussing mainly the financial ques- 
tion. He almost always knew what the visiting spokes- 
man was going to say so that he was often able to revise 
his own address beforehand. These speeches of McKin- 
ley's were carefully prepared, as he well knew that he was 
addressing the newspaper-reading public of the whole 
country as well as the men who had travelled some dis- 
tance to greet their candidate in person. Close students 
of the art of guiding public sentiment assert that people 
will often read in the newspaper a speech that has been 
orally delivered while they pass by an essay or letter in 
the same type and given the same prominence. McKin- 
ley's efforts were called his "front porch " * speeches and, 
in their general tenor were of a piece with the formal letter 
of acceptance that was given to the public on August 26. 
Acknowledging that the money question was the chief 
issue of the campaign he gave it the first and most prom- 
inent place in his letter. "The meaning of the coinage 
plank adopted at Chicago," he wrote, "is that anyone 
may take a quantity of silver bullion, now worth fifty- 



1 John Hay said in his Memorial Address on McKinley delivered in the 
Capitol at Washington on Feb. 27, 1902: "From the front porch of his 
modest house in Canton he daily addressed the delegations which came 
from every part of the country to greet him in a series of speeches 
so strong, so varied, so pertinent, so full of facts briefly set forth, of 
theories embodied in a single phrase, that they formed the hourly text 
for the other speakers of his party and give probably the most convincing 
proof we have of his surprising fertility of resource and flexibility of mind. 
All this was done without anxiety or strain. I remember a day spent 
with him during that busy summer. He had made nineteen speeches the 
day before ; that day he made many. But in the intervals of these ad- 
dresses he sat in his study and talked, with nerves as quiet and free from 
care as if we had been spending a holiday at the seaside or among 
the hills." 



26 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

three cents, to the mints of the United States, have it 
coined at the expense of the Government and receive for 
it a silver dollar which shall be legal tender for the pay- 
ment of all debts, public and private. . . . Until in- 
ternational agreement is had, it is the plain duty of the 
United States to maintain the gold standard. It is 
the recognized and sole standard of the great commercial 
nations of the world with which we trade more largely 
than with any other. Eighty-four per cent of our for- 
eign trade for the fiscal year 1895 was with gold standard 
countries and our trade with other countries was settled 
on a gold basis." Addressing himself to the argument 
that the "present industrial and financial depression 
was the result of the gold standard," he declared, "Good 
money never made times hard." 

Hanna had a high opinion of the influence of the Fourth 
Estate and knew the hold that the weekly county journals 
had on their readers. He sent them specially prepared 
matter, plates and ready prints. It was fortunate that 
nearly all of the large daily newspapers, whether Demo- 
cratic or Republican, were ardent advocates of the cause 
of sound money ; copies of these were industriously dis- 
tributed. "Of course," wrote Croly, "cartoons, posters, 
inscriptions and buttons wore manufactured by the car- 
load — the most popular poster being the five-colored, 
single-sheet lithograph, bearing B portrail of McKinley 
with the inscription underneath, 'The Advance Agent 
of Prosperity.'" l 

During AuguM Hanna was somewhat staggered by the 
poll of Iowa which indicated that this sure Republican 
State would cast her electoral vote for Bryan. Yet ad- 

i P. 218. 



Ch. i.] Mckinley — bryan 27 

mitting, for the moment, that Iowa must be placed in 
the doubtful column, he was still confident of McKinley's 
election, believing that at the worst it would be a close 
shave, while he really hoped for a stampede. At any 
rate, the campaign was to him too serious a matter for 
any phase of it to be left to chance; indeed, he and 
McKinley had decided that, if matters got desperate, 
McKinley should take the stump in Illinois, Indiana, 
Michigan, Iowa and Kansas. 

The Methodist, the Roman Catholic and the other 
churches were mainly on the side of sound money and 
many preachers did not hesitate to bring politics 
into the pulpit during their Sunday exhortations. Na- 
ture gave a welcome help to Hanna in an advance in the 
price of wheat. Now do something for corn came a 
witty demand from the Indian corn-growing States. 

To Bryan's oratory more than to any other one cause 
was due the impression that the campaign was one of the 
masses against the classes. Some of the resolutions of 
the Chicago platform were deemed anarchistic 1 and in- 
fluenced votes against Bryan who thought it wise to deny 
the imputation. "We have been called anarchists," he 
said. "I am not an anarchist. There is not beneath 
the flag a truer friend of government or a greater lover 
of law and order than the nominee of the Chicago con- 
vention." 2 It is difficult to describe with strict impar- 
tiality a heated political campaign in one's own country 
and one's own time, but a keen observer from England 
should have been able to view the events of 1896 with a 
comparative lack of bias. "I have never thought the 
Republic in [such] serious peril as I do now, " wrote Gold- 

1 Ante. 2 Speech in Baltimore during September, 463. 



28 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1896 

win Smith, "when I see the organization of the Demo- 
cratic party captured by Anarchism and Repudiation. 
Bimetallism, you will understand, is the least part of the 
matter; even Repudiation is not the greatest. The 
greatest is the uprising of disorder, in all its forms and 
grades against the institutions of the American Repub- 
lic. . . . Bryanism is a vast cave of Adullam, in which 
are combined all the distressed, all the discontented, all 
who have nothing to lose and may hope to gain by a 
general overturn. ... In November the Republic of 
the Fathers will be fighting for its life." l 

During October the stampede to McKinley took place. 
General J. D. Cox, who was then living in Cincinnati, 
Ohio, wrote on October 26 in a private letter: "When 
I went East in June I am sure nine-tenths of the Ohio 
Republicans were ardent bimetallists, with more leaning 
to free silver than to gold monometallism. Now nearly 
every man seems to rival his neighbor in putting gold 
forward as the single standard. . . . The claim of Re- 
publican managers that there is a 'landslide' going on in 
McKinley 's favor, I assume to be sufficiently true to war- 
rant a confident expectation of his election." 

Bryan made a wonderful cam ass, travelling IS, 000 
miles and addressing audiences almost every day. The 
mere factof his bearing the physical strain he was under- 
going and the eagerness <>f people to see and hear this 
famous orator must have counted in hi- favor. 2 






1 Saturday B toig. l. Sept. •">. Oct 31 

'In this aooount of the campaign of 1896, I have been aiwiwtftd by 
Crniv'.s I. iff of Banna; Oloott'a Life "f McKinley; Bryan, The First 
Battle; Peek; Stanwood, ii. I of the Presidency; The \ ijini; 

Geldwin Smith's articles in the Saturday Bavin EToraker, Notes of a 
Busy Lifr, i.; Conversations with Mark Ihinna, A.Ug. 28, Dec. 20. 



Ch. I.] THE ELECTION OF 1896 29 

On Tuesday, November 3, nearly fourteen millions 
voted. McKinley was triumphantly elected. He was 
to receive 271 electoral votes to Bryan's 176, a majority 
of 95. His plurality in the popular vote was somewhat 
over six hundred thousand. "No President since U. S. 
Grant," wrote Croly, "entered office supported by so 
large a proportion of the American people as did William 
McKinley." l Bryan congratulated McKinley on his 
election and the successful candidate made a graceful 
reply. 

McKinley carried the New England States, New York, 
New Jersey and Pennsylvania by large majorities. The 
Middle Western States gave him their electoral votes. 
He invaded the solid South, carrying Delaware, Kentucky, 
West Virginia and Maryland, Maryland by an imposing 
plurality. Bryan carried Kansas and Nebraska, all the 
mining States except California, and also Washington, 
while Oregon voted for McKinley. North Dakota did 
likewise, while South Dakota gave her electoral vote to 
Bryan by a small plurality. Ohio, the State of McKinley 
and Hanna, was a disappointment to the Republicans. 
While they never regarded seriously the boasts of the 
Bryanites that they would carry the State, yet her plu- 
rality, being less than that of Michigan and about one 
third that of Illinois, showed that Ohio was somewhat 
uncertain. For, in the August forecast, Michigan was 
set down as very doubtful and, while Illinois was con- 
sidered less doubtful, she was not regarded, like Ohio, as 
safe beyond peradventure for McKinley. 

»P. 227. 



CHAPTER II 

After the election of McKinley, Mark Hanna occupied 
an enviable position. Had it been usual, the freedom of 
Cleveland would have been conferred upon him. "He 
can own this city," said an enthusiastic financial adherent. 
"What a glorious record Mark Hanna has made this 
year!" wrote John Hay in a private letter. "I never 
knew him intimately until we went into this fight together, 
but my esteem and admiration for him have grown every 
hour. He is a born general in politics, perfectly square, 
honest and courageous with a coup d'oeil for the battle- 
field, and a knowledge of the enemy's weak points which 
is very remarkable. I do not know whether he will take 
a share in the government, but I hope he will." ' McKin- 
ley desired him to accept a Cabinet position and for a 
while he revolved in his mind whether he would not take 
the post of Secretary of the Treasury, a place which he 
was entitled to and which he would have admirably filled. 
On looking into the matter, however, he found the 
routine and confinement of the office objectionable ; more- 
over, he aspired after the senatorship from his State — 
an office that would give him tin' inlluence he desired to 
exert, and yet effectually preserve his independence. 
Therefore he made public the declaration that he would 
accept no office from the McKinley administration. 



I Croly. 228. 

30 



Cn. II] SECRETARY SHERMAN 31 

Hanna did not appreciate that this statement would 
rise up to plague him. For he had conceived the idea of 
inducing the President to appoint Senator John Sherman 
Secretary of State and of being appointed by the Governor 
of Ohio to succeed him for his unexpired term in the Sen- 
ate [March 4, 1899]. During his many interviews and 
conferences with McKinley he canvassed the matter, 
with the result that on January 4, 1897, the President- 
elect offered to Sherman the position of Secretary of State . 
in his administration, and this was promptly accepted. 1 
The course of events gave efficient support to those who 
wished to attack McKinley and Hanna, as it demonstrated 
that the appointment was utterly unfit owing to mental 
failure on the part of the Secretary of State. The critics 
averred that Sherman had given way to unusual excite- 
ment, both on the floor of the Senate and in a newspaper 
interview, that his memory had been failing for two or 
three years, that this fact was so presented to Hanna 
and McKinley that they ought to have recognized it, 
staying their hands from such procedure ; that it was in 
short, a case of an aged statesman being "kicked up- 
stairs" to make a place for Mark Hanna. Sherman him- 
self, after the resignation of the office of Secretary of State 
[April 25, 1898] by newspaper interview and private let- 
ter, confirmed this criticism. "No doubt," he wrote con- 
fidentially on November 8, 1898, "I ought to have re- 
mained in the Senate during my term, which would not 
have expired until the 4th of March next. At that time 
I regarded McKinley as a sincere and ardent friend, whom 
I had assisted and whose election I had promoted. When 



J Life of McKinley, Olcott, 329. 



32 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 

he urged me to accept the position of Secretary of State, 
I accepted with some reluctance and largely to promote 
the wishes of Mark Hanna. The result was that I lost 
the position both of Senator and Secretary. . . . They 
deprived me of the high office of Senator by the tempo- 
rary appointment as Secretary of State." l 

Wisdom after the event is the source of much criticism, 
and so it is in this case when the well-meant plan of 
Hanna and McKinley turned out badly. Hanna had 
twice supported Sherman for the presidential nomina- 
tion, and had a high idea of his wisdom, not only in 
finance but in foreign affairs ; seeing something of his work 
as chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations in 
the Senate, he admired his clear comprehension and ef- 
fective statement, and as he felt in a measure responsi- 
ble for the success of the McKinley administration, he 
really thought that he was contributing to it by helping 
Sherman to the leading place in the Cabinet. His atti- 
tude to the stories that came to him regarding Sherman's 
mental failure was characteristic ; he had such confidence 
in Sherman's ability and so desired the succession to the 
Senate that he did not believe the stories, oven though 
some of them must have been endorsed by his New York 
financial friends to whom he had been drawn closely by 
the exigencies of the political campaign. He knew Sher- 
man well socially; was aware that he had always been 

temperate in eating and drinking, moderate in all of his 
pleasures and, although nearly 71. Could not see that there 



1 Note* of i I'.usy Life, Foraker, L BOB. Sherman died in 1000. This 
letter was handed to Porakei by General Miles, March I, 1002, but was 
not printed until the first edition of thia book, which was published in 
February, l'JIU. 



Ch. II.] SECRETARY SHERMAN 33 

was any reason for thinking, apart from the stories that 
were afloat, that he might not be physically and mentally 
fit for six years to come. The Nation, which became a 
severe critic of the appointment, said in an editorial on 
August 20, 1896: " Senator Sherman can make a good 
speech when he tries to do so. His speech at Columbus 
on Saturday was one of the best he has ever made." x 

McKinley's first impression against Sherman's appoint- 
ment was entirely different from the result. The Sena- 
tor was generally considered as the leader of his party in 
his State and McKinley feared that on account of his 
masterfulness he would wish to dominate the adminis- 
tration. It is not surprising, therefore, that with this 
idea fixed in his mind McKinley should have made little 
account of the reports that he heard of Sherman's mental 
failure and should write to Joseph Medill on February 
8, 1897: "I concur in your opinion that the stories re- 
garding Senator Sherman's 'mental decay' are without 
foundation and the cheap inventions of sensational writers 
or other evil-disposed or mistaken people. When I 
saw him last [this was January 15, 1897] I was convinced 
both of his perfect health physically and mentally, and 
that his prospects of life were remarkably good." 2 

Sherman was glad to accept the Secretaryship of 
State. He exchanged two years in the Senate with a 
doubtful succession for apparently a four years' tenure of 
the Cabinet head of the new Republican administration, 
which was undoubtedly a promotion. It was not un- 
usual, however, for Senators to decline Cabinet appoint- 



1 P. 134 ; see also June 24, 1897. 

2 Life of McKinley, Olcott, i. 334. 



34 CLEVELAND'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 

ments, and it was open to Sherman to do so, but as matter 
of fact the prospect was attractive. He had enjoyed 
himself in the Treasury Department under Hayes, hav- 
ing great influence with the President and he might well 
have thought that a similar experience now awaited 
him. 

The important question was, would Governor Asa 
Bushnell appoint Hanna ? The two belonged to different 
factions in the Republican party in Ohio and there was 
no love lost between them. Sherman used his influence 
to get the Governor to name Hanna as his successor, and 
the President-elect wrought powerfully in his friend's be- 
half. Nevertheless the Governor did not want to appoint 
a factional enemy and he authorized his personal and 
political friend, Joseph B. Foraker, to offer the place to 
Theodore E. Burton of Cleveland, then a Representative in 
Congress who, however, declined it. During the first 
part of February, McKinley must have despaired of the 
carrying out of this part of the program, as he still urged 
Hanna to accept a Cabinet position, writing to him on 
February 18, 1897, "I have hoped, and so stated to you 
at every convenient opportunity, that you would yet 
conclude to accept the Postmaster-Generalship." The 
Treasury was no longer at the President-elect's disposal, 
as on January 28 he had authorized the announcement 
that he had selected for that post Lyman J. Gage of 
Chicago. 1 "You have as often declined," McKinley con- 
tinued in this letter to Hanna, "and since our conversation 
on Tuesday last (February 16) I have reluctantly con- 
cluded that I cannot induce you to take this or any other 



1 The Nation, Feb. 4. 



Ch. II.] SENATOR HANNA 35 

Cabinet position. You know how deeply I regret this 
determination and how highly I appreciate your life-long 
devotion to me. You have said that if you could not 
enter the Senate you would not enter public life at all." 

Those who like to consider the " might have been" 
may conjecture whether, if Hanna had even now decided 
to go into the Cabinet, McKinley would have induced 
Sherman to withdraw his acceptance of the office of Secre- 
tary of State on the ground that he would prefer not to have 
two men from Ohio in his Cabinet ? In which event he 
would have appointed as Secretary of State a man flatly 
opposed to a warlike intervention in favor of Cuba, as 
at that time McKinley was himself. 

Hanna, more persistent than McKinley, had no idea 
of giving up the game. Bushnell was a candidate for the 
Republican nomination for Governor who would be elected 
in the autumn of 1897, and, if he failed to appoint Hanna 
Senator, he would jeopardize materially his chance of nom- 
ination. Finally, through fear of failing to receive the 
renomination he desired, and from the unmistakable sen- 
timent in the Republican party in Ohio that Hanna 
should have the place, he determined to appoint his an- 
cient enemy, and wrote to him on February 21, "I wish 
to communicate to you my conclusion to appoint you as 
the successor of Senator Sherman when his resignation 
shall have been received." 1 

William McKinley was inaugurated on March 4, 1897, 
and in his address made clear the immediate policy of the 



1 Life of Hanna, Croly, 240. This book has been used freely in this 
account. Also Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, i. ; Life of McKinley, 
Olcott; John Sherman, Theodore E. Burton; do. W. S. Kerr, ii.; The 
Nation, passim. 



36 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 

government. 1 There were "depression in business, dis- 
tress among the people." The government needed more 
revenue and ought to get it by an increase in tariff 
taxation. On this point he spoke to a united party 
and had Congress and Republicans with him ; to carry 
out this purpose he summoned an extra session for 
March 15. 

The position which McKinley took need not have sur- 
prised anyone ; nevertheless, the gold Democrats who had 
supported him were disappointed that he did not put the 
money question to the fore and advocate legislation 
which should fix by law permanently the gold standard ; 
this development received fit expression in the speeches 
of ex-President Cleveland and ex-Secretary Carlisle at the 
New York City Reform Club dinner of April 24. Cleve- 
land could speak with authority, as he was the hero of 
the gold standard even as McKinley was the apotheosis of 
a protective tariff. And Cleveland and his Cabinet had 
given McKinley a hearty welcome, unusual in a change of 
one party administration to its opponent. But McKin- 
ley was wiser than his critics in declaring that the securing 
of adequate revenue must precede financial legislation. 
So far as finance was concerned he must endeavor to effect 
international bimetallism ; until that was decided, the ex- 
isting gold standard would be maintained. The Presi- 
dent knew that no act such as he desired could pass the 
existing Senate, and his foresight was confirmed by that 
body adopting, within less than a year, a resolution which 
declared that the principal and interest of the govern- 
ment bonds were payable in silver dollars at the option 



1 Tin- [nnugund addn m ii printed in Cong Eteoord, xxx. Pt. 1. For 

McKinley 'a Cabinet, w;c l'cck, 621. 



Ch. II.] THE DINGLEY TARIFF 37 

of the administration. 1 McKinley made a sincere at- 
tempt to obtain international bimetallism but, when 
Great Britain blocked the way, 2 he appreciated that busi- 
ness in the United States must be conducted on the single 
gold standard. In the attempt to secure this by proper 
legislation, he said, in a confidential talk with Senator 
Hanna and Secretary Alger on one of the last evenings 
of August, 1897, the Republican party may go down and 
I may go down with it but, after that temporary sacrifice, 
the Republican party devoted to such a noble cause will 
rise again. 

Everything was in proper shape to enact a protective 
tariff to take the place of the Democratic Act of 1894. 
It had been tacitly agreed that Thomas B. Reed should 
be reelected Speaker of the new House, and Nelson 
Dingley, also of Maine, should be chairman of the Com- 
mittee on Ways and Means ; this tacit agreement was at 
once carried into effect. This Committee, which was 
substantially the same as that of the preceding Congress, 
had at that session, after hearing abundant testimony, 
prepared a tariff bill which was now introduced into the 
House and passed on March 31. The Senate offered 
many amendments and did not pass their bill until July 
7, when it went to a Committee of conference whose re- 
port was adopted by the House on July 19 by yeas 187, 
nays 1 16, and by the Senate on July 24 by yeas 40, nays 30 ; 
on this day the President signed it and it became a law. 

"We expect," Dingley had written in a private letter, 
"to cut nearly all our duties considerably below those of 



1 Life of McKinley, Olcott, i. 358. It was a concurrent resolution. 
It passed the Senate by a vote of 47 : 32 on Jan. 28, 1898, and was rejected 
by the House on Jan. 31, the vote standing 133 : 181. * Ibid., 355. 



38 McKINLEY'9 ADMINISTRATION [1897 

the Act of 1890." J To no better man could the tariff 
bill have been confided. No one in public life, except 
McKinley and Senator Aldrich, understood the subject 
better. For Dingley, it was a labor of love, and with the 
assistance especially of Sereno E. Payne of New York and 
John Dalzell of Pennsylvania, fellow members of the Com- 
mittee, he presented to the House "a fairly good pro- 
tectionist measure." 2 As showing the confidence felt in 
him by the President, he had been offered the Treasury 
Department which, on account of a question of health, he 
had declined, but saying at the same time that he could 
do more for the success of the administration as chair- 
man of the Committee on Ways and Means than he could 
in the Treasury. 3 The measure is quite properly called 
the Dingley Act and is so known in history. 

When Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island reported the 
bill from the Senate Committee on Finance, he said that 
it was "thoroughly understood throughout the country 
in the last political campaign, that if the Republican party 
should be again entrusted with power, no extreme tariff 
legislation would follow." 4 Dingley and Aldrich ex- 
pressed the idea of the Republican leaders and, while the 
House was readily controlled by the power of the Speaker 
Thomas B. Reed, it was quite different when the tariff 
question was opened up in the Senate. Tt was as John 
Sherman had previously said, "When Republicans and 
Democrats together arc f ruining a tariff, each Member or 
Senator consults the interest of his 'district' or State." 6 



'Turbdl, Tariff in Our Time, 343. 'Ibid, 243. 

3 Ufa and Times of Nelson Dingley, 413. 

* Stan wood, American Tariff Controversies, ii. 3S4. 

1 Recollections, ii. llbo. 




I irlncu- 



^%£^^_ ZJ^ 




Ch. II.] THE DINGLEY TARIFF 39 

A feature of the case in hand is told by Edward Stanwood, 
"The plans of the Republican leaders were overturned 
... by senators who were more in favor of silver than of 
a protective tariff." l The Dingley Act, when it became a 
law, had rates of duty higher than they had been under 
any preceding tariff. 2 The McKinley Act was a 49^ per 
cent tariff, the Wilson, 40 to 41 f, while the percentage of 
the Dingley Act ran from 49| to 52. 3 

McKinley enjoyed the first few months of his presi- 
dential life more than the later ones. As he did the hon- 
ors of the White House, he appeared to have lived there 
always, so well did he fit into the place. He had a gen- 
uine liking for his predecessor. "Fine old fellow, wasn't 
he?" was a not uncommon remark to his Secretary. 
Alive to the power and influence of the presidential office, 
he said to Cleveland as they drove together to the Capi- 
tol on Inauguration Day, " What an impressive thing it is 
to assume tremendous responsibilities!" 4 And Cleve- 

1 Stanwood, ii. 386. 2 Ibid., 391. 

1 Noyes, Amer. Finance, 269. 

The Dingley Act reimposed the duties on wool ; brought about a duty 
on hides that had been on the free list since 1872 ; imposed lower duties 
on cotton goods than those of 1890 but higher on silks and linens; re- 
stored the rates on chinaware of 1890. Iron ore was dutiable at 40£, pig 
iron at $4, steel rails $7.84 per ton, the same as in 1894. Tin plate under 
the Act of 1890 paid 2£$i, in 1894, 1U, and in 1897, IU per pound. On 
sugar the differential was the same as under the act of 1894. "But the 
moral effect was very different. The House in 1897 had adopted the plan 
of leaving things as they were and had successfully resisted the effort of 
the refining monopoly to secure more." — Taussig. Tariff History, 
5th ed., 328, 332, 335, 336, 342, 347, 352. See also correspondence in 
Life and Times of Dingley, 424 et seq. 

" The Dingley Act restored the duty on works of art, free under the Tariff 
of 1894." — Tarbell, 243. " European travellers could bring in free only one 
hundred dollars worth of goods bought abroad." — Dingley, 443. "The 
tariff of 1897 like that of 1890 was the outcome of an aggressive spirit of 
protection." — Taussig, 358. 

* Olcott, ii. 367. 



40 McKINLEYS ADMINISTRATION [1897 

land returned the liking and respect. "McKinley was dis- 
tinguished, great and useful," he declared in his Memorial 
address at Princeton, "patriotic and faithful as a soldier, 
honest and upright as a citizen, tender and devoted as a 
husband and truthful, generous, unselfish, moral and 
clean in every relation of life." 1 

Cleveland and Olney had negotiated "a treaty for the 
arbitration of all matters in difference between the United 
States and Great Britain" which Cleveland had trans- 
mitted to the Senate during January, 1897, where it was 
pending when McKinley took the oath of office. Believing 
that politics should cease at the water's edge, he took the 
rather unusual course of approving emphatically a treaty 
negotiated by a preceding administration, which was that 
of a partisan opponent. "We want no wars of conquest," 
McKinley said in his inaugural address; "we must avoid 
the temptation of territorial aggression. War should 
never be entered upon until every agency of peace has 
failed ; peace is preferable to war in almost every contin- 
gency. Arbitration is the true method of settlement of 
international as well as local or individual differences. . . . 
Since this treaty [the Olney-Pauncefote treaty of Jan. 11, 
1897] is clearly the result of our own initiative, since it 
has been recognized as the leading feature of our foreign 
policy throughout our entire national history — the adjust- 
ment of difficulties by judicial methods rather than by 
force of arms — and since it presents to the world the 
glorious example of reason and peace, not passion and 
war, controlling the relations between two of the greatest 
nations of the world, an example certainly to be followed 



1 This address W9M delivered on Sept. 19, 1901, Andrew F. We*t, Cen- 
tury Magazine, Jan., 1909. 



Ch. II.] THE CUBAN QUESTION 41 

by others, I respectfully urge the early action of the Sen- 
ate thereon, not merely as a matter of policy but as a 
duty to mankind. The importance and moral influence 
of the ratification of such a treaty can hardly be over- 
estimated in the cause of advancing civilization." l The 
Senate acted on the treaty but failed to ratify it, the vote 
on May 5, 1897, standing 43, to 26, less than the necessary 
two thirds. The result was a disappointment to the 
President and his intimate friends. 

McKinley felt fully competent to deal with the tariff, 
which was one of the absorbing questions during his first 
months in the White House, and he gave efficient aid to 
the supporters of the Dingley Act. The Cuban ques- 
tion troubled him from the first. With Cleveland at the 
White House on the evening before' his inauguration, he 
manifested the subject uppermost in his mind — the 
threatened conflict with Spain and the horrors of war. 
"Mr. President," he said, "if I can only go out of office 
at the end of my term, with the knowledge that I have 
done what lay in my power to avert this terrible calamity, 
with the success that has crowned your patience and per- 
sistence, I shall be the happiest man in the world." 2 
Sherman's failure disturbed him, but during April 3 he 
called to his aid William R. Day as Assistant Secretary of 
State. Day had inherited his essential qualities from his 
father who was of fine subtle fibre all through and a re- 
tiring nature. 4 William R. Day was a fellow practitioner 



1 Moore, International Law Digest, vii. 75 et seq. 
1 Parker's Rec, 249. 

3 1897. Day was nominated April 24. The nomination was not re- 
ceived in the Senate until May 3. He was confirmed on the same day. 
* Riddle, Rec, 234. 



42 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 

of McKinley at the Canton, Ohio, bar, and was known by 
the President as one comes to know one's daily associates 
and competitors. The two now wrought together in en- 
tire harmony and, so far as one may judge by the diplo- 
matic correspondence, foreign relations did not suffer 
from the defection of Sherman. Sherman, however, could 
not brook his relegation to an inferior place and he there- 
fore resigned on April 25, 1898, leaving Day the nominal 
as well as the real Secretary of State. 1 For a long while 
McKinley thought that he could settle the Cuban ques- 
tion without war and that he would have the country at 
his back, but he was hampered in the choice of a minister 
to Spain. He wanted Seth Low, and he thought that he 
might have persuaded him to undertake the difficult job 
could he have induced him to visit Washington. His 
next choice fell upon General J. D. Cox, an admirable 
appointment, who for personal reasons was obliged to de- 
cline it. McKinley would have liked John W. Foster, but 
finally he named Stewart L. Woodford 2 whose work 
turned out much better than might have been expected. 
From his inauguration to the assembling of Congress 
at its regular session in December, 1S97, McKinley tasted 
the sweets of office. After the adjournment of Congress 
on July 24, he took a trip East, stopping at a hotel on the 
New York side of Lake Champlain. One day he crossed 
over into Vermont and was struck with the sturdy patriot- 
ism of the men of the Green Mountain State and their 
devotion to Republican party ideals. Returning to his 
own State, he paid a memorable visit to Mark Hanna, 



1 Day was nominated aa Secretary' of State and confirmed on April 
* Woodford WEI Dominated on June 16, 1897. 



ch. ii.] Mckinley 43 

whose hospitality he enjoyed for a number of days, meet- 
ing men connected with his administration and Republi- 
cans whom he looked to for countenance and support. 
Of a genial nature and possessing attractive manners, he 
commended himself to all sorts and conditions of men and, 
at this time, might sincerely have felt that his influence 
was second to that of no other man in the country. 



CHAPTER III 

McKinley's opinion expressed to Cleveland regarding 
his treatment of Cuban affairs was thoroughly sincere, 
and at this distance may be justified. "Patience and 
persistence" were well applied to Cleveland's and Olney's 
management. The Cuban insurrection began in Febru- 
ary, 1895, and failed to be suppressed by a humane 
governor-general who conducted the war in accordance 
with civilized usage. He was succeeded less than a year 
later by Weyler, who adopted at once drastic methods, 
the most important of which was his proclamation re- 
quiring a concentration of inhabitants at military head- 
quarters in the provinces still under his control. To re- 
quire people to quit their plantations and villages where 
they might secure a living and herd together in towns 
subject to starvation and disease was extreme cruelty and 
deserved McKinley's statement that "it was not civil- 
ized warfare" but "extermination." ' v 

During the spring of 1896, both Houses of Congress 
adopted a concurrent resolution declaring thai in their 
opinion the United States should accord to the insur- 
gents belligerent rights 2 but Cleveland and his Secretary 

•Annual Message, Dee. •>. IS97. "The cruel policy of concentration 

WBS initiated February 1»>. IS'.tti' ibid. Sec The Relations of the I'nited 
States and Spain, Diplomacy, Chadwiok, 181. This valuable hook will 
be referred to afl Chadwiok. 

'The Resolution as finally passed, April 6, 1896, declared that the 

United Btatet Should be Strictly neutral granting belligerent rights to 
both parties ami lhat the president hoiiM offer the friendly offioefl of the 

United States to Spain for the recognition of the independence of Cuba. 
Tde resolution ai passed was the Senate one. The milder one of the 

House was rejected by the Senate and the BOUM reeedod. 

44 



Ch. III.] CLEVELAND'S CUBAN POLICY 45 

of State Olney declined to act in accordance with this ad- 
vice, not deeming that the insurgents had acquired a 
condition of proper belligerency. In his last Message to 
Congress, Cleveland told clearly the actual state of af- 
fairs. While Spain held " Havana and the seaports and 
all the considerable towns, the insurgents still roam at 
will over at least two thirds of the inland country. . . . 
If Spain has not yet reestablished her authority, neither 
have the insurgents yet made good their title to be re- 
garded as an independent state. . . . The excesses on 
both sides have become more frequent and more deplor- 
able. . . . The rural population is required to concen- 
trate itself in the towns." The industrial value of the 
island, consisting very largely in its capacity to produce 
sugar, was fast diminishing. In most of Cuba a state of 
anarchy existed, where property was no longer protected 
and life was unsafe. Despite the avowed sympathy of 
the inhabitants of the United States, the number of resi- 
dent Cubans ready to help their brother insurgents, and 
the utter ruin threatening a neighboring and fertile coun- 
try, our obligations to Spain, so Cleveland asserted, had 
been duly observed. But he uttered a note of warning 
when he said that a situation may be presented "in which 
our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be su- 
perseded by higher obligations." i 

Reviewing carefully the last two years of Cleveland's 
administration, his conduct and that of his Secretary of 
State Olney in regard to Cuba merit commendation ; 
they might easily have brought on a war with Spain. 

The Cuban question was inherited by McKinley. The 



1 Message of Dec. 7, 1S96. 



46 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1897 

Senate at the special session called in March, 1897, passed 
a resolution in favor of recognizing the belligerency of the 
Cuban insurgents, but it was never acted upon by the 
House, as Speaker Reed had not appointed a Committee 
on Foreign Affairs to which it should properly be referred. 
Anarchy in Cuba continued. In the destruction of prop- 
erty and disregard of life, the insurgents were equally to 
blame with the Spaniards. "The deliberate destruction 
of the support of a people," wrote Chadwick, "shown in 
the orders of Gomez [the insurgent leader] are deep stains 
upon the conduct of the Cuban cause." A large number 
of sugar mills were wrecked and this wreckage involved 
deprivation of work, and consequent suffering and death 
to vast numbers of working people. "Historic truth," 
Chadwick added, "demands the setting forth of the fact 
that Cuban and Spaniard were alike regardless of the mis- 
ery caused by their methods and of its extent." ' 

During the summer and autumn of 1897, McKinley 
gave the subject much anxious thought which was ap- 
parent in his first annual Message to Congress. He re- 
ferred with elation to the performance of its full duty ac- 
cording to the law of nations by the United States. The 
Government had "successfully prevented the departure of 
a single military expedition or armed vessel from our 
shores in violation of our laws." He argued against the 
recognition of the belligerency or the independence of 
Cuba and did not deem it wise to intervene for the pres- 
ent in the contest. Rather should we await the result of 
the entire change of policy promised by the new ministry 
in Spain. 2 The reactionary premier had been assassi- 



1 P « Message of Doc. 6, 1897. 



Ch. III.] CUBA AND SPAIN 47 

nated and Sagasta, a Liberal, had succeeded to the head of 
the new ministry which was in sympathy with his aims. 
When John Hay was first Secretary of Legation to Spain, 
he wrote in his Diary during 1869 : "Sagasta is the hardest 
hitter in the Cortes. Everybody calls him a scamp and 
everybody seems to admire him nevertheless. He is a 
sort of Disraeli — lithe, active, full of energy and hate." * 
A writer in the Encyclopaedia Britannica said that Sa- 
gasta was a " leader, skilful in debate, a trimmer par ex- 
cellence." He now appreciated in some degree, if not fully, 
the pressure from the United States. His ministry "re- 
called the commander whose brutal orders inflamed the 
American mind and shocked the civilized world ; it modi- 
fied the horrible order of concentration and has under- 
taken to care for the helpless and permit those who de- 
sire to resume the cultivation of their fields to do so." 
It also proclaimed by decree a scheme of autonomy to be- 
come effective upon ratification by the Cortes. 2 It was 
extremely doubtful whether the Spanish mind under- 
stood autonomy as did the British and American, and a 
self-governing colony as was Canada could hardly be ex- 
pected, but Sagasta was sincere in offering autonomy as he 
understood it. 

It is easy to see that the President hoped for a peace- 
ful solution despite the fact that the Sagasta scheme was 
not satisfactory to the extremists on either side. Riots oc- 
curred in Havana, which was loyal to Spanish interest, 
directed against the governor-general and autonomy; 
owing to the prevailing excitement the United States 
Consul-General in Havana thought that it might be neces- 

1 Life of Hay, W. R. Thayer, i, 321. 
* McKinley Message, Dec. 6, 1897. 



48 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

sary to send a war-ship thither for the protection of the 
American residents. The President considered the mat- 
ter and determined to send the battleship Maine to Ha- 
vana, but the statement was made to the Spanish minis- 
ter that it was "an act of friendly courtesy" and it was 
so given out to the press. Spain looked upon "the pro- 
posed visit of the Maine" as a proof of "cordial friend- 
ship," and replied that "wishing to reciprocate such 
friendly and courteous demonstrations we shall arrange, 
also, that vessels of our squadron may visit the ports of 
the United States in passing to and from the island of 
Cuba." x While the President feared that the scheme of 
autonomy had come to nothing, he nevertheless exhibited 
his continued friendship to Spain. At the diplomatic 
dinner of January 27, 1898, he showed marked attention 
to the Spanish minister and congratulated him on the 
fact that "we have only good news." 2 

These friendly relations were interrupted by an indis- 
cretion on the part of the Spanish minister in Washington, 
de L&me. A confidential letter written by him during the 
previous December to a friend sojourning in Cuba was 
"surreptitiously, if not criminally obtained" 3 and, on 
February 9, published by a New York newspaper. De 
Lome said : "The message [the President's of December 
6, 1897] has been a disillusionment to the insurgents 
who expected something different ; but I regard it as 
bad [for us]. Besides the ingrained and inevitable ill- 
breeding with which is repeated all that the press and 
public opinion in Spain have said about Weyler, it once 
more shows what McKinlcy is, weak and a bidder for the 

1 Npaniuli Chit mm. I I Mrs, 68, 60 ' Ibid., 71. 

• Day, Kon.'npi Relations, 680. 



Gh. III.] THE MAINE 49 

admiration of the crowd, besides being a would-be poli- 
tician who tries to leave a door open behind himself while 
keeping on good terms with the jingoes of his party." l 
De Lome's folly was astounding. It was well known in 
Spain that while Congress was for war, the President was 
earnest for peace and no one could be in daily relations 
with him without feeling the sincerity of his purpose. 
The aim, therefore, of a Spanish diplomatist should have 
been to humor the President, not to impugn his motives. 
So far, however, as McKinley was concerned, he found most 
objectionable the intimation further on in the letter that 
the negotiations for commercial reciprocity with the au- 
tonomous government of Cuba might be "for effect" 
only. But as Assistant-Secretary of State Day wrote, 
"The publication of the letter created a good deal of feel- 
ing among Americans." 2 De L6me at once cabled to 
Madrid his resignation which was promptly accepted. 
Day conducted the affair with discretion and on March 
3 was glad to tell Stewart L. Woodford, our minister to 
Spain that the de Lome incident was "fortunately 
closed." 3 

Meanwhile an occurrence took place in Havana which 
prevented the peaceful solution that the President sought. 
At forty minutes past nine on the evening of February 
15, the Maine, lying peacefully at anchor in the harbor, 
was destroyed by an explosion with a loss of two officers 
and 258 men. The Spanish Government and the Cuban 
authorities expressed at once their sympathy with the 
United States on account of this dreadful occurrence, and 
their immediate action was all that could be desired. 



1 Foreign Relations, 1007. 

* March 3. Foreign Relations, 680. 8 Ibid. 



50 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

The Court of Inquiry into the disaster was composed of 
three members and a judge advocate of the American 
Navy. Captain William E. Sampson was at its head 
and another member was Captain French E. Chadwick, 
whose excellent book on "The Relations of the United 
States and Spain, Diplomacy," gives an account of the 
transaction. "The situation," wrote Chadwick, "pre- 
cluded any haste, and the inquiry was carried on deliber- 
ately, carefully, and searchingly for twenty-three days and 
with every effort to reach a fair and just finding." 1 The 
question in the official and public mind was, did the de- 
struction take place from an external or an internal explo- 
sion ? Chadwick was one of the two members of the Court 
who had thought the explosion was internal, and he and 
his colleague were convinced against their prepossessions. 2 

On March 28, 1898, Congress and the public were in- 
formed of the finding of the Court by a special message of 
the President to Congress. The Court determined that 
the disaster was not in any respect due to the fault or 
negligence of officers or crew. "In the opinion of the 
Court the Maine was destroyed by the explosion of a 
submarine mine which caused the partial explosion of two 
or more of the forward magazines. The Court has been 
unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the 
destruction of the Maine upon any person or persons." a 

John D. Long, who at this time was Secretary of the 
Navy, in his book published in 1903, wrote : "The mystery 
of the loss of the Maine remains yet to be solved." 4 
Chadwick, however, had keener insight, writing in his 



i P. 543. •Chadwiok, 563 n. 

'Senate Doc Destruction of Battleship Maine. 
* The New American Navy, i. 144. 



Ch. III.] THE MAINE 51 

book published in 1909 that he "would welcome an exam- 
ination of the wreck by a complete exposure of it as it 
lies. It could only result in substantiating the description 
of the injuries by the Court whose examination was too 
complete to leave chance of serious error." ! Chad- 
wick's expressed wish was gratified. In 1911, by a fine 
piece of engineering, the wreck was exposed and a board of 
one army and four navy officers made an examination of 
it, reporting on December 1, 1911, that the destruction 
was due to "the explosion of a charge of a low form of 
explosive exterior to the ship. . . . This resulted in ig- 
niting and exploding the contents of the 6-inch reserve 
magazine, said contents including a large quantity of 
black powder. The more or less complete explosion of 
the contents of the remaining forward magazines followed. 
The magazine explosions resulted in the destruction of the 
vessel." 2 

Contemporaneous material and many later books at- 
tribute much influence to Senator Redfield Proctor's 
speech in the Senate on March 17, which, owing to the 
confidence reposed in him by the country, held their at- 
tention. "My trip," he said, "was entirely unofficial 
and of my own motion." Of the six provinces in Cuba, 
"my observations were confined to the four western prov- 
inces which constitute about one half of the island. The 
two eastern ones are practically in the hands of the in- 
surgents, except the few fortified towns. ... All the 
country people in the four western provinces, about 
400,000 in number, remaining outside the fortified towns 



1 Chadwick, 5G3 n. 

* House Docs. 62d Cong. 2d Sess. No. 310. 



52 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

when Weyler's order was made, were driven into these 
towns, and these are the reconcentrados. They were the 
peasantry, many of them farmers, some landowners, 
others renting lands and owning more or less stock, others 
working on estates and cultivating small patches; and 
even a small patch in that fruitful clime will support a 
family. . . . General Blanco's [the governor-general 
succeeding Weyler] order of November 13 last somewhat 
modifies the Weyler order but is of little or no practical 
benefit. ... In fact though the order was issued four 
months ago I saw no beneficent results from it worth 
mentioning." "I am not in favor of annexation," he 
declared; and while Senator Proctor suggested no plan 
it is easy to see that intervention would have from him 
powerful support. "To me," he said, "the strongest ap- 
peal is not the barbarity practised by Weyler, nor the loss 
of the Maine . . . terrible as are both these incidents, 
but the spectacle of a million and a half of people, the en- 
tire native population of Cuba, struggling for freedom and 
deliverance from the worst misgovernment of which I 
ever had knowledge." ! 

The Spanish minister 2 in Washington was much im- 
pressed, telegraphing to the home government that Sen- 
ator Proctor's speech had "produced great effect because 
of his temperate stand. He set forth In black colors the 
situation of the reconcentrados, declared that the country 
was opposed to autonomy and favorable to independence. 
. . . Before making the speech he had seen the President 

•Cong. Record, 2916 rt Mg. Senator Proctor gave alio the eetimated 

population of Cuba with its racial divi.--ii.iis. II,- also discussed the mili- 
tary and political situations, i'roctor had been Si-, retury of War under 
Harrison. 

' Polo, who succeeded de Lome. 



Ch. III.] THE MAINE 53 

and Day, for which reason more importance is attached 
to his words. My impression is that the President will 
try to withstand the powerful public sentiment in favor 
of the insurrection." l 

As early as March 20 the President learned confiden- 
tially that the naval board would make a "unanimous re- 
port that the Maine was blown up by a submarine 
mine." 2 This knowledge and Proctor's account dictated 
Day's midnight telegram of March 25 to Woodford at 
Madrid: "The concentration of men, women and chil- 
dren in the fortified towns and permitting them to starve 
is unbearable to a Christian nation geographically so 
close as ours to Cuba. ... It was represented to the 
President in November that the Blanco government would 
at once relieve the suffering and so modify the Weyler 
order as to permit those who were able to return to their 
homes and till the fields from which they had been driven. 
. . . The reconcentration order has not been practi- 
cally superseded. There is no hope of peace through 
Spanish arms. . . . The Spanish government seems un- 
able to conquer the insurgents. ... We do not want 
the island. . . . Peace is the desired end." 3 Be it re- 
membered that Congress, the country and Spain had the 
report of the Naval Board concerning the destruction of 
the Maine on Monday, March 28. Next day was sub- 
mitted to the Spanish ministry what turned out to be the 
President's ultimatum. Premising that "the President 
instructs me to say that we do not want Cuba," Wood- 
ford said in conversation with Sagasta, with the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and the Minister for the Colonies, who, 

1 Spanish Corr. and Docs., 95. 

2 Foreign Relations, 692. s Ibid., 704, 712. 



54 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

being well acquainted with English, acted as interpreter, 
"we do wish immediate peace in Cuba." The President 
"suggests an immediate armistice lasting until October 1, 
negotiations in the meantime being had looking to peace 
between Spain and the insurgents through the friendly 
offices of the President of the United States. He wishes 
the immediate revocation of the reconcentration order." 

With effect, does Chadwick, in recounting the history 
of the diplomacy of these days, speak of Spain's "fatal 
habit of procrastination." 1 On March 31, two days after 
Woodford's conversation, she showed this in her answer 
to the President's reasonable request. Far from accept- 
ance of the suggestion relating to the Armistice and con- 
sequent negotiations, it laid down propositions utterly in- 
admissible. Well did Woodford write to McKinley on 
April 1, "Yesterday's conference was a sorrow to me, for 
I have worked hard for peace." 2 

On March 30, the day between the President's request 
and Spain's answer, Day apprised Woodford of the state 
of affairs in Washington. "You should know and fully 
appreciate," he telegraphed, "that there is profound feel- 
ing in Congress and the greatesl apprehension on the part 
of most conservative members that a resolution for inter- 
vention may pas^ both branches in spite of any effort 
which can be made. Only assurance from the President 
that, if he fails in peaceful negotiations ho will submit all 
the facts to Congress at a very early day, will prevent im- 
mediate action on the part of Congress." s 

It was evident thai BubmissioD of the question to Con- 
gress meant a declarati >n of war against Spain. Public 



* P. 654. » Foreign Relations, 7J7 ■ Ibid., 721. 



Ch. III.] SPAIN AND CUBA 55 

sentiment had been worked up by the sensational press, 
frequently called the "yellow press"; it had manipu- 
lated the real news, spread unfounded reports, putting all 
before their readers with scare headlines. Newspaper 
editors and their assistants differed from those between 
1850 and 1860, who made their appeals to the electorate 
by cogent editorials directed against the slave power. 
Now recourse was had to the news columns in which 
Spain was painted as perfidious and untrustworthy. Af- 
ter the Naval Board had made its report in regard to the 
Maine, it was impossible to convince the multitude that 
Spain had not, in some way or other, touched off the sub- 
marine mine which caused the explosion. " Remember 
the Maine" became the watchword. Appeal was made 
to what England would have done under like circum- 
stances, whose "commonest phrase" was, "I wish you 
would take Cuba at once. We wouldn't have stood it 
this long." J Public sentiment acted effectually upon 
Congress, a dominant majority of which wanted war with 
Spain. "Every Congressman," said Boutelle of Maine, 
"had two or three newspapers in his district — most of 
them printed in red ink . . . and shouting for blood." 2 
It may be affirmed that if a referendum had been taken 
on April 1, 1898, a majority would have voted for war 
with Spain in order to expel her from Cuba. But the 
financial and business interests of the country were op- 
posed to the war, as they deemed it needless and they 
shrunk from its horrors and expense. The Jingoes taunted 
men who held this view with being influenced by Wall 
Street, and it proved an effective taunt, but really Wall 



1 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 166. 

1 Oct. 22, 1898. Boston Herald, Oct. 23. 



56 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

Street was only one part of this sentiment which was 
shared by business men throughout the country whose 
fit representative was Mark Hanna. "I am not," he 
declared, "in favor of heedlessly precipitating the coun- 
try into the horrors of war" on account of the Maine in- 
cident or Spain's attitude to Cuba. 1 As late as April 5, 
he wrote in a private letter that in his opinion the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations ought to pass a resolu- 
tion giving the President some discretion ; otherwise, he 
added, "War cannot be avoided, and even under the most 
favorable circumstances it must come unless Spain backs 
down, which I believe she will do." 

A phase of the reflecting and intelligent part of the com- 
munity was well represented in the private letters of Gen- 
eral J. D. Cox. "The dreadful accident to the Maine," 
he wrote, "ought to make everybody sober and reasonable 
in thinking of foreign affairs. It ought to be a very good 
cause that would justify a war in which such things might 
be happening any day. 1 don't envy the public man who 
should have to look back on an unnecessar3 T war as in 
any part the work of his hands ; and to rush into it for 
mere wantonness, as many seem inclined to, is such un- 
speakable folly as to make one wonder that it is possible 
in an enlightened age." Again, od March 2, "It is en- 
tirely incredible that a civilized government should have 
ordered or approved the destruction of a ship in her 
port in time of peace." And on March 29, "as to inter- 
vention, the whole island and everybody on it are not 
worth the American volunteers who would inevitably 

die of yellow fever if we sent an army there." 

The officers and men who went forth to fight Spain, 

1 Interviews, N. Y. Tribune, Feb. 24, 27. 



Ch. III.] ROOSEVELT 57 

obedient to a dominant public sentiment and the fiat of 
Congress, might have used the words with a variation 
suitable to the time and country, which Philip Gibbs put 
into the mouth of British soldiers who suffered and fought 
in the trenches during the great World War: "I don't 
want to die — I want to live. Why should I be sacri- 
ficed to please the politicians of the world — those fools 
who are the cause of all this? People at home don't 
understand what we have to suffer. They don't care. 
Those infuriated old females in England, those compla- 
cent old bald-heads in St. James Street Clubs would see 
us all smashed to pulp, and die to the last man, without a 
question. They think it natural and nice, 'Dulce et de- 
corum est,' etc." 1 

A phase of the sentiment of "literary fellows" was re- 
flected by Theodore Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and 
John Hay. "When the Maine was blown up in Havana 
harbor," wrote Roosevelt in 1913, "war became inevita- 
ble." 2 He, in 1898, was impatient that the President did 
not act more promptly and wrote in a private letter,' 
"The blood of women and children, who have perished 
by the hundred thousand in hideous misery, lies at our 
door ; and the blood of the murdered men of the Maine 
calls not for indemnity but for the full measure of atone- 
ment which can only come by driving the Spaniard from 
the New World. I have said this to the President before 
his Cabinet ; I have said it to Judge'Day . . . ; and to 
my own chief;" 3 and again, "McKinley has no more 
backbone than a chocolate eclair!" 4 



1 Boston Herald, May 4, 1919. 2 Autobiography, 232. 
3 Letter of March 21 to Brooks Adams, J. B. Bishop. Scribner's Mag- 
azine, November 1919, 524. * Peck, 642. 



58 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

Henry Cabot Lodge wrote in 1S99: "The outside en- 
gine of destruction [of the Maine) was a government sub- 
marine mine and had been exploded without the author- 
ity or knowledge of the Spanish government by men who 
wore the uniform of Spain. ... The result had been 
inevitable since the fatal 15th of February, although men 
did not understand it at the moment and still thought 
they could stay the current of events which had been 
gathering strength for seventy years and broken loose at 
last." ' 

On May 8, 1898, John Hay, now our Ambassador to 
England, wrote in a private letter : "I detest war and had 
hoped I might never see another, but this was as neces- 
sary as it was righteous. I have not for two years seen 
any other issue." 2 

One may wonder if Roosevelt, Lodge and Hay took 
fully into account the Spanish habit of procrastination. 
Did Roosevelt with his habit of omnivorous reading come 
across the reported remark of Lord Clarendon: "Span- 
ish dynasties go and come ; Spanish queens go and come, 
and Spanish ministries go and come; but there is one 
thing in Spain that is always the same — they never an- 
swer letters" ? 3 

Senator Lodge of course knew all about Lowell's mis- 
sion to Spain, and he mighl have read before the Spanish 
War his impressions of the people to whom he was ac- 
credited. "I [ike the Spaniards very well so far as I 
know them," Lowell wrote, "and have an instinctive 
sympathy with their wanl of aptitude for business." 



1 The War with Spain, SI >: scq. 
'Life of Bay, Thayer, ii. 167. 

* Life of Lord Granville, Fitztnaurke, 1905, ii. 31. 



Ch. III.] THE SPANIARDS 69 

"They are unenterprising and unchangeable." "Spain 
is as primitive in some ways as the books of Moses, and 
as Oriental." "They fancy themselves always in the age 
of Charles V, and the perfect gravity with which they al- 
ways assume the airs of a Great Power is not without a 
kind of pathetic dignity. We all wink at the little shifts 
of a decayed gentleman, especially when he is Don Quix- 
ote, as this one certainly is." l 

John Hay in Spain, as first Secretary of Legation in 
1869-1870, during the earlier insurrection, was impressed 
with her procrastination. Sagasta was one of the minis- 
try and defended the government "with wonderful vigor 
and malice." "This government," wrote Hay in 1870, 
"wants to sell Cuba but daresjiot, and has no power to 
put a stop to the atrocities on the island. The only thing 
left to our government is to do nothing and keep its mouth 
shut; or interfere to stop the horrors in Cuba on the 
ground of humanity or the damage resulting to Ameri- 
can interests." 2 

The pressure upon the President in 1898 to refer the 
matter to Congress was great. The Secretary of War, 
Russell A. Alger, said to a senator: "I want you to ad- 
vise the President to declare war. He is making a great y 
mistake. He is in danger of ruining himself and the 
Republican party by standing in the way of the people's 
wishes. Congress will declare war in spite of him. He'll 
get run over and the party with him." A bellicose sen- 
ator said to the Assistant Secretary of State : "Day, don't 
your President know where the war-declaring power is 



1 Dec. 23, 1877, Apr. 14, 1878, May 2, 1879, Dec. 30, 1879. Letters 
of James Russell Lowell (1894), ii. 205, 213, 241, 246. 
1 Life of Hay, Thayer, i. 324. 



60 McKINLEVS ADMINISTRATION [1898 

lodged? Tell him that if he doesn't do something, Con- 
gress will exercise the power." l Congressman Boutelle, 
who was opposed to the war, is authority for the state- 
ment that forty or fifty Republican members of Congress 
held a caucus, sent a committee to the President and told 
him that unless he sent an aggressive message to Con- 
gress, they would introduce a resolution for war and vote 
with the Democrats to carry it through. 2 Olcott, the 
biographer of McKinley, is authority for the statement 
that the Vice President and a number of senators who 
were opposed to war polled the Senate in order to see if 
they could sustain a veto should a war resolution be pre- 
maturely passed ; 3 but this must have been only a mo- 
mentary thought, as for the President to veto a declara- 
tion of war by Congress was hardly to be considered. 

McKinley was averse to war. He said to Senator 
Fairbanks: "It isn't the money that will be spent nor 
the property that will be destroyed, if war comes, that 
concerns me ; but the thought of human suffering that 
must come into thousands of homes throughout the country 
is almost overwhelming." 4 But he was much perturbed 
at the idea that his action might break up the Republi- 
can party. He could not sleep without sleeping powders. 
During the week when he sent what turned out to be his 
ultimatum to Spain he was much cast down but, on re- 
ceiving her rejection of his terms, he determined to go 
with the war party and to turn the affair over to Congress. 
"Congress," wrote Senator Lodge, "has no diplomatic 
functions or attributes. Willi a foreign nation it has 



1 Life of McKinley, Olcott, ii. 2& 

•Boston Herald, Oct 28, L898. •Olcott, ii. 28. 

♦Life of McKinley, Oloott, i. 400. 



Ch. III.] McKINLEY 61 

but one weapon — the war power ; and when a President 
calls in Congress in a controversy with another nation, 
his action means that Congress, if it sees fit, must exer- 
cise its single power and declare war." l The President 
had decided to send his message to Congress on Monday, 
April 4 ; he postponed it until the 6th, then until Mon- 
day, April 11th, on account of an urgent request from the 
Consul-General in Havana to delay it in order that he 
might insure the safe departure of Americans from Cuba. 
On that day [April 11th] the message went to Congress: 
this action meant war with Spain. 

No one can go through carefully the diplomatic des- 
patches without thinking that up to March 31 McKinley's 
conduct of the affair had been faultless. The pressure 
exerted upon the Spanish ministry and people was marked 
by courtesy, discretion and thorough knowledge of the 
situation. John D. Long is the excellent authority for 
the consideration which McKinley and his Cabinet showed 
for the susceptibilities of the Spaniards. 2 But just about 
as the President was to succeed completely he abandoned 
his policy and went over to the war party. "To the peo- 
ple we come sooner or later," wrote James Bryce, 3 and 
the ministry of the cabinet government of Spain, though 
eager for peace, could go no further than they could count 
upon the support of public sentiment. On April 3, Wood- 
ford telegraphed to the President: "The Spanish Minis- 
ter for Foreign Affairs assures me that Spain will go as 
far and as fast as she can. ... I know that the Queen 
and her present ministry sincerely desire peace and that 
the Spanish people desire peace, and if you can still give 

1 The War with Spain, 36. 2 American Navy, i. 133. 
8 American Commonwealth, i. 270. 



y/ 



62 McKINLEVS ADMINISTRATION [1898 

me time and reasonable liberty of action ... I am sure 
that before next October I will get peace in Cuba, with 
justice to Cuba and protection to our great American 
interests." l 

For the sake of clearness reference will again be made 
to the President's ultimatum of March 27-29. 2 He de- 
manded the immediate revocation of the reconcentrado 
order and an armistice until October 1. The revocation 
of the reconcentrado order was at once made. And now 
the Pope, assisted by Archbishop Ireland of St. Paul, 
who went to Washington by his order, 3 interfered in the 
interest of peace. His intervention, supported by that 
of "six great European powers," induced the Spanish 
ministry to direct on April 9 the governor-general of 
Cuba to grant immediately an armistice, leaving the 
length of time to himself. Having submitted this action 
to Day, Woodford telegraphed on April 10 to the Presi- 
dent that if he could get full authority from Congress he 
might secure a final settlement "before August 1st on 
one of the following bases : either such autonomy as the 
insurgents may agree to accept, or recognition by Spain of 
the independence of the island, or cession of the island to 
the United States. I hope that nothing will now be done 
to humiliate Spain, as I am satisfied that the present 
government is going, and is loyally ready to go, as fast 
and as far as it can." 4 

The President and his immediate advisers had been 
brought by the logic of events to see that no permanent 



1 Foreign Relations, 732. 

■The di patch of I ).i\- t<> Woodford was Sunday, March 'J7; the sub- 
i of the ultimatum to the Spanish ministry, Tuesday, March 29. 
The report on the ifaint went ti> Congress on Monday, March 2R. 

'Spanish Corr. and DoOB., Ill, 11-'. * Foreign Relations, 746, 747. 



Ch. III.] McKINLEY 63 

peace could be secured unless the Spaniards abandoned 
Cuba ; and in this they agreed with the war party. But 
the Jingoes desired to smash Spain and were " spoiling 
for a fight" ; and the well-informed men of the war party 
did not believe that Spain would give up Cuba without 
war. But they could not see things as we see them now. 
The Spanish ministry feared that a contest with the United 
States would be hopeless. Whatever might happen 
at first they appreciated that America had the " sinews of 
war." The unanimous passage by the House of the bill 
placing fifty millions at the President's disposal did not 
excite the Spaniards but "stunned them." * On March 
31, Woodford telegraphed to the President: "I believe 
the ministry are ready to go as far and as fast as they can 
and still save the dynasty here in Spain. They know 
that Cuba is lost. Public opinion in Spain has moved 
steadily toward peace." 2 " Speak softly and carry a 
big stick," was Theodore Roosevelt's idea of a foreign 
policy. Up to March 31 McKinley had spoken softly, 
but after that he failed to continue the soft speech and 
yet he had strong and what might have been efficient 
support. The Speaker of the House, the Vice President, 
all of his Cabinet but two, nearly all of the leading Re- 
publicans in the Senate were with him. 3 For it seems 
clear that the Spaniards might have been led to grant in- 
dependence to Cuba through negotiation. Jules Cam- 
bon, Ambassador from France, representing on the part 
of his country financial and personal sympathy with 



1 Woodford, March 9. Foreign Relations, 684. * Ibid., 727. 

3 Letters of T. Roosevelt to Captain Cowles, March 29, 30, 1898; to 
Douglas Robinson, March 30 ; to Elihu Root, April 5 ; to Dr. Henry Jack- 
son, April 6 ; J. B. Bishop ; Scribner's Magazine, Nov. 1919, 524. 



64 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

Spain, could see that she ought not to go to war with 
America, and labored to bring about a peaceful result. 
McKinley feared a rupture in his own party, and on ac- 
count of that fear, had not the nerve and power to resist 
the pressure for war. We may rest assured that if Mark 
Hanna had been President there would have been no war 
with Spain. As much of a partisan as McKinley, he 
would have had the self-determination to resist the war 
party and the confident belief that he could secure the 
end desired without war and without the rupture of the 
Republican party ; at all events he would have taken the 
risk. 1 

That the President had cast his lot freely with the war 
party was evident from his reply to the six representatives 
of Great Britain, Germany, France, Austria-Hungary, 
Russia and Italy, who hoped that further negotiations 
would lead to peace. We must end a situation, he said, 
on Wednesday, April 6, "the indefinite prolongation of 
which has become insufferable." 2 



1 John W. Foster said at the Conference of the American Society for 
the Judicial Settlement of International Disputes on Dec. 15, 1910: "It 
is well known tli.it President McKinley was strongly opposed to the war, 
and he was ably supported in striving for peaoe by General Woodford, to 
whom too much praise cannot be given for his conduct of the negotiations. 
It is now apparent that had not the President yielded to the war clamor 
in the country and the demands of Congress, the war might have been 
averted. ... In the light of the Woodford despatches, we must con- 
clude that bad Preaidenl McKinley displayed the same firmness as Grant 
and Cleveland and continued to 'keep hold of the reins of diplomacy' the 

Spanish War with its long 'rain of OOnsequences might never have come 

upon us." Sec the Speeches of General Woodford and Congressman 

Boutelle before the Massachusetts Club, Oct. 22, W |s > ; BofltOO Herald, 

Oct. 23; Chadwiok, 575; Remarks in the Senate by Senators Hah- and 
Depew, May 25, 1008 I bement, Columbus, Ohio, May 25. Boyle 

was priv • ry <>f McKinley when governor of Ohio, and after* 

wards his appointee as consul to Liverpool. B I n Evening Transcript, 
20, 1906; l' ' - . M y 10, 1018; Oot r r cr e ations 

with Mark II anna and Henry s. Pritchett : Foreign Relations, Til 



Ch. III. J McKINLEY 65 

His message to the Congress on Monday, April 11, 
brought on the war. "With this last overture in the di- 
rection of immediate peace" [his ultimatum of March 
27-29], he said, "and its disappointing reception by Spain, 
the Executive is brought to the end of his effort." l The 
disaster to the Maine was put in a subsidiary place in 
his message. 2 The President said toward the end of the 
message: " The issue is now with Congress. . . . I have 
exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition 
of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute 
every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution 
and the law, I await your action." 3 

To the crowning effort of his diplomacy of being able 
to secure peace and in all probability Cuban independ- 
ence, he referred in the last two paragraphs of his mes- 
sage in a perfunctory manner. "Yesterday" (Sunday, 
April 10), he said, "and since the preparation of the fore- 
going message, official information was received by me 
that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain di- 
rects General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate 
peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the dura- 
tion and details of which have not yet been communicated 
to me." 4 

Congress, the country and Spain knew that this message 
meant war. Congress immediately addressed itself to the 
subject and after certain disagreements united in the fol- 



1 Foreign Relations, 755. 

2 " In any event the destruction of the Maine, by whatever exterior 
cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that 
is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish 
government cannot assure safety and security to a vessel of the American 
Navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there." 

8 Foreign Relations, 760. 
4 Foreign Relations, 760. 



66 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

lowing resolutions, which were adopted on April 19, and 
signed by the President on the next day. 1 They said : 
"First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, of 
right ought to be, free and independent. 

"Second. That it is the duty of the United States to 
demand, and the Government of the United States does 
hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once 
relinquish its authority and government in the Island of 
Cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba 
and Cuban waters. 

"Third. That the President of the United States be, 
and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the en- 
tire land and naval forces of the United States and to 
call into the actual service of the United States the mili- 
tia of the several States to such extent as may be neces- 
sary to carry these resolutions into effect. 

"Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any 
disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdic- 
tion or control over said Island except for the pacification 
thereof and asserts its determination, when that is accom- 
plished, to leave the government and control of the Island 
to its people." 2 

President Tail ish War was an al- 

truistic war. 3 The ground OD which such a statement 
may be defended lies in the fourth resolution. It was of- 
fered by Senator Teller of Colorado and agreed to in the 
Senate without a division. Ii le wonderful thai the United 
States, large and powerful, about to make war on 



1 Thi' itafM which led i 'lutions and the disagreement* are 

well told by Hi'nrv Cabot Ix>dKe in the War with Spain, 35 ft stq. ; see 
also Chadwirk. I 

•Fop 'ions, liv. 'John W. Foster, I.e. 



Ch. III.] DECLARATION OF WAR 67 

Spain, weak and decadent, should renounce solemnly 
any desire to get Cuba. The fertile island, the Pearl of 
the Antilles, Cuba, had long been coveted by America, 
and now when the plum was ready to drop into her mouth 
she abjured the wish of conquest. But it seemed impos- 
sible to convince the Spaniards that our aim was not the 
annexation of Cuba. This resolution had the sympa- 
thetic adhesion of the President and many, if not all, of his 
warmest friends. It lightens up the declaration of this 
unnecessary war. 



CHAPTER IV 

Nothing excites a nation so much as going to war. The 
first few days after its declaration, tumult reigns. So 
it came to pass in 1898. The feeling in Congress was 
intense and all the more so because it had been so long 
suppressed, awaiting the President's action. A large 
majority of Congress was in favor of war to expel the 
Spaniards from Cuba, and most of the Democrats, assisted 
by some Republicans, desired, as a stage in the pro- 
ceedings, to recognize the republic of the Cuban insur- 
gents. Two days after the President's Message was sent 
to Congress, the members of the House met in "a state 
of frenzied excitement" with "partisan passion running 
high." During a passionate colloquy, a Republican mem- 
ber said to a Democrat, "You are a liar," when the Demo- 
crat seized a bound copy of the Congressional Record and 
hurled it at his opponent. The missile fell short ; the 
two members rushed for one another, and the House, 
so a reporter wrote, "was in an uproar. Shouts of anger 
and indignation were beard on every hand. Members 
in the crush espoused the cause of the two original com- 
batants, and there were several exciting collisions but no 
blows struck." At last, owing to the work of the Speaker 

and the Scrgeant-at-Anns, the efforts of a dosen muscu- 
lar members and an impassioned appeal by Dingley, the 

us 



Ch. IV.] GEORGE DEWEY 69 

fighters were restrained, the angry members took their 
seats "and a resemblance of order was restored." l 

" Beware of entrance to a quarrel, but being in, 
Bear't that the opposed may beware of thee." 

In such wise did the McKinley administration conduct 
the Spanish War. 

Congress formally declared that war with Spain had 
existed since April 21. Excitement had given way to 
alarm in the public mind lest the Navy might not prove 
equal to the job when the country learned that the first 
successful blow had been struck in the Orient on May 1 
by the Asiatic squadron, under the command of George 
Dewey. 2 

During the autumn of 1897, Dewey thought that we 
were drifting into a war with Spain and, of all things, he 
desired the command of the Asiatic squadron. Theo- 
dore Roosevelt, in his position of Assistant Secretary of 
the Navy, had made up his mind that Dewey was the man 
for the place, but political influence was pushing another 
officer who was his senior. 3 "I want you to go," Roose- 
velt said to him. "You are the man who will be equal 
to the emergency if one arises. Do you know any sen- 
ators?" 

"Senator Proctor," 4 was the reply, "is from my State. 
He is an old friend of the family and my father was of 
service to him when he was a young man." 



1 N. Y. Tribune, Apr. 14; Recollections of Henry S. Pritchett. 

1 "The newspapers of May 2 had a brief announcement of the victory." 
Dewey, Autobiography, 228. These first (May 2) announcements were 
from Spanish sources and gave no adequate idea of the completeness of 
the victory; the reading between the lines made it possible to arrive at 
a conclusion that made the headlines of victory justifiable. 

* Theodore Roosevelt. Autobiography, 231. 

4 Redfield Proctor, "who was very ardent for the war." Ibid. 



70 MoKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1898 

"You could not have a better sponsor," Roosevelt re- 
joined. "Lose no time in having him speak a word for 
you." Dewey at once enlisted the favor of Senator Proc- 
tor, whose influence with the President secured him the 
appointment. 1 

In a Japanese harbor on January 3, 1898, Dewey took 
over the command of the Asiatic squadron and hoisted 
his broad pennant on the Olympia. In his accurate 
and modest account of his work, written soon after 
his return to Washington in 1899, 2 he told of the care- 
ful preparation that he made for an attack on the 
Spanish fleet in the Philippines. Before he heard of 
the disaster to the Maine, the news of which reached 
him on February 17, he had decided to take the 
squadron to Hong Kong. An evidence of the common 
working of two minds bent on war is Roosevelt's despatch 
to Dewey of February 25, 1898. "Order the squadron 
to Hong Kong. Keep full of coal. In the event of dec- 
laration of war Spain, your duty will be to see that the 
Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and 
then offensive operations in Philippine Islands." 3 

In Dewey's account of the interchange of hospitalities 
among the ships assembled at Hong Kong during the 
month of March, he related a conversation that he had 
with Prince Henry of Prussia, brother of the Kaiser, who 
remarked "that he did not believe thai the [lowers would 
ever allow the United Slates to annex Cuba." 

"We do not wish to annex Cuba," Dewey answered, 
"but we cannot Buffer the horrible condition of affairs, 



1 Dewey, Autobiography, 168 

1 Dewey, Autobiognphyi vi. This accouut was not published until 1913. 
1 Dewey, Autobiography, 179. 



Oh. IV.J GEORGE DEWEY 71 

which exists at present in that island at our very doors, to 
continue, and we are bound to put a stop to it." 

"And what are you after? What does your country 
want?" the Prince asked jokingly on another occasion; ! 
and, although a word in jest, it represented the European 
attitude which could see in our action only a desire to 
acquire a rich territory. 

Having served under Farragut, Dewey looked upon him 
as a master. "Valuable as the training of Annapolis 
was," he wrote, "it was poor schooling beside that of 
serving under Farragut in time of war." 2 

On April 25 came this word from Secretary Long : 
"War has commenced between the United States and 
Spain. Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Com- 
mence operations at once, particularly against Spanish 
fleet. You must capture vessels or destroy. Use ut- , 
most endeavors." 3 Two days later Dewey set sail, on 
his 600-mile voyage to Manila Bay. The Hong Kong 
newspapers stated that Manila was impregnable, and in 
the Hong Kong club which was British, whose members 
were in thorough sympathy with the United States, it 
was not thought that Dewey would be successful in his 
attack. Arriving off Manila, he signalled for all the com- 
manding officers to come on board his flag-ship and said 
to them, "We shall enter Manila Bay to-night, and you 
will follow the motions and movements of the flag-ship 
which will lead." 4 

That night (as he told the story) he asked himself, 



1 Dewey, Autobiography, 185. 

3 Dewey, Autobiography, 50. 

8 The New American Navy, Long, i. 182. 

4 Dewey, Autobiography, 206. 



72 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

"What would Farragut do?" and he thought he would 
have done exactly as proposed. 1 On April 30 at 11.30 
p.m., with all lights masked, the gun crews at their guns, 
Dewey entered the South Channel, and with eminent suc- 
cess ran by the batteries. After half of the squadron had 
passed, a battery opened fire but none of the shots took 
effect. 2 Now he was in Manila Bay in which was the 
Spanish fleet that he must "capture or destroy." 

"In action," Dewey wrote, "we had six ships to the 
Spaniards' seven, but we were superior in class of vessel 
and in armaments." 3 Proceeding across the bay at 
slow speed at 5.15 in the morning of May 1, his squadron 
was fired upon by three batteries at Manila, two at Ca- 
vity 4 and by the anchored Spanish fleet. Still Dewey 
went forward to the attack, leading the column with his 
flag-ship Olympia; the rest of his command followed with 
a distance of 400 yards between ships. Two submarine 
mines exploded, but they were two miles ahead, "too far 
to be effective." 5 At 5.40 a.m., when two and one half 
miles away from their objective, the Spanish fleet, Dewey 
said to his captain, "You may fire when you are ready, 
Gridley." 6 At once the squadron opened lire. Firing 
without cessation as they moved, three inns were made 
from the eastward ami two from the westward ; the length 
of each run was aboul two miles. Approaching on the 
fifth run, when Dearest, within 'JDiiO yards, this rapid 



1 Autobiography, 60. 

7 Dew rt, M;iv t Appendix to the report of tin- Chief of the 

Bureau of Navigation, 70. Thia « ill I" n f erred to m ( Srowninahield. 

' Autobiography, 203; see also 212, '-'i I 

> Cavite* WSJ tan miles from Manila, bad 5000 people, a navy yard, 
arsenal and fortifications Lodge, Hie War with Spain, 53. 

Saportj I Srowninahialdi 70. 

• Autobiography, 214. 



Ch. IV.] BATTLE OF MANILA 73 

and concentrated fire — "smothering," he called it — 
demolished the Spanish fleet. At 7.35 a.m., an erroneous 
report was made to the Commodore that his ship was 
short of ammunition ; this caused him to withdraw the 
squadron from action, and gave his men time for break- 
fast, as they had made the fight on coffee served in the 
early morning. All but one of the Spanish fleet, however, 
had been destroyed, and as Dewey naively remarked, " Vic- 
tory was already ours, though we did not know it." 1 At 
11.16 a.m., he returned with the squadron to the attack. 
"By this time," he said in his report, "the flag-ship and 
almost the entire Spanish fleet were in flames, and at 12.30 
p.m. the squadron ceased firing, the batteries being 
silenced and the ships sunk, burnt, and deserted." 2 The 
Spaniards lost at least thirteen vessels : three were sunk, 
eight burned [only seven of these were in line of battle] ; 
two tugs and a number of small launches were captured. 
Their casualties were 381 men. 3 In Dewey's squadron 
none was killed and only seven slightly wounded. "The 
squadron," he reported, "is in as good condition now as 
before the battle." 4 

"The completeness of the result," wrote Senator Lodge, 
"which is the final test, gives Manila a great place in the 
history of naval battles and writes the name of George 
Dewey high up among the greatest of victorious admi- 
rals." 5 The rapid and concentrated fire of the Americans 
destroyed the Spanish fleet. This disconcerted the Span- 
iards whose valor was remarkable but whose fire was 
hasty and inaccurate. Dewey told the secret of his suc- 



1 Autobiography, 218. 2 Crowninshield, 70. 

8 Ibid., 71, 92. 

4 Ibid., 71. B The War with Spain, 67. 



74 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

cess. "It was," he wrote, "the ceaseless routine of hard 
work and preparation in time of peace that won 
Manila." l It looked " 'so easy' after it was all done." 2 
But let one imagine Dewey with his Americans on the 
defence in the position of the Spaniards with their many 
resources and incentive to preparation, and let one con- 
ceive the Spanish admiral and his fleet the attacking party, 
and the result would have been just the contrary. But 
in truth the Spanish admiral would not have attacked, 
nor would any American of "the respectable common- 
place type." 3 To attack a foe seven thousand miles 
from a base was a risk too great to take for any comman- 
der who did not pattern after Nelson and Farragut, as 
defeat or even "failure to gain a decisive victory" would 
have been a disaster. 4 Dewey was long-headed as well 
as daring and took into account all the conditions of the 
game. "In the event of defeat," he wrote, "no ship of 
our Asiatic squadron would have been afloat to tell the 
story." 5 

Honors and congratulations came. The President 
made him a rear-admiral. Congress thanked him, his 
officers and men. In writing to him, his "old friend" 
John Hay spoke of his "mingled wisdom and daring." 
Roosevelt, who appreciated Dewey before and admired 
him greatly after the battle, cabled, "Every American 
is your debtor." 6 

It was the "man behind the gun" that did the business. 
The Spanish Captain-General in his war proclamation 



1 Autobiography, 2 31 ' The War with Spain, 62. 

I iography, 281. 
'Admiral Lure, cited by Dewey, Autobiography, 189 n. 
' Autobiography, 252 

'■ I >> wry, Autobiography, 229. 



Ch. IV.] GEORGE DEWEY 75 

had declared that the North American people "were 
constituted of all the social excrescences ;" their squadron 
was " manned by foreigners possessing neither instruction 
nor discipline." As a matter of fact, the percentage of 
American-born seamen in Dewey's squadron was about 
eighty all told. The Archbishop of Manila who, it was 
said, had written the Captain-General's proclamation, 
visited the Olympia some months afterwards and Dewey 
had the ship's company paraded in his honor. "As he 
saw the fine young fellows march past," wrote the Ad- 
miral, "his surprise at their appearance was manifest." 
"Admiral," he said, "you must be very proud to com- 
mand such a body of men." "Yes, I am," was the reply, 
"and I have just the same kind of men on board all the 
other ships in the harbor." "Admiral," the Archbishop 
rejoined, "I have been here for thirty years. I have seen 
the men-of-war of all the nations but never have I seen 
anything like this," as he pointed to the Olympia' s crew. 

Dewey paid tribute to his officers as well as to his men. 
"I doubt," he said in his report, "if any commander-in- 
chief under similar circumstances, was ever served by 
more loyal, efficient and gallant captains than those of 
the squadron now under my command." J 

The moral effect of Dewey's victory was great. It 
gave the country confidence in her navy. It was gener- 
ally thought that on paper the Spanish Navy was supe- 



1 My authorities for the battle of Manila Bay are Dewey's account 
printed in his Autobiography; reports of Dewey, Gridley, Coghlan, 
Walker, Dyer, Wood, Wildes, Montojo, the Spanish Admiral, printed by 
Crowninshield. I have also used The War with Spain, Lodge ; The New 
American Navy, Long; and I have consulted the Autobiography of 
Roosevelt; Twenty Years of the Republic, Peck; America as a World 
Power, J. H. Latan6 (Hart's American Nation Series) ; The Nation, May 
5, 12, 1898. 



76 McKIXLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

rior, and it might prove so in action. As a formidable 
fleet would certainly be sent across the ocean, imagina- 
tion ran riot as to the destruction it might cause to the 
seaboard cities and to the summer resorts on the coast. 
Many Boston men took their securities inland to Worces- 
ter and Springfield. Roosevelt spoke of it as a "fairly 
comic panic" and wrote truly, "The state of nervousness 
along much of the seacoast was funny in view of the lack 
of foundation for it." ' For the authorities in Washing- 
ton, naval and otherwise, had perfect trust in the Amer- 
ican Navy and felt that with a fair show it would destroy 
any Spanish squadron sent across the water to take a 
necessary part in the war. Now Dewey's victory showed 
the stuff in the officers and men of the American Navy 
and imparted a confidence to the general public that was 
sorely needed at the commencement of hostilities. 

Sympathy in the large powers of Europe on the con- 
tinent was with Spain, and especial manifestations were 
in Paris and Berlin. If there was any design to interfere 
in the conflict, it was checked by the attitude of England, 
who favored decidedly the United States. Dewey's vic- 
tory strengthened the position of England by rendering 
any intervention on the part of the continental powers 
impossible. Sentiment on the continent was that, in the 
first encounters, Spain would be victorious, such was the 
confidence felt in her navy and distrust in the American 
sea power. Andrew D. White, our Ambassador to Ger- 
many, gave a vivid account of the sentiment, as shown in 
the German newspapers and in an interview granted by 
Momxnaen, on the conduct of the United States toward 



Autobiography, 286. 



Ch. IV.] GERMAN AND FRENCH OPINION 77 

Spain. This, White wrote, "was even more acrid than 
his previous utterances and exhibited sharply and at 
great length our alleged sins and shortcomings." 1 Fol- 
lowing the Spanish newspapers, which liked to call their 
opponents "Yankee pigs," the "continental press teemed 
with the grossest caricatures, in which the Americans 
were drawn as swine." 2 

Anatole France in his novel "L'Anneau d'Am6thyste " 
(226), published in 1899, gave this lively account of a 
conversation in a Paris salon : A general expressed the 
opinion that "in declaring war on Spain the Americans 
were imprudent and it may cost them dear. Having 
neither an Army nor a Navy it will be difficult for them 
to maintain a conflict with a trained army and experi- 
enced sailors. . . . The Americans are not prepared 
for war, and war requires long preparation." 

"Now then, general," cried a lady, "do tell us that 
those American bandits will be beaten." 

"Their success is doubtful," replied the general. "I 
should say that it would even be absurd, and would 
amount to an insolent contradiction of the whole system 
in vogue among military nations. In short the victory 
of the United States would constitute a practical criti- 
cism of principles adopted in the whole of Europe by the 
most competent military authorities. Such a result is 
neither to be expected nor desired." 

"What luck!" exclaimed the lady, "Our friends the 
Spaniards will be victorious. Vive le roi !" 

"Certain facts seem to indicate that the Americans are 



1 Autobiography, 11, 160, 17S. White saw the proof sheets of the in- 
terview but it was never published. 
* Peck, 544, 553. 



78 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

beginning to repent of their rashness," said a gentleman 
of the party. "It is said that they are terrified. They 
expect any day to see Spanish warships appear on their 
Atlantic coast. Inhabitants of Boston, New York and 
Philadelphia are fleeing in great numbers toward the in- 
terior of the country. It is a general panic." 

A servant brought in the mail. "Perhaps there will 
be news of the war," said the gentleman opening a news- 
paper. Amid an intense silence, he read aloud: "Com- 
modore Dewey has destroyed the Spanish fleet in the 
port of Manila. The Americans did not lose a single 
man." 

"On the 30th of April, 1898," wrote Dewey, "I had been 
practically unknown to the American public. In a day 
my name was on everyone's lips. The dash of our squad- 
ron into an Oriental bay seven thousand miles from home 
had the glamour of romance to the national imagina- 
tion." ! 

After the battle of Manila Bay, Senator Redfield Proc- 
tor wrote to President McKinley : "Dewey will be as 
wise and safe, if there are political duties devolving on 
him, as he is forcible in action. There is no better man 
in discretion and safe judgment." 2 The sequel showed 
how profoundly the Senator comprehended the Admiral. 
After the battle, Dewey established a blockade of Manila 
which he aimed to maintain thoroughly and impartially. 
A good student <>f international law, he was guided in his 
conduct by the best of authorities, and his attitude to the 
men-of-war Bent by several nations to Manila Bay for 
purposes of observation, was correct. The English, who 



1 Autobiography, 289. J Ibid., 228. 



Ch. IV.] GERMAN ACTION 79 

thoroughly sympathized with the United States, the 
Japanese, who partially did so, and the French, whose 
feeling was favorable to the Spaniards, respected Dewey's 
authority and permitted him to prescribe rules for their 
guidance. Not so the Germans, who were a law unto 
themselves and chafed against the exercise of any author- 
ity not their own. 

After Dewey's return to Washington, at a dinner at 
the White House given him by the President, the Presi- 
dent desired to know the truth of the statements fre- 
quently made in the newspapers regarding the friction 
between him and the German Vice- Admiral. "There is 
no record of it at all on the files," McKinley said. "No, 
Mr. President," Dewey answered, "as I was on the 
spot and familiar with the situation from day to day, it 
seemed best that I look after it myself, at a time when 
you had worries enough of your own." 1 Dewey came 
into collision with the Germans a number of times before 
the arrival of the Vice- Admiral von Diedrichs. On June 
12, he came in on his flag-ship, the Kaiserin Augusta 
making the third German cruiser in the harbor ; another 
was expected and a transport had already arrived. In 
accordance with naval etiquette, Dewey made the first 
call upon Diedrichs and referred to the large German 
force and the limited German interest in the Philip- 
pines. The British, with a much larger commercial 
interest, with a greater number of resident subjects, with 
the largest naval force of any power in far Eastern waters, 
never had at any one time during the blockade more than 
three warships in Manila harbor. To Dewey's gentle 



Dewey, Autobiography, 252. 



80 McKINXEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

remonstrance Diedrichs answered, "I am here by order 
of the Kaiser, sir." ■ 

Dewey properly entitled his chapter "A Period of Anx- 
iety." He had news of a more powerful squadron than 
his own on the way from Spain to the Philippines ; he 
awaited with great anxiety intelligence from Sampson's 
fleet in the Atlantic ; at the same time it was evident 
from the action of the Germans that they did not accept 
his interpretation of the laws of the blockade. They 
were on the most cordial social terms with the Spaniards 
in Manila, and the talk of the town was that the Germans 
would intervene in favor of Spain. Dewey addressed a 
formal letter to Vice-Admiral von Diedrichs in which he 
said : "As a state of war exists between the United States 
and Spain, and as the entry into this blockaded port of 
the vessels of war of a neutral is permitted by the blockad- 
ing squadron as a matter of international courtesy, such 
neutrals should necessarily satisfy the blockading vessels 
as to their identity. ... I claim the right to communi- 
cate with all vessels entering this port, now blockaded 
with the forces under my command." 2 To this Died- 
richs demurred and notified Dewey thai "he would sub- 
mit the point to a conference of all the senior officers of 
the men-of-war in the harbor." Only Captain ( ihichester 
of the British ship Immortality answered the call, and his 
expressed opinion was decidedly on Dewey's side. Never- 
theless it took further and peremptory action on the pari 
of Dewey to convince the German that his orders in 
Manila Bay must be obeyed.' 

1 Dewey, Autobiography, 267. ■Dewey, Autobiography, 286 

■My authority is oh. xvii. of Dewey's Autobiography. Bui ! 

D. White, A'/ ihy, ii. 160 <■' seq.; Chadwick, the Spanish- 

Auicncuu W;ir, ii. 864; Long, ii. iii.; Lodge, 106; Peek, 6" 



Ch. IV.] PROGRESS OF THE WAR 81 

The glamour of our entrance into the Orient through 
Dewey's victory could not take the public mind, nor that 
of the historian, off the real centre of the war, which was 
in Cuba, and from the direction of affairs, which lay in 
Washington. On April 22, President McKinley pro- 
claimed a limited blockade of Cuban ports, and four days 
later he declared "that the policy of this government will 
be not to resort to privateering but to adhere to the rules 
of the Declaration of Paris." On April 23, he called for 
125,000 volunteers and a little over a month later for 
75,000 more. 1 The Secretary of War, Alger, wrote that, 
as events turned out, the additional call was unnecessary, 
as 136,000 volunteers did not leave the United States. 2 
But it is a tradition in American administration that 
Lincoln in his first call for 75,000 demanded too small a 
number, so that McKinley, if he erred at all, was bound 
to err on the safe side; but a prolongation of the war 
would have justified the larger number. 

Before the United States declared war the President 
had appointed Captain William T. Sampson commander 
of the North Atlantic squadron. Advanced over seven- 
teen other officers, he was made rear-admiral at the out- 
break of the war and placed in supreme command of all 
operations on the Atlantic coast. Appointed rear- 
admiral sixteen days before Dewey, the appointment came 
to him as a surprise, causing him to feel deep responsibil- 
ity rather than any elation. 3 

1 Richardson x. 202 et seq. 2 The Spanish-American War, 19. 

' The Relations of the United States and Spain : The Spanish War, 
Chadwick, i. 18 et seq. Chadwick was Captain of the flag-ship New York 
and also Sampson's chief of staff. This valuable and useful work is in 
two volumes published in 1911 and will be referred to as Chadwick, The 
Spanish American War i. and do. ii. ; see also The New American Navy, 
Long, i. 211. 



82 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION !1898 

The "sinews of war" were carefully looked after. Two 
hundred million of an authorized loan of double that 
amount was offered to popular subscription and eagerly- 
grasped at. Although paying but three per cent, it was 
oversubscribed seven and one half times, was entirely 
taken at home and went to a premium of six per cent 
within three months. 1 A revenue bill was carefully 
framed by Dingley and his Republican associates on the 
Ways and Means Committee and adroitly piloted through 
the House and eventually the Senate ; it became a law 
on June 13. 2 

It was known that a Spanish fleet under command of 
Admiral Cervera had left Cape Verde Islands on April 29, 
and was steaming westward. The public was uncertain as 
to its destination, but the Navy Department felt sure that 
it was either Puerto Rico or Cuba. As it proceeded much 
more slowly than was estimated, it was a source of mysti- 
fication and alarm ; it arrived at Martinique, a French 
island, on May 12, and one week later in Santiago harbor, 
Cuba. Cervera's choice of Santiago and decision to 
remain there made the battle, which finally took place, 
the decisive one of the war. In due time, his fleet was 
blockaded so that he could not make a sortie without a 
fight. 

The President appreciated that to gain a decided re- 
sult the Army must cooperate with the Navy, and Cer- 
vera's entrance into Santiago fixed that place as the 
Army's objective point. Consequently an expedition was 
prepared to proceed thither. Theodore Roosevelt, a 
participator in the war and the historian of a phase of it, 



1 N"ii\i -■«, A morion n Finance, 279 

1 Life of Nelson Dingley, Jr., 462 el seq. 



Ch. IV.] ROOSEVELT 83 

called the chapter on it in his Autobiography "The War 
of America the Unready," and this title is true so far 
as it applied to the Army. With the charitable and in- 
telligent view of men and affairs, which was a real dis- 
tinction in a man of active life, he wrote, "Secretary Al- 
ger happened to be Secretary when war broke out, and 
all the responsibility for the shortcomings of the Depart- 
ment were visited upon his devoted head. He was made 
the scapegoat for our National shortcomings. The 
fault was not his; the fault and responsibility lay with 
us, the people, who for thirty-three years had permitted 
our representatives in Congress and in National executive 
office to bear themselves so that it was absolutely im- 
possible to avoid the great bulk of all the trouble that 
occurred, and of all the shortcomings of which our people 
complained during the Spanish War." x But it was dif- 
ferent in the Navy, as no one knew better than Roosevelt, 
who was Assistant Secretary when the war broke out. 
"The Navy," he wrote, "really was largely on a war 
footing, as any Navy which is even respectably cared for 
in time of peace must be. The admirals, captains and 
lieutenants were continually practicing their profession 
in almost precisely the way that it has to be practiced 
in time of war. Except actually shooting at a foe, most 
of the men on board ship went through in time of peace 
practically all that they would have to go through in 
time of war." 2 

If one desires to read a graphic account of the bad man- 
agement and confusion attendant upon our getting 18,000 
troops 3 from Tampa, Florida, to Santiago, let him read 



1 The Autobiography (1913), 244. 2 Ibid., 242. 

1 Chadwick, The Spanish-American War, ii. 77. 



84 McKINLEVS ADMINISTRATION [1898 

Roosevelt's books. 1 "We were kept several days on the 
transport," he wrote, "which was jammed with men, so 
that it was hard to move about on deck. Then the fleet 
got under way, and we steamed slowly down to Santiago. 
Here we disembarked, higgledy-piggledy, just as we had 
embarked. Different parts of different outfits were jum- 
bled together, and it was no light labor afterwards to as- 
semble the various batteries. For instance, one trans- 
port had guns, and another the locks for the guns; the 
two not getting together for several days after one of 
them had been landed. Soldiers went here, provisions 
there ; and who got ashore first largely depended upon 
individual activity." 2 In some way or other the Army 

•The Rough Riders; Autobiography. 

Roosevelt went to Cuba as Lieut. Colonel of the Rough Riders of which 
Dr. Leonard Wood was the Colonel. In a private letter to Dr. \V. Sturgis 
Bigelow of March 29, 1898, Roosevelt wrote: "I do not know that I 
shall be able to go to Cuba if there is a war. . . . But if I am able to 
go I certainly shall. ... I like life very much. I have always led a 
joyous life. I like thought and 1 like action, and it will be very bitter to 
me to leave my wife and children; and while I think 1 could face death 
with dignity, I have no d< Bire before my time has come to go oul into the 
everlasting darkni - • So I -hall riot go into a war with any undue exhila- 
ration of spirits or in a frame of mind in any way approaching reckless- 
ness or levity." — J. B. Bishop. Scribner'e Magazine, Nov. 1919, 531. 

1 Autobiography, 255. Roosevelt wrote in his diary which was given 

in 1921 by Mrs. Theodore Roosevelt to the Roosevelt Memorial Associa- 
tion: "June 3 — Reached Tampa in morning. Railroad system in wild- 
« ' "nfusion; it tool; us twelve hours to gel into camp with our baggage. 
"June 5- -No words can paint the confusion No head; a breakdown 

Of both the railroad and military systems of the country. 

"June — No plana ; no Btaff officers ; no instructions to us. Each officer 

finds out for himself and takes his chances. 

"June 8- Told to go aboard transport Worst confusion yet. No allotment 
of transports; no plans ; utter confusion." Boston Herald, Sept. 29, 1921. 
Roosevelt wrote to Ins sister, Mrs. Robinson, on June 12: "11 seems 

tome that the people at Washington are inexcusable for putting us 

aboard ship and keeping us crowded to suffocation on these transports for 
six days in Tampa harbor in a Bemi-tropical sun." Previously one whole 

night had been spent "standing Up Opposite a railway track waiting for 
ii tram to COme, and finally taking coal cars m the morning." — Mrs. 
Robinson's Roosevelt, 109. 



Ch. IV.] FIGHT AT SAN JUAN HILL 85 

was entirely ashore by June 27. * The General in com- 
mand was Shafter, a regular army officer of talent. 2 
but entirely unfitted for a tropical expedition. Sixty- 
three years of age, weighing over 300, with a tendency 
to the gout, mounting a horse with difficulty, 3 his physi- 
cal disabilities weighed upon him to an extent to unfit 
him entirely for his dangerous and responsible job. 

"I expect to attack Santiago to-morrow morning," 
Shafter wrote to Sampson on June 30. 4 He was as good 
as his word, and the battles of El Caney and San Juan 
Hill resulted. The fort at El Caney was captured, but 
the fight at San Juan Hill was the more important. Cap- 
tain John Bigelow, who was a captain in the regular cav- 
alry with the expedition, wrote: "The enemy's position 
was about as nearly ideal as a real position can be. I 
have seen the famous stone wall at Fredericksburg backed 
by Marye's Heights. It is hardly a circumstance to this 
position. San Juan was more suggestive of Gettysburg 
than of Fredericksburg. Our attack seemed hardly less 
desperate than that of Pickett's division. At Gettys- 
burg a cannonade of several hours' duration designed to 
shake the morale of the defence, preceded the advance 
of the attacking infantry which, during this period of 
preparation, was kept out of fire. At San Juan there was 



1 "The Army was in a region with a character wholly unlike that of any 
in its experience. Nearly the whole of the regular force of which it was 
composed had been accustomed to harrying Indians over treeless plains 
or arid mountains. In this case however it found itself in a country cov- 
ered with brush so heavy that, almost impassable to the individual man, 
it was altogether so to troops in formation." Chadwick, The Spanish- 
American War, ii. 62. 

2 Chadwick, Spanish-American War, ii. 6 ; Alger. 

8 Chadwick, ii. 110; R. H. Davis, The Cuban and Porto Rican Cam- 
paigns, 185. 

4 Chadwick, Spanish-American War, ii. 75. 



86 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION 11898 

hardly any preparation by artillery, and the infantry and 
dismounted cavalry, who made the attack, were exposed 
to the enemy's fire for about an hour immediately pre- 
ceding their advance, most of them not being able or 
permitted to fire back." x The work was done by the 
regular troops, "the flower of the American standing 
army," Senator Lodge so termed them. 2 They were 
assisted by three volunteer regiments, only one of which, 
the Rough Riders, under the command of Theodore Roose- 
velt, 3 did effective service. The Cuban insurgents helped 
the Americans by doing their part in cutting off the sup- 
plies from Santiago, but were not as valuable support as 
had been expected. San Juan Heights was taken on 
this July first. "The attack," wrote Chadwick, "was 
indeed one of high heroism ... as gallant a deed as 
was ever done." 4 

No word of praise can be too high for the work of the 
soldiers that day, but their creature comforts were not 
looked after. They fought on empty stomachs, as the 
commissariat was badly managed ; they were also short 
of tobacco so highly prized by soldiers in the field. "Their 
woolen clothing," said Roosevelt, "was exactly what I 



1 Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign, 127. 

1 P. 130. Chadwick wrote: "Our first army WU one of extraordinary 
quality; such probably as will never a: the field, as the condi- 

tions of its training can never be repeated. It was the product of long 
years of war against tin- wiliest and moei capable of savage races. 
Schooled in every trick of Savage warfare, inured to every privation of 
lent and cold, individualized as no other soldier ever has been, these men 
of the plains were accustomed to fighting their own battles, and took with 

them to San Juan 1 bll the qualities and character which made this u force, 
which it is not too much to say, has never been equalled in general effi- 
ciency." ii. L2. 

J W ! ! i I been advanced to a brigade command which made Roose- 
velt colonel Of the RoUgb Meiers. • ii. %. 



Ch - IV] AMERICAN DEPRESSION 87 

would have used in Montana in the fall." » The Span- 
iards were better armed and equipped and had a larger 
supply of smokeless powder. Nevertheless, the events 
justified the charge on the fortified position, as Spanish 
firing was less deadly than the climate. But the loss at 
El Caney and San Juan Hill was over ten per cent of the 
men engaged; the casualties among the officers were 
unusually heavy. 2 

Next day, July 2, while the Spaniards made no attempt 
to retake San Juan Heights they kept up an incessant firing 
This and the heavy losses of July 1 completely demoralized 
bhafter who, suffering from malarial fever, almost always 
accompanied by mental depression, was thoroughly de- 
spondent when, on July 3, he telegraphed to Washington 

I am seriously considering withdrawing about five miles 
and taking up a new position." ■ 0ther officerg of ^ 
army shared his anxiety but nevertheless two captains of 
the regular troops came to Roosevelt desiring him to protest 
against any retirement. Roosevelt, who always disliked 
the word retreat, cordially agreed with them "that it 
would be far worse than a blunder to abandon our posi- 
tion." * But Shafter had not forgotten the American 
game of bluff and at 8.30 that morning demanded the 
surrender of Santiago, which was peremptorily declined 
by the Spanish commander. 

Senator Lodge gave a graphic account of the feeling in 
Washington on July 3. "It was the one really dark day 
of the war," he wrote, "and the long hot hours of that 
memorable S unday were heavy with dou bt, apprehen- 

1 Chadwick, ii. 66. 

2 Chadwick, The Spanish-American War, ii 100 
Chadwick, The Spanish-American War ii 109 

* The Rough Riders, 148; Chadwick, ii. 108 



88 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

sion and anxiety." l But if the administration in Wash- 
ington and Shaft er could have known the sentiment of 
the Spanish camp, their despondency would have given 
way to elation. For Santiago was reaching the point 
of capitulation ; while the fleet had food for about a 
month longer, the army and the city had been reduced 
to rice. 2 The fleet, however, was the important thing. 
"The eyes of every nation," wrote Captain-General 
Blanco to Cervera from Havana, "are at present fixed 
on your squadron on which the honor of our country 
depends." 3 Before this Blanco had suggested to Mad- 
rid that all the land and naval forces in the Western 
waters be placed under his supreme command and his 
suggestion had been complied with. 4 Admiral Cervera, 
the commander of the Spanish squadron, was discouraged 
at the outlook. He wrote on June 25, eight days before 
the dark day in Washington, to the Spanish general in 
command at Santiago ; "I have considered the squadron 
lost ever since it left Cape Verde. . . . To-day I con- 
sider the squadron lost as much as ever, and the dilemma 
is whether to lose it by destroying it, if Santiago is not 
able to resist, after having contributed to its defence, or 
whether to lose it by sacrificing to vanity the majority 
of its crews and depriving Santiago of their cooperation, 
thereby precipitating its fall. ... It is therefore for 
the Captain-General to decide whether I am to go out to 
suicide, dragging along with me those 2000 sens of Spain." 
On the same day he telegraphed to the Captain-General, 
"In my opinion the sortie will entail the certain loss of 



' P. 1 : 

•Chadwick, ii. 111. 'Juno 26, ibid., 119. 

* June 30-26, ibid., 115. 



Ch. IV.] SPANISH DESPAIR 89 

the squadron and majority of its crews." l Blanco de- 
sired the escape made "from that prison in which the 
squadron is unfortunately shut in" on a dark night and 
in bad weather, but to this Cervera replied, "With the 
harbor entrance blockaded as it now is, the sortie at night 
is more perilous than in daytime, on account of ships 
being closer inshore." 2 

Thus stood affairs until the army made the attack of 
July 1, after which the Spanish general in command re- 
ported the "exhausted and serious condition of Santiago." 
The result of that battle brought the Spanish authori- 
ties to a decision. Cervera had lent his "landing forces" 
to the army for the defence of Santiago, and to make a 
proper sortie he must have them reembarked. He re- 
ceived an order from Blanco on July 1 to reembark "the 
crews" and to hasten the sortie from the harbor. This 
was followed up by a despatch next day to go out immedi- 
ately. A telegram to the general in command showed 
plainly the thought that dwelt in Blanco's mind : "Main 
thing is that squadron go out at once, for if Americans 
take possession of it, Spain will be morally defeated and 
must ask for peace at mercy of enemy. A city lost can 
be recovered ; the loss of the squadron under these cir- 
cumstances is final and cannot be recovered." 3 It was 
impossible to make the sortie in the afternoon of July 2, 
so the morning of July 3 was decided upon. 

The historian is able to look into both camps — a 
look of course impossible to either Sampson or Cervera. 
There was friction between Sampson and Shafter as well 



iChadwick, ii. 116, 118. 2 Ibid., ii. 118, 119. 

3 Ibid., ii. 122, 124. 



90 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION 11898 

as between the Army and Navy departments in Washing- 
ton. When the Naval Board announced — an announce- 
ment which was endorsed by the Secretary — that it 
was better to sacrifice a number of soldiers rather than to 
lose one battleship, such an opinion was regarded as in- 
human although probably based on good naval strategy. 
Shafter, appalled at the losses of July 1, did not want to 
sacrifice further his men, and desired Sampson to force 
an entrance into the harbor on the Farragut plan, which, 
on his part, Sampson did not want to do on account of 
the risk of losing a battleship. Shafter was ill and tele- 
graphed to Washington on July 3 : "I have been unable 
to be out during the heat of the day for four days, 1 but 
am retaining the command. ... I am urging Admiral 
Sampson to attempt to force the entrance of the harbor 
and will have consultation with him this morning." 2 
This conference was to be had at Shafter's headquarters, 
for which place Sampson on his armored cruiser, the New 
York, started on the morning of July 3. The port at 
which he proposed to land was eight miles from his posi- 
tion in the blockading squadron. No fortune could have 
been worse for Sampson. Since June 1 he had main- 
tained a perfect blockade of Santiago Harbor. "The 
faithful search-light" 3 made him feel secure at night. 
"When I wake up," he said, " and can see from where I lie 
the operation of the search-light, I can fall asleep quite 
contented, knowing that everything is all right." Among 
the eventualities which he considered, was the escape of 



'On July 4, after the nival battle of BantiagOj Shafter wrote to the 

Adjutant-General in \\ a bington, "I am nil wrv much exhausted, eat- 
ing a little this p.m. f, >r the fir>t tune in four >l:ivs." Chadwick, ii. 192. 
* Ibid., lU'J. • Long, ii. 7. 



Ch. IV.] BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 91 

ships from the harbor, and he had issued the order, "If the 
enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as 
soon as possible, and endeavor to sink his vessels or force 
them to run ashore"; 1 but he could have had no idea 
that the plan of battle which he had considered and care- 
fully thought out would be put into force on that day. 
Not only was the commander-in-chief and his cruiser 
New York absent, but the Massachusetts had gone away 
forty miles in order to coal. 

The Spanish squadron consisted of the armored cruisers 
Infanta Maria Teresa, Oquendo, Vizcaya, Cristdbal Colon 
and two torpedo-boat destroyers; the American, of the 
armored cruiser Brooklyn, the battleships Texas, Iowa, 
Oregon, Indiana and the auxiliaries Gloucester and Vixen. 
The Spanish vessels came out of the harbor of Santiago on 
this Sunday morning, July 3, "a superb day," 2 between 
9.35 and 10 ; the flag-ship Maria Teresa was in advance 
and, following at a distance of about 800 yards, were the 
Vizcaya, Cristdbal Coldn and the Oquendo and at a greater 
distance the torpedo-boat destroyers. The men on the 
American ships were at Sunday "quarters for inspection," 
which was to be followed by divine service. But their 
officers were on the alert and, at the first sight of the 
Spaniards, the American ships, carrying out Sampson's 
standing orders, closed in and began the work of destruc- 
tion which their careful labor of preparation and accurate 
firing enabled them to do. The Spaniards advanced 
with coolness and courage. The Maria Teresa "presented 
a magnificent appearance," wrote Robley Evans, Cap- 
tain of the Iowa, and the fleet "came at us like mad 



1 Long, ii. 7. 2 Wilson, The Downfall of Spain, 295. 



92 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

bulls." ' At first the fire of the Maria Teresa was rapid 
and accurate, but as the American fire "smothered" her, 
it grew "ragged and inaccurate." 2 "I felt sure," wrote 
Cervera, "that the disaster was inevitable ... al- 
though I did not think our destruction would be so sud- 
den." 3 

Between ten and half past the Maria Teresa andOquendo, 
"with large volumes of smoke rising from their lower 
decks aft, gave up both fight and flight and ran in on the 
beach" when about seven miles from Santiago. At quar- 
ter past eleven the Vizcaya, when fifteen miles from San- 
tiago, "turned in shore and was beached"; she "was 
burning fiercely and her reserves of ammunition were 
already beginning to explode." 4 Meanwhile the Spanish 
torpedo-boat destroyers had been smashed by the fire 
of the battleships and especially by that of the auxiliary, 
Gloucester, a converted yacht. Remained "the sleek 
foxy Coldn," 5 the "best and fastest vessel" 6 of the Span- 
ish fleet, which was overhauled by the Brooklyn and 
Oregon; at twenty minutes past one, forty-eight miles 
from Santiago, she hauled down her colors and sur- 
rendered. 

"I regard," wrote Sampson in his Official Report, "this 
complete and important victory over the Spanish forces 
as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and 
close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night 
that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt 



1 A Sailor's Log, 446. : [bid., i 16. ■ Chadwick, ii. 188, 185. 

* Admiral Sampson's Official Report, July i. r >. Crowninahield, 507 ei 
«eq. 

'SpOUB, Our Navy in t ho War with Spain, 319. 

* Sampson. 



Ch. IV.] BATTLE OF SANTIAGO 93 

to escape at night and deliberately elected to make the 
attempt in daylight." 1 

President Roosevelt, with a comprehension of naval 
affairs such as few or no civilians had, after a careful re- 
view of all the facts, wrote, "It was a captains' fight." 2 

The casualties of the Spanish squadron, which num- 
bered 2227, did not exceed 474 and were probably fewer ; 
the American loss was one killed, one seriously wounded. 3 
"It is safe to say," wrote H. W. Wilson, an English au- 
thority, "that most Englishmen, with their knowledge of 
1812 and the feats of the Civil War, confidently ex- 
pected the Americans to win. It is equally safe to say 
that no one anticipated that two important victories 
would be secured at the cost of but one American life. 
. . . After less than five hours' fighting a modern 
squadron was completely annihilated with infinitesimal 
loss and infinitesimal damage to the victors. It is the 
low cost at which victory was purchased that renders 
this great battle so honorable to the American Navy." 4 

The naval battle of Santiago was a great victory and 
decisive of the war. "Do not Europeans regard us as 
barbarians?" was asked of a man, who, though not a 



1 Crowninshield, 509. Secretary Long wrote: "The battle of July 3 
was actually fought and the great victory won in accordance with the 
plan of the commander-in-chief," ii. 8. President Roosevelt wrote, Feb. 
18, 1902: "Sampson's real claim for credit rests upon his work as com- 
mander-in-chief; upon the excellence of the blockade; upon the prepar- 
edness of the squadron ; upon the arrangement of the ships head-on in 
a semicircle around the harbor ; and the standing order with which they 
instantly moved to the attack of the Spaniards when the latter appeared." 
Long, ii. 208. 

2 Long, ii. 208. 

3 Chadwick, ii. 176. According to Spanish authority the Spaniards 
had 323 killed and 151 wounded. 

* The Downfall of Spain, 69, 334. 



94 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

native American, had passed enough time in the United 
States to speak and write English well and, although 
devoted artistically to Europe, had gained a thorough 
comprehension of Americans. " They did," was the reply, 
"until you smashed two Spanish fleets, but they think so 
no longer." Such is the judgment of the civilized world. 
Our work toward the elevation of humanity, toward the 
greater diffusion of education, are counted as naught in 
contrast with these naval victories. 

Noteworthy as was the victory of Santiago it was sup- 
plemented by humane action. "As the Maria Teresa 
struck the rock, the tars of the Texas . . . began to 
cheer." But their Captain Philip exclaimed, "Don't 
cheer, boys; the poor devils are dying." ' When Cap- 
tain Robley Evans instantly handed back the surrendered 
sword to the Captain of the Vizcaya, his "blue shirts" 
cheered lustily. 2 "So long," he wrote in his report of 
July 4, "as the enemy showed his flag they fought like 
American seamen ; but when the flag came down they 
were as gentle and tender as American women." 3 "This 
rescue of prisoners," wrote Admiral Sampson in his re- 
port, "including the wounded from the burning Spanish 
vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and 
gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore 
and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were explod- 
ing, and it was not known at what moment the fire would 
reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy 
surf was running just inside of the Spanish ships. But no 
risk deterred our officers ami men until their work of hu- 
manity was complete." * Cervera in his report eulogized 

"Long, ii. 39. * A Sailor's Log, 161. » CrowHinahield, 539. 

* Crownmshiold, 509. 



Ch. IV.] THE SPANISH FLEET DESTROYED 95 

"the chivalry and courtesy of the enemy. They 
clothed the naked," he wrote, "giving them everything 
they needed ; they suppressed the shouts of joy in order 
not to increase the suffering of the defeated, and all vied 
in making their captivity as easy as possible." l He 
wrote to the Captain of the St. Louis when "at sea" on 
his way home, "I thank you for the delicate and mani- 
fold acts of kindness through which you have endeavored 
to alleviate the sore burden of our great misfortune." 2 
In other words, the American seamen fought like gentle- 
men and not like brutes. Exactly the same may be said 
of the American soldiers who contended before Santi- 
ago. 3 

As has been previously stated, the naval battle of San- 
tiago was the decisive one of the war. Blanco thought 
that the squadron must make a fight to save Spanish 
honor but he recognized that its destruction meant that the 
game was up. The annihilation of the fleet, wrote Cap- 
tain Concas, the acting chief-of-staff of Cervera, deprived 
"Spain of the only power still of value to her, without 
which a million soldiers could do nothing to serve her; 
of the only power which could have weight in a treaty 
of peace ; a power which, once destroyed, would leave 
Spain, the old Spain of Europe, not Cuba as so many 
ignorant persons believed, completely at the mercy of 
the enemy." 4 

The fall of Santiago quickly followed. Puerto Rico 
was also captured. "In comparison to the Santiago 



1 Crowninshield, 562. See also Cervera to Blanco and Sampson. 
Chadwick, ii. 189, 190. 

2 Foreign Relations, 1898, 798. 

1 Chadwick, ii. 262 ; Peck, 598. * Chadwick, ii. 128. 



96 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

nightmare," wrote Richard Harding Davis, "the Porto 
Rican expedition was a 'fete des fleurs.'" l 

Meanwhile it was learned that the reserve fleet of Spain 
was despatched to the Philippines, and soon thereafter an 
American squadron was collected, the destination of 
which should be the Spanish coast. This was publicly 
announced. The reserve Spanish fleet went through the 
Suez Canal, but the public announcement of the desti- 
nation of the American fleet, together with the news of 
the destruction of Cervera's squadron, compelled its re- 
turn to Spain. 

A glance must now be had at the Orient. Troops were 
sent at different times until on August 6 there were about 
8500 men ashore in the Philippines. General Merritt 
commanded the land forces and, in conjunction with 
Dewey, demanded the surrender of Manila and the Span- 
ish forces in occupation. On August 13, an attack was 
begun which soon terminated, as arranged through "the 
good offices of the Belgian consul," by the surrender. 2 

The 10,000 Filipino insurgents under Aguinaldo had 
rendered valuable assistance in the investment of Manila 
and now made "a passing demand for joint occupation 
of the city" and, as the situation was difficult, Merritt 
and Dewey asked for instructions from Washington. 
President McKinley in reply directed that there "must 
be no joint occupation with the insurgents." 3 

"Had not the cable been cut," wrote Dewey, "there 
would have been no attack on August L3, for while our 
ships — counting the twelve hours' difference in time 



1 i be ( Subao and Porto RA tn ( iampaigna, 296. 
■ Ghadwick, ii 408. 

• Chmiwick, u. 428; Riclmrdsou, x. 217. 



Ch. IV.] THE WAR DECIDED 97 

between the two hemispheres — were moving into posi- 
tion and our troops were holding themselves in readiness 
for a dash upon the Spanish works, the Protocol was being 
signed at Washington. The absence of immediate cable 
connection had allowed no interruption to the fateful 
progress of events which was to establish our authority 
in the Philippines." 1 

The smashing of the two fleets decided the war, and 
this was acknowledged by the Spaniards themselves. 
They had made resistance to save their honor but recog- 
nized that, when the fortunes of war decided against them, 
it was useless to prolong the conflict. Through a letter 
from the Spanish Minister of State to President McKin- 
ley 2 they started negotiations through Jules Cambon, 
the French Ambassador, who showed wonderful qualities. 
Frankly on the Spanish side, he saw clearly the American 
position, appreciated the magnitude of the naval vic- 
tories and the helplessness of Spain. He found McKin- 
ley inflexible and disposed to drive a hard bargain. Be- 
lieving that the "Conqueror resolved to procure all the 
profit possible from the advantages it has obtained," 8 
he advised Spain to give him authority to sign the Pro- 
tocol. This was done and the Protocol was signed by 
him and Secretary of State Day. 4 

The Protocol provided that Spain should relinquish 
all claim of sovereignty over Cuba, that she should cede 
to the United States Puerto Rico and an island in the 
Ladrones. This cession was in lieu of a pecuniary in- 



1 Autobiography, 282. J Olcott, ii. 59. 3 Chadwick, ii. 440. 

4 Elihu Root said when Secretary of War (Nov. 15, 1902) that Cambon 
was an " ideal ambassador," the " sympathetic representative and de- 
fender " of Spain. Miscellaneous Addresses, 145, 147. 



98 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

demnity for the cost of the war. Furthermore, "The 
United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and har- 
bor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace 
which shall determine the control, disposition and gov- 
ernment of the Philippines." 

Five Commissioners on the part of the United States 
and five on the part of Spain should meet in Paris not 
later than October 1 to negotiate and conclude a treaty 
of peace, subject to ratification by the constitutional au- 
thorities of both countries. This Protocol was signed on 
August 12 and involved a total suspension of hostilities. 1 

The war was over, having lasted 113 days [April 21 
to August 12], less than four months. 2 

1 Foreign Relations, 1898, 828. 

2 Authorities on the Spanish-American War : First, and foremost, 
the two volumes of Admiral French E. Chadwick. Chadwick has used 
the Spanish as well as the American documents with the result that he 
has enabled us to see both camps at the same time. He has written an 
impartial account. His action on the New York before and during the 
naval battle of Santiago made him an excellent interpreter of the docu- 
ments, showing no animosity whatever to Spain. At the end of Vol. ii. 
he has given an excellent bibliography. 

Reports of Battle of Santiago by Sampson; Schley and Cook of the 
Brooklyn; Chadwick of the New York; Clark of the Oregon; Philip of 
the Texas; Taylor of the Indiana; Evans of the Iowa; Wainwright of 
the Gloucester; Report of Cervera; Crowninshiold, 506 et seq.; Auto- 
biography of George Dewey ; Foreign Relations, 1S98 ; The New Ameri- 
can Navy, Long ; Lodge, The War with Spain ; Theodore Roosevelt, 
Autobiography, Rough Riders; R. A. Alger, The Spanish- American War; 
Evans, A Sailor's Lor; John Bigelow, Jr., Reminiscences of the Santiago 
Campaign; II. \V. Wilson, The Downfall of Spain; Et H. Davis, The Cu- 
ban and Porto Rican Campaigns; F. D. Millet, The Expedition to the 
Philippines; Bpesx'a Our Navy in the War with Spain; Mahan, Les- 
sons of the War with Spain; Peek ; Latum'-, America as a World l'ower, 
Hart's American Nation a 

Secretary Long wrote that the trip of the Oregon "has no parallel in 
history," n. 54, Admiral Sampson spoke of her "brilliant record" under 
Captain dark, Crowninshield, MO. "Her performance," wrote Chad- 
wick, "was one unprecedented ID battleship history and was one which 
will probably long preserve its unique distinction," i. 16. ( fa "the Ore- 
gon' Spear's chap. xii. For Hobson's exploit, see 
Chadwick, i. 338; Long, ii. 71. 



CHAPTER V 

In the first article of the Protocol, Spain relinquished 
Cuba. This rich island might fall to the United States. 
It was a ripe plum l that needed only the plucking. But 
there stood in the way the sentiment of a majority of the 
American people embodied in the so-called Teller Amend- 
ment to the resolutions adopted by Congress when the 
United States went to war with Spain. Although long 
a favorite policy that Cuba ought to belong to the Uni- 
ted States, she now disclaimed any intention of taking 
the island, but proposed to leave it to the Cubans them- 
selves. Any other large country would not probably in 
the first place have adopted the Teller Amendment but, 
even had it done so, its occupancy would have been made 
the prelude on one pretext or another to an eventual ab- 
sorption. Undoubtedly a powerful minority would have 
supported McKinley in such a policy, but he deserves 
credit that, believing in the terms of the Teller Amend- 
ment when adopted, he held to them firmly, after the 
quick result of the war, and wrote a glorious page in his 
country's history as the pledge was faithfully carried out. 
In lieu of a pecuniary indemnity for the cost of the war 
and because it was desirable that Spain should quit the 
Western Hemisphere, Puerto Rico and other islands under 
the Spanish dominion in the West Indies were taken. 
Also on the ground of pecuniary indemnity an island in 
the Ladrones was required ; this article resulted in the 



1 Substantially the same remark was made in chap. iii. 
99 



100 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1898 

selection of JGuam. Remained the Philippines, which 
caused much discussion in the Cabinet, country and with 
the Spanish Peace Commissioners, who by the terms of 
the Protocol, met in Paris those sent from the United 
States to negotiate a treaty of peace. 

When the letter of the Spanish Minister of State was 
received [July 26] l the President on a hot afternoon took 
the members of the Cabinet on a lighthouse tender for a 
trip down the Potomac, when were thoroughly discussed 
the terms of peace. This resulted later in the submission 
by Secretary Day of an article which proposed to "re- 
linquish all of the Philippine Islands to Spain except suf- 
ficient ground for a naval station." 2 On this proposi- 
tion the Cabinet was about equally divided. It is easy 
to see that had the President then decided not to take the 
Philippines he would have had a powerful backing. Dur- 
ing the war he had displayed a shrewd trading instinct 
thus expressed, "While we are conducting war and until 
its conclusion we must keep all we get ; when the war is 
over we must keep what we want." 3 Now he did not 
desire to come to a positive decision, and preferred to leave 
the matter open for the development of circumstances 
and until we had more information and especially some 
enlightening word from Dewey. The President said to 
Jules Cambon : "The negotiators of the two countries 
will be the ones to decide what will be the permanent ad- 
vantages that we shall demand in the archipelago and 
finally the control, disposition and government of the 
Philippines. The Madrid government may be assured 
that up to this time there is nothing determined d priori 



1 This is printed by Oloott, ii. 5 ( J. 

1 Life of McKinley, Oloott, ii. 6L ■ Ibid., 1G5. 



Ch. V.] the peace COMMISSIONERS 101 

in my mind against Spain ; likewise I consider there is 
nothing decided against the United States." 1 Therefore, 
Article III in the Protocol, agreed to with Jules Cambon, 
left the disposition of the Philippines until a formal treaty 
of peace should be concluded. 

The Protocol provided for the appointment of five 
Commissioners to meet in Paris an equal number from 
Spain. The President named William R. Day, Cushman 
K. Davis, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee, William P. Frye, Senator from Maine, Whitelaw 
Reid, editor and proprietor of the New York Tribune 
and ex-minister to France, and George Gray, Senator 
from Delaware, the only Democrat on the Commission. 
The discussion between the Peace Commissioners and 
the different despatches of the Americans to Washing- 
ton make interesting reading, but it is apparent that the 
decision of the main points rested with the President, 
who used the communications from the Commissioners 
as materials on which to base his own judgment. He 
decided at once that neither the United States nor any 
government which she might set up in Cuba would as- 
sume any portion of the so-called Cuban debt which had 
been largely incurred in fighting two insurrections. 

The greatest contention, however, was in regard to the 
Philippines. These consisted of a number of islands with 
a combined area of 115,000 square miles, nearly as large 
as England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales. The largest is 
Luzon with nearly 41,000 square miles, substantially the 
size of Ohio. The total population was more than seven 
and one half millions; the population of Luzon was 



1 Despatch of Cambon to Spain, Aug. 4, Chadwick, ii. 436. 



102 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

3,798,507 and that of Manila, the chief city, 219,92s. 1 
"The Philippines were a rich prize for any ambitious 
power," was Dewey's opinion after his victory. 2 

After the Protocol was signed, the President inclined 
toward taking the Philippines. Of his five Peace Com- 
missioners, three, Davis, Frye and Reid, were avowed im- 
perialists. In his instruction to the Commission of Sep- 
tember 16, 3 he wrote that we must have the island of 
Luzon and on October 26 he had his Secretary of State, 
John Hay, 4 telegraph as follows to Commissioner Day : 
"The information which has come to the President since 
your departure convinces him that the acceptance of the 
cession of Luzon alone, leaving the rest of the islands 
subject to the Spanish rule, or to be the subject of future 
contention, cannot be justified on political, commercial or 
humanitarian grounds. The cession must be of the whole 
archipelago or none. The latter is wholly inadmissible 
and the former must therefore be required. The Presi- 
dent reaches this conclusion after most thorough consid- 
eration of the whole subject, and is deeply sensible of the 
grave responsibilities it will impose, believing that this 
course will entail less trouble than any other, and besides 
will best subserve the interests of the people involved, 
for whose welfare we cannot escape responsibility." 6 



•Life of McKinley, ii. 146; Foreign Relations, 1898, 925. "The en- 
tire population, according to the census of 1903, was 7,(335,426. Of these 
G,987,6S6 were classed as civilized and (547,740 as wild. The civilized na- 
tive inhabitants are practically all adherents of the Roman Catholic 
Church. < )f the wild tribes at leasl two-fifths are Mohammedan Moros. 
Wiih the exception of the aboriginal Negritos, who are widely dispersed 
through the mountain regions, all the natives are believed to be Malays." 
Latane, 79. 

itobiography, 261 ■ Foreign Relations, 904. 

4 John llnv had become Secretary of State succeeding William R. Day. 

L Hay to Day, Foreign Relations, 1898, 935. 



CS. V.] THE PHILIPPINES 103 

Between October 10 and 22 McKinley visited the 
Omaha Trans-Mississippi Exposition ; in going thither and 
returning he made a number of speeches at convenient 
rail stops. 1 Senator Hoar called it "his famous Western 
journey." 2 Unquestionably Hoar is correct in attribut- 
ing to McKinley too great a reliance on the sentiment 
exhibited by the enthusiastic crowds that he addressed, 
but in truth his deductions from the meetings only con- 
firmed what he had already determined. 

By direction of the President, General Merritt went 
from Manila to Paris and gave a full report to the Peace 
Commission. While he was careful not to express himself 
positively in response to certain questions, a fair inference 
from his testimony is that it was desirable to take the 
whole group. 3 

The President had before him Dewey's report, from 
which it may be gathered that the Admiral favored the 
retention of Luzon alone, but General Greene, who 
brought to the White House this report, with whom 
McKinley had a "long talk" and whom he found 
"thoroughly well informed," approved decidedly our 
taking all of the Philippines. 4 The President had also 



1 For these speeches, see New York Tribune, Oct. 11-23, 1898. 

1 Autobiography, ii. 311. 3 Foreign Relations, 1898, 918. 

* "Luzon is in almost all respects the most desirable of these islands 
and therefore the one to retain." — Dewey, Aug. 29. General Greene 
said in his Memorandum of August 27 which represented his opinion when 
he had the "long talk" with McKinley on September 28 : "If the United 
States evacuate these islands, anarchy and civil war will immediately 
ensue and lead to foreign intervention. The insurgents were furnished 
arms and the moral support of the Navy prior to our arrival, and we can- 
not ignore obligations, either to the insurgents or to foreign nations, which 
our own acts have imposed upon us. The Spanish Government is com- 
pletely demoralized and Spanish power is dead beyond possibility of res- 
urrection. Spain would be unable to govern these islands if we surren- 
dered them. . . . On the other hand, the Filipinos cannot govern the 



104 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION 11898 

before him the opinion of the several members of the 
Peace Commission before it was necessary to arrive at a 
final decision. The opinions of the three imperialists, 
Davis, Frye and Reid, tallied with his own ; that of Day 
was a compromise, 1 but Senator Gray's opinion deserves 
consideration. "I cannot agree," he said, "that it is wise 
to take Philippines in whole or in part. To do so would be 
to reverse accepted continental policy of country, declared 
and acted upon throughout our history. Propinquity gov- 
erns case of Cuba and Puerto Rico. Policy proposed 
introduces us into European politics and the entangling 
alliances, against which Washington and all American 
statesmen have protested. . . . Attacked Manila as part 
of legitimate war against Spain. If we had captured 
Cadiz and Carlists had helped us, would not owe duty to 
stay by them at conclusion of war. On contrary interest 
and duty would require us to abandon both Manila and 
Cadiz. . . . 

"So much from standpoint of interest. But even 
conceding all benefits claimed for annexation we thereby 
abandon the infinitely greater benefit to accrue from 
acting the part of a great, powerful and Christian nation ; 
we exchange the moral grandeur and strength to be 
gained by keeping our word to nations of the world and 
by exhibiting a magnanimity and moderation in hour of 
victory that becomes the advanced civilization we claim, 
for doubtful materia] advantages and shameful stepping 
down from high moral position boa bfully assumed. We 



rnunt.rv v. itho ] I x , no. 

62 ; ' i I .--] ain, 37 !. 383 ; For- 

115, '.H7. 
1 I oraign Relations, 1 398, 93 



Ch. V.J SENATOR GRAYS OPINION 105 

should set example in these respects, not follow the self- 
ish and vulgar greed for territory which Europe has in- 
herited from mediaeval times. Our declaration of war 
upon Spain was accompanied by a solemn and deliberate 
definition of our purpose. Now that we have achieved 
all and more than our object, let us simply keep our 
word." » 

Admiral Chadwick, after citing Gray's dissent, wrote : 
"There is no questioning the cogency of Judge Gray's 
argument, nor the nobility of its sentiment. To demand 
the Philippines was undoubtedly to alter the moral po- 
sition of the United States and change its attitude from 
one of altruism to one of self-interest. This much is 
self-evident and scarcely requires statement." 2 But 
McKinley stuck to his determination and had Hay tele- 
graph it to Commissioner Day on October 28 : "The sen- 
timent in the United States," he said, "is almost universal 
that the people of the Philippines, whatever else is done, 
must be liberated from Spanish domination. In this sen- 
timent the President fully concurs. Nor can we permit 
Spain to transfer any of the islands to another power. Nor 
can we invite another power or powers to join the United 
States in sovereignty over them. We must either hold 
them or turn them back to Spain. 

"Consequently, grave as are the responsibilities and 
unforeseen as are the difficulties which are before us, the 
President can see but one plain path of duty — the accept- 
ance of the archipelago. Greater difficulties and more seri- 
ous complications, administrative and international, would 
follow any other course. The President has given to the 



!Oct. 25, Foreign Relations, 1898, 934. 2 ii. 461. 



106 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

views of the Commissioners the fullest consideration, and 
in reaching the conclusion above announced, in the light 
of information communicated to the Commission and to 
the President since your departure, he has been influenced 
by the single consideration of duty and humanity." • 

On November 13, the President's idea was further 
elaborated by Hay's despatch again to Commissioner 
Day. "Do we not owe an obligation to the people of 
the Philippines which will not permit us to return them 
to the sovereignty of Spain?" he asked. "You are 
therefore instructed to insist upon the cession of the whole 
of the Philippines and, if necessary, pay to Spain 
$10,000,000 to $20,000,000. . . . The trade and commer- 
cial side as well as the indemnity for the cost of the war 
are questions we might yield. They might be waived or 
compromised but the questions of duty and humanity 
appeal to the President so strongly that he can find no 
appropriate answer but the one he has here marked out." 2 

The biographer of McKinley shows us the working of 
his mind in some words he addressed to his Methodist 
brethren: "The truth is," he said, "I didn't want the 
Philippines and when they came to us as a gift from the 
gods, I did not know what to do with them. . . . 
I sought counsel from all sides — Democrats as well as 
Republicans — but got little help. 1 thought first we 
would take only Manila ; theD Luzon ; then other islands, 
perhaps, also. I walked the floor of the White House 
night after night until midnighl ; and I am not ashamed 
to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees 



1 Foreign Relations, 1898, 937. 

2 Ibid., 949. For an interesting account of the work of the Peace Com- 
misaiou, see Life of Whitcluw Reid, Cortissoz, ii. chap. xiii. 



Ch. v.] Mckinley 107 

and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more 
than one night. And one night late it came to me this 
way — I don't know how it was, but it came : (1) that 
we could not give them back to Spain — that would be 
cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn 
them over to France or Germany — our commercial 
rivals in the Orient — that would be bad business and dis- 
creditable ; (3) that we could not leave them to them- 
selves — they were unfit for self-government — and they 
would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse 
than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left 
for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the 
Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, 
and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as 
our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. And then I 
went to bed, and went to sleep and slept soundly." x 

It is true that McKinley was inconsistent in his public 
words. In his message of December, 1897, he had said, 
"Forcible annexation . . . cannot be thought of; that, 
by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression." 2 
One cannot read the proceedings of the Peace Commis- 
sion in Paris and see in any other light than that our tak- 
ing of the Philippines was " forcible annexation." In his 
instructions to the Commissioners of September 16, 1898, 
he had said that the United States must be "scrupulous 
and magnanimous in the concluding settlement." It 
should not be tempted into "excessive demands or into 
an adventurous departure on untried paths." 3 But our 
attitude to Spain denied the injunction to show mag- 
nanimity, and our demand for and the taking of the 

1 Interview, Nov. 21, 1899. Life of McKinley, ii. 109. 

2 Richardson, x. 131. 3 Foreign Relations, 1898, 907. 



108 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1898 

Philippines was an excessive demand and a venture on 
untried paths. 

Yet McKinley was entirely sincere. He was truly re- 
ligious, and when he told his Methodist brethren of the 
working of his mind, he told exactly the truth as he saw 
it. When he wrote, "The war has brought us new dutic 
and responsibilities which we must meet and discharge 
as becomes a great nation on whose growth and career 
from the beginning the Ruler of Nations has plainly 
written the high command and pledge of civilization," l 
he meant what he said ; and many good moral and re- 
ligious men were entirely of his mind. Indeed it was a 
troublesome question to decide. The opinion of a ma- 
jority of the American people was opposed to allowing the 
islands to go back to Spain ; and yet as we see it now, 
that was the only alternative. They and the Presi- 
dent did not believe that things should be permitted in 
the Eastern Hemisphere that they had gone to war to 
stop in Cuba. While the humanitarian impulse did the 
President honor, he had no right to commit bis country 
to a dangerous course, to run the risk of "an adventurous 
departure on untried paths," on account of a religious 
sentiment. Despite the obvious opinion of the majority, 
which with "his ear close to the ground" - he well knew, 
his hold on the country was bo great, increased as it was 
by a victorious war, that he could have led it to accept 
any conditions that he deemed necessary for the con- 
clusion of a peace. The only possible alternative, Leav- 
ing the islands to Spain, niiulit have been done under 
conditions suggested by Commissioner Day. 1 Such cpn- 

1 ForciKn Relations, 1898, 907. 

i p.rk, 669. 1 ">■ igo K< lations, 1898, 926, '.»34. 



Ch. V.] THE MONROE DOCTRINE 109 

ditions would have filled the measure of humanity; but 
there would naturally have been the query whether Spain 
would or could carry them out. 1 

An American condition, however, should have influ- 
enced the President without fail. The Monroe Doc- 
trine had come to be regarded as sacred and the spirit 
of it, if not the letter, was violated when we annexed the 
Philippines. We held that no European Power should 
take territory or increase what she possessed in the West- 
ern Hemisphere. In other words we said, "You keep 
away from us and we will keep away from you." 2 By 
the same token we were bound not to encroach on the 
Eastern Hemisphere. A cartoon in Punch entitled " Doc- 
trine and Practice" represented Dame Europa in a gar- 
den, her attitude haughty, saying coldly to an intruder, 
"To whom do I owe the pleasure of this intrusion?" 
The intruder, in face, figure and get-up of the well-known 
type, replied "Ma'am — my name is Uncle Sam!" 
When came the rejoinder, "Any relation of the late Colo- 
nel Monroe?" 3 True it was urged that we had grown 
too large to be confined by the Monroe Doctrine, that 
the teachings of Washington, Monroe and John Quincy 
Adams applied to the country as it was then and had no 
longer application. 4 Others reasoned that the Monroe 



1 General MacArthur said in his Testimony before the Senate Com- 
mittee on the Philippines on April 11, 1902: "When we landed [Mac- 
Arthur sailed for Manila from San Francisco on June 27, 1898] we found 
the entire population [of the Philippines] in open, violent, vindictive re- 
sentment against Spain, as an expression of their desire to be emanci- 
pated from that monarchy. ... I think if they had been granted the 
reforms which were extended to the people of the peninsula [of Spain] 
that the Filipinos would have been loyal Spaniards to-day. " — Part ii. 1384. 

2 The Nation, Nov. 10, 1898, 345. 

3 Punch, Aug. 6, 1898; Winslow Warren in Boston Herald, Apr. 18, 1919. 

4 See The Nation, May 19, 1898, 376. 



110 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 

Doctrine only obliged us to keep out of Europe and had 
no reference to Asia. 1 But it was entirely easy for Presi- 
dent McKinley to set aside such reasonings did he so 
desire. 

The Secretary of State, John Hay, was influenced by 
the opinion of England as she had been the sole large 
European power on our side during the Spanish War. 
"The dull hostility between us and England which ex- 
isted a year ago," he wrote while Ambassador, has been 
changed into a firm friendship. "If we give up the Phil- 
ippines it will be a considerable disappointment to our 
English friends. ... I have no doubt that Germany 
has been intriguing both with Aguinaldo and with Spain. 
They are most anxious to get a foothold there ; but if 
they do there will be danger of grave complication with 
other European powers." 2 

With the determination of the President, events moved 
forward to the Treaty of Peace which was signed on De- 
cember 10, 1898. It followed the Protocol as regards 
Cuba, Puerto Rico and the island in the Ladrones [Guam], 
but it further provided for the cession of the Philippine 
Islands and the payment by the United States to Spain 
of twenty million dollars. Neither the Cuban nor the 
Philippine debt was assumed. McKinley had a difficult 
time in getting his Treaty confirmed by the Senate which 
considered it from January 4 to February 0, 1899, and 
finally ratified it by 57: 'J7, only one vote more than the 
necessary two thirds. Senator Gray sinned the Treaty, 
advocated it in the Senate and afterwards accepted the 
position of judge from President McKinley. Naturally 

1 LAtan6, 
Cotters of Aug. 2, Sept. '.». Life of McKinley, ii. 135. 



Ch. V.] THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION 111 

his after-conduct does not agree with the heretofore 
cited opinion anent taking the Philippines ; but in a news- 
paper interview and in his speech in the Senate for the 
Treaty he explained his change of mind. 1 Both Senators 
Hoar and Hale, Republicans, opposed it, but Bryan came 
to Washington during its pendency and urged enough of 
Democrats to vote for it to secure its ratification. 2 

Two days before the ratification of the Treaty, the Fili- 
pinos, whose leader Aguinaldo was exasperated at the 
non-establishment of a Philippine Republic with him- 
self at the head of it, attacked the American soldiers at 
Manila 3 and war began, which, with an ensuing guerilla 
warfare, continued for more than three years. In truth 
the United States had paid twenty millions for "a white 
elephant." It was " scarcely comprehended," wrote 
Dewey, "that a rebellion was included with the pur- 
chase." 4 It cost the United States to subdue the Philip- 



1 Jan. 20, 1899; Jan. 31, Feb. 1, 1899, New York Tribune. 

2 Life of McKinley, ii. 139; George F. Hoar, Autobiography, ii. 322; 
Latane, 77. 

3 The following I believe to be the truth about the much disputed ques- 
tion, who began the actual hostilities : "About 8.30 on the night of Febru- 
ary 4, four Filipinos approached within five yards of an American outpost 
near the San Juan bridge and, ignoring the command to halt, were fired 
upon by the sentry. A Filipino detachment near by returned the fire 
and the firing soon became general along the entire line. . . . The 
Filipinos at that particular hour were unprepared for attack or defence. 
The expected battle came when they were off their guard, most of the 
higher officers being absent at Malolos." — The Philippines, Charles B. 
Elliott (1916), i. 452. J. A. Le Roy wrote: "The strained condition of 
affairs' between the American and Filipino forces, having reached a climax, 
virtually brought on trouble of itself ; a subordinate Filipino officer, un- 
checked by the discipline of his superiors, was the chief deus ex machina 
of the affray of February 4 ; the American authorities in Manila, having 
taken a more positive stand at the close of that week regarding encroach- 
ments upon their line, let loose the dogs of war they had been holding 
ready, and promptly followed up the provocation given." The Ameri- 
cans in the Philippines (1914), J. A. Le Roy, ii. 16. 

4 Autobiography, 284. 



112 HARRISON'S ADMINISTRATION [1893 

pine insurgents nearly one hundred and seventy millions, 1 
while the cost of the Spanish War was three hundred 
million. 2 The one was attended with glory, the other 
with apology, despite the splendid results accruing from 
our rule. 

Nearly all writers agree that the annexation of Hawaii 3 
was brought on by the Spanish- American War, and by the 
taking of the Philippines. Hawaii, wrote John W. Fos- 
ter, was a link in the chain of our possessions in the Pa- 
cific. 4 Like Cuba it had long been coveted by some Ameri- 
can officials and a crisis occurring in January, 1893, fur- 
nished the fit occasion. "The Hawaiian pear is now fully 
ripe, and this is the golden hour for the United States to 
pluck it," wrote our minister. 5 A revolution, assisted by 
the United States forces, took place ; the corrupt and des- 
potic government of the Queen was overthrown and a 
provisional government established in its place. This 
government at once despatched a Commission to Wash- 
ington with a treaty of annexation which had the thorough 
sympathy of President Harrison, who on Fel unary 14, 
1893, signed it and submitted it to the Senate. The 
Treaty was favorably reported but, before action could 



'Peck, 61") ; Senate. <l,,es, ."ih <.'<>nu l.-i S. ss. no. 416. June 20, 1902. 
2 Lif.- of McKinley, ii. 112. 

'"The Hawaiian Islands constitute a group of several islands in (he 

mi I Pacific having a total area of tiii'.i square mile-. According to the 
United States census of 1900 their total population was 164,001 (or, de- 
ducting '_'7 l persons in the military and naval service >>f the United states, 
153,727). 'The latter number was made up of 61, 122 ( Chinese, 25,7 12 Japan- 
29,83 1 I la v. pari Sawaiians, 28,533 Americans, K)7 South 

Sea [slanders, and 254 " - Willoughby, rerritories and De- 

pendencies of the i inted States, 61. 

4 American l Kplomacv in the I blent, 38 I 

max} i. L893 Prat. Cleveland's message of Dee. 18, 1898. 
Richard on, ix 16 i 



Ch. V.] CLEVELAND — HAWAII 113 

be taken on it, Cleveland became President and during 
March, 1893, withdrew it ; in his special message of De- 
cember 18, 1893, he gave the reason for this withdrawal 
and for his subsequent action. Believing that a grievous 
wrong had been done to the government of the Queen 
by the United States forces, he endeavored to restore her 
to her preexisting power, but his movement was defeated 
by the recalcitrant action of the Queen herself. With 
his sturdy sense of justice Cleveland could do no other 
than permanently to withdraw the treaty of annexation, 
but his attempt to restore the Queen was at the time un- 
popular and does not now merit approval. As the United 
States would not have Hawaii and the Queen's govern- 
ment was impossible, the revolutionary parties estab- 
lished a republican form of government which was recog- 
nized by the Powers, including the United States. This 
new government administered affairs " through a period of 
four years," so John W. Foster 1 wrote, "in which the 
country enjoyed unexampled peace and prosperity. 
Never before in its history had there been such honesty 
in administration, such economy in expenditures, such 
uniform justice in the enforcement of the laws and re- 
spect for the officials, such advance in education and such 
encouragement of commerce and protection to life and 
property." 2 

When McKinley became President Hawaii was annexed 
by joint resolution of Congress. 3 This form was used as 



1 Foster was Secretary of State under Harrison at the time the treaty 
of annexation was presented. 

2 American Diplomacy in the Orient, 381. 

3 A treaty of annexation was signed June 16, 1897, and submitted the 
same day to the Senate, which body removed the injunction of secreoy on 
it the next day. — Senate Jour., 55th Cong. 1st Sess., 181, 183. 



114 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 

doubt existed whether a two-thirds vote for the ratifica- 
tion of a treaty could be secured in the Senate. "What 
is to be thought of a body," wrote John Hay in a pri- 
vate letter from London, "which will not take Hawaii as 
a gift and is clamoring to hold the Philippines?" l But 
on July 7, 1898, Hawaii became part of the United States 
by a two-thirds vote in both Houses, 2 a little over two 
months after Dewey's victory at Manila. 

Had it not been for the foreshadowed policy in regard 
to the Philippines, it was a case of let well enough alone. 
A good government under a republican form was func- 
tioning in Hawaii and it was taking too great a risk to 
annex territory 2089 miles away. 3 

"The story of alternating 'booms' and panics," wrote 
Noyes, "is largely the story of modern industrial prog- 
ress." 4 Those who believe in the periodicity of panics 
and recovery therefrom may note with elation that it 
was twenty years from the panic of 1873 to that of 1893, 
and twenty years from the "boom" of 1879 to that of 
1899. As in the earlier case, recovery began sooner than 
was generally appreciated and is placed by Noyes in the 
middle of 1897. 5 Certain it is that the revival would 
have been in full swing had it not been for the Spanish War. 
War is a disturbing factor in finance and business and, 
when it was declared, no one would have dared to proph- 
esy its brief duration. The "boom" year of 1899 re- 
sembles that of 1S79. Both were the result of recupera- 



1 May 27, 1898, Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 170. 
■ Foster, 383. 

• Authorities : Foster ; Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies 
of the United States; Cleveland's special message of Dec. 18, 1S93; 
Peck. 

* American Finance, 258. 6 P. 262. 



Ch. V.] JOHN PIERPONT MORGAN 115 

tive years after panics and both were attended with large 
crops in the United States, a failure in Europe, or, as 
Noyes expressed it, "A European famine and a bumper 
crop at home," immense exportations of breadstuffs, an 
import of gold and a buying-back of securities which 
Europe had taken in former years. Hay and Adams in 
their walks, discoursed of "the insolent prosperity of the 
United States." x While the dominant characteristics of 
1879 were an advance in the price of pig iron and rail- 
road shares, 1899 was noted for its "boom" in industrials 
and putting railroads on their feet. 

John Pierpont Morgan is the hero of 1899 and of the 
succeeding years, and he came into public notice from his 
reorganization of railroads which had been badly hurt by 
the panic of 1893 and by conditions prevailing before 
and after. While circumstances favored his operations, 
they were really marvellous and may be fully appreciated 
by putting the question whether any other man in the 
country could have accomplished what he did. Not by 
affability and not by any strong hold on public sentiment 
did he work his results ; for he was reticent, taciturn, 
decisive and blunt ; his manner was stern and brusque ; 
endowed with great energy, he was ruthless. He lacked 
a wide range of knowledge, but somehow he arrived 
quickly at decisions involving millions to the amazement 
of the beholder. He rarely read books and, on a con- 
stitutional question, he once displayed an ignorance that 
would have disgraced a College freshman. But the 
apologists for a mathematical training may point to Mor- 
gan as a shining example. From the English High 



Hay, Letters, iii. 140. 



116 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 

School of Boston he went to the University of Gottingen 
where he so distinguished himself in mathematics that 
the professor, under whom he sat, wanted him to remain. 
"You would have been my assistant as long as I lived," 
he said, "and unquestionably at my death you would 
have been appointed professor of mathematics in my 
place." l This incident Morgan used to tell in the day of 
his success with justifiable pride. His action showed 
" precision" and " wariness of mind" which John Stuart 
Mill mentioned as some of the "excellencies of mathe- 
matical discipline." 2 

The railroads had tried competition with the result 
that large numbers of them were in the hands of receivers 
and the sounder ones had difficulty in making both ends 
meet. Morgan substituted combination for competi- 
tion. In the parlance of the street his first name was 
Jupiter and this was properly bestowed, for his word 
was ''I command." Those who wished a reorganiza- 
tion of their railroads must accept his terms; and the 
result proved their justification. A contrast of the con- 
dition of the railroads in 1899 and before that year is 
one between excellent business management and the 
proper payment of interest and dividends, and a cut- 
throat competition that did no one, except perhaps spec- 
ulators, any good. Naturally Morgan added to hi-; 
great reputation of a banker that of a reorganizer of 
railroads. He always bore in mind what his father 
told him. .Junius S. Morgan was one of America's first 

men of business who developed an influential London 

banking house. This was the advice he gave to his son: 



1 Life of Morguu, Hovey, 31G. * See my vol. ii. 333. 



Ch. V.] the steel INDUSTRY 117 

"Remember one thing always. Any man who is a bear 
on the future of the United States will go broke. There 
will be many times when things look dark and cloudy in 
America, when everyone will think there has been over 
development. But remember yourself that the growth of 
that vast country will take care of it all. Always be a 
'bull' on America." l 

Along with the reenhancement of the railroads was 
the revival of industrial conditions. Captains of indus- 
try showed their ability and power and forged to the front 
with their manufactures, so that Europe began to hear of 
what they called the " American invasion." " European 
nations," said the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
"must close their ranks and fight shoulder to shoulder, in 
order successfully to defend their existence." 2 

A conspicuous development was in the steel industry 
which is fully represented in a report of Charles M. 
Schwab, dated May 15, 1899. "I know positively," he 
wrote, "that England cannot produce pig iron at actual 
cost for less than $11.50 per ton, even allowing no profit 
on raw materials, and cannot put pig iron into a rail 
with their most efficient works for less than $7.50 per ton. 
This would make rails at net cost to them of $19.00. We 
can sell at this price and ship abroad so as to net us 
$16.00 at works for foreign business, nearly as good as 
home business has been. ... As a result of this we are 
going to control the steel business of the world. You 
know we can make rails for less than $12.00 per ton, 
leaving a nice margin on foreign business." 3 Schwab 



1 McClure's Magazine, Nov., 1910, 16. 2 Noyes, 273. 

8 The Inside History of the Carnegie Steel Co., Bridge, 314. 



118 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 

was President of the Carnegie Steel Co. and his report 
was to Henry Clay Frick, chairman, his superior officer, 
but both were under Andrew Carnegie, who, despite his 
obvious faults, was the greatest iron master of the world, 
was now at the head of the best equipped steel works and 
could make steel cheaper than anyone else. 

"Between 1893 and 1899 our export of manufactures 
actually doubled." l 

In the old school-books it was set down that the de- 
velopment of a State lay in commerce, manufactures, 
and agriculture. Agriculture was the largest single in- 
terest in the United States and commerce and manu- 
factures owed more to it than it owed to the others. In 
1899 the farmer was prosperous. "Every barn in Kan- 
sas and Nebraska has had a new coat of paint." "For 
anyone," wrote Ray Stannard Baker, "who knew the 
West of 1895 and 1896, with its bare weather-stained 
homes, its dilapidated barns, its farm machinery stand- 
ing out in the rain, its ruinous ' boom ' towns, its discon- 
tented inhabitants crying out for legislation to relieve 
their distress, this bit of observation raises a picture of 
improvement and smiling comfort such as no array of 
figures, however convincing, could produce. The West 
painted again : how much that means ! The farmer has 
provided himself with food in plenty and the means for 
seeding his fields for another year; he has clothed him- 
self and his family anew ; he has bought an improved 
harvester, a buggy and a sewing machine; and now with 
the deliberation which is born of a surplus and a sturdy 
confidence in himself and in the future, he is painting his 

»Noyes, 275. 



Ch. V.] legislation for GOLD 119 

barn. Paint signifies all of these preliminary comforts. 
And after paint comes a new front porch, a piano and the 
boys off to college." l Baker might have added that 
cancelled farm mortgages were reckoned by the carload. 2 

Since the campaign of 1896, there had been an enor- 
mous increase in the production of gold so that circum- 
stances were ripe for the Republicans to fulfil the prom- 
ises they had made in their platform of 1896 and during 
that lively canvass. Unquestionably the gold Demo- 
crats, who had supported McKinley, were disappointed 
that financial legislation was not enacted as the result of 
his victory, but those who believed in a protective tariff 
dominated the councils of the party and before they 
tackled the subject of finance they felt that the tariff de- 
manded their attention: hence the Dingley Tariff Bill. 
McKinley and his immediate advisers had come to be- 
lieve in a gold standard and were right in their convic- 
tion that a better law could be later secured than in 
1897. But this conviction was based on the education 
of their party, as they could not have foreseen how Na- 
ture was going to work on their side. 

On March 14, 1900, a law was enacted declaring the 
gold dollar to be the standard unit of value. It provided 
that " United States notes [greenbacks] and Treasury 
notes" issued under the Act of 1890 " shall be redeemed 
in gold coin ; and, in order to secure the prompt and cer- 
tain redemption of such notes, it shall be the duty of the 
Secretary of the Treasury to set apart a reserve fund of 



1 Ray Stannard Baker, The New Prosperity, McClure's Magazine, 
May, 1900, 86. 

1 In addition to authorities already cited, I have used The Nation for 
1899, and conversations with Mark Hanna and J. P. Morgan. 



120 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 

one hundred and fifty millions in gold, which fund shall 
be used for such redemption purposes only." If that 
fund should fall below one hundred millions it should be 
the duty of the Secretary of the Treasury to replenish it 
to the maximum sum of one hundred and fifty millions, 
by the sale of three per cent bonds, of which the interest 
and principal should be payable in gold. The proceeds 
of these bonds should not "be used to meet deficiencies 
in the current revenues." United States notes, when re- 
deemed and reissued, should be held "in the reserve 
fund until exchanged for gold." The legal tender quality 
of the silver dollar was unaffected. 1 

During the summer of 1900 affairs in China claimed 
the attention of the State Department, and Hay as its 
head directed the admirable course of the United States, 
showing great ability in state-craft. 

John Hay, as he gave an account of himself, "was born 
in Indiana, grew up in Illinois, was educated in Rhode 
Island. I learned my law," he continued, "in Spring- 
field and my politics in Washington, my diplomacy in 
Europe, Asia and Africa." - He had an innate sense of 
refinement but his cultivated manner never obscured his 
Western raciness. He loved society and talk. Residing 
ten years in Cleveland, he organized a dinner club, 
called the Vampire, of which he was the life. Hay used 
to come to the dinners primed with circumstances and 
anecdotes and, eating and drinking little, he gave him- 
self up to talk and was listened to with Interest and de- 
light. Not infrequently one of the wits of the club 



1 I . S St.'itutos. xvxi. I A. 
1 Life of Ilay, Thayer, i. 2. 




C 'u I'l/rii/h! Ou Pa&l Bnl/Urt. 





Ch. V.] JOHN HAY 121 

would prod Hay and, with his rare sense of humor a 
witticism of the sort served for an additional display. 
Occasionally he would fall into a serious strain and talk 
of political events or his acquaintances in New York or 
England, but always replete with intelligence. Some- 
times, although with seeming reluctance, he would speak 
of his work on Lincoln, on which he was then engaged, 
and the business men, who gathered at that round table, 
were eager to hear of the processes of a live author. But 
it was a common remark that he never repeated himself. 

" What things have we seen 
Done at the Mermaid [Union Club of Cleveland] heard words that 

have been 
So nimble and so full of subtile flame." 

"There is no longer the play of wit and raillery," 
wrote Professor Matthews, ''the brilliancy, the concen- 
tration, the rapid glancing at a hundred subjects in suc- 
cession, which there used to be in the attic nights of John- 
son, Burke, Garrick and Sheridan." l But had the 
Professor dined with the Vampire, when Hay was at his 
best, he might have thought it an attic night. 

Hay was the soul of the club and when in 1879 he felt 
compelled to accept the position of Assistant Secretary 
of State, offered him by William M. Evarts, he left a 
void, which, although the dinners went on, was not filled 
until his return to Cleveland, when he was welcomed 
with glee. 

Hay was not a trained historian in the way of knowing 
thoroughly the masters of the art. He did not read with 
rapt attention Gibbon, Macaulay, Parkman or any other 



iThe Great Conversers (1874), 42. 



122 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 

historian except Henry Adams. He was apt to have at 
hand some high class French novel or Memoirs. He was 
especially fond of Tourgu6neff. Is there in literature, 
he asked, such another story of a suicide so dramatically 
told, as that of Nejdanof in Terres Viorges? During a 
long acquaintance I never heard him talk of historians 
except of his friend Henry Adams, but he had at his 
tongue's end what we used to call belles-lettres and his 
conversation thereon was a profit and delight. In his 
familiar letters written to his coadjutor Nicolay in re- 
gard to the History, when he spoke of condensation or 
the troubles of narration, there is never a question how 
Macaulay or Parkman would have treated the one or 
solved the other. We "must seize every chance to con- 
dense," he wrote. "We could cut down a good deal and 
present what would be a continuous narrative in about 
half the space we have taken for our book." ' Unques- 
tionably had he followed out this idea, the History would 
have been more popular and less criticized. 

Although Hay did not possess the power of generaliza- 
tion of Gibbon he had two qualities invaluable for a his- 
torian — that of narration and a skepticism that influ- 
enced in a marked degree his judgment of men and of 
events. And no writers in America ever had more price- 
less material. As private secretaries of Lincoln, feeling 
that he was the central figure of the time, thinking that 
some day they might write a history of these eventful 
years, they made memoranda and garnered up their im- 
pressions. Robert T. Lincoln, the President's son, had 
a large body of material which he placed at their dis- 



1 Thayer, ii. 28, 35. 






Ch. V.] JOHN HAY 123 

posal. The two merits which Gibbon ascribed as those 
of a historian, diligence and accuracy, they possessed. 
The ten volumes of the History testify to their diligence ; 
that they rarely, if ever, failed in the correctness of a quo- 
tation or a reference is a warrant of their accuracy. 

Hay was a partisan and he carried partisanship into 
his historical work, but he aimed at impartiality. "We 
ought to write," he said, "the history of those times like 
two everlasting angels who know everything, judge every- 
thing, tell the truth about everything, and don't care a 
twang of their harps about one side or the other." Yet 
in the same letter he wrote, "I am of that age and im- 
bued with all its prejudices," and "We are Lincoln men 
all through." * Therein lay an unconscious partisanship. 
Nicolay and Hay made Lincoln out a saint and, when he 
came into contact with other men, the saint was always 
right. 

"No man," Hay wrote in a private letter, "can be a 
great historian who is not a good fellow." A "good fel- 
low," a genuine man was Hay in every respect. 

An earnest Republican, he took great interest in poli- 
tics and cooperated with the managers of the Republican 
cause in Ohio and in the country at large. Those who 
knew him best thought that, until McKinley appointed 
him in 1897, his ability was not appreciated by those high 
in power, as the offers to him of office were below his 
merits. He helped Hanna in the nomination of McKin- 
ley and when McKinley was elected, among the large 
number of well-backed aspirants for the English mission, 
Hanna's voice was for Hay; as Hay jocosely wrote, 

1 Thayer, ii. 33. 



124 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1899 

"Hanna is a good judge of men and he recognizes infalli- 
bility when he sees it." McKinley named him Ambassa- 
dor to Great Britain, a position which pleased him im- 
mensely and which he was abundantly qualified to fill. 

McKinley and Hay took to one another, drawn to- 
gether by an innate sense of refinement, for McKinley 
appreciated culture. Hay was decidedly a cultivated 
man. His natural propensity for culture was fostered 
by the reading of books and by mingling in the best 
society. Having a notable aptitude for acquiring knowl- 
edge at second hand he used this knowledge in his talk 
with wonderful skill. Always meeting interesting peo- 
ple he absorbed incidents that in turn set off his own con- 
versation. He loved wit and humor and any manifes- 
tation of them was to his latest day a passport to his favor. 
He was a remarkable dinner-table talker and, in a dis- 
cussion of the subject, a man of wide experience could 
think only of two shining lights of Boston and Cambridge 
who were his equal or superior. 

In August, 1898, McKinley offered Hay the position of 
Secretary of State for which he had no wish, as he would 
have preferred to remain Ambassador to Great Britain. 1 
Thus he wrote during September to his brother-in-law : 
"I did not want the place and was greatly grieved and 
shocked when it came — but of course I could not refuse 
to do the best I could. It was impossible, after the Presi- 
dent had been so generous, to pick and choose, and say, 
'I will have this and not that.' But I look forward to the 
next year with gloomy forebodings." 2 



•The Education of Henry Adams, 3G1 ; Life <»f II. iy. Thayer, ii. 173 

rt •"/. 

■ Thayer, ii. 183. 






Ch. V.] CHINA 125 

The correspondence between McKinley and Hay, when 
Hay's first canal treaty was rejected by the Senate, is 
honorable to them both. Hay showed consideration for 
the President in offering his resignation and McKinley in 
declining it, affirmed his loyalty to his Secretary of State. 
"Your administration of the State Department," he 
wrote, "has had my warm approval. As in all matters 
you have taken my counsel, I will cheerfully bear what- 
ever criticism or condemnation may come." 1 In his sym- 
pathetic eulogy delivered before the Congress, Hay rose 
to a sublime height, as he depicted the ability, moral 
greatness and success of his master. His countenance 
was the picture of his mind and heart. "His face," he 
said, "was cast in a classic mold; you see faces like it 
in antique marble, in the galleries of the Vatican ; . . .his 
voice was the voice of the perfect orator." 2 

China, devoted to Oriental civilization, did not wish 
for Western modern improvements, had no desire for 
railroads and telegraphs, the importation of English and 
American cotton fabrics and of American petroleum. 
She could see no use in them ; they disturbed her calcu- 
lations and her mode of life; she was satisfied to be let 
alone. To the European nations she seemed inert — a 
fat goose for the plucking — and therefore, on one ac- 
count and another, these foreign nations claimed and ob- 
tained "spheres of influence or interest." Especially 
was this the case with Great Britain, Germany and Rus- 
sia, and, from their point of view, such spheres in China 
were economically and politically like their own terri- 
tory. The China trade was important to the United 



1 Thayer, ii. 228. 

2 Memorial Address, Feb. 27, 1902. 






126 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 

States and the American manufacturers desired part of 
the consumption of the three hundred and fifty million 
Chinese. Did these nations adopt preferential tariffs in 
their spheres of interest, the American manufacturers 
would suffer, and for aid they looked to the State De- 
partment which was alive to the situation. 

On September 6, 1899, Hay addressed a note to Great 
Britain in which his English predilection tallied with her 
traditional and declared policy for freedom of trade, and 
he asked her to maintain the "open door" policy which 
meant that the commerce and navigation of the world 
should receive equality of treatment within the "spheres 
of influence or interest." On the same day, he addressed 
notes to Germany and Russia pleading to these protec- 
tive tariff countries for the "open door" policy within 
their spheres of interest, although to them he did not use 
the term "open door." On November 30 England re- 
plied that she would declare for the "open door" pro- 
vided that the other powers concerned would do likewise. 
During December Germany and Russia answered, af- 
firming the principle under like conditions. Meanwhile 
Hay addressed similar notes to Japan, France and Italy, 
from all of whom he received satisfactory answers. This 
led to his note of March 20, 1900, to the several six na- 
tions, giving the course of his negotiations and saying 
that as each nation had "accepted the declaration sug- 
gested by the United States concerning foreign trade in 
China" he considered the assent of each one addressed 
"as final and definitive." ' Hay's sanguine anticipations 
were substantially realised. 



1 Corr. concerning Amer. Commercial Rights in China, Foreign Rela- 
tions, 1899. 



Ch. V.] THE BOXER UPRISING 127 

But the game of grab had received a check. The worm 
trodden on will turn. Before 1900, there were mutter- 
ings of the coming storm which is known as the Boxer 
uprising. The Boxers were a secret Chinese society 
and their name may be freely translated as "The Fist of 
Righteous Harmony." Sir Robert Hart "looked upon 
the Boxer movement as a national and patriotic one for 
freeing China of the foreigners to whom, rightly or 
wrongly, is attributed all the country's misfortunes dur- 
ing the last half century." * Hart was properly called by 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica, an Anglo-Chinese states- 
man and his remark was made after the suppression of 
the uprising which had individually cost him much; it 
stated a condition that the Boxers, dominated by the fa- 
natics, sought to remedy, but the remedy was worse than 
the disease. The Empress Dowager who sympathized 
with the fanatical Boxers said in a secret edict, "The va- 
rious powers cast upon us looks of tigerlike voracity, hus- 
tling each other in their endeavors to be the first to seize 
upon our innermost territories." 2 A Chinese politician 
declared that the Boxer movement "was due to the deep- 
seated hatred of the Chinese people towards foreigners. 
China had been oppressed, trampled upon, coerced, ca- 
joled, her territory taken, her usages flouted." 3 While 
this feeling against foreigners as such was undoubtedly 
the main cause of the Boxer uprising, it was mixed with 
antagonism toward Christian missionaries who were try- 
ing to convert the Chinese to an alien religion. Mate- 
rial conditions likewise fostered the movement. In De- 



1 Foreign Relations, 1900, 207. 

* Nov. 21, 1899. Foreign Relations, 1900, 85. 

* J. W. Foster, Amer. Diplomacy in the Orient, 416. 



128 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1900 

cember, 1899, our minister E. H. Conger wrote to John 
Hay, "Crops have failed on account of the drought; 
great poverty and want prevail." 1 Little wonder was it 
that a placard was issued saying, "The Roman Catholic 
and Protestant religions have ruined and destroyed 
Buddhism. Their adherents . . . have irritated heaven 
and in consequence no rain has fallen. ... If foreigners 
are not swept away no rain will fall." 2 Swayed by these 
different impulses the Peking Boxers attacked the foreign 
legations. On June 11, 1900, Conger wrote to Hay : "We 
are besieged in Peking, entirely cut off from outside com- 
munication. ... In a civilized country of course there 
would be no question as to our safety, but here, with prac- 
tically no government, and the army only a mutinous 
horde of savage ruffians, there can be no predicting what 
they may attempt." 3 Ordinarily, government soldiers 
would protect foreign legations but in this case the armed 
Boxers, who were looked upon as patriots, were assisted 
by the Imperial troops. The entire city of Peking, wrote 
Conger on June 15, is "in the possession of a rioting, mur- 
dering mob, with no visible effort being made by the gov- 
ernment in any way to restrain it." 4 Five days later 
the German Minister, who had ventured out on an official 
errand, was murdered. Nearly all the foreigners repaired 
to the British legation, which was made a veritable for- 
tress; their lines of defence were quickly shortened and 
straightened ; trenches and barricades were built. "The 
Chinese army," related Conger on August 17 after relief 
came, "had turned out against us; the whole quarter of 



1 h. :. L8Q0 Foreign Relations, 1900, 77. 

•-■ \m 80, L900, Foreign Relations, 128. 'Ibid., 145. 

4 Foreign Relations, i"> t. 



Ch. V.] THE BOXER UPRISING 129 

the city in which the legations are situated was sur- 
rounded by its soldiers, firing began on all sides and the 
battle against the representatives of all foreign govern- 
ments in China was begun. . . . Until July 17 there 
was scarcely an hour during which there was not firing 
upon some part of our lines . . . varying from a single 
shot to a general and continuous attack along the whole 
line. Artillery was planted on all sides of us." l 

Culminating by July 17, a thrill of horror ran through 
Europe and the United States at the idea that the lega- 
tions to an ostensibly friendly country were besieged and 
in danger of massacre. London, Paris and Berlin be- 
lieving that the worst had happened, mourned for those 
who had suffered this conjectured untimely fate. On 
July 16 it was stated in the House of Commons that the 
government entertained ' ' no further hope for the safety 
of the foreign community in Peking." The London 
Times, the most conspicuous journal in Europe, which con- 
tained this news, printed in the same issue conventional 
eulogies of the British Minister, of the Times correspond- 
ent and of Sir Robert Hart, and gave a list of British 
officials and others who were in the Chinese capital. 
While those connected with the American press were in- 
clined to the belief of their confreres over the sea, the Chi- 
nese Minister in Washington, Wu, Secretary John Hay and 
President McKinley doubted the story of a general mas- 
sacre. Amid a period of excitement Hay and McKin- 
ley did not lose their heads and cooperated in efforts to 
relieve the suffering garrison. Hay was determined to 
get correct news and through Minister Wu sent a des- 



1 Foreign Relations, 162. 



130 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 

patch to Conger on July 11, "Communicate tidings 
bearer." Conger replied under date of July 16, received 
in Washington four days later : "For one month we have 
been besieged in British legation under continued shot 
and shell from Chinese troops. Quick relief only can pre- 
vent general massacre." l Five days later (not received 
in Washington until August 5) Conger telegraphed 
through the Consul-General at Shanghai: "All well. 
No fighting since 16th by agreement. Enough provi- 
sions; little ammunition. Hope for speedy relief." 2 In 
his despatch of July 21, Conger was somewhat too op- 
timistic as the situation was one of ebb and flow. Nev- 
ertheless relief was at hand and he had the satisfaction 
of announcing on August 14, "We are safe." 3 

The occupying forces 4 restored order and organized a 
provincial administration, which gave way eventually 
to a reestablished Chinese government. Protracted ne- 
gotiations followed, with the result that suitable punish- 
ment was meted out to the guilty and an indemnity in a 
lump sum agreed upon. The success of President 
McKinley and Secretary Hay lay in their confidence in the 
Southern viceroys. As Hay said in his eulogy on McKin- 



1 Foreign Relations, 155, 156. "Your telegram was the first communi- 
cation received by anyone from outside since the siege began and mine 
the first sent out." Conner to Hav, ibid., 161. 

> Ibid., 156. 

5 Ibid., 160. The paraphrase of Conger's message of Aug. 17 ran: "Ex- 
cepting the Imperial palace the entire city is occupied by 2000 Americans, 
2000 British, 3000 Russians, 8000 Japanese and 200 French and is being 
apportioned for police supervision. The Chinese army has fled. The 
Imperial family and court have gone westward. . . . There are no rep- 
resentative* of the. Chinese government in sight. The palace will b« 
taken at once. . . . Conditions chaotic." It must be noted that our rapid 
action of relief wa« due to our having troops in the Philippines. 

* For what the occupying forces were which relieved the foreign com- 
munity in Peking, see note 3. 



Ch. V.] PEACE WITH CHINA 131 

ley, " While the legations were fighting for their lives 
against bands of infuriated fanatics, the President de- 
cided that we were at peace with China ; and while that 
conclusion did not hinder him from taking the most en- 
ergetic measures to rescue our imperilled citizens, it en- 
abled him to maintain close and friendly relations with 
the wise and heroic viceroys of the south, whose reso- 
lute stand saved that ancient Empire from anarchy and 
spoliation." 1 They also believed Minister Wu ; and their 
voices, as friends of China, were for the preservation of 
her integrity and for moderation in every respect. 
"Hay's achievement," wrote Thayer, "in this Chinese 
contest gave him an immense prestige. Throughout the 
world he was now looked upon as a statesman, honest, 
disinterested, resourceful and brilliant." 2 Reference is 
had to the "open door" correspondence as well as to his 
conduct during the Boxer uprising ; lapse of time con- 
firms fully this effective statement. The brother Vam- 
pires who listened to Hay's brilliant talk when he was 
forty were not surprised at the development of his parts 
until he became Secretary of State. They were prepared 
for the History, knew that he would be an excellent Am- 
bassador to Great Britain, but were amazed at the able 
statecraft he displayed in handling Chinese affairs. 3 



1 Addresses, 1G2. 

2 Life of Hay, ii. 249. 

3 Authorities : Foreign Relations, 1900 ; Life of Hay, Thayer ; Life of 
McKinley, Olcott; President's Messages of Dec. 1900 and Dec. 1901; 
Peck. 



CHAPTER VI 

President making was a concern of the year 1900, 
which in this case meant practically the action of the Re- 
publican Convention that assembled in Philadelphia dur- 
ing June. There was no difference as to the presidential 
candidate, none as to the platform. According to the 
prevailing sentiment McKinley had deserved well of the 
party and the country, and was entitled to another term. 
The platform was on the point-with-pride order and glo- 
ried in the achievements of the Republican party. Mer- 
ited indeed was all that it said about the Republican 
opposition to the free coinage of silver and the preserva- 
tion of the gold standard ; for the action of the Republi- 
can party had been in line with what believers in sound 
money advocated. While the platform commended the 
foreign policy of the President it could not ignore entirely 
the bloody suppression of the Philippine rebellion which 
was still on foot, so that the statement regarding the 
Philippines limped and took no account of patent facts 
as I have stated them. The platform was adopted with 
unanimity; there is not "a particle of objection to it," 
a delegate from New Jersey declared, 1 and he spoke the 
unanimous voice of the Convention. 

The nomination of McKinley and the platform had 
practically been decided by public opinion freely ex- 
pressed in various way.- in :i [ire-convention canvass, and 
traversed Ostrogorski's statement thai a National Con- 
vention is "a colossal travesty of popular institutions." 2 



1 < MBoial Proceeding* of the Etepub. Nat. Com. of 1900, Ms i ii. 278. 

182 



Ch. VI.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 133 

The Convention and the Republican party were well repre- 
sented in the words of Theodore Roosevelt, a delegate 
at large from New York State, who seconded McKinley's 
nomination. "We nominate President McKinley," he 
said, " because he stands indeed for honesty at home 
and for honor abroad ; because he stands for the contin- 
uance of the material prosperity which has brought com- 
fort to every home in the Union ; and because he stands 
for that kind of policy which consists in making perform- 
ance square with promise." l 

The whole ticket of 1896 could not be renominated as 
Hobart, the Vice-President, had during the year previous 
passed away. A new candidate must therefore be chosen 
and the convention is remarkable for its choice. The 
services of Theodore Roosevelt during the Spanish- 
American War made him Governor of New York State, 
where he came into collision with Senator Piatt and the 
Republican organization who were influenced by "the 
big corporation men." 2 Roosevelt desired a renomina- 
tion for governor by the New York State Convention, 
which would be held subsequent to the National Con- 
vention in Philadelphia, as the governorship interested 
him and he had policies which he desired to perfect and 
carry out ; and he did not want to be sidetracked as 
Vice-President. He positively declined a number of 
times to be a candidate for that office. Hanna regarded 
Roosevelt as erratic and "unsafe" and was emphatically 
opposed to his nomination as Vice-President. The natu- 
ral antagonism between the two became publicly known 
at this Convention. Hanna was for the old order with an 



Official Proceedings, 119. 2 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 110. 



134 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 

important modification, Roosevelt for the new. And 
President McKinley in an unobtrusive way let it be 
known that he did not want Roosevelt as a running mate. 
Roosevelt arrived in Philadelphia on Saturday, June 16, 
and next day had an interview with Hanna, in which he 
said frankly to the Senator, "I am not a candidate for 
Vice-President and I don't want the nomination. What 
I want is to be Governor of New York." l Roosevelt's 
own account of the matter may be set down as true his- 
tory : "Senator Hanna appeared on the surface to have 
control of the Convention. He was anxious that I should 
not be nominated as Vice-President. Senator Piatt was 
anxious that I should be nominated as Vice-President 
in order to get me out of the New York Governorship. . . . 
My supporters in New York State did not wish me nom- 
inated for Vice-President because they wished me to con- 
tinue as Governor ; but in every other State all the people 
who admired me were bound that I should be nominated 
as Vice-President." 2 A supplement to this is a telephone 
despatch to President McKinley which reached him late 
on Sunday evening, June 17: "The Roosevelt boom is 
let loose and it has swept everything. It starts with the 
support of Pennsylvania and New York practically solid 
and with California and Colorado back of it also. The 
feeling is that the thing is going pell-mell like a tidal 
wave." 3 

On this Sunday Hanna and Roosevelt failed to reckon 
the strength of popular sentiment. Roosevelt, on ac- 



1 OI<-,,tt, ii. 275. 'Autobiography, 882. 

•Oloott, ii. 271. In the midst of tin- r\ritrnn-iit Mrs. EtobmSOO, who 

hud hastened to Philadelphia at Roosevell a request . found him in his hotel 
room reading flu- "History of Josephus." My Brother, T.Roosevelt, 
Mrs. Robinson, 1%. 



Ch. VI.] ROOSEVELT VICE-PRESIDENT 136 

count of his course during the Spanish-American War 
and the governorship of New York was one of the most 
popular men in the country especially in the West, of 
the inhabitants of which he was fond. He could not 
ignore the manifestation in his favor and was forced to 
bow to the will of the people thus expressed. McKinley 
also arrived at the same opinion by the Tuesday and thus 
telephoned: "The President's close friends must not 
undertake to commit the Administration to any candi- 
date. It has no candidate. The convention must make 
the nomination ; the Administration would not if it could. 
The President's close friends should be satisfied with his 
unanimous nomination and not interfere with the vice- 
presidential nomination. The Administration wants the 
choice of the convention and the President's friends must 
not dictate to the convention." 1 As soon as Hanna 
knew of the President's wishes, he abandoned his oppo- 
sition and favored unanimity. This was effected on 
Thursday, June 21 ; Roosevelt received on the ballot 
taken the vote of every delegate except his own. 2 

The Democratic Convention was held in Kansas City 
on July 4. Bryan had made so gallant a fight four years 
previously that no one else was talked of for presidential 
candidate. He had the nomination for the asking and 
he purposed dictating the policy of his party. His article 
in the North American Review for June showed what 
was passing in his mind. "The issue presented in the 
campaign of 1900," he wrote, "is the issue between plutoc- 



1 Olcott, ii. 279. 

2 Besides the Life of McKinley and Roosevelt's Autobiography I have 
used freely the Life of Hanna by Croly, and the Official Proceedings. I 
have also consulted The Nation, passim; the Life of Foraker, ii. ; Piatt's 
Autobiography, chap. xix. 



136 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 

racy and democracy. All the questions under discussion 
will, in their last analysis, disclose the conflict between 
the dollar and the man." Later on he came to details. 
" To-day," he wrote, " three questions contest for primacy 
— the money question, the trust question and imperial- 
ism." l In placing the money question to the fore, Bryan 
displayed greater consistency than wisdom, but as he 
had made the contest of 1896 on the remonetization of 
silver on the basis of 16 : 1, he was determined that the 
question should not now be ignored. He dominated 
the committee on resolutions and the Convention in Kan- 
sas City. They therefore demanded the "free and un- 
limited coinage of silver ... at the present legal ratio 
of 16 : 1 without waiting for the aid or consent of any other 
nation"; but in an earlier resolution they declared that 
"the burning issue of imperialism" was the paramount 
one of the campaign. 

On the first ballot Bryan was unanimously nominated 
for President and at Indianapolis on August 8 accepted 
the nomination in what he regarded "as one of the most 
if not the most important of his political speeches." The 
speech in the authorized volume "revised and arranged 
by himself" is entitled "Imperialism" and is mainly 
devoted to the Republican management of the Philip- 
pines. 

The Philippine Islands were acquired as the result of 
the Treaty with Spain and it was a well-known fact that 
the Treaty could not have beeD ratified without Demo- 
cratic votes. This is tersely Btated by Senator Hoar in 
his Autobiography. "Seventeen of the followers of Mr. 

1 Pp. 753, 758. 



Ch. VI. 1 WILLIAM J. BRYAN 137 

Bryan voted for the Treaty. 1 The Treaty would have 
been defeated, not only lacking the needful two-thirds 
but by a majority of the Senate but for the votes of Dem- 
ocrats and Populists. Mr. Bryan in the height of the 
contest came to Washington for the express purpose of 
urging upon his followers that it was best to support the 
Treaty, end the war, and let the question of what should 
be done with our conquest be settled in the coming cam- 
paign." 2 In his speech on "Imperialism," Bryan ac- 
knowledged the truth of this statement, defended his 
position in a careful argument, and then addressed him- 
self to the question, What should we do with the Philip- 
pines ? He and the Democratic party say, treat the Fili- 
pinos as we have promised to treat the Cubans. Why 
ought not the Filipinos "of right to be free and indepen- 
dent" as well as the Cubans? Admiral Dewey reported 
that the Filipinos were more capable of self-government 
than the Cubans, and Bryan stated plainly his purpose. 
"If elected," he said, "I will convene Congress in ex- 
traordinary session as soon as inaugurated and recommend 
an immediate declaration of the nation's purpose, first, 
to establish a stable form of government in the Philippine 
Islands, just as we are now establishing a stable form of 
government in Cuba; second, to give independence to 
the Filipinos as we have promised to give independence 
to the Cubans ; third, to protect the Filipinos from out- 
side interference while they work out their destiny just 
as we have protected the republics of Central and South 
America, and are, by the Monroe Doctrine pledged to 



1 Ten of these were Democrats. 

*ii. 322. This has been briefly stated in chap. v. 



138 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 

protect Cuba." * Bryan enforced his argument by a 
poetical citation : 

" Would we tread in the paths of tyranny, 
Nor reckon the tyrant's cost? 
Who taketh another's liberty 
His freedom is also lost. 
Would we win as the strong have ever won, 
Make ready to pay the debt, 
For the God who reigned over Babylon 
Is the God who is reigning yet." 2 

The important printed contributions to the campaign 
are this speech of Bryan's and McKinley's letter of ac- 
ceptance of September 8 ; of this two-thirds are devoted 
to the Philippines and a defence of his management. The 
letter is in effect a reply to the speech and on the whole 
may be deemed an effective answer. The majority of 
voters probably thought so, although the quotable por- 
tions of McKinley's speech of July 12 may have had the 
greater influence. We have fulfilled the pledges we made 
in 1890, he declared, "We have prosperity at home and 
prestige abroad," yet by the action of the Democratic 
party, "the menace of 1G : 1 still hangs over us. The 
Philippines are ours and American authority must be 
supreme throughout the archipelago. . . . There must be 
no scuttle policy." "No blow has boon struck except for 
liberty and humanity and none will be." The Republi- 
can party "broke the shackles of 4,000,000 slaves" and now 
it has liberated 10. (Hid. 000 "from the yoke of imperial- 
ism." 3 Kipling's words fepresenl McKinley's action : 



1 Speeches, ii. 16. 

5 In ft oourteou letter to D, M. Matteaon, Willi ■mi .1. Bryan says the 
citation we from a poem written : \. I dgerton. 

Official Proceedings, pp. 1 18, 1 19, 160. 



Ch. VI.] THE CONTEST OF 1900 139 

"Take up the White Man's burden . . . 



By open speech and simple 
An hundred times made plain, 
To seek another's profit, 
And work another's gain." 

The decisive jury was the thirteen and a half million 
voters. The logical result of Democratic policy was to 
turn over the Philippines to Aguinaldo and his associates, 
and there were many who thought as did Senator Lodge, 
the permanent chairman of the Republican convention, 
that Aguinaldo was "a self-seeking adventurer and 
usurper." While the bloody suppression of the Philip- 
pine rebellion militated against Republican success, there 
seemed no other way out. Even if we had an undesir- 
able acquisition, it was ours and our authority must be 
preserved. 

McKinley and Hay, who took an eager though imper- 
sonal l view of the contest, were solicitous that Hanna 
should continue as chairman of the Republican National 
Committee and, when he decided to do so, the President 
wrote to him: "I am delighted that you have accepted 
the chairmanship of the National Committee. It is a 
great task and will be to you a great sacrifice." 2 As we 
see it now, the election of McKinley appeared a foregone 
conclusion, but during the canvass there was anxiety 
among the knowing ones. On September 25 Hay wrote 
to Henry Adams : "Hanna has been crying wolf all sum- 
mer, and he has been much derided for his fears, but now 
everybody shares them. Bryan comes out a frank an- 
archist again in his letter of acceptance ; and Mitchell 



1 See letter to Samuel Mather, Life by Thayer, ii. 254. 2 Croly, 319. 



140 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 

with his coal strike has thrown at least a hundred thou- 
sand votes to him." • The anthracite coal strike dis- 
turbed Hanna and he used his influence with the coal 
operators to get it settled before election. 2 

Hanna was unquestionably the chief man on the Re- 
publican side. All of his executive ability and his knack 
at raising money were exercised in behalf of his candi- 
date and party. So far, it was 1S96 over again, but he 
had learned to make effective speeches on the stump and, 
as he was much in demand from the several committees, 
he appeared before many audiences throughout the coun- 
try. The burden of his talk was that Republican suc- 
cess and administration had given prosperity to the man- 
ufacturer, merchant and financier, and the full dinner 
pail to the laborer. His more effective work was through 
his personality. Westerners beyond Ohio had the idea 
that he was a "bloated millionaire," ami when they came 
to see a man of easy bearing, of democratic ways, placing 
himself on a par with the common man and hear his rough 
speech adapted to their easy comprehension, they were 
converted to the Hanna cult. "This trip," wrote Croly 
with singular penetration, "helped to make Mr. Hanna 
personally popular throughout the West, just as his first 
stumping tour in Ohio had made him personally popular 
in his own State. As soon as he became known, the vir- 
ulence and malignity with which he had been abused 
reacted in his fa\<u\ When he appeared on the platform, 
the crowd, instead of seeing a monster, found him to be 
just the kind of man whom Americans best understand 



1 Letter Pi irately Printed, iii. 1 98 
i ly, 828; 1 '■ ' .. Not. i, 1000, 843 



Ch. VI.] MARK HANNA 141 

and most heartily like. He was not separated from them 
by differences of standards and tastes or by any intellec- 
tual or professional sophistication. The roughness of 
much of his public speaking and its lack of form which 
makes it comparatively poor reading, were an essential 
part of its actual success. He stamped himself on his 
speeches just as he had stamped himself upon his busi- 
ness. His audiences had to pass judgment on the man 
more than on the message and the man could not but 
look good to them." 1 

11 1 have never wondered," said Senator Dolliver of Iowa, 
"as so many have, that Hanna suddenly developed into a 
great orator. ... I was present in 1900 at the stock yards 
in Chicago when I had a glimpse of the colossal personal- 
ity of this man which made a very profound impression 
on my mind. We took him down there to speak to the 
working people of Chicago, and curiously enough — a 
very strange anomaly under institutions like ours — a 
large part of the audience had assembled there, not to 
listen to him but to prevent him from speaking; and 
with noise, riot, tumult, disturbance, and breach of peace 
. . . that surging multitude for one hour and thirty 
minutes fought an unequal battle with the genius of a 
single man ; and at 10 o'clock, the audience calmed, con- 
trolled, fascinated, he began one of the most remarkable 
political speeches it was ever my good fortune to hear." 2 

Next in importance was Roosevelt's stumping. If we 
may judge his speeches by his letter of acceptance, he 
defended Republican policy and administration. He in- 
sisted that the remonetization of silver meant disaster, 



1 P. 340. 2 Address, April 7, 1904. 



142 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 

and that our acquisition of new provinces was in the line 
of national development ; it meant expansion and not 
"imperialism or militarism." ! He added strength to the 
ticket and his appearance and manner increased his strong 
personal popularity. "His attitude as speaker," wrote 
Thayer, "his gestures, the way in which his pent-up 
thoughts seemed almost to strangle him before he could 
utter them, his smile showing the white rows of teeth, 
his fist clenched as if to strike an invisible adversary, 
the sudden dropping of his voice, and levelling of his fore- 
finger as he became almost conversational in tone, and 
seemed to address special individuals in the crowd before 
him, the strokes of sarcasm, stern and cutting, and the 
swift flashes of humor which set the great multitude in 
a roar, became in that summer and autumn familiar to 
millions of his countrymen ; and the cartoonists made 
his features and gestures familiar to many other millions." 2 
As was the case four years previously, Bryan was in- 
defatigable on the stump. By his and the Democratic 
criticism of the Republican management of the Philip- 
pines, he gained the support of the anti-Imperialists, at 
the head of whom was Carl Schurz, but as The Nation 
remarked on another occasion, "Those who sup with the 
devil, even with a long spoon, are sure to have to swallow 
a nauseous portion at the end." 3 Bryan had the cordial 
support of Tammany Ball and showed his appreciation 
of it when h< v came to New York, declaring "Great is 
Tammanyl And Croker is its prophet." This disgusted 
Carl Schurz. who wrote. "Bah! Wasn'1 it awful!" 4 



1 ( official IV ,180 

1 i: ivelt, LSI. 'June 28, 1900, 

* KiMiniii icenoea, iii. 1 17. 



Ch. VI.] THE ELECTION OF 1900 143 

Despite the strength of the cause and the candidates, 
there will be hours of depression among those destined 
to victory. While 1900 must be put down as a year of 
prosperity, there were weeks when business halted owing 
partly to a reaction from the flush times of 1899, partly 
to the depression usual in a presidential year and partly 
to a real alarm by financiers at the prospect of Bryan's 
success. His policy was distrusted and his administra- 
tive power feared. This feeling is well reflected in John 
Hay's private letter of October 31 : "This last week of 
the campaign is getting on everybody's nerves. There 
is a vague uneasiness among Republicans, which there 
is nothing in the elaborate canvasses of the Committee 
to account for. I do not believe defeat to be possible, 
though it is evident that this last month of Bryan, roar- 
ing out his desperate appeals to hate and envy, is having 
its effect on the dangerous classes." 1 Also Hay wrote to 
Henry Adams on the same day, "Our folks are curiously 
nervous about next Tuesday. The canvass is all right — 
the betting also. But nobody knows what Jack Cade 
may do." 2 

Forty-five States voted on November 6, giving McKinley 
292 electoral votes to Bryan's 155, and a plurality 
in the popular vote of 849,000, — the greatest Republi- 
can victory since 1872. 3 Bryan carried only four North- 
ern States, Colorado, Idaho, Montana and Nevada; 
as compared with 1896 he lost his own State of Nebraska, 
Kansas, Utah, Washington, South Dakota and Wyoming. 



1 To Samuel Mather, Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 256. 
1 Letters Privately Printed, iii. 201. 

5 Grant in 1872 had a greater percentage of the popular vote. In 1896 
Kentucky gave McKinley 12 of her 13 votes. All went to Bryan in 1900. 



144 McKINLEYS ADMINISTRATION [1900 

Hanna and Roosevelt undoubtedly contributed to the 
result west of the Missouri River. 

By McKinley's reelection in 1900, wrote Croly, "The 
Republicans had received a clear mandate to govern the 
country in the interest of business expansion." ' J. Pier- 
pont Morgan, with his great reputation of railroad re- 
organizer as well as banker, now turned his attention to 
the iron and steel business, where it was thought his facul- 
ties would have full play. Under the regime of competi- 
tion, men bid against one another for trade. Pig iron 
manufacturers were eager for the custom of the steel 
mills, who in turn sought to sell to the railroads. Con- 
fining our attention to the period from the close of the 
Civil War to 1900, fluctuations had been great. A glut 
of pig iron naturally induced low prices, a large capacity 
for the manufacture of steel resulted in the enterprising 
managers bidding against one another for whatever trade 
was in sight. Fostered by the "hard times" following 
the panic of 1873, long-headed men developed the manu- 
facture of/' specialties" in steel, but every pound so made 
took the place of the same quantity of iron with the re- 
sult that mills devoted exclusively to iron could not in 
dull periods make the two ends meet. Failures came 
and the list of bankruptcies in the iron trade was appall- 
ing. It was always a "feast <>r a famine" was a common 
expression ami the hard years were followed by the "Ben- 
ner boom" of 1S79 when prices wait beyond all reason. 
This, with less violent fluctuations after 1SS1, was the 
history of the iron trade bo the panic of 1803. Requiring 
large capital and managing ability, the Dumber of steel 



1 Life of Hanna, 341. 



Ch. VI.] MORGAN — CARNEGIE 145 

mills was not large, but the feeling among them was not 
harmonious unless the common dislike of all the others 
for Andrew Carnegie and his methods might draw them 
together in sympathy. Between 1893 and 1900 a pro- 
cess of consolidation had been going on so that a large 
part of the steel business of the country had become cen- 
tred in seven concerns outside of the Carnegie Steel 
Company. The consolidation was effected by promoters 
and " water" was a component part of all of the common 
and preferred stocks which made up the capitalization. 
The rebound from the panic of 1893 made easy the 
flotation of these securities and in some of the concerns 
Morgan had an interest. The question arose after the 
election outcome of 1900, Could not these seven be united 
into one concern? and with one accord it seemed to be 
agreed that Morgan was the man to finance the enter- 
prise. Attracted to it, he went to work and soon had 
under way the combination of the seven, which would 
have been a huge concern with the Carnegie Steel Com- 
pany its chief opponent. 1 

Andrew Carnegie came from Scotland to America as 
a poor boy and got a job in a cotton mill in Allegheny 
City at the wage of $1.20 per week. He told of his ex- 
perience : "For a lad of twelve to rise and breakfast every 
morning, except the blessed Sunday morning, and go into 
the streets and find his way to the factory and begin to 
work while it was still dark outside and not be released un- 
til after darkness came again in the evening, forty minutes 



1 A convenient list of these seven plus the Carnegie Steel Co., the Ameri- 
can Bridge Co., and the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines is given 
by Cotter, 22. See likewise Berglund, 102. "The American Bridge Co., 
and the Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines entered the Steel Cor- 
poration soon after its organization." 



146 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 

only being allowed at noon, was a terrible task." l At 
fourteen he became a messenger boy in a telegraph office, 
attracted the attention of Thomas A. Scott who asked 
him to be his "clerk and operator." Scott took a fancy 
to Carnegie and suggested investments, so that he de- 
veloped into what his boy friends termed a " capitalist." 
When Scott became Vice-President of the Pennsylvania 
Railroad, Carnegie became superintendent of the Pitts- 
burg division and remained for a number of years in the 
service of this great company. Prospering in his invest- 
ments he organized the Keystone Bridge Works, which 
was among the first, if not the first, to construct success- 
ful iron bridges. 2 Thus, becoming a business man, work- 
ing on his own account, he resigned his position on the 
Pennsylvania Railroad, and devoted his attention first 
to the making of pig iron and then by a natural develop- 
ment to the manufacture of steel. Financial vicissitudes, 
differences with partners, manufacturing difficulties had 
to be overcome, but in 1900 he was the greatest steel- 
maker in the world and could produce steel rails cheaper 
than anywhere else on earth. His history has been told 
in an unsympathetic yet truthful way by J. H. Bridge, 
who had been private secretary of Herbert Spencer and 
literary assistant to Carnegie bimi elf ; ye1 from a careful 
reading of this book one cannot be otherwise than con- 
vinced that, in this day of material progress, Carnegie 
was a great man. 

Carnegie's faults were those of many self-made men 
and lay on the surface, lie was egotistical and con- 



1 The Gospel <>f Wealth, \. "The hours hung heavily upon me and in 
the work itsatf I took bo pleasure." Carnegie's Autobiography, 34. 
1 See Carnegi' '^ Autobiography, L15, L22 






Ch. VI.] ANDREW CARNEGIE 147 

ceited and had an opinion dogmatically expressed on 
many subjects on which confessed ignorance would have 
been better. Apparently without reverence for those 
who had made study the pursuit of a lifetime, he took 
issue with Greek scholars on the desirability of a study 
of Greek; and there was scarcely a subject in English 
or American politics as to which he had not a positive 
opinion. Dispensing a generous hospitality from his 
Scotch retreat of Skibo Castle he was much run after 
for contributions to all sort of enterprises. This phase 
of his life is well represented in a contemporary cartoon. 1 
Was it not humiliating, said an observer, "to see people 
in a London drawing-room cringing before him in order 
to get a cheque?" But it was no better in the United 
States, where he was besieged by all sorts of men 
for money contributions to their favorite enterprises. 
"With sincerity," said Confucius, "unite a desire for 
self-culture." Carnegie was sincere. "The man who 
dies rich, dies disgraced," he wrote in 1899. 2 He was not 
then rolling in superabundant wealth, but when he pos- 
sessed it after the event I am about to relate he carried 
out his dictum of years before. That he had a desire 
for self-culture is evident from his reading of books which 
he displayed in his writings and from his benefactions. 
When he was a working-boy in Pittsburg he had con- 
stant recourse to a free library, and he told of his "in- 
tense longing" for a new book. "I resolved," he wrote, 
"that if ever wealth came to me, it should be used to 
establish free libraries." 3 The Anglo-Saxon world knows 
how well this resolution was carried out. 



1 Cleveland Plain Dealer; Cosmopolitan Mao., Sept. 1901. 

2 The Gospel of Wealth, 19. ■ Ibid., 28. 



148 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1900 

Such was Andrew Carnegie, the poor boy, the great 
manufacturer of steel and after 1901 the possessor of two 
hundred and fifty millions. Of course he was helped by 
the high tariff and he took advantage of all the condi- 
tions in the country that he had made his own. 

Men may poke fun at him because he wrote, "I sym- 
pathize with the rich man's boy and congratulate the 
poor man's boy," for most of the "immortals" have been 
born to "the precious heritage of poverty," 1 but it 
was the sincere observation of a poor boy, who during 
his life had amassed millions. 

We now return to the organization of the United States 
Steel Corporation in which were displayed some of Mor- 
gan's best and doubtful qualities. He was keen enough 
to see that the Carnegie Steel Company must be in the 
combination and while Carnegie was desirous of selling, 
the Scotchman was determined to get a good price. His 
policy of threat was effectually used. According to Bridge, 
he wrought through a "press agent" and by newspaper 
interviews. It was given out that owing to a dis- 
agreement with the Pennsylvania Railroad he would 
give all possible business to the railroad running from 
Pittsburg to Conneaut, the Lake Erie terminus, and 
would also take advantage of the cheap water transporta- 
tion. Striking thus directly at the Pennsylvania Pail- 
road, he also threatened to build at Conneaut the largest 



1 The Gospel of Wealth, xii. In his Autobiography, 31, Carnegie gave 
n charming picture <>f the life of hie family after they had left Scotland 
and settled In Allegheny City and then trrote: "The children of honest 
poverty have the most precious <>f all advantages over those of wealth. 
The mother, nurse, rook, governess, teacher, saint, all in one; the father, 

l>lar, guide, OOUnaellor and friend! Thus were inv brother and 1 
brought up. What has the child of millionaire or nobleinau that counts 
compared to auch a heritage?" 



Ch. VI. J ANDREW CARNEGIE 149 

and best equipped tube works in the country, giving a 
direct blow to Morgan who was largely interested in the 
National Tube Company, one of the combining concerns. 
It was likewise well known that the Carnegie Steel Com- 
pany could make steel cheaper than any other company 
in the world. Carnegie had his price which Morgan, with 
apparently little hesitation, paid. It was said at the time 
that the canny Scotchman had outwitted the New Eng- 
land Yankee. Thus the so-called "billion dollar trust" 
was launched. It consisted of 550 million common stock, 
550 million preferred, and 304 million * 5 per cent bonds ; 
all of the bonds went to the Carnegie Steel Company 
of which Andrew Carnegie got the lion's share. The 
Carnegie Steel Company also received $98,277,120 in 
preferred stock and $90,279,040 in common stock at par. 
Reckoning the bonds of $303,450,000 worth one hundred 
cents on the dollar, the preferred stock at 82 and the 
common stock at 38, the Carnegie Steel Company re- 
ceived $418,343,273 for their property. It was no won- 
der then that Andrew Carnegie was counted worth $250,- 
000,000. 

The other combining companies 2 took stock. Of the 
1,100,000,000 stock all of the common and some of the 
preferred was " water" ; but as there was an abundance 
of "water" in the combining companies, the increase 
of stock and the increase of "water" do not seem to have 
been objected to. For their services the Morgan syndi- 
cate received 649,897 shares of the common stock of the 



1 Probably $303,450,000. There were also about 5G million of bonds 
owned by the combining companies which the U. S. Steel Corporation 
assumed. Berglund, 71. 

2 See again Cotter, 22 ; Berglund, 102. 



150 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

United States Steel Corporation and an equal number 
of the preferred. At $38 a share for the common 
and $82 a share for the preferred, this amounted to 
$77,987,640. This was all effected on a cash capital of 
25 millions, which the syndicate received back, plus 200 
per cent in dividends. 1 Although J. P. Morgan himself 
never speculated in the way of buying or selling stocks 
on a margin, he comprehended the stock market well 
and engaged a celebrated manipulator to market the 
shares, which were put upon the market as paying div- 
idends of four per cent on the common and seven per 
cent on the preferred. Starting on the curb at 38 for 
"steel common" and 82| for " steel preferred," these 
stocks were soon admitted on the Stock Exchange and 
within a month advanced to 55 and 101£ respectively, 
although perhaps considerable of this advance was due 
merely to "matching of orders." 2 

It was popularly supposed that the United States Steel 
Corporation possessed about two-thirds of the Lake Su- 
perior iron ore and Connellsvillo coal of the country, al- 
though the actual figures of production do not substan- 
tiate the popular belief. In the four years, 1902-1905 
inclusive, the United States Steel Corporation shipped 
56 per cent of the Lake Superior ore, produced 36 per 
cent of the Connellsville coke, 70 per cent of Bessemer 
steel ingots, 60 per cent of Bessemer Bteel rails and 51 per 
cent of open hearth Bteel Ingots and castings. There was 
naturally some efficiency in operation by bringing so many 
plants under our bead and management, and there was 



1 American Finance, Noyce, 300; Life of Morgan, Hovcy, 216. 
• Noyce, 800. 



Ch. VI.] THE UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION 151 

a praiseworthy effort to get workingmen, superintend- 
ents and other employes interested in the Company by 
selling them shares at lucrative rates. The United States 
Steel Corporation constantly stabilized prices. After its 
formation there was no violent enhancement of values 
during a time of "boom," no "runaway market" in steel. 
On the other hand, during times of depression, prices 
never went below what would give a fair profit. 

The distribution of interests by Jupiter does not work 
in our common world and did not under Morgan. In 
short, the United States Steel Corporation was too big 
for effective work. As Morgan discovered, it is exceed- 
ingly difficult to find a man of sufficient ability and char- 
acter to head so large a concern. His first efforts were 
failures and while the present x "chief executive officer," 
Judge Elbert H. Gary, is a decided success, it is doubtful 
whether his successor will possess his eminent qualities. 
But at no time has the United States Steel Corporation 
made steel absolutely or comparatively as cheap as did 
the Carnegie Steel Company just before the combination 
was made. Carnegie said that "his partners knew noth- 
ing about making stocks and bonds but only the mak- 
ing of steel." 2 The difference lies in the combination of 
companies and the adjustment of interests with a sharp- 
ened pencil on a writing pad in a Wall Street office and 
presence at the works among the men where steel is 
turned out. Charles M. Schwab, the first President 
of the United States Steel Corporation, in New York 



1 1920. 

2 Trusts of To-Day, Montague, 37. "America is soon to change 
from being the dearest steel manufacturing country to the cheapest." — 
Written before the sale to J. P. Morgan. Autobiography of Andrew 
Carnegie, 227. 



152 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

City and Europe, was a different Schwab from him 
who, in the grime and dirt of Pittsburg, administered 
the affairs of the Carnegie Steel Company. "Schwab 
had graduated at Braddock under Captain Jones 
and, displaying exceptional ability as a manager of men, 
had quickly won his way from one of the lowest posi- 
tions in the yards to the highest in the office. His 
cheery friendliness made him especially popular among 
the workmen." • Anyone who knew personally William 
R. Jones, or as he was familiarly called, Captain Bill 
Jones, and what he stood for, may well join in this 
tribute which Bridge paid him: "Greater than all of 
Jones's inventions was his progressive policy. . . . The 
young men whom he trained ably seconded him. . . . 
The famous scrap heap for outgrown, not outworn, 
machinery was instituted by Jones, who never hesi- 
tated to throw away a tool that had cost half a mil- 
lion if a better one became available. And as his own 
inventions saved the company a fortune every year, he 
was given a free hand. Under this greatest of all the 
captains of the American steel industry [Jones] a group 
of younger men grew up, trained in his broad views and 
habituated to his progressive methods ; so that when in 
1889 he was killed in a horribly tragic way by the ex- 
plosion of one of his furnaces, there were men ready trained 
to take up his work and continue it." - Carnegie said 
that he owed his success to Jones and to Schwab ; ■ and 



1 Bridge, 246. Schwab wrote, July 24, 1919, on hu photograph which 

is reproduced in Carnegie'a Autobiography op|x>site '_'."><>: "To my dear- 
eat friend and ' Master ' with the sincere love of ' Hi- Boy. ,M 

: Bridge, 105. 

1 Cotter, 89. "Jones," so wrote Amlnw Carnegie in his Autobiogra- 
phy, "bore trace* of his Welsh descent. . . . He came to us a two-dollar- 



Ch. VI. 1 ANDREW CARNEGIE 153 

he once suggested for his epitaph, "Here lies the man 
who knew how to get around him men who were cleverer 
than himself." x He said, "The nation that makes the 
cheapest steel has the other nations at its feet." 2 Hen- 
drick also affirmed that Carnegie did not like "this Wall 
Street coterie." 3 What a pity that, with his desire to 
get out of business, such inducements were offered that 
he must perforce go in with them ! For the United States 
Steel Corporation has never been the asset for the coun- 
try that the Carnegie Steel Company was or might have 
been. Carnegie in the United States was greater than 
Krupp in Germany. The one made the implements of 
peace ; the other was skilful in the production of neces- 
saries of war. Carnegie had a fit successor in Henry 
Clay Frick to carry on his work while he might have de- 
voted himself to his noble benefactions. Unfortunately 
however, the two had quarrelled. 

While the Carnegie foibles are apparent, he was ahead 
of his age in his devotion to "gentle Peace." How much 
he thought of it, why the world ought to have it, why 



a-day mechanic from the neighboring works at Johnstown. . . . He 
had volunteered as a private during The Civil War and carried himself 
so finely that he became captain of a company which was never known 
to flinch. Much of the success of the Edgar Thomson Works belongs to 
this man." In later years, Carnegie offered him an interest which would 
have made him a millionaire without entailing any financial responsi- 
bility. This Jones declined saying, "No, I don't want to have my 
thoughts running on business. I have enough trouble looking after these 
works. Just give me a big salary if you think I am worth it." "All right, 
Captain, the salary of the President of the United States is yours." 
" That's the talk," rejoined Jones. P. 203. 

"Captain Jones described me as having been born with two rows of 
teeth and holes punched for more, so insatiable was my appetite for new 
works and increased production." — Ibid., 112. 

1 The Age of Big Business, B. J. Hendrick, 68. 

2 The Age of Big Business, Hendrick, 60. * P. 81. 



154 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

war was the worst of evils, are amply testified to in his 
writings, private letters, expressed desires and by his 
benefactions. No wonder then that the great war of 
1914 broke his heart. 1 

Different from Carnegie, J. P. Morgan had inherited 
wealth and a good education ; he possessed the confidence 
of the investing public. It was thought in 1901 and 1902 
that he could accomplish anything. Ex-Mayor Grace's 
experience was that of many. One morning he received 
a brief letter by post saying that he had been awarded 
a hundred thousand dollar share in the Underwriting 
syndicate of the United States Steel Corporation. Hav- 
ing had no conversation with Morgan on the subject, 
knowing only by hearsay of the organization of the "bil- 
lion dollar" trust, he sent his cheque for what was asked 
for, being $8000, from his entire confidence in the banker. 
Although liable up to the amount of 8100,000 he never 
got a further call for more but in due time received back 
the money he had sent and his share of the enormous 
profits of the Underwriting. "I never made money as 
easy as that," he said. 2 

The organization of the "billion dollar steel trust," 
as the Steel Corporation was called, the impetus of 
McKinley's second election, the rebound from the panic of 
1893, the war of 1898 and the stock depression of 1899 
turned men's heads in 1901. Stocks went up, money was 
easily made, thoughts ran in hundred millions, men and 
women were extravagant, champagne corks popped, the 
assertion was made thai the day of panics had passed 



1 Prefun- to Carnegie'i Autobiography by Mrs. Carnegie, v. 
1 Life uf Murgiwi, llovey, 216. 



Ch. VI.] THE STOCK PANIC OF 1901 155 

and all went as merry as a marriage bell. "The out- 
burst of speculation during April 1901," wrote Noyes, 
"was something rarely paralleled in the history of specu- 
lative manias." Men who were made millionaires by 
their sales of United States Steel Corporation shares be- 
came speculators in Wall Street. "The 'outside public' 
meantime seemed to lose all restraint. A stream of ex- 
cited customers of every description brought their money 
to New York and spent their days in offices near the Stock 
Exchange. . . . The newspapers were full of stories of 
hotel waiters, clerks in business offices, even doorkeepers 
and dressmakers, who had won considerable fortunes in 
their speculations." 1 Happily this booming condition 
was for a time brought to an end by a quarrel between 
Edward H. Harriman on one side and Morgan and James 
J. Hill on the other. Both parties desired control of the 
Northern Pacific Railroad and began bidding against 
one another for its possession. The stock ran up from 
160 to 1000 but "all other stocks broke violently" and 
a good part of Wall Street was for two hours on that day 
of May 9, 1901, "technically insolvent." 2 Those who 
term this a real panic and are fond of historical parallels 
may refer to 1881 and point to the facts that the Indian 
corn crop in 1901 was with two exceptions 3 the smallest 
in twenty years and that a President was also assassi- 
nated. The strife for the Northern Pacific was a battle 
of financial giants but all this turmoil would have been 
avoided had they composed their differences before in- 
stead of after this Wall Street shock. 

1 Noyes, 301. 

(1900 the crop was 2,105,000,000 

2 Noyes, 306. 3 1881, 1894. In 1901 the crop was 1,522,000.000 

[1902 the crop was 2,523,000,000 



166 McKIXLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 

Elated with his success in the Steel combination Morgan 
attempted a similar enterprise in connection with trans- 
port across the Atlantic Ocean. He got hold of the Do- 
minion Line, the American and Red Star, the Atlantic 
Transport Company, the White Star Line and the 
Leyland, paying for the ships more than they were worth. 
The chairman of the Leyland Company told the share- 
holders that Morgan's offer was so high "that no man- 
agement had a right to refuse it." l Morgan attempted 
to get hold of the German lines and the Cunard Company 
but these for similar reasons would not sell their ships. 

As I have previously written, the whole amount of 
cash in the flotation of the United States Steel Corpora- 
tion was twenty-five millions ; the rest was faith in Mor- 
gan. It may be readily conceded that he alone in the 
country could effect such an organization but, was it worth 
while to abuse that faith and put upon the market at a 
supposedly valuable price more than 550 millions of 
"water"? True, Morgan's friends argued that the cap- 
italization was based upon earnings and not upon the 
value of the property; but what consolation was that 
to "widows and orphans" who had invested in Steel Com- 
mon at from 38 to 55 because it paid four per cent, when 
the Corporation suspended dividends on the Common 
and the stock went below 10 as it did in 1903? The de- 
cline in the market was from loi fur the Preferred down 
to 49, and from .v> for the Common I i 10. No wonder 
thai Morgan was ed coming as it did with the 

utter failure of his ship combine. Morgan has "fallen 
down" in his steamship combination, was a usual remark. 

This depression in 1903 was called " the rich men's 

1 Noyea, 303. 



Ch. VI.] JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 157 

panic." After what is known as the Northern Pacific 
Railroad corner, speculation again grew rampant as the 
"bumper wheat crop" in 1901 made up for the shortage 
of corn, but early in 1903 it became apparent that the old 
rules of business and finance remained in force and the 
"little panic" between two economic crises occurred. As 
Morgan said in a newspaper interview it was a case of 
"undigested securities." l 

The Boston Herald of January 10, 1920, commented on 
"The Greatest Epic in the History of Big Business" by 
which it meant the Standard Oil Company, that is typi- 
fied by John D. Rockefeller. In the constituent com- 
panies which made up the United States Steel Corpora- 
tion one finds the "Lake Superior Consolidated Iron 
Mines," which is put down as the "Rockefeller interests" 
and which was necessary to the Corporation as owning 
a large quantity of Lake Superior iron ore. Lake Su- 
perior ore had become the basis of the steel industry from 
its quantity and, while the Bessemer process ruled, from 
so much of it being low in phosphorus. Ores high in 
phosphorus were inadmissible as that element was at 
enmity with steel. The "Rockefeller interests" were 
not absorbed until after the Carnegie Steel Company. 
The transaction is simply related by Rockefeller. "After 
some negotiation," he wrote, "Morgan made an offer 
which we accepted whereby the whole plant — mines, 
ships, railways, etc. — should become a part of the United 



1 Noyes, 308. Besides works already referred to, I have used in this 
account, Trusts of To-Day, G. H. Montague ; Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, 1900, 1901; The Nation, 1900," 1901; Articles of deed, Mac- 
chen, Ely, Cosmopolitan Mag., 1901 ; article of R. S. Baker, McClure's 
Mag., Nov. 1901; Peck; Life of Hill, Pyle, ii. 



158 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

States Steel Corporation. The price paid was, we felt, 
very moderate considering the present and prospective 
value of the property." 1 

John D. Rockefeller was one of the directors of the 
huge corporation and he is comprehensible to us from a 
study of Napoleon I and from a remark made by Her- 
bert Spencer in 1882 when he was considered a great phi- 
losopher, "Practically business has been substituted for 
war as the purpose of existence." 2 From a bookkeeper 
Rockefeller had become a partner in a small commission 
house on the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, when the dis- 
covery of petroleum in Western Pennsylvania started 
many men in Cleveland, bent on making their fortunes, 
in that direction. Nothing like the excitement had been 
known since the discovery of gold in California. 3 Sam- 
uel Andrews had invented an easy and cheap process of 
cleansing the crude oil with sulphuric acid and oil refin- 
eries went up in Cleveland as if by magic. Rockefeller, 
like Cassius, was not fat and thought much and he made 
up his mind that for him success lay in oil ; he embarked 
on its manufacture, made a copartnership with Andrews 
and H. M. Flagler and the three went into the business 
as did many others. For a while the demand for "the 
light of the world" could not be supplied but eventually 
the supply became greater than the demand and Cleve- 
land manufacturers wen* confronted with the fact that 
the refining of oil in Cleveland for the whole trade of the 



1 Random Reminiscences, 131. 

1 After-dinner speech in New York, Nov. 0. lssiv Kssays, iii. 484. 

'An fi 1 1 i 1 1 iri 1 1 -c 1 account of the discovery of oil and the excitement en- 
suiriK \M given by Oberholtier in his History of the United States, i. 250 
el stq. 






Ch. VI.] THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 159 

world was a geographical absurdity, as the bulk of the 
trade lay east of the oil regions. The Cleveland re- 
finers were engaged in a cutthroat policy ; they bid 
against one another in the purchase of the crude oil from 
Pennsylvania, and in the other direction were intense 
competitors for the sale of the refined. In 1870 the Stand- 
ard Oil Company was formed with Rockefeller as the 
directing agent, who conceived the idea of uniting all 
under one head by the purchase of all of the Cleveland 
refineries. This he did, paying a fair price and giving 
the owners the choice of Standard stock or cash for their 
works. Those who took cash thought that they were 
getting a bargain ; those who took stock became rich. 

Rockefeller had difficulty in raising money to meet 
his desires as the financial " bigwigs" of Cleveland, with 
two exceptions, were opposed to his scheme and thought 
that he was taking too many and too great chances. At 
this time he would have preferred to pay for the refineries 
that he was buying in stock rather than in money, as the 
one commodity was more plenty than the other. "We 
invariably," he wrote, "offered those who wanted to sell 
the option of taking cash or stock in the company. We 
very much preferred to have them take the stock because 
a dollar in those days looked as large as a cart-wheel, but 
as a matter of business policy we found it desirable to 
offer them the option and, in most cases, they were even 
precipitate in their choice of the cash. They knew what 
a dollar would buy but they were very skeptical in regard 
to the possibilities of resurrecting the oil business and 
giving any permanent value to these shares." l The tale 



1 Random Reminiscences, 95. 



160 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 

of Rockefeller's financial anxieties seems strange to the 
younger generation which associates him with unlimited 
amounts of money, but those whose memory goes back 
to the time know how true is his account and that he does 
not exaggerate in any way his difficulties. "We had 
our troubles and setbacks," he wrote, "we suffered from 
severe fires; and the supply of crude oil was most un- 
certain. ... At best it was a speculative trade and I 
wonder that we managed to pull through so often." 1 

The Standard Oil Company was thus launched. 2 If 
Rockefeller did not say it, he thought that, "The coal 
oil business belongs to us." 3 Keeping in mind the simi- 
larity and the difference between war and trade how like 
Napoleon's expression in 1811, "Three years more and 
I am lord of the universe!" 4 With great method and 
untiring zeal Rockefeller wrought for the control of the 
manufacture and business of refined oil. He acted in 
accordance with the conditions of his time. After the 
panic of 1873 railroad business became poor and the rail- 
roads were "cutting one another's throats" for whatever 
business was in sight. Rockefeller took in the situation 
and, by his control of a large amount of desirable freight, 
compelled rebates not only on his own shipments but on 
those of his competitors. 

William H. Vanderbilt, who succeeded his father in 
the control of the New York Central and Lake Shore 
Railways, important lines of communication for the oil 



1 Random Eli miniacencea I 

2 I do Qol digres into a history of the South Improvement Company, 
believing thai it died in embryo. Bee Wealth against Commonwealth, 
llcurv I). Lloyd, 59. 

3 Bistory <>f the Standard Oil Company, Tarbell, ii. 34. 

* Slotinc's Napoleon, ii. -35. 



Ch. VI.] VANDERBILT— ROCKEFELLER 161 

business, was then supposed to be the richest man in the 
country, worth $200,000,000. Only one man in the 
world, the Duke of Westminster, had an equal amount, 
but his return from this capital was not as great as Van- 
derbilt's. His appreciation of the ability shown in the 
management of this enterprise is therefore important. 
Vanderbilt testified in 1879: "These men [the Standard 
Oil Company managers] are smarter than I am a great 
deal. They are very enterprising and smart men. I 
never came in contact with any class of men so smart 
and able as they are in their business." l 

Rockefeller's handling of the railroads placed him in 
a commanding position. Herbert Spencer said in the 
speech already quoted, "I hear that a great trader among 
you deliberately endeavored to crush out everyone whose 
business competed with his own." 2 This was unques- 
tionably Rockefeller's method but he was absolutely 
fair to all of his stockholders and gentle to competing 
refineries who would work with him on his own terms, 
which in every case turned out advantageously for those 
manufacturers. The crude oil producers looked upon 
him "with superstitious awe," so Miss Tarbell wrote. 
"Their notion of him was very like that which the English 
common people had for Napoleon in the first part of the 
nineteenth century ... a dread power, cruel, omniscient, 
always ready to spring." 3 He undoubtedly squeezed 
the crude oil producers as he did recalcitrant partners of 
friends whom he started in outside operations. It was 
owing to these tactics that the man who from nothing 



1 Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, ii. 252. 

* Essays, hi. 4S4. 

* Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, ii. 63. 



162 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

had made a billion, had to be guarded by detectives. He 
could have no such funeral as Peter Cooper had, of which 
a journalist at the time said Jay Gould, a rich man of 
the day, with all of his money, could not buy such a 
funeral. 

Rockefeller accepted the conditions of the game and 
played it accordingly. The management of the Standard 
was one of efficiency in every direction. "It seemed 
absolutely necessary," Rockefeller wrote, "to extend the 
market for oil by exporting to foreign countries which 
required a long and most difficult development." x This 
was in exact keeping with the ideas of the day and ex- 
pressed a thought in many minds. Rockefeller put the 
idea in active operation, and, while making money for 
the Standard made it an important factor in the country's 
foreign trade. 2 When the "spellbinders" declaimed that 
the tariff was the mother of all trusts, the Standard 
Oil Company must be excepted, as its operations were 
not dependent on the tariff legislation of Congress. 

In line with efficiency, every bit of waste was carefully 
looked after. His scientific men were encouraged in the 
development of by-products which were sold cheaply, 
brought comfort to many households and swelled the 
foreign exports. Rockefeller himself was a remarkable 
judge of men and gathered around him a number of able 
lieutenants who wrought loyally under his direction. 
While he himself was a puritan in life he never made his 
personal system of morality a guide in the choice of those 



1 Random Reminiscences, 82 

• Exports fiscal yean 1870-71 to lsw i<mm» in valuo. <\.rn si. nr:'..: ::;::.- 
508, Wheat 12,495,182,543, Wheat Flour SI, 3N'_>,()7.-.,30<I, Cotton $0,-JUU,- 

112,711, Refined Mineral Oi] 11,294,058,816. 



Ch. VI.] JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 163 

under him. Was the man equal to his job? seemed to 
be the sole test. For efficient cooperation the United 
States never saw the equal of the Standard. 

Rockefeller was the first to develop on a large scale 
the sale of a natural product direct from the producer 
to the consumer. He suppressed the middleman and 
of course made enemies. A man who had a small broker- 
age business dependent upon the Standard, on which 
he supported in economic ease a small family, could 
not refrain from exclaiming, when deprived of his means 
of living, as he thought of the work of this powerful rich 
man, "He has taken from me my one ewe lamb." To 
such considerations Rockefeller was callous. Mercy in 
business never entered into his calculations. Not unlikely 
he ascribed talk, critical of his work, to envy, which he 
illustrated in his Reminiscences with the action of an 
Irish neighbor who built an extremely ugly house, the 
bright colors of which were offensive, as he looked out 
from his windows ; therefore he moved some large trees 
to shut out the house from his view. Why are those 
large trees moved? the Irishman was asked, to which 
came the quick reply, "It's invy, they can't stand looking 
at the evidence of me prosperity." l 

Rockefeller quoted the expression of an old and ex- 
perienced Boston merchant, "I am opposed on principle 
to the whole system of rebates and drawbacks — unless 
I am in it." 2 This was undoubtedly the opinion 
of business men until this practice was forbidden by the 
Interstate Commerce Law of 1887. But before 1887 the 
Standard had developed its system and, as it increased 



1 Random Reminiscences, 72. 2 Ibid., 112. 



164 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

in power and wealth, dictated to those high in command 
of the railroads, getting low rates which enabled it to 
crush competitors, or when that was unnecessary, to 
amass hitherto unheard of wealth. 

As Rockefeller's operations were successful he had no 
difficulty in obtaining all of the money that he desired, 
so that we see in the Standard a corporation efficiently 
directed with a real genius at its head and an ever ready 
supply of cash. To develop the foreign trade and to 
supply the East it was soon seen that the crude oil must 
be refined at the seaboard, hence refineries were estab- 
lished at Brooklyn, Bayonne in New Jersey, Philadelphia 
and Baltimore. Having made dictatorial arrangements 
with the railroads, organized trade with Europe, Asia, 
Africa, the East and West of his own country, a common 
man would have rested on his oars satisfied with his great 
accomplishments. Not so Rockefeller who was ever on 
the watch. Pipe-lines had early been in operation to 
gather the oil from the wells to the railroads, of which 
the Standard had its share, but in 1879 it was demon- 
strated by an opposition company that crude oil could 
be pumped over the mountains and so roach the seaboard. 
Pipe-line transportation was much cheaper than railroad 
even if the railroads cut down their carrying charges to 
cost. Under this new competition all of Rockefeller's 
carefully made contracts with the railroads, so far as the 
carrying of crude oil was concerned, were for naught, 
but he was equal to the emergency. Within five years 
he owned all of the pipe-lines to the seaboard or had them 
under his control. With groat effect he wrote in his book : 
"The entire oil business is dependent upon the pipe-line. 
Without it every well would be less valuable and every 



Ch. VI.] THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY 165 

market at home and abroad would be more difficult to 
serve or retain." 1 

Constantly in litigation the Standard employed the 
best lawyers to fight its cases. Its policy ever to get 
hold of the ablest was in this particular exemplified with 
good results. 

Did the Standard make the light of the world cheaper? 
An affirmative answer is at once given by its apologists, 
a negative by its critics. For ourselves we shall do well 
to accept the judgment of the intelligent historian of 
the Standard Oil Company, Gilbert H. Montague, who 
with the energy of youth investigated fully the matter. 
"The vexed question," he wrote, "of the effect of the 
Standard Oil combination on the price of refined oil will 
probably never be settled." 2 It certainly stabilized 
prices. Under Cleveland competition, as it existed be- 
fore 1871, there would have been an era of low prices 
succeeded by one of high, in entire accordance with the 
law of supply and demand. Under Standard manage- 
ment the price could not have been excessive or it would 
have lacked candid defenders. On the other hand there 
were the large dividends and the fact that everyone con- 
nected with the Standard grew rich. 

Henry D. Lloyd in "Wealth against Commonwealth" 
makes a sharp criticism of the Standard Oil Company, 
and his remedy for the evils it and other trusts caused 
is State Socialism. This discussion will go on as long as 
socialists and individualists exist. But the student of 
men and affairs cannot overlook that "government is 



1 Random Reminiscences, 84. 

2 The Rise and Progress of the Standard Oil Company, 136. 



166 MCKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

some of us, and those not the best of us, put over the rest 
of us." l After a careful reading of this book of Lloyd's 
one inclined to individualism cannot fail to approve the 
statement of the reviewer of The Nation, "Were we not 
satisfied from evidence aliunde," it said, "that the man- 
agers of the Standard Oil Company had violated both 
law and justice in their attempts to suppress competition, 
we should be inclined to acquit them after reading this 
screed. It is quite beyond belief that these men should 
be capable of the height and depth of wickedness attrib- 
uted to them, even if they possessed the superhuman pow- 
ers with which they are credited. It is plain upon Mr. 
Lloyd's showing that their competitors would be no bet- 
ter than they if they had similar opportunities and it 
is impossible to arouse sympathy for men whose com- 
plaint is that they were not allowed to make enormous 
profits, for it appears to have been the policy of the Stand- 
ard Company to buy out its rivals at reasonable rates." 2 
Miss Tarbell, from a number of articles in McClure's 
Magazine, devoted to muckraking, has written two vol- 
umes entitled "The History of the Standard Oil Com- 
pany "in which her industrious research can do no other 
than compel admiration from anyone who seeks historic 
truth. Her examination of documents that bear upon 
the subject seems thorough and no one can attempt acon- 
sideration of the Standard without recourse to the many 
facts thai she has uncovered. All the same, the fooling 
grows that she had determined on her thesis and in her 
book had sought facts which should support her precon- 
ceived impressions. Again must one have recourse to The 



1 Cited from memory but the remark was, I think, made by Professor 
W. G. Sumner. *Thc Natwn, Nov. s, 1894, 348. 



Ch. VI.] JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 167 

Nation. "The writer" [i.e. Miss Tarbell], it said, "has 
either a vague conception of the nature of proof or she 
is willing to blacken the character of John D. Rockefeller 
by insinuation and detraction." But he "has been 
caught in no worse crimes than underselling his competi- 
tors and getting rebates from railroads. ... It is mat- 
ter of public notoriety that Mr. Rockefeller is offensively 
reticent. ... In impassioned . . . language a desperate 
struggle is described between the powers of evil incarnate 
in the Standard Oil Company and the powers of goodness 
appearing in a metaphysical entity called the 'Oil Region.' 
This being, it appears, loved virtue for its own sake ; it 
believed in independence and fair play ; it hated the re- 
bates and secret rates; it hated, but it also feared, its 
adversary. . . . The 'Oil Region' means a number of 
men engaged in the wildest kind of speculation, many 
of whom proved themselves willing to engage in every 
kind of wickedness of which the Standard Oil Company 
was accused." It "might say like the French deputy to 
his constituents, ' So intense was the corruption that even 
I did not altogether escape.'" 1 

A careful consideration of the subject, with a thorough 
reading of Lloyd's and Miss Tarbell's books cannot fail 
to impress an inquirer with the great ability shown by 
Rockefeller, who was to business what Napoleon was to 
war and to civic society. In Rockefeller may be seen a 
ripe development of the application of energy to resources. 
This quiet, reticent man, thinking and listening, 
as he stropped his penknife over the heel of his boot, 
like the traditional Yankee whittling a stick, made com- 
binations which startled the world. Always given to 

1 The Nation, Jan. 5, 1905, 15. 



168 McKINLEY'S ADxMIXISTRATION [1901 

reflection when not taking needed physical exercise, read- 
ing no book but "Ben Hur," ' he moved men upon his 
chess-board like pawns in the game. Sincerely religious, 
it must have been a surprise to him that his methods 
were questioned when he simply played the game as he 
found its conditions, and supposed that he never violated 
the tenets of the Christian religion as commonly under- 
stood. Outside of religion and physical exercise he pur- 
sued one single idea and was eminently successful from 
the grasp of his mind. 

The question must arise, Is it well for the State to have 
such huge fortunes as those of Rockefeller and Carnegie 
accumulated in a lifetime? It must be said in their 
defence that they accomplished the difficult art of giving, 
that their benefactions were noble and that they set a 
pattern for other rich men, whose gifts and bequests have 
been on the side of civilization. In the amassing of such 
wealth it is well that they or their descendants did not 
spend it in luxurious or riotous living ; that they them- 
selves obeyed the call of duty and were as systematic 
and wise in their dispensations as in their acquirements. 
That their gifts made for the good of civilization, however, 
will fail to convince the mass of voters, who cannot see 
that fine pictures, well-collected libraries, endowed uni- 
versities, cure of disease and prophylactic treatment com- 
pensate them for a deprivation of their share of the cake 
in favor of Rockefeller, ( 'arnegie and others. 1 



1 Up to 1918. The Bible of course excepted. 

'For authorities nol specifically referred to I h.ive consulted Indus- 
trial Commission Reports, vol. i. 19. House docs., 1809-1900, vol. 93; 
1901-1902, vol. B2; Trusta of To Day, M< Fortj Years 

of American I inanoe; Burton J. Sendrick, Age of Big Business; Peck; 
The Nation, 1900, 1901. 



Ch .VI.] McKINLEY 169 

McKinley's second inaugural address (March 4, 1901) 
was a paean to the successful accomplishment of the past 
four years. Then there was a deficit, now a surplus ; 
then depression, now activity. "The national verdict 
of 1896," he declared, "has for the most part been exe- 
cuted." His personal bearing, action and amiability had 
contributed much to the achievement of what he stated 
in fitting words : " Sectionalism has disappeared. Division 
on public questions can no longer be traced by the war 
maps of 1861." * "I can no longer be called the Presi- 
dent of a party," he said to his Secretary ; "I am now the 
President of the whole people." 2 

Between the second inauguration' and his death 
McKinley enjoyed his office] and the hold which he had 
on the people ; his content was 'marred by the alarming 
illness of his wife during a trip to the Pacific coast. On 
his return to Washington, he was obliged, because of her 
condition, to decline an invitation to the Commence- 
ment of Harvard University and receive the honorary 
degree of Doctor of Laws. In answer to repeated public 
requests that he should again be a candidate for the pres- 
idency, he made an open statement that under no cir- 
cumstances would he accept a nomination for a third 
term. 

He had promised to visit the Buffalo fair, believing, 
as he there said, "Expositions are the timekeepers of 
progress. They record the world's advancement." " The 
crowning and original feature of this Exposition," 
wrote Robert Grant, was the illumination by the electric 



1 Messages and Papers, Supplement, 163. 
*Life of McKinley, Olcott, ii. 296. 



170 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 

lights; the power for the electricity was furnished by 
Niagara Falls. "The time fixed for the ceremony of 
illumination," continued Grant, "is half-past eight, just 
as the summer twilight is deepening into darkness. . . . 
There is a deep silence and all eyes are riveted on the 
electric tower. Suddenly ... we have a veritable fairy- 
land ; the triumph not of Aladdin's lamp but of the mas- 
ters of modern science over the nature-god, Electricity." ' 
Dooley likewise visited the fair. "They tell me," he 
wrote, "that at th' Pan-American show in th' city iv 
Buffalo th' ilicthric light is made be Niag'ra Falls. . . . 
Hogan seen it, an' he says it makes th' moon look like 
a dark lanthern. They speak iv th' sun in Buffalo th' 
way a motorman on a trolley line wud shpeak iv a horse 
car. ' Th' sun is settin' earlier,' says he to Conners, th' 
thruckman that wus towin' him. 'Since th' fair begun,' 
says Conners, 'it hasn't showed after eight o'clock. We 
' seldom hear iv it nowadays. We set our clocks be th' 
risin' an' settin' iv th' lights.' ' ' 2 

The President's visit to the Buffalo fair was delayed 
until September when, during a crowded reception, he 
was shot by an anarchist (September 6) who, in the line 
of approaching people, pretending to have an injured 
hand, concealed, in the handkerchief wrapped around it, 
a revolver from which two shots dealt the death-blow 
to the President. The fatal shot was fired on a Friday 
afternoon. McKinley lingered for over a week and at 
times strong hopes were entertained for his recovery, but 
these were vain, and early on Saturday morning, Septem- 
ber 14, In- passed away. 

1 Cosmopolitan ifa^dftfU, Sept. 1901, 453. 
1 Cosmopolitan Magazine, Sept. 1901, 478. 



Ch. VI.] ASSASSINATION OF McKINLEY 171 

The crowd, amazed at the attempt on the life of their 
beloved President, threatened to lynch the assassin but 
McKinley, stricken to death, showed his respect for the 
law in his words, "Don't let them hurt him." ! Then 
his thoughts dwelt upon his wife, who, accompanying 
him to Buffalo, was at a neighboring house. "My wife 
— be careful, Cortelyou, how you tell her — oh, be care- 
ful !" A week later when he and all of his friends knew 
that the end was near, he said, "It is God's way. His 
will, not ours, be done"; then he repeated some lines 
of his favorite hymn, "Nearer, my God, to Thee." 2 In- 
voluntarily came to many lips, "See how a Christian 
can die." The journalist who had sneered at "the pious 
McKinley" could not, from his skeptical view, appreciate 
the depth and sincerity of McKinley's religious nature. 

Roosevelt, on hearing of the assassination, hurried to 
Buffalo but, on the assurance that the President would 
recover, left for the Adirondacks whence he was hastily 
summoned again. Before his arrival McKinley had 
passed away and, when reaching Buffalo, Roosevelt was 
met by a request from Secretary Elihu Root, the ranking 
member of the Cabinet who was there, that he "take 
the constitutional oath of President of the United States." 
To this he replied : "I shall take the oath at once in ac- 
cordance with your request, and in this hour of deep and 
terrible national bereavement I wish to state that it shall 
be my aim to continue absolutely unbroken the policy 
of President McKinley for the peace and prosperity and 
honor of our beloved country." 3 

1 For the trial and execution of McKinley's assassin, see my vol. viii. 
151. 

3 Life of McKinley, Olcott, ch. xxxiv. 
' Messages and Papers, Supplement, 298. 



172 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

Elihu Root, McKinley's Secretary of War, said: "I 
have talked with him [McKinley] again and again before 
a Cabinet meeting and found that his ideas were fixed 
and his mind firmly made up. He would then present 
the subject to the Cabinet in such a way as not to express 
his own decision, but yet bring about an agreement ex- 
actly along the lines of his own original ideas, while the 
members often thought the ideas were theirs. ... He 
cared nothing about the credit but McKinley always had 
his way. ... He had vast influence with Congress. He 
led them by the power of affectionate esteem not by fear. 
He never bullied Congress." l Shelby M. Cullom, Sena- 
tor from Illinois for thirty years, wrote : "We have never 
had a President who had more influence with Congress 
than McKinley. ... I have never heard of even the 
slightest friction between him and the party leaders in 
Senate and House. . . . He looked and acted the ideal 
President. He was always thoroughly self-poised and 
deliberate ; nothing ever seemed to excite him and he 
always maintained a proper dignity." 2 President Roose- 
velt said in his first Message to Congress: "At the time 
of President McKinley's death he was the most widely 
loved man in all the United States ; while we have never 
had any public man of his position who has been so wholly 
free from the bitter animosities incident to public life. . . . 
To a standard of lofty integrity in public life he united 
the tender affections and home virtues which are all- 
important in the make-up of national character." 3 

From my point of view it will ever be a regret that the 



•Olcott, ii. 846. : Fifty Ymn, 275. 

3 Messages and I 'a pi rs, Supplement, 315. 



Ch. VI. 1 McKINLEY 173 

long-standing distrust of and enmity to Spain should have 
come to a head during McKinley's administration. For 
he was essentially a peace minister. Coming before the 
public, the high-priest of protection, he had, through the 
exercise of executive authority, modified his views. He 
was diligent in the enforcement of the reciprocity pro- 
vision of the Dingley Act and named John A. Kasson to 
negotiate in accordance therewith reciprocity agreements. 
It was not necessary that these agreements should be 
ratified by the Senate but some Senators, who were more 
strongly high tariff than McKinley himself, thought that 
France had gotten the better of Kasson in the bargain. 1 
Nor was McKinley's recommendation of free trade with 
Puerto Rico immediately adopted. In his message of 
December, 1899, he said, "Our plain duty is to abolish 
all customs tariffs between the United States and Puerto 
Rico and give her products free access to our markets." 
It took him a little over a year and a half to accomplish 
this but he had the satisfaction before his death of seeing 
complete free trade with the island. 2 In the speech that 
he made in Buffalo the day before his assassination, he 
showed how far behind him he had left the doctrines of 
ultra-protection. "A system," he said, "which provides 
a mutual exchange of commodities, is manifestly essential 
to the continued and healthful growth of our export trade. 



1 Kasson made the agreement with France on May 28, 1898 ; it was 
proclaimed on May 30. He made an agreement with Italy on Feb. 8, 
1900 ; it was proclaimed on July 18, 1900 ; another with Portugal on 
May 22, 1899; it was proclaimed on July 12, 1900. 

There were later made the following agreements, but not by Kasson : 
Germany, proclaimed July 13, 1900. Switzerland, proclaimed Jan. 1, 1906. 
Spain, signed Aug. 1, 1906. Bulgaria, proclaimed Sept. 15, 1906. Great 
Britain, proclaimed Dec. 5, 1907. Netherlands, proclaimed Aug. 12, 1908. 

2 Willoughby, Territories and Dependencies, 113. 



174 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

We must not repose in fancied security that we can for- 
ever sell everything and buy little or nothing. If such a 
thing were possible, it would not be best for us or for those 
with whom we deal. We should take from our customers 
such of their products as we can use without harm to our 
industries and labor. . . . The period of exclusiveness is 
past. The expansion of our trade and commerce is the 
pressing problem. Commercial wars are unprofitable. 
A policy of good will and friendly trade relations will 
prevent reprisals. Reciprocity treaties are in harmony 
with the spirit of the times, measures of retaliation are 
not." "We find our long-time principles echoed," de- 
clared The Nation, " to our unfeigned satisfaction." l 

McKinley, however, did not live up to the expectations 
of the Civil Service reformers, inferred from his expres- 
sions and attitude when a member of the House. The 
testimony of William D. Foulke of Indiana is of high 
value. Singularly in favor of Civil Service reform, on 
excellent terms with Eaton, Curtis, Schurz, Dana and 
others who labored in the vineyard, he supported by 
speech and action McKinley in 189G and 1900 and was a 
level-headed man who could look on both sides of any 
question. By his order of July 27, 1897, asserted Foulke, 
McKinley "greatly strengthened the competitive ser- 
vice" ; it provided that no removal should be made "ex- 
cept for just cause." In his Annual Message of Decem- 
ber, 1897, he said that the merit system "has the approval 
of the people and it will be my endeavor to uphold and 
extend it," and in the ensuing session of Congress "he 
opposed all efforts to repeal or change the law. But in 



•Sept. 12, 1001. 107. 



Ch. VI.] CIVIL SERVICE REFORM 175 

the administration of it," continued Foulke, "the execu- 
tive department showed great weakness." An antici- 
pated and forecasted order was promulgated on May 
29, 1899, which marked "the first considerable reduction 
in the area of the merit system since the Civil Service law 
was enacted in 1883." As a quasi-atonement he extended 
the merit system to the Philippine Islands "by his in- 
structions to the Philippine Commission in April, 1900." 
"As the campaign of 1900 drew near," Foulke went on 
to say, "the opinions of Civil Service reformers were di- 
vided." The anti-imperialists, among whom was Carl 
Schurz, "felt a deep resentment at the backslidings of 
McKinley and could see nothing of his extension of the 
competitive system to the Philippines which could atone 
for breaking his promises regarding that system in the 
United States." l 

McKinley' s action in regard to Civil Service reform 
was tortuous. He seemed swayed by opposing forces. 
Undoubtedly the one opposed to Civil Service reform 
was represented by Mark Hanna who sincerely believed 
that, for the good of the country and the party, he him- 
self, the heads of the departments, the senators and 
representatives could make better appointments than 
could be secured by any system of competitive exam- 
ination. 2 



J W. D. Foulke, Fighting the Spoilsman, 119, 122, 123, 125. See 
Richard H. Dana's review, Amer. Polit. Science Rev., Feb. 1920. 

2 Authorities not specifically mentioned. Proceedings of National 
Civil Service Reform League, 1900, 1901; Carl Schurz, Speeches, Cor- 
respondence, etc., vi. ; Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, ii. ; The Nation, 
passim. 



CHAPTER VII 

With our new colonies it has been impossible to pre- 
serve a chronological unity of narrative. It is now nec- 
essary to enter upon an account of Puerto Rico, Cuba 
and the Philippines, going back to a point beyond which 
the narrative has already taken us and terminating ahead 
of the time to which the history of our domestic trans- 
actions will be carried. 

Puerto Rico may be easily disposed of. In the words 
of Archibald C. Coolidge, its annexation, "being a natural 
consequence of the Spanish War, met with little opposi- 
tion from any quarter." Writing in 1908 he sums up 
with, "All told, the record of American rule has been 
satisfactory and creditable." l This is supported by the 
words of a competent and intelligent English authority, 
Eustace Percy, who wrote about 1919, "In Porto Rico 
the United States has pursued a most liberal and pro- 
gressive policy." 2 To Joseph B. Foraker, chairman of 
the Senate Committee on Puerto Rico, fell the duty of 
drafting the organic act which determined our relations 
with Puerto Rico. This became a law in 1900, is known 
as the Foraker Act, was upheld somewhat over a year 
later as constitutional by the United States Supreme 
Court, and is thus referred to with commendable pride 
by the author, "Tin- mere fact that thifl law has continued 
in force, practically without change, ever since it was 



1 Tin- United State* u a World Power, 148, 146. 
'Tin' Reeponaibilitiei "t the League, 87. 

176 



Ch. VII.] PUERTO RICO — CUBA 177 

enacted, now full fifteen years ago, is enough to indicate 
that it proved satisfactory when put into practical op- 
eration." » "This Act," wrote William F. Willoughby, 
"is in every respect an important document. It may be 
said to stand to our new insular possessions in much the 
same relation as the Northwest Ordinance did to our 
dependent territory on the mainland." Willoughby wa 
Treasurer of Puerto Rico from 1901 to 1907 and, while in 
that office, wrote a book in which he gave an excellent 
account and analysis of the Foraker Act summing up 
with, "The problem that Congress had to meet when it 
framed the organic act — that of providing a system of 
government that should at once grant a maximum of 
local autonomy and at the same time make provision for 
sufficient central control — was an exceedingly difficult 
one. If it has erred, it has been in immediately granting 
too much rather than too little." 2 

"Whatever may be the fate of Cuba in the future,'' 
wrote Archibald C. Coolidge, "the treatment she has 
received at the hands of the United States in the decade 
since she was made free will remain something to be proud 
of." 3 The pledge contained in the Teller Amendment 
was faithfully kept. After the Treaty of Paris the gov- 
ernment of Cuba was for a while under the direction of 
the American Army. Elihu Root had become Secretary 
of War and he was insistent that Cubans be prepared 
for a civil government to be administered by themselves. 



1 Notes of a Busy Life, Foraker, ii. 82. This was published in February, 
1916. The statute is printed in U. S. Statutes at large, 56th Cong., vol. 31, 
p. 77. 

2 Territories and Dependencies of the United States, 83, 117. 

3 The United States as a World Power, 130. 



178 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

But before the American Army left, a great work was 
accomplished in sanitation — "the marvel of the age," 
Latane" terms it. 1 "Read the story of yellow fever in 
Havana and Brazil," wrote Dr. William Osier, "if you 
wish to get an idea of the powers of experimental medi- 
cine ; there is nothing to match it in the history of human 
achievement." 2 The work in Cuba is well stated by 
Secretary Root in his report of November 27, 1901. "The 
eastern part of the island," he wrote, "is entirely free 
from yellow fever. The western part is practically free 
there being but a few cases in or about Habana. This 
dreaded disease has passed from one of the leading causes of 
death to one of the least frequent. The reduction of death 
rate in Habana alone, as compared with the former death 
rate, shows an average of approximately 3700 lives per year 
saved, and Habana has changed its position from one of 
the most unhealthy cities to one of the most healthy. 
The control of yellow fever, acting upon the results of 
investigation as to its causes, prosecuted under the direc- 
tion of the military government, appears to be now prac- 
tically absolute." 3 

The chief credit is of course due to General Wood without 
whose command nothing could be done, but associated 
with him in this "extraordinary service in ridding the 
island of yellow fever" were Major Walter Reed and Ma- 
jor William C. Gorgas. "The name of Dr. Jesse W. 
Lazear, contract surgeon," continued Secretary Root, 
"who voluntarily permitted himself to be inoculated 

with the ydlow fev<T germ, in order to furnish a necessary 



l Tho Dnil u a World Power, 182. 

, "M:in'.« Redemption. <>f Man," u ■ Mag., Dec, 1910, 251. 

■ Report, House Docs., 57th Cong. 1st Seas., 39. 



Ch. VII.] CUBA 179 

experimental test in the course of the investigation, and 
who died of the disease, should be written in the list of 
the martyrs who have died in the cause of humanity." * 

A census was taken showing a population of 1,572,797, 
of whom 34 per cent were able to read and write, while 
66 per cent were illiterate. The desire and need of popu- 
lar education were great and both private and public 
efforts were made in this direction. The wise President 
of Harvard University, Charles W. Eliot, was to the fore, 
raised a fund for the purpose and invited a number of 
Cuban teachers to the summer school in Cambridge where 
they could learn from masters of the art how to instruct 
others eager for education but ignorant of the way to get 
it. These teachers, 1281 in number, spent the summer 
in attending the school and in a study of neighboring 
institutions of art and practical manufacture, and, before 
they went home, were given a free visit to New York 
City and Washington. 2 

All the while, progress was making toward the training 
of the people of Cuba for self-government. A basis of 
suffrage was agreed upon 3 and on June 16, 1900, munici- 
pal officers throughout the entire island were elected. As 
soon as the new municipal governments were fairly in- 
stalled, a call for a constitutional convention was made, 
and thirty-one delegates to it were orderly chosen. The 
convention met in Havana on November 5, 1900, and was 
opened by General Wood. But before Cuba could be 
let go, the relations between the island and the United 
States must be defined. This was done in the Piatt 



1 Report of Dec. 1, 1902. House Docs. 57, Cong. 2d Sess., 10. 

1 Military and Colonial Policy, Root, 198. 

' For restrictions on universal suffrage, ibid., 194. 



180 McKINLEY'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 

Amendment to the Army Appropriation Bill which be- 
came a law on March 2, 1901. The author of this was 
Orville H. Piatt of Connecticut who is fitly described by 
his biographer, Louis A. Coolidge, as "an old-fashioned 
senator," and the biography is said to be "the story of a 
life unselfishly devoted to the public service." He feared 
that he could not pass the measure independently through 
the Senate at the short session and so had recourse to a 
rider to an appropriation bill. 

The Piatt Amendment provided that : 

I. The independence of Cuba should not in any way 
be impaired by any compact with a foreign power. 

II. A proper limitation was made as to the amount of 
any public debt that Cuba should contract. 

III. Cuba consented to the intervention of the United 
States "for the preservation of Cuban independence, the 
maintenance of a government adequate for the protection 
of life, property and individual liberty and for discharg- 
ing the obligations imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the 
United States." 

IV. The acts of the United States during the military 
occupancy should be validated. 

V. Cuba would maintain "and as far as necessary" 
extend the work of sanitation. 

VI. The Isle of Pines should bo omitted "from the 
proposed constitutional boundaries of Cuba." 

VII. Cuba was to furnish tin- United States "lands 
necessary for coaling or naval stations." l 

Article III caused the greatest amount of opposition 
in the Cuban constitutional convention and this was 



1 See America u.s i World Power, ImfiuoA, iiuris American Nation 

Scries, 189. 



Ch. VII.] THE PLATT AMENDMENT 181 

finally quieted by a statement of Senator Piatt and an 
official communication to a committee of the convention 
by the Secretary of War. 1 Then the provisions of the Piatt 
Amendment were appended to the Cuban Constitution. 

Like many important documents the authorship of 
these wise provisions has been in dispute. The editors 
of the series of the Root publications have maintained 
that it was drafted by Secretary Root and this claim was 
made indeed during the lifetime of Senator Piatt. The 
true genesis of the Piatt Amendment, however, is truth- 
fully and effectively told by Senator Piatt in a private 
letter of January 1, 1904: "The original draft was my 
own. ... It was changed from time to time, somewhat 
in language but not in spirit, in consultation both with 
Republicans of the Committee, President McKinley and 
Secretary Root. A final consultation between myself 
and Senator Spooner put the document in its complete 
form." 2 Root's titles to greatness were so many that 
he would be the last man to claim aught that was not 
fully his own, while Senator Piatt's admiration at an 
early day for Root was unbounded. He, said the Sena- 
tor, is discharging the duties of Secretary of War better 
than any other man could. But he could fill any position 
in the Cabinet and indeed he might serve as President 
with capacity and wisdom. 

"At any rate," wrote the Senator in a private letter, 
"the United States will always, under the so-called Piatt 
Amendment, be in a position to straighten out things if 
they get seriously bad." 3 



1 Life of Piatt, Coolidge, 344 ; Military and Colonial Policy, Root, 214. 

2 Life of Piatt, Coolidge, 351, et ante; Military and Colonial Policy, 
Root, viii. 3 Life of Piatt, Coolidge, 349. 



182 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 

Elections were held in Cuba under the Constitution on 
the last day of December, 1901, when governors of prov- 
inces, members of the House of Representatives and 
presidential and senatorial electors were chosen ; these 
electors met during the following February and elected a 
President, Vice-President and senators. The civil govern- 
ment of Cuba was duly inaugurated and the American 
troops withdrawn on May 20, 1902. With pardonable 
pride Elihu Root wrote as Secretary of War in his 
report of 1902 : "I know of no chapter in American his- 
tory more satisfactory than that which will record the 
conduct of the military government of Cuba. The credit 
for it is due, first of all, to General Leonard Wood." In 
his order of July 4, 1902, Root said that the officers and 
enlisted men "have with sincere kindness helped the 
Cuban people to take all the successive steps necessary to 
the establishment of their own constitutional government ; 
. . . they have governed Cuba wisely, regarding justice and 
respecting individual liberty ; have honestly collected 
and expended for the best interests of the Cuban people 
the revenues" of the island. 1 

The peace, the health, the independence of Cuba are 
necessary to the United States. A commercial arrange- 
ment should bo made with her under which she can live, 
said Root in his report of November 27, 1901. 2 This 
meant that in a reciprocal arrangement the duties on 
her sugar and tobacco should be reduced. This proved 
to be a long and tedious process owing to the opposition 

of some Belnshly protected interests, bul the arrangement 
was finally submitted to both Bouses of Congress. 



1 Report oi Deo. i. v.>m. 9, if * P. 53. 



Ch. VII.] THE TREATY WITH CUBA 183 

Through the influence of President Roosevelt and the 
work of Senator Orville H. Piatt (to mention some of the 
agencies working to this end) a treaty of reciprocity be- 
tween Cuba and the United States was ratified late in 
1903. During the contest Senator Piatt wrote in a pri- 
vate letter: "The reduction on Cuban imports will not 
hurt the sugar or tobacco industry one particle. Neither 
the sugar trust nor the tobacco trust will derive the slight- 
est benefit from it. The talk about it has been the great- 
est exhibition of expansive bosh that I have ever 
known." l 

By the Piatt Amendment it was provided that a treaty 
between the two countries should embody its provisions. 
This was made. Our course towards Cuba is well 
summed up by Theodore Roosevelt: "We made the 
promise to give Cuba independence; and we kept the 
promise. . . . We also by treaty gave the Cubans sub- 
stantial advantages in our markets. Then we left the 
island, turning the government over to its own 
people." 2 

The Philippines is a knotty question. It has been a 
political issue and the course of the administration has 
aroused sentimental objection. The literature on the 
subject is enormous and observers, who have remained 
long and have written candid accounts, have arrived at 
opposite conclusions. 3 It is best, therefore, in the maze 



1 Life of Piatt, Coolidge, 381. 

2 Autobiography, 545. In this study of Cuba I have been much helped 
by Latane"s "America as a World Power." See the Chapter in Life of 
Piatt on "Cuban Scandals and Allowances." 

3 Charles B. Elliott wrote: "Many writers, American and English, 
who have favored the public with their views on the Philippines . . . sug- 



184 McKIXLEY AND THE PHILIPPINES (1898 

of contradictions to rely on the man, who, more than any 
other one, is responsible for our policy — Elihu Root. 
It will be told later how he came into administrative 
office. For the moment it suffices to say that he regarded 
the United States as the greatest of his clients, and that 
an ambassador of the Russian Czar said that having met 
most of the public men of Europe, he knew no one who 
was as able as Elihu Root. 

Before he called Root to his aid President McKinley 
had inaugurated the government of the Philippines. His 
message to Otis, who was the military commander in the 
islands, stated the mission of the United States but in 
it he said that we had succeeded to the "sovereignty of 
Spain" and that our aim was "benevolent assimilation." 
Now McKinley was entirely sincere and the anti-Impe- 
rialists, who afterwards played upon those words, failed 
to comprehend the depth of his religious nature. The 
overpowering feeling which swayed him was religious 
and this cannot be better stated than in the private letter 
to him of Senator Orville II. Piatt of Augusl 15, 1S98. 
"I feel that I ought to say," he wrote, "that during tin- 
past week I have been well over the State of Connecticut 
and I am satisfied that nine-tenths of the people of the 
State have an Intense feeling that we should insisl upon 
the cession of all the Philippine Islands. Those who l>c- 



gest Kipling*! famou I' tl M. P.' who visited India in winter and 
"f the beat "f [ndis as the Asia solar myth.'" As his entertainer 
returned homeward be v. rot< : 

"And lii i drove from the station but 

tin- mirth died out on my lips 
As I thought "f the fools like Pagett who write 
of their Eastern Trips." 

The Phflippint i to the End of the < Sommi -ion ( tovernmi nt, 376. 



Ch. VII.] THE PHILIPPINES 185 

lieve in Providence see, or think they see, that God has 
placed upon this government the solemn duty of provid- 
ing for the people of these islands, a government based 
upon the principle of liberty, no matter how many diffi- 
culties the problem may present. They feel that it is 
our duty to attempt its solution. Among Christian 
thoughtful people the sentiment is akin to that which 
has maintained the missionary work of the last century 
in foreign lands. I assure you that it is difficult to over- 
estimate the strength and intensity of this sentiment. 
If, in the negotiations for peace, Spain is permitted to 
retain any portion of the Philippines it will be regarded 
as a failure on the part of this nation to discharge the 
greatest moral obligation which could be conceived." l 

Connecticut is a small State but it has great influence 
especially in the Western States through which President 
McKinley made his "famous Western journey" and had 
his own opinion confirmed. The attempt of many anti- 
Imperialists to hint that love of gain was the prime cause 
of our taking the Philippines is not borne out by the 
record. 

The first interference by Congress with the Commis- 
sion government was by the Spooner Amendment to the 
Army Appropriation Bill, which was approved on March 
2, 1901 ; this was decidedly opposed to any attempt to 
exploit the islands. 2 The Philippine Commission, in their 
report to the Secretary of War of November 1, 1902, spoke 
of "the burdensome restrictions upon the investment of 



x Lifc of Piatt, Coolidge, 287. 

2 The Spooner Amendment is printed in Root, Milit. and Colonial 
Policy, 255. See speech of Senator Lodge on an earlier bill. Speeches 
and Addresses, 317. 



186 NO LAND-GRABBING GAME [1901 

capital in lands and mines in these islands. . . . The re- 
quirements," they continued, "that no corporation shall 
own more than 2500 acres, stops absolutely the invest- 
ment of new capital in the sugar industry and in the to- 
bacco industry. It takes away any hope of bringing 
prosperity to these islands by the extending of the acreage 
in the cultivation of these two important products of the 
archipelago. It very much interferes with the invest- 
ment of capital in railroad enterprises, because they are 
naturally connected with the possibilities of transporta- 
tion of sugar and tobacco from the interior to the sea- 
ports." 1 In their report of December 23, 1903, they re- 
turned to the subject and recommended that "the limi- 
tation ought either to be removed entirely or be increased 
so as to allow the acquisition of at least 25,000 acres of 
land." 2 

The charge that our acquisition was "a greedy land- 
grabbing game" may have come from the open plans of 
promoters of new enterprises. So far as I have been able 
to discover there were no extravagant profits except those 
made out of the 70,000 American soldiers by some half 
dozen "American trading companies," who acquired 
"quick and large profits" referred to by Civil Governor 
William II. Taft in his report of November 15, 1903. 3 
It was the old story of Pistol, 

"I shall sutler be 

Unto the Camp and profits will accrue." * 
While on this subject the idea may at onCS be dismissed 
that the United States made any money out of the Phil- 
ippines. Archibald C. Coolidge, whose authority can- 



1 i;. port, 7. ; port, 9. 

•P. 10, 4 King Henry V.. act ii.. MOM 1. 



Ch. VII.] THE PHILIPPINES 187 

not be gainsaid, wrote in 1908: "American capital has 
not come in in the way that was expected, partly on 
account of the legislation passed to protect the natives 
against exploitation, but more particularly because people 
have found it safer and more profitable to invest their 
money nearer home." l It is true that the manipulation 
of the tariff, although a concession was made to the prod- 
ucts of the Philippine Islands, was not enlightened pol- 
icy. Governor Taft desired absolute free trade with the 
islands but it took a number of years, and then under his 
own presidency (1909), to effect this consummation. 

President McKinley was a conscientious Methodist, 
and he fully believed that in the Philippines the white 
man's burden was laid upon the United States. As men 
act from mingled motives, the idea of personal fame 
doubtless was bound up in his action. He was a student 
of American history and knew it well for the years that 
came within his personal remembrance. Every American 
President since 1865 has emulated the fame of Lincoln, 
as did McKinley, when in his speech accepting the nomi- 
nation in 1900, he declared : "The Republican Party . . . 
broke the shackles of 4,000,000 slaves and made them free, 
and to the party of Lincoln has come another supreme 
opportunity which it has bravely met in the liberation 
of 10,000,000 of the human family from the yoke of im- 
perialism." 2 He likewise believed that the possession of 
the Philippines would be an assistance to our growing 
trade in the Orient. 

No one can write on this subject without devoting a 
large amount of study to the arguments of the anti- 



1 The United States as a World Power, 170. 

J Life of McKinley, Olcott. ii. 287. This was then stated 



188 STOREY — SCHURZ [1901 

Imperialists with whose statements, so far as they can be 
tortured into reasoning that we had no business trying to 
govern people 7000 miles away, I am in entire sympathy. 
Moorfield Storey's acute logic and large present 
intelligence would make one almost feel that Charles 
Sumner was on earth again interpreting the Constitution 
and the acts of the President by the truths of the Declara- 
tion of Independence. His opposition to our work in 
the Philippines was sincere and was urged by a sacrifice 
of present ease and earthly honors. For he was of the 
stuff of which martyrs are made and, in earlier days, would 
have suffered for his opinions at the stake. Carl Schurz, 
according to a personal friend, was a revolutionist and 
thus he showed himself in his opposition to the Philippine 
policy. His speeches were those of an orator and his 
well-rounded periods put his position with great force. 
His argument, which was generally concurred in by the 
anti-Imperialists that we should treat the Philippines as 
we had treated Cuba, was well put, attested as it was by 
the despatch of Admiral Dewey that the Filipinos "are 
far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self- 
government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar 
with both races." 1 But Schurz's plan in giving self- 
government to the Philippines was "to make the Philip- 
pine Islands neutral territory as Belimmi and Suit /.(Miami 
are in Europe." - Schurz fortunately did not live to Bee 
the guarantee of Belgium's neutrality treated as a mere 
"scrap of paper," nor did he become disabused of his 

profound admiration for the (ierman Emperor, Wilhelm 



1 Di patch of Dewey to See. of Navy, June 27, 1808. 
■ Speech of Oct 17, L889. Speeches, etc, vi. 1U8. 



Ch. VII.] THE EMPEROR OF GERMANY 189 

II. "Whether the Emperor of Germany did not at one 
time wish to acquire the Philippines, I do not know," 
he said. "But if we offered him the Philippines to-day 
with our compliments, he would doubtless ask, 'How 
large an army do you have to employ to subjugate the 
country?' The answer would be, 'At present 60,000 
men ; we may need 100,000. ' The Emperor would smil- 
ingly reply, 'Thank you. Offer this job to someone who 
is as foolish as you have been.' He would probably be 
too polite to say so, but he would doubtless think so." x 
At this time a majority of the best informed people in 
the United States and England believed that Germany 
would take these islands if she could get them and apply, 
if need be, the ruthless methods which the Emperor told 
his troops to employ in China. "Spare nobody," he 
said, "make no prisoners, use your weapons in a manner 
to make every Chinaman for a thousand years to come 
forego the wish to as much as look askance at a Ger- 
man." 2 

The opposition of Senator George F. Hoar was pathetic. 
A true Republican, he loved McKinley, who, late in 1898, 
was committed to taking the Philippines. When he saw 
the President during December of that year and was 
taken by the hand with the question, "How are you feel- 
ing this winter, Mr. Senator?" "Pretty pugnacious, I 
confess, Mr. President," "The tears came into his eyes 
and McKinley said, grasping my hand again, 'I shall 
always love you whatever you do.'" 3 Hoar planted 



1 Speech of Sept. 28, 1900, ibid., 248. 

2 July 2, 1900. The Kaiser's Speeches, Wolf von Schierbrand, 260 
(1903). 

3 Autobiography, ii. 315. 



190 GEORGE F. HOAR [1899 

himself on the Declaration of Independence that "gov- 
ernments derive their just powers from the consent of 
the governed." He was a true disciple of Charles Sum- 
ner "to whom," he said, "the Declaration of Independ- 
ence was another gospel." l We ought to have treated 
the Philippines as we did Cuba, he affirmed, and had we 
done so, a government under Aguinaldo and his associates 
would have been formed as stable as the governments 
from the United States to Cape Horn. A democracy, he 
declared, "cannot rule over vassal states as subject people 
without bringing in the elements of death into its own 
constitution." 2 This idea was extensively elaborated 
by Carl Schurz, but it had great force coming from a true 
American and a loyal Republican like Senator Hoar. 

In truth there is something admirable in these three 
men pleading for the rights of ci .lit million brown people 
as they had hitherto for four million blacks. It is the 
old story of the superior taking the part of the inferior, 
and it involves the subjugation of race pride and putting 
one's self in the place of the brown or black man. 

McKinley had aspirations after culture and was es- 
pecially fond of college men. lie decided to send a Com- 
mission to the Philippines, at whose head should be Jacob 
G. Schurman, President of Cornell University. During 
January, 1899, Schurman was summoned to Washington 
and such an invitation was extended to him. lie de- 
murred Brs1 because he feared thai he could not Leave 
the University and then he said, "To be plain, Mr. Pres- 
ident, I am opposed to your Philippine policy; 1 never 



'Speech in the Senate, Jan. '.'. L899; see Senator Lodge's argument 
en "consent of the governed." Speeches and Ad dr ess e s, 826. 
■ Senal oh. 



Ch. VII.] THE SCHURMAN COMMISSION 191 

wanted the Philippine Islands." "Oh," was the reply, 
"that need not trouble you ; I didn't want the Philippine 
Islands either; and in the protocol to the treaty I felt 
myself free not to take them, but in the end there was 
no alternative." The American people certainly would 
not consent to leave the Philippines to Spain, the Presi- 
dent argued, and, as that was no longer a question, if 
"American sovereignty were not set up, the peace of the 
world would be endangered." We, so he implied, cer- 
tainly owed responsibilities to the world at large. The 
President desired this Commission to act as an advisory 
Cabinet and he especially wished to know what sort of 
political relations it was wise to establish between the 
United States and eight million ! brown men of Asia. 
He desired aid in shaping such a policy and at the same 
time a tactful cooperation with the naval and military 
authorities at Manila. 2 Schurman accepted the Presi- 
dency of the Commission and McKinley named as his 
associates Admiral Dewey, General Otis (who was the mil- 
itary commander in the Philippines), Charles Denby and 
Dean C. Worcester of the University of Michigan. 

When Schurman arrived in Manila he found a war in 
progress which was an interruption to his peaceful errand. 
The American and Philippine armies had faced each other 
near Manila for a number of weeks in hostile array. The 
Americans had bought the sovereignty of the islands 
from Spain but the Filipinos supposed that in the event 



1 The first Commission adopted that figure (15). The Census of 1903 
made the population somewhat less. Enc. Brit. ; Blount, Amer. Occupa- 
tion of the Philippines, 567. Williams wrote that the population to the 
square mile was about 66, to 350 in Java, 290 in Japan, 200 in In- 
dia. Odyssey of the P. Com., 306. 

* Schurman, A Retrospect and Outlook, 2. 



192 THE REVOLT OF THE FILIPINOS [1899 

of American success they were to be granted their inde- 
pendence. The fight which broke out on February 4, 
1899, was therefore one between sovereignty and inde- 
pendence. The feeling which became pretty general 
among the Filipinos may be stated thus : "If the Amer- 
icans are going to look on us and treat us as the Spaniards 
have done for three hundred years we do not want them 
here." l Aguinaldo was the head of the Filipinos and he 
was a Malay of marked ability. A born leader he knew 
how to consolidate the different factions in the islands. 
While he was far from being the "George Washington 
of the Orient," as some of the anti-Imperialists in Amer- 
ica called him, he probably conducted as well as possible 
the war for independence. But it is a question whether 
he and most of his followers would have opposed the 
Americans had they known that they came there not to 
exploit the islands but to assist them in their progress 
toward civilization. The Filipinos, however, had been 
fed with promises until they had come to distrust the 
white man; and the minute blood was shed the sympa- 
thy of the mass ran with their brown brothers. The 
Filipino soldiers were, however, no match for the Amer- 
icans, and while they had modern rifles they did not know 
how to use them, so thai casualties on their side were 
large and entirely out of proportion to the losses of the 
Americans. By the end of 1S99 organized resistance to 
the United States ( rovernment came to an end, and there- 
after the insurrection took the form of guerilla warfare 
which, in many cases, degenerated into brigandage. In 
November of this year Aiminaldo disappeared into the 



i Unofficial Letters of an Official's Wife, Edith Moeea (190S\ 74 



Ch. VII. J THE SCHURMAN COMMISSION 193 

wilderness and apparently played little or no part in the 
guerilla warfare. 

The Schurman Commission became one of investiga- 
tion and in their report of January 31, 1900, maintained 
that the Philippine Islands could not stand alone. To 
become "self-governing and independent" they needed 
the "tutelage and protection of the United States." But 
the "goal of the intelligent Filipinos" was ultimate in- 
dependence — "independence after an undefined period 
of American training." l "Should our power by any 
fatality be withdrawn," it said, "the Commission be- 
lieve that the government of the Philippines would speed- 
ily lapse into anarchy, which would excuse, if it did not 
necessitate, the intervention of other powers and the 
eventual division of the islands among them." 2 

About ten per cent of the Filipinos were educated men, 
of high intelligence. They knew Spanish, the civilization 
and the literature of Spain, but naturally they were not 
all saints. A goodly proportion of them were office- 
seekers of the type we know in the United States, and 
they desired independence in order to hold the purse 
strings of the nation, while if they were under an Ameri- 
can protectorate they would be protected from other 
Asiatic and European countries by the American Navy, 
in the event that they should misconduct themselves in 
foreign affairs. The radicals, whose true leader was Agui- 
naldo, influenced a majority of this ten per cent and they 
swayed the mass. All but less than a million were Ro- 



1 Report, 83. 

2 Senate hearings on affairs in the Philippine Islands, 2983. Henry 
Cabot Lodge was the efficient chairman of the committee before whom 
the hearings were had. 



194 THE FILIPINOS [1900 

man Catholic Christians and this religion was imposed 
upon them by the Spanish conquest three hundred years 
before, and the Spaniards brought to them also Spanish 
civilization which proved to be an element of great prog- 
ress. In one respect at least the Filipinos stood high in 
comparison with other Orientals and even Europeans — 
in their regard for women. Antedating the Spanish con- 
quest there was an equal inheritance law. Never were 
soldiers and officers of the American Army more mis- 
taken than when they called the Filipinos "niggers," as 
in all essentials the Filipinos stood far in advance of the 
American negro. 1 Really the Filipinos and Americans 
should have stood shoulder to shoulder instead of appeal- 
ing to force for their varying immediate aims. But as 
Carl Schurz sagely remarked, "The best government 
will always be unpopular if it is foreign government." 2 
When Storey, Hoar and Schurz opposed the Philippine 
policy of the administration on the ground that "govern- 
ments derive their just powers from the consent of the 
governed" they were entirely logical, for the course of 
events makes it evident that the Filipinos did not desire 
American rule ; but it was no more flagrant a case than 
the war of the North on the Confederate States, as the 
Southern people desired a government of their own with 
slavery amply protected. Lincoln conducted the war on 
the ground that a majority of the Southern people were 
not of the same mind as their leaders, and McKinley, 
Root and Taft made war on the Philippine insurgents 
with a similar view. 



1 As to this Me Blount, Americas Occupation of the Philippines, 365. 
1 Schurz, Speeches, vi. 175. 



Ch. VII.] ROOT SECRETARY OF WAR 195 

i 

McKinley was a rare judge of men. When he forced 
the resignation of Russell A. Alger as Secretary of War, he 
appointed to the position Elihu Root of New York. The 
appointment was made during July, 1899, and Root thus 
told the story: " Having just finished the labors of the 
year and gone to my country home, I was called to the 
telephone and told by one speaking for President 
McKinley, ' the President directs me to say to you that 
he wishes you to take the position of Secretary of War.' 
I answered, 'Thank the President for me, but say that it 
is quite absurd. I know nothing about war. I know 
nothing about the army.' I was told to hold the wire, 
and in a moment there came back the reply, 'President 
McKinley directs me to say that he is not looking for 
anyone who knows anything about the army ; he has got 
to have a lawyer to direct the government of those Span- 
ish islands and you are the lawyer he wants.' Of course," 
proceeded Root, "I had then, on the instant, to deter- 
mine what kind of a lawyer I wished to be, and there was 
but one answer to make, and so I went to perform a law- 
yer's duty upon the call of the greatest of all our clients, 
the government of our country." 

Root described his labor : "It was a fascinating work. 
It was the work of applying to some ten millions of people 
in Guba and Porto Rico and the Philippines, the prin- 
ciples of American liberty. They were living under laws 
founded upon the customs of their lives, customs drawn 
from old Spain and developed in social and industrial 
activity quite unlike that of the United States ; and the 
problem was to apply those principles which are declared 
in our constitutions, which embodied the formative idea 
of the Declaration of Independence that all men are en- 



196 ROOT AND McKINLEY [1901 

dowed with inalienable rights, among which are life and 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, to the customs and 
the laws of people which had come down from the Spain 
of Philip the Second and the Inquisition." ! 

Root's opinion of McKinley after more than two years 
of official and personal intercourse may well be cited : 
"How wise and skilful he was! how modest and self- 
effacing ! how deep his insight into the human heart ! how 
swift the intuitions of his sympathy ! how compelling 
the charm of his gracious presence ! He was so unselfish, 
so thoughtful of the happiness of others, so genuine a 
lover of his country and kind. And he was the kindest 
and tenderest friend who ever grasped another's hand. 
Alas that his virtues did plead in vain against cruel 
fate!" 2 

As President McKinley was unable to secure the re- 
turn to the Philippines of his first Commission, he ap- 
pointed a new one: William H. Taft, Professor Dean C. 
Worcester of the University of Michigan, Luke E. Wright 
of Tennessee, Henry C. Ide of Vermont and Professor 
Bernard Moses of the University of California. It must 
be premised that Tail was Judge of the United States 
Circuit Court and the height of his ambition was a scat 
on the United States Supreme bench. lie was desig- 
nated as President of the Board and has thus told the 
story of his appointment: "It was in February, 1900, 
that in the court house in Cincinnati I received from Mr. 
McKinley a telegram which read like this, 'If you have 
no other engagement, you will do me a great favor by 
calling on me in Washington some time next week.' I 



1 Milit:ir> and Colonial Policy, Root, riv, w. : I., 112. 



Ch. VII.] THE TAFT COMMISSION 197 

did not know of any vacancy existing on the Supreme 
Court bench but I went to Washington just the same. 
Arriving at the White House I was ushered into the Cab- 
inet room and there I met the President. 'Judge/ he 
said, 'I'd like to have you go to the Philippines.' I said, 
1 Mr. President, what do you mean by going to the Philip- 
pines?' He replied, 'We must establish a government 
there and I would like you to help.' ' But, Mr. Presi- 
dent/ I said, 'I am sorry we have got the Philippines. 
I don't want them and I think you ought to have some 
man who is more in sympathy with the situation.' ' You 
don't want them any less than I do/ replied the President, 
'but we have got them and in dealing with them I think 
I can trust the man who didn't want them better than 
I can the man who did.' You can readily understand," 
continued Taft, "the feelings of a man whose only ob- 
ject in going to Washington was the hope of finding a 
vacant cushion on the Supreme Court bench to be asked 
to go 10,000 miles from home. But after I had talked 
with Mr. McKinley and with Secretary Root I decided 
I would go and in a hurry. I went under the influence 
of Mr. McKinley's personality, the influence he had of 
making people do what they ought to do in the interest 
of the public service. Mr. McKinley said he would stand 
by me in the Philippines and he did." l 

The instructions to this Commission of April 7, 1900, 
addressed to the Secretary of War are properly called 
the magna carta of the Philippines. It is asserted by 
the editors of the Root volumes 2 that this paper was 



1 Speech of President-elect Taft, New York City, Dec. 13, 1908, Bos- 
ton Herald. 

2 Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott. 



198 ROOT'S INSTRUCTIONS 11900 

drafted by Root and with "trifling verbal changes "signed 
by the President. 1 This is asserted by other writers and 
so far as I know not contradicted, so it may be recorded 
as a fact. As the military government was now supreme 
and it was desirable to avoid any conflict with the Civil 
Commission, both the general in command and the Com- 
mission were directed to report to the Secretary of War. 
The Commission should at first "devote their attention 
to the establishment of municipal government, in which 
the natives of the islands, both in the cities and in the 
rural communities, shall be afforded the opportunity to 
manage their own local affairs to the fullest extent of 
which they are capable, and subject to the least degree 
of supervision and control, which a careful study of their 
capacities and observation of the workings of native con- 
trol show to be consistent with the maintenance of law, 
order, and loyalty." Next should be the organization of 
government in the large administrative divisions, the 
intent being to substitute civil for military control. On 
September 1, 1900, the legislative authority which had 
been exercised by the military governor should be trans- 
ferred to the Civil Commission. "Exercise of this legis- 
lative authority," the instructions continued, "will in- 
clude the making of rules and orders, having the effect 
of law, for the raising of revenue by taxes, custom duties 
and imports; the appropriation and expenditure of pub- 
lic funds of the islands; the establishment of an educa- 
tional system throughout the islands; the establishment 

of a system to secure an efficient civil service ; the organiza- 
tion and establishment of courts; the organization and 



1 Military and Colonial Policy, 226. 



Ch. VII.] ROOT'S INSTRUCTIONS 199 

establishment of municipal and departmental govern- 
ments, and all other matters of a civil nature. . . . Wher- 
ever civil governments are constituted under the directions 
of the Commission, such military posts, garrisons and forces 
will be continued for the suppression of insurrection and 
brigandage and the maintenance of law and order as the 
Military Commander shall deem requisite, and the military 
forces shall be at all times subject, under his orders, to the 
call of the civil authorities for the maintenance of law 
and order and the enforcement of their authority." 

Natives of the islands should be preferred for the offices 
but they must be absolutely and unconditionally loyal 
to the United States. The government established is 
"not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theo- 
retical views, but for the happiness, peace and prosperity 
of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures 
adopted should be made to conform to their customs, 
their habits, and even their prejudices to the fullest extent 
consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable 
requisites of just and effective government." 

Then followed, substantially, the Bill of Rights of the 
American Constitution ; but the right to bear arms and 
trial by jury were not included in the enumeration of the 
safeguards of liberty. Education should be promoted 
and extended. This was an easy matter as the desire 
for education was almost universal and the wish to learn 
English eager. With wisdom the direction to the Com- 
mission was: "Instruction should be given in the first 
instance in every part of the islands in the language of 
the people. In view of the great number of languages 
spoken by the different tribes, it is especially important 
to the prosperity of the islands that a common medium 



200 ROOT'S INSTRUCTIONS 11900 

of communication may be established, and it is obviously 
desirable that this medium should be the English lan- 
guage. Especial attention should be at once given to 
affording full opportunity to all of the islands to 
acquire the use of the English language." The compre- 
hensive instructions ended with: A "high and sacred 
obligation rests upon the Government of the United 
States to give protection for property and life, civil and 
religious freedom and wise, firm and unselfish guidance 
in the paths of peace and prosperity to all the people of 
the Philippine Islands. I," said the President of the 
United States, " charge this Commission to labor for the 
full performance of this obligation, which concerns the 
honor and conscience of their country, in the firm hope 
that through their labors all the inhabitants of the Phil- 
ippine Islands may come to look back with gratitude to 
the day when God gave victory to American arms at 
Manila and set their land under the sovereignty and the 
protection of the people of the United States." ! 

The way was paved by the introduction of a bill from 
the Committee on the Philippines which, although not 
enacted, offered a statement from Senator Henry Cabot 
Lodge, who was in full sympathy with our possession of 
the Philippines. On March 7, 1900, he said : The "Presi- 
dent, under the military power, which still controls and 
must for some time control the islands, could do all that 

this bill provides. . ■ . We follow the well-settled pre- 
cedents of Jefferson and Monroe. . . . We may safely 

tread in the footsteps of the author of the Declara- 
tion of [ndependence. Be saw no contradiction be- 



1 Messages and Papers of the Prcidont, Supplement, 139. 



Ch. VII.] ROOT'S INSTRUCTIONS 201 

tween that great instrument and the treaty with 
Napoleon." l 

These instructions were approved by the Spooner 
Amendment (March 2, 1901) and by the Philippine Gov- 
ernment Act of July 1, 1902. Upon this magna carta 
was built the government of the Philippines. The Com- 
mission had full power to rule the islands. Root was the 
creator and Taft the practical instrument; both were 
backed loyally by Presidents McKinley and Roosevelt, 
and all wrought together in perfect harmony, furnishing 
an example of the wise administration of colonial pos- 
sessions on a new and original plan. Certainly no gov- 
ernment was better served. 

The Commission had a guerilla warfare to reckon with. 
During 1900 this was kept alive by the hope of Demo- 
cratic success in the presidential election, as the leaders 
assured the masses that, in the event of Bryan's triumph, 
their independence would be secured. 2 

During March, 1901, Aguinaldo, who was termed "the 
incarnation of the insurrection," was captured, as the 
result of a "desperate enterprise" by General Funston 
with four American officers, assisted by about eighty Mac- 
cabebes, who, though Filipinos, had a long-standing 
feud with their brothers, had been loyal to the Spanish 
authorities and transferred that loyalty to us. "I take 
pride," wrote Theodore Roosevelt to General Funston, "in 
this crowning exploit of a career filled with cool courage, 
iron endurance and gallant daring, because you have added 



1 Speeches and Addresses, 317 et seq.; letter from Senator Lodge, Nov- 
15, 1920. 

2 The Americans in the Philippines, Le Roy, ii. 135 n. 



202 AGUINALDO [1901 

your name to the honor roll of American worthies." 1 
On April 19 Aguinaldo took the oath of allegiance to 
the American Government and has faithfully kept this 
oath. 2 He also issued a proclamation in which he said : 
"The cause of peace . . . has been joyfully embraced by 
a majority of our fellow countrymen who are already 
united around the glorious and sovereign banner of the 
United States. In this banner they repose their trust, 
in the belief that under its protection our people will at- 
tain all the promised liberties which they are even now 
beginning to enjoy. The country has declared unmis- 
takably in favor of peace ; so be it. Enough of blood ; 
enough of tears and desolation. . . . By acknowledging 
and accepting the sovereignty of the United States 
throughout the entire archipelago, as I now do, without 
any reservation whatever, I believe that I am serving 
thee, my beloved Country. May happiness be thine." 3 
On September 1, 1900, the Taft Commission entered 
upon their legislative work; on July 4, 1901, Taft was 
appointed Civil Governor of the islands. By July 4, 1902. 
the guerilla warfare was at an end and Root issued this 
address to the soldiers: "The President thanks the offi- 
cers and enlisted men of the army in the Philippines, 
both regulars and volunteers, for the courage and forti- 
tude, the indomitable spirit and loyal devotion with which 
they have put down and ended the great insurrection 
which has raged throughout the archipelago againsl the 
lawful sovereignty and just authority of the United 
States." When the organized resistance "had been over- 



1 Theodore Roosevelt and BQsTime, Bishop, i. 108. 

1 Blount, American Occupation i»f the Philippines, 352. 

3 The Philippines, Military Regime, Elliott, 826. 



Ch. VII.] THE PRESIDENT THANKS THE ARMY 203 

come, they were required to crush out a general system 
of guerilla warfare conducted among a people speaking 
unknown tongues, from whom it was almost impossible 
to obtain the information necessary for successful pur- 
suit or to guard against surprise and ambush." They 
"had to do with a population among whom it was im- 
possible to distinguish friend from foe, and who in count- 
less instances used a false appearance of friendship for 
ambush and assassination. They were obliged to deal 
with problems of communication and transportation in 
a country without roads and frequently made impassable 
by torrential rains. They were weakened by tropical 
heat and tropical disease. . . . Under all these adverse 
circumstances the army of the Philippines has accom- 
plished its task rapidly and completely. . . . Utilizing 
the lessons of the Indian wars it has relentlessly followed 
the guerilla bands to their fastnesses in mountain and 
jungle and crushed them. ... Its officers have shown 
high qualities of command and its men have shown de- 
votion and discipline." l 

So far as I know the charges that were made as to the 
use of torture by American soldiers consisted in the ap- 
plication of the "Water-cure" to elicit information as to 
the whereabouts of hostile bands. A bamboo reed was 
placed in the victim's mouth and water was poured down 
through it to the disturbance of all the digestive organs. 
When the victim was permitted to void the water, the 
desired intelligence was frequently procured by the threat 
of a renewed application. While very painful this tor- 
ture was seldom fatal nor permanently damaging. 2 The 

1 Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Supplement, 396. 

2 Blount, The American Occupation of the Philippines, 202. 



204 ROOSEVELT — ROOT [1902 

American soldiers despised the Filipinos and were ready 
to practise the principle of "an eye for an eye; a tooth 
for a tooth," but in most instances they were restrained 
by their officers. 1 

Theodore Roosevelt, who as President was thoroughly 
informed, who had a high rega -d for humanity, who ap- 
preciated fully the harm of torture both to the tortured 
and to him who inflicts the torture, has written the truth on 
this subject in a few words. "Under the strain of well nigh 
intolerable provocation there were shameful instances, 
as must happen in all wars, where the soldiers forgot 
themselves and retaliated evil for evil. There were one 
hundred thousand of our men in the Philippines, a hun- 
dred thousand hired for a small sum a month apiece, put 
there under conditions that strained their nerves to the 
breaking point, and some of the hundred thousand did 
what they ought not to have done." 2 

Root fully appreciated the burden which he had as- 
sumed. "It concerned the credit and honor of our coun- 
try that we should succeed in the Philippines," he de- 
clared. But he admitted during September, 1902, that 
there were moments of despair. "There come always," 
he said, "in every great and difficult undertaking, times 
when failure seems possible; times when discourage- 



1 The army Bong wgnifiw the feeling : 

"Damn, damn, damn the Filipino 
P aiarked Khakiao ladrone : [Copper-oolored thief] 
Underneath the starry Han 
Civilise him with a Krag. 
And return iu to our own beloved home," 

emitf t'i the tune of " [ramp, tramp, (rami'," Blount) 270. 

1 [he Philippines, Mrs. C. Daunoey (1910), 5 \ see T. Roosevelt and 
Hia Time, Bishop, i. 191; also T. K.'- letter to Bishop Lawrence and ad- 
to Arlington Cemetery, ibid. ; My Sistorieal I 238. 



Ch. VII.] CIVIL GOVERNMENT SUBSTITUTED 205 

ments and difficulties and doubts beset the pathway of 
endeavor." 

"As armed resistance ceased," wrote Root, in " island 
by island, province by province, town by town, civil gov- 
ernment was substituted for military government; the 
bill of rights extended its protection over the people ; 
the writ of habeas corpus became the guaranty of their 
liberty; elections were held at which the people chose 
the officers of their own towns and provinces ; a native 
constabulary was organized and proved faithful and effec- 
tive for the protection of life and property ; the people 
resumed their customary vocations under the protection 
of law. . . . The personnel of civil government has been 
brought together under an advanced and comprehen- 
sive civil service law which has been rigidly enforced. 
. . . The Philippine people will follow in the footsteps 
of the people of Cuba ; more slowly indeed because they 
are not so advanced" yet as surely, they will grow in ca- 
pacity for self-government, and receiving power as they 
grow in capacity, will come to bear substantially such rela- 
tions to the people of the United States as do now the people 
of Cuba, differing in details as conditions and needs differ, 
but the same in principle and the same in beneficent 
results." ! 

In those days German opinion in reference to admin- 
istration was highly regarded. The circular of the Ger- 
man government for 1901, said, "that the American ad- 
ministration of the affairs of the Philippines has, as far 
as the economic betterment of the country is concerned, 
already achieved extraordinary success." 2 



1 Milit. and Colonial Policy, Root, 77, 80, 101, 103; 1902, 1904. 

2 Ibid., 78. 



206 ROOT AND TAFT [1902 

The opponents of the policy of the administration 
maintained that "the Constitution followed the flag," 
but the United States Supreme Court validated the pro- 
cedure of the President and of Congress who were sus- 
tained by public opinion that denied the inhabitants of 
the Philippines "equal rights under the Constitution." 
John H. Latan6 has written an intelligent chapter analyz- 
ing the different decisions in cases relating to Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines, 1 in which their burden was this sub- 
ject, and at its close he intimated what has been humor- 
ously put by Dooley, "No matter whether the Consti- 
tution follows the flag or not th' Supreme Court follows 
th' illiction returns." 2 

As Root was the creator of the Philippine policy so 
was William H. Taft its administrator. It was he who 
by suave and persistent negotiation settled the difficult 
question of the friars' lands. The friars were Domini- 
cans, Augustinians, Franciscans and Recolectos, held 
sway in the country and represented the most tyrannical 
aspect of the Spanish dominion. 3 Making themselves 
obnoxious to the Philippine people who were, neverthe- 
less, good Catholics, they and their lands must in some 
way be disposed of , were success to attend the American 
occupation. To an arrangement which, while maintain- 
ing the right of private property, should take away the 
undoubted grievance of friar ownership, Taft, under au- 
thority of an Act of Congress, addressed himself with 
eminent success. During the progress of the negotiation 



'Chap. viii. Amr-rira as a World Power. 

■ The Philippines, Military Regime, Elliott, 496 a. 

•"The people hated the Priare worse than they did the locusts." 

Odyaacy of the P. Com., Williams, iss. 



Ch - VII.] GOVERNOR TAFT 



207 



he made a visit to Rome and in the end brought the own- 
ers of the lands practically to his terms, finally closing 
"the purchase of upward of 410,000 acres at a price of 
$7,239,000 gold." He then proposed to dispose of the 
lands "to the tenants on contracts of sale with easy pay- 
ments for a number of years." This was done. We 
did not purchase these lands, he wrote "with a view to a 
profitable investment ... but merely for the purpose of 
ridding the administration of the government in the is- 
lands of an issue dangerous to the peace and prosperity 
of the people." » The account which he gave of these 
negotiations in his report of November 15, 1903, sub- 
stantiated as it is by other sources, stamps him as an un- 
usual colonial administrator. In fact all the glimpses 
one gets of his work in the islands are much to his credit. 
His unabated energy, his determination to commend 
himself to the Filipinos, his smile and hearty handshake, 2 
his tactful speeches, his attendance at dinners and balls, 
his excellent dancing thereat 3 — all show his resolution 
to make his mission successful. At a meeting in the sec- 
ond city of the islands, an observer wrote, "Taft pre- 
sided with that cordial good-natured expression which is 
one of his greatest charms and which cannot but inspire 
confidence and good-will." In another province the 
observer was impressed with Taft's master talk. "It 
was in detail, yet succinct and clear, fitted to the com- 
prehension of the people." 4 

Personally, he told a Senate Committee in Washington 
during February, 1902, "I did not favor going into the 

1 Report, Nov. 15, 1903, 44. 

2 Blount, 286. " Odyssey of the P. Com., Williams, 310. 
4 Ibid., 179, 182. 



208 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

Philippine Islands. I was sorry at the time that we got 
into it. But we are there. ... I have been called an 
optimist ; I think the Mark Tapley of this business. It 
is true I am an optimist. If I did not believe in the suc- 
cess of what we are attempting to do out there, I would 
resign and come home. Certainly no man ever succeeded 
who did not believe in the success of what he was doing. 
We think we can help these people ; we think we can 
elevate them to an appreciation of popular government ; 
and we think that because the experiment has not really 
ever been tried before is not reason for saying that the 
trial of the experiment may not be a success in this in- 
stance." ' 

In truth he had an opportunity to go home. Presi- 
dent Roosevelt cabled to him late in 1902 : "On January 
first there will be a vacancy on the Supreme Court to 
which I earnestly desire to appoint you. ... I feel that 
your duty is on the Court unless you have decided not 
to adopt a judicial career. I greatly hope you will ac- 
cept." To this Taft replied: "Great honor deeply ap- 
preciated but must decline. Situation here most critical 
from economic standpoint. . . . Nothing would satisfy 
individual taste more than acceptance. Look forward 
to the time when I can accept such an offer but even if 
it is certain that it can never be repeated 1 must now 
decline." At the same lime he cabled to Secretary Root : 
"Chance has thrown every obstacle in the way of our 
success but we shall win. 1 Long for a judicial career but 
if it must turn on my present decision I am willing to 
lose it." Late in November Taft received this letter 



1 Sc-uatc Hearing! on Affairs in tin- Philippine i Put i 846. 



Ch. VII. 1 ROOSEVELT AND TAFT 209 

from President Roosevelt: "Dear Will, I am disap- 
pointed, of course, that the situation is such as to make 
you feel it unwise to leave, because, exactly as no man 
can quite do your work in the islands, so no man can 
quite take your place as the new member of the Court. 
But, if possible, your refusal on the ground you give 
makes me admire you and believe in you more than ever." 
But about one month later President Roosevelt wrote 
to Taft, the letter being received January 6, 1903 : "Dear 
Will, I am awfully sorry, old man, but after faithful effort 
for a month to try to arrange matters on the basis you 
wanted, I find that I shall have to bring you home and 
put you on the Supreme Court. I am very sorry. I 
have the greatest confidence in your judgment, but after 
all, old fellow, if you will permit me to say so, I am Presi- 
dent and see the whole field. . . . After the most careful 
thought, after the most earnest effort as to what you 
desired and thought best, I have come, irrevocably, to the 
decision that I shall appoint you to the Supreme Court 
in the vacancy caused by Judge Shims' resignation. . . . 
I am very sorry if what I am doing displeases you, but 
as I said, old man, this is one of the cases where the Pres- 
ident, if he is fit for his position, must take the respon- 
sibility." 

In answer to this letter Taft sent this cable to the Pres- 
ident: "Recognize soldier's duty to obey orders." But 
"I presume on our personal friendship, even in the face 
of your letter, to make one more appeal, in which I lay 
aside wholly my strong personal disinclination to leave 
work of intense interest half-done." These people are 
convinced "that I am their friend and stand for a policy 
of confidence in them and belief in their future and for 



210 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

extension of self-government as they show themselves 
worthy. . . . Announcement of withdrawal pending 
settlement of church question, economic crisis, and 
formative political period when opinions of all parties 
are being slowly moulded for the better, will, I fear, give 
impression that change of policy is intended because 
other reasons for action will not be understood. ... I 
feel it is my duty to say this. If your judgment is un- 
shaken I bow to it." To this came a cable from Presi- 
dent Roosevelt, "All right, stay where you are. I shall 
appoint someone else to the Court." l 

One of the most interesting matters in American his- 
tory during the first two decades of the twentieth cen- 
tury is the relation between Roosevelt and Taft ; to 
end the Supreme Court incident a violation of chronology 
in the narrative is needed. We therefore go on to 1906 
when Taft was Secretary of War in President Roosevelt's 
Cabinet. He was again offered a position on the Supreme 
Court bench but in a personal interview showed unwill- 
ingness to accept it. Shortly afterwards, on March 15, 
190G, Roosevelt wrote to Taft a letter in which he said: 
"My dear Will, it is preeminently a matter in which no 
other man can take the responsibility of deciding for you 
what is best for you to do. . . . But I appreciate, as every 
thoughtful man must, the importance of the part to be 
played by the Supreme Court in the next twenty-five 
years. . . . There are strong arguments against your tak- 
ing this justiceship. In the first place, my belief is that, 
of :ill the r i it*ii who have appeared so far, you are the man, 
who is most likely to receive the Republican nomination, 



•Mrs. w. II. Taft, Recollections, 262 a seq. 



Ch. VII.] ROOSEVELT AND TAFT 211 

and who is, I think, the best man to receive it. It is not 
a light thing to cast aside the chance of the Presidency, 
even though, of course, it is a chance, however, a good 
one." Taft considered the offer over four months and 
then wrote to the President (July 30, 1906) from Murray 
Bay, Canada, where he was taking his summer vacation, 
declining the offer, saying: "I would much prefer to go 
on the Supreme Bench for life than to run for the Presi- 
dency. . . . But circumstances seem to me to have im- 
posed something in the nature of a trust to me personally 
that I should not discharge by now succeeding Justice 
Brown. In the nature of things the trust must end with 
this administration and one or two years is short to do 
much. Yet the next session of Congress may result in 
much for the benefit of the Filipino and, it seems to me, 
it is my duty to be in the fight." 1 

While still in the Philippines Taft twice put aside the 
coveted place and remained in the islands, the climate 
of which was unsuitable. Before he appeared before the 
Senate Committee in Washington, on leave for the state 
of his health, and before these first two offers were made 
to him of a supreme judgeship, he had submitted to two 
surgical operations and was in bed for a number of weeks, 
but maintained "his usual cheerful frame of mind." 2 
His wife, too, was debilitated and needed a change to 
America. Finally, at the end of 1903, he left for Wash- 
ington to accept the position of Secretary of War. He 
was popular with the native inhabitants; they loved 
him and their anxiety when he was ill knew no bounds. 



1 J. B. Bishop, Roosevelt and His Time, ii. 99 et seq. 
1 Mrs. W. H. Taft, Recollections, 229; Unofficial Letters, Edith Moses. 
187. 



212 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

At the time when President Roosevelt insisted on his 
acceptance of the second offer of supreme judgeship and 
it leaked out that Taft was going to leave the Philippines, 
there was a sincere demonstration in his favor in the city 
of Manila which was placarded with the sentiment in 
various languages, "We want Taft." In his farewell 
speech he declared that the Philippines were for the Fili- 
pinos. It need not occasion surprise that President Roose- 
velt in a review of this colonial administration said that 
Taft's work in the Philippines is as great as Lord Cro- 
n.cr's in Egypt. 

The cost of the Philippines by the end of 1907 is esti- 
mated at $300,000,000 ; besides, the cost per annum of 
the native scouts and the 12,000 American troops was 
about 14 millions. 2 The government of the islands is 
self-supporting, wrote Governor Forbes, and this, accord- 
ing to Blount, is true except for the expense of the scouts 
and the American soldiers. In February, 1002, Taft told 
a Senate committee: "I think the intervention of the 
United States in the Philippine Islands is the best possible 
thing that could have happened to the Filipino people 
but ... for the people of the United States it probably 



1 Mrs. W. H. Taft, Recollections, 267. 

'The American Occupation of the Philippines, Blount, 600. In 
his report of Dec. 1. 1902, Rool wrote : "Since the ending of the insurrec- 
tion and the complete establishment <>f civil government in the Philip- 
pines, it has been possible t<» make :i farther reduction of the Army and on 
11 ber 24, L902, an order was made reducing the enlisted strength to 
69,8('><>. . . . The effect of carrying out this order will be to bring the 
rican troop. Btationed in the Philippines down to an enlisted strength 
of 13,480." in hie report of Dec 7, 1903, he said, "The Imerican troops, 
in tin- Philippines consisted of 843 officers and 14,667 enlisted men. . , ■ 
The number can still further be reduced." 1 nave assumed that the num- 
ber was reduced to 12,000 as Blounl was very unfriendly to the American 
administration. 



Ch. VII.] CAMERON FORBES'S OPINION 213 

would be better that chance had not thrown the Filipino 
people under our guidance and protection." x And dur- 
ing May, 1907, in a speech at St. Louis, he admitted that 
the islands had been a financial drain. 2 

W. Cameron Forbes, when Vice-Governor, wrote in 
the Atlantic Monthly for February, 1909: "We have 
completed the separation of Church and State, buying 
out from the religious orders their large agricultural prop- 
erties, which are now administered by the government 
for the benefit of the tenants. We have put the finances 
on a sound and sensible basis. . . . We have established 
schools throughout the archipelago, teaching upward of 
half a million children." And Forbes affirmed that with 
some natural exceptions it was "safe to travel everywhere 
throughout the islands without carrying a weapon. 
We," he continued, "have given the Filipinos almost 
complete autonomy in their municipalities. . . . The 
record of the Americans in the Philippines is one of which 
no American need be ashamed. . . . We are casting off 
the shackles which held down the laboring classes of the 
Philippines and, with the laboring classes raised, we are 
raising all the people to a higher and nobler plane. We 
may not as yet have given independence to the Philip- 
pines but we are certainly giving independence to the 
Filipinos." 3 

All the money raised by internal taxation was spent 
on the islands. There was absolutely no exploitation. 
"As I look back," wrote Elihu Root in 1916 in a preface 



1 Hearings on Affairs in the Philippine Islands, Part 1, 406. 

* Blount, 357. 

3 Article entitled "A Decade of American Rule in the Philippines." 
The citations down to "weapon," are made by Blount in his American 
Occupation of the Philippines. 



214 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

to Charles B. Elliott's book, "over our American admin- 
istration in the Philippines .... down to the close of 
the Taft Administration in the spring of 1913, I think 
the American people are entitled to say to themselves 
that their work was well done. We maintained in the 
islands a very able and honest government which con- 
stantly and effectively kept in view the very high stand- 
ard of purpose with which we began. By limiting this 
statement to the end of the Taft Administration I do not 
mean to imply that 1 think any differently of our adminis- 
tration since that time. I simply do not know enough 
about it since then to make an assertion one way or the 
other. The time during which I knew about the Phil- 
ippine government covers the first fourteen years, and 
as to that time I say that the people of the United States 
ought to be proud of their government in the Philippines 
and grateful to the men and women who reflected credit 
on their country by giving their strength and lives to 
that public service." l 

Root was a broad-minded man as well as a great law- 
yer. His allusion to "my friend Air. Schurz" 2 at the 
time that Carl Schurz was assailing the Philippine policy 
with all the force of his periodic eloquence, shows an ab- 
sence of partisan spirit. Like Webster, Root earned 
the title of "Defender of Peace"; in December. 1913, 
he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. When Secretary 
of State, 3 and .lames Bryce was Ambassador from Greal 
Britain, the two by wise diplomacy settled all matters 



1 Prefatory not<> The Philippine^ To the End <>t the Military Regime, 
• Military and Colonial Policy, R m t, 43. 

rotary of Wta from 1899-1004, Secretary of State from 

i/ - ' 



Ch. VII.] COOLIDGE'S OPINION 215 

of dispute between the two countries. I may parallel 
what 1 wrote of Webster : The social intercourse between 
Root and Bryce while they were at work on these treaties 
is one of those international amenities that grace the 
history of diplomac} 7 . 1 

It is well now to hear from Archibald C. Coolidge, an 
academic man, yet a man of the world, a traveller, an 
observer, a thinker, who comprehends thoroughly the 
Orient. "Criticize as we may the details of the present 
policy" [in the Philippines], he wrote in 1908, "no im- 
partial observer will deny that since 1898 the Americans 
have accomplished a great deal in their task of transform- 
ing the islands. Improved means of communication, 
public works of all kinds, modern sanitation, justice, 
public security, honest and efficient government, popular 
participation in the government and a system of general 
education form a record to be proud of. In all this, good 
fortune has counted for but little." 2 



1 See my vol. i. 139, 140. Bryce said in London, July 28, 1920, on the 
occasion of unveiling a copy of the Saint-Gaudens statue of Lincoln: "If 
I may venture to express what I believe to be the general feeling in Amer- 
ica, America looks upon Elihu Root as the greatest Secretary of State 
it has had since Daniel Webster. It was my good fortune to have to nego- 
tiate with him in Washington not a few treaties between our two coun- 
tries, and I have never known in either hemisphere anyone with a wider 
range of vision or with a mind more fair and just in handling diplomatic 
questions. He always showed the sincerest wish for perfect concord and 
friendly cooperation between our two great countries. With such a man 
it was a pleasure to negotiate, and to listen to such a man is a privilege." 
London Daily Telegraph, July 29, 1920 ; private letter from Elihu Root 
Dec. 24, 1920. 

* The United States as a World Power, 170. The Taft Com. reported 
on Nov. 1, 1902: "By the war and by the rinderpest, chiefly the latter, 
the carabaos or water buffalos have been reduced to 10 per cent of their 
former number. The chief food of the common people of these islands 
is riee and the carabao is the indispensable instrument of the people in 
the cultivation of rice, as they cultivate it, as it is also the chief means of 
transportation of the tobacco, hemp and other crops. The loss of the 



216 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

James A. Robertson wrote in 1917 : The American 
policy may have resulted in a "loss of efficiency in gov- 
ernment. There has been extremely little of ' Woe 
to the conquered' spirit from Americans, and the slogan 
'The Philippines for the Filipinos 'has been real. ... On 
the whole the result has been better than the most ardent 
advocates . . . had hoped." The American experiment 
"has attained valuable results which, notwithstanding 
the political and anti-imperialistic diatribes against the 
sincerity of Americans, has been conducted not without 
honor." l Theodore Roosevelt wrote truly: "The Eng- 
lish and Dutch administrators of Malaysia have done 
admirable work ; but the profit to the Europeans in those 
States has always been one of the chief elements con- 
sidered ; whereas in the Philippines our whole attention 
was concentrated upon the welfare of the Filipinos them- 
selves, if anything to the neglect of our own interests." 2 

What shall we do with the Philippines, as a large ma- 
jority of the American people desire to be rid of them 
if the riddance can be safely and honorably done? Theo- 
dore Roosevelt, who, as President for over seven years, 
gave the subject grave thought, made an answer sound 
and complete. Thus he wrote in 1913 : "We are govern- 
ing and have been governing the islands in the interests 
of the Filipinos themselves. If, after due time, the l'ili- 



Barabao has reduced the production of rice in the island- 7" per cent and 
the 2 in imminent danger from the locusts. " Gov. 

Taft wrote in hie report of Nov. r>, L903: "Prom the first of January 
until late in August then was a droughl in the island* of unusual length 
which interfered with the successful reaping of many of the crops, and 

with the drought a pest of U> I that hade fair to consume V\ 

part | f the food supply that grew above the ground." 

1 Atnerieam Historical Ii>~view, July, 1917, 817, 830. 

1 Autobiography, 544. 



Ch. VII.] THE PHILIPPINES 217 

pinos themselves decide that they do not wish to be thus 
governed, then I trust that we will leave ; but when we 
do leave it must be distinctly understood that we retain 
no protectorate — and above all that we take part in no 
joint protectorate — over the islands and give them no 
guarantee of neutrality or otherwise; that, in short, we 
are absolutely quit of responsibility for them of every 
kind and description." x 



1 Autobiography, 545. Authorities : Dewey's Autobiography ; Rich- 
ardson, x. ; McKinley's Messages of Dec. 1899 and 1900 ; Roosevelt's 
Message, Dec. 1901, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, Supplement, 
1889-1902; Moorfield Storey, Letter to a Friend, Oct. 21, 1899, Sec- 
retary Root's Record in the Philippine Warfare (1902), What Shall We 
Do with Our Dependencies (1903), Before the House Committee on In- 
sular Affairs (1906), Political Pamphlets in Boston Athenaeum; George 
F. Hoar, Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 9, 1S99, Letter, Our Duty to the 
Philippines, Jan. 11, 1900, Autobiography, ii., 309; Carl Schurz, Writ- 
ings, etc., hi., Speeches, etc., vi. ; Schurman, Report of Philippine Com- 
mission, 1899, A Retrospect and Outlook, Address, 1902; Senate Hear- 
ings on Affairs in Philippine Islands, Parts 1, 2, 3, Senate Docs. 23, 24, 
25; Reports of Secretary of War, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903; Reports of 
Philippine Commission, 1900, 1901, 1902, 1903, House Docs. ; Coolidge, 
The U. S. as a World Power; Elihu Root, Milit. and Colonial Policy; 
Charles B. Elliott, The Philippines to the End of the Military Regime; 
ibid., To the End of the Commission Government; James A. Le Roy, 
The Americans in the Philippines, i. & ii. ; Worcester, The Philippines 
Past and Present, i. & ii. ; Blount, The American Occupation of the 
Philippines; Williams, The Odyssey of the Philippine Commission; 
Edith Moses, Unofficial Letters of an Official's Wife ; The Philippines, 
Mrs. Campbell Dauncy, Introduction by Theodore Roosevelt; Theodore 
Roosevelt, Autobiography; Mrs. W. H. Taft, Recollections; Latan6, 
America as a World Power; Olcott, Life of McKinley; Willoughby, 
Territories and Dependencies ; Scribner's Magazine, June, 1920. 



CHAPTER VIII 

On taking the oath of office at the time of McKinley's 
death Theodore Roosevelt was entirely sincere when he 
said that "in this hour of deep and terrible bereavement 
... it shall be my aim to continue absolutely unbroken 
the policy of President McKinley." [September 14.] 
The student of Roosevelt's seven and one-half years in the 
White House will fail in their comprehension if he does 
not believe thoroughly in Roosevelt's sincerity and cour- 
age. On the train carrying the late President's body be- 
tween Buffalo and Washington, Senator Mark Hanna, 
who must be regarded as the inherited representative of 
McKinley's policy, said, "Theodore, do not think any- 
thing about a second term." That no thought of the 
sort at this time entered Roosevelt's head is apparent 
from the remark he made to Joseph B. Bishop on his 
first day in the White House: "I don't know anything 
about seven years. But this I do know — I am going to 
be President for throe years and I am going to do my ut- 
most to give the country a good President during that 
period. ... I am no second G rover Cleveland. I ad- 
mire certain of his qualities, but I have no intention of 
doing with the Republican party what he did with the 
Democratic party. I intend to work with my party and 
to make it strong by making it worthy of popular sup- 
port." l 

1 Theodore EtootevsH and Eia Time, Bishop, i. 150. When here- 
, irork I shall ref er to it m Biahop. 
218 




Copyright by Underwood & Underwood. 



Ch. VIII.] ROOSEVELT AS PRESIDENT 219 

"Wise legislation," declared Roosevelt in seconding 
McKinley's nomination at the Republican convention 
in Philadelphia during June, 1900, "is vitally important, 
but honest administration is even more important." l 
The importance which he gave to administration is ap- 
parent from his action during the time that he was Presi- 
dent. Believing that a bad colonel makes a bad regi- 
ment, he was particular in getting efficiency at the head 
of departments and in other places where the master 
gave the cue to his subordinates. He knew McKinley to 
be a good judge of men and Roosevelt was not of the sort 
who believed so thoroughly in his own selections that he 
could not accept those of others. He would take a good 
man wherever he found "him. Root, Hay, Knox and Gov- 
ernor Taft were all chosen by McKinley, yet they be- 
came trusted counsellors of Roosevelt. On September 
17 he asked all of the members of the Cabinet to remain 
in office, which they consented to do. 2 

"It is a dreadful thing," he wrote to his friend Sena- 
tor Lodge, "to come into the Presidency in this way; 
but it would be a far worse thing to be morbid about it. 
Here is the task and I have got to do it to the best of 
my ability, and that is all there is about it." 3 

Continuing "absolutely unbroken the policy of Presi- 
dent McKinley" was not the same as continuing the 
heads of the departments. That Roosevelt meant ex- 
actly what he said when he took the oath of office is un- 
doubted, but what he promised was entirely impossible. 



1 Official Proceedings, 118. 

2 The reasons for the retirement of Gage, Smith and Long are given by 
Leupp, The Man Roosevelt, 73 et seq. 

» Bishop, i. 151. 



220 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

I am, he said, temperamentally more like Cleveland than 
like McKinley. The legacy which McKinley left to his 
countrymen in his Buffalo speech was to revise the tariff 
in the direction of lower duties by means of reciprocity 
treaties. And there is no doubt that Roosevelt balanced 
the policy of attacking the tariff first instead of attack- 
ing the trusts. Not that he believed that the tariff was 
the mother of all trusts but he wrote, "As regards politi- 
cal economy I was of course while in college taught the 
laissez-faire doctrines — one of them being free trade — 
then accepted as canonical." 1 By extreme tariff men 
he was not regarded as sound on account of this educa- 
tion, as Harvard College was looked upon as devoted to 
the doctrine of free trade. Although he felt that he could 
carry a reduction of duties through Congress such a 
course would divide his party, while in an attack on the 
Trusts he could carry his party in Congress with him. 
Therefore during his administration there was no revi- 
sion of the tariff 2 but his light against Big Business was 
one of his keynotes. 

Roosevelt endeavored to carry out faithfully what he 
had said on the day that ho took the oath of office. He 
wrote a cordial letter to Senator Ilanna requesting an 
early conference and received this reply: "There are 
many important matters to lie considered from a politi- 
cal standpoinl and I am sure we will agree upon a proper 
course to pursue. Meantime 'go slow.' You will he be- 



1 Charles O, Washburn, Theodore Roosevelt, 112. Autobiography, 80. 

'Charl G Washburn, Theodore H rait, ill; see Roosevelt's 

on The Tariff and Trust Speech in Cincinnati, Sept. 20, 1002. 

i •.•!!. Hi. Life Meaning and ' , The CWrenJ IAL Pub. Co., 

lyiu. 32 



Ch. VIII.] THE NORTHERN SECURITIES CASE 221 

sieged from all sides and I fear in some cases will get the 
wrong impression. Hear them all patiently but reserve 
your decision." l 

McKinley's inheritors did not like the position which 
Roosevelt took towards the large financial interests of the 
country. He touched upon the subject in his first An- 
nual Message and submitted what he said to Senator 
Hanna, receiving the advice not to give it so much promi- 
nence, but this suggestion he disregarded. 2 His action 
ought not to have been a surprise to those who had fol- 
lowed his course while Governor of New York and had 
rated correctly his many public utterances. Neverthe- 
less the announcement of it in the merger of two com- 
peting railroads into the Northern Securities Company 
caused a shock to the financial world. 

The Northern Pacific and Great Northern railroads 
ran from Lake Superior to Puget Sound on the Pacific 
coast, and on through traffic were competing lines ; but 
for a number of years their relations had been altogether 
friendly. Both desired a terminal in Chicago which 
should connect with their St. Paul-Minneapolis lines, 
and after much discussion and negotiation acquired the 
Chicago/Burlington and Quincy. James J. Hill, as hon- 
est a man as ever lived, whose career from early poverty 
to superfluous wealth was noted for the confidence other 
men reposed in him, may be said to be the hero of the 
merger of the three railroads. He formed a company 



1 Oct. 12, 1901. Bishop, i. 154. One cannot fail to be reminded of 
Polonius's advice to Laertes : 

" Give every man thy ear, but few thy voice : 

Take each man's censure, but reserve thy judgment." Hamlet, Acti.,Sc. 1. 

2 Bishop, i. 159. 



222 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

called the Northern Securities which was to own theC, 
B. and Q. property as well as that of the other two. This 
was a holding company whose officers should manage the 
three railroads and divide the dividends among the stock- 
holders of the Northern Pacific and Great Northern ; the 
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy stockholders were paid 
by joint bonds of the two purchasing railroads. Hill's 
idea in making the merger was for the sake of no vulgar 
profit but to render the stock of the Northern Securities 
Company an investment to men and their heirs who 
would have a greater protection in the event of the death 
of those now in control. Hill and his attorneys studied 
the precedents, laws and regulations and especially the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court in the 
Knight case, arriving at the conclusion that the Anti- 
Trust Act of 1890 did not apply to such a merger ; they 
went forward therefore with their plans. And if James 
J. Hill could have left men who would carry on business 
as he had carried it on, the merger could not be said to 
interfere with the public good. 

But he had to reckon with Theodore Roosevelt, who 
was antagonistic to the operations of large financiers and 
believed that it was incumbent on him as President to 
protect the public againsl their operations. While 
Roosevelt liked Hill, he did not consider J. Pierpont 
Morgan, who was an active coadjutor with Hill in this 
enterprise, a good financial adviser. When Morgan 
heard of the President's opposition to the merger he went 
to Washington and said to him, "If ^< i have done any- 
thing wrong semi your ni:in (meaning Attorney-General 
Knox) to my man (naming one of his lawyers) and they 
can fix n up." "That can't be done," said the President. 



Ch. VIII.] MORGAN — HILL — ROOSEVELT 223 

"We don't want to fix it up," added Knox who assisted 
at this interview, "we want to stop it." Morgan in- 
quired, "Are you going to attack my other interests, the 
Steel Trust and the others?" "Certainly not," replied 
the President, "unless we find out that in any case they 
have done something that we regard as wrong." When 
Morgan went away Roosevelt expressed his opinion, 
saying to Knox: "That is a most illuminating illustra- 
tion of the Wall Street point of view. Mr. Morgan could 
not help regarding me as a big rival operator, who either 
intended to ruin all his interests or else could be induced 
to come to an agreement to ruin none." l Roosevelt con- 
sidered Hill a good financial adviser but said that he had 
to be on the watch that Hill, in giving him counsel, had 
not an eye to his own interest. Still Roosevelt appreci- 
ated a man who from nothing had amassed a fortune of 
sixty millions, although he did not rate as the highest 
ability the acquiring of wealth in this country of enor- 
mous resources. His heroes were drawn from another class. 
It is interesting to note the conflict between these two 
honest men. Roosevelt requested an opinion from 
Attorney-General Knox, who on February 19, 1902, author- 
ized the publication of the following statement: "Some- 
time ago the President requested an opinion as to the le- 
gality of this merger, and I have recently given him one 
to the effect that, in my judgment, it violates the provi- 
sions of the Sherman Act of 1890 (the Anti-Trust Act), 
whereupon he directed that suitable action should be 
taken to have the question judicially determined." 2 



1 Bishop, i. 185. 

2 Meyer, History of the Northern Securities Case. Bulletin of the 
University of Wisconsin, No. 142, 258. 



224 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 

This was a bomb shell in Wall Street and the beginning of 
the active hostility of the large financial interests to Theo- 
dore Roosevelt, whojiirected the course of his Attorney- 
General. Knox knew the ground well, as before McKin- 
ley had drawn him from the active practice of his profes- 
sion, he was a corporation lawyer. He began suit in the 
United States Circuit Court in St. Paul on March 10, 
1902 ; and on April 9, 1903, a decision was rendered by 
four Circuit judges sitting in St. Louis. This tribunal 
"decreed that, as the combination known as the North- 
ern Securities Company violated the Anti-Trust Act of 
1890, that Company is enjoined from attempting to ac- 
quire further stock of the Northern Pacific or Great 
Northern Railways; it is further enjoined from voting 
the stock already acquired or attempting to exercise any 
control whatsoever. The Northern Pacific and Great 
Northern are enjoined from permitting any such action 
on the part of the Securities Company and from paying 
to that Company any dividends on stock which it now 
claims to own." l 

The case went to the United States Supreme Court, 
the majority opinion of which was written by Justice 
Harlan (March 14, 1904) which took the ground that the 
merger was opposed to the Anti-Trust Act of 1890 and 
therefore illegal; the decree of the lower Court was af- 
firmed. 2 It was given out thai the Court had decided in 
favor of the Government by 5: I bul Justice Brewer, in 
stating his agreement in the main with the four others, 
differed in Bome degree, bo that it was jocularly said that 



' 193 V. S. Reports, 265. 

J Tin- opinion ma oonourred in i>v Justioei I lion a, McKenna and Day. 
193 r B. Report*, L98, 817. 



Ch. VIII.] THE NORTHERN SECURITIES CASE 226 

the Government had won by 4| to 4f . Many were vi- 
tally interested in the decision and the gossip of the day 
put Justice Holmes, who was appointed by Roosevelt, on 
the side of the Government. It was a great surprise 
therefore that when the decision was known, he should 
be found on the other side, giving the grounds of his judg- 
ment. 1 Gossip of the day was also concerned with two 
other judges who were counted against the Government, 
but as matter of fact concurred with Harlan in his opin- 
ion. This gossip redounded to the majesty of the Court. 

Hill's opinion soon after Knox's announcement was 
given in a private letter. "It really seems hard," he 
wrote, "when we look back on what we have done and 
know that we have led all Western companies in opening 
the country and carrying at the lowest rates, that we 
should be compelled to fight for our lives against the po- 
litical adventurers who have never done anything but 
pose and draw a salary." 2 But when the Supreme 
Court decision, which he thought would be favorable to 
his enterprise, was rendered, he said, "We must all bow 
to the law of the land," 3 and steps were taken to undo 
the work of combination. Through the decisions of the 
Courts, no property was sacrificed, but shares, which had 
been transferred to the Securities Company, were returned 
to their original owners ; but any such holding company 
as the Northern Securities was forbidden. 

No one who has read carefully the life of Hill can do 
otherwise than feel sympathy with the man when one of 

1 Both Justices Holmes and White delivered dissenting opinions ; with 
them concurred Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Peckham. 193 U. S. 
Reports, 364, 400. 

2 March, 1902. Life of Hill, Pyle, ii. 171. 
• Ibid., 175. 



226 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 

his darling projects was defeated, but as we look at it 
now, President Roosevelt was right and the decision of 
the Court was sound. While this combination as directed 
by Hill may not have been against the public good, the 
mischief lay in the precedent, for, were this merger ap- 
proved, a few men by successive steps might have con- 
trolled the railroad system of the country. Hill, Mor- 
gan and a few of their associates holding the majority of 
stock or representing it in the Northern Securities Com- 
pany, would have controlled the business of the Northern 
Pacific, the Great Northern and the Chicago, Burlington 
and Quincy Railroads ; and by the same token a few men 
might have controlled the railroad system of the country. 
Roosevelt's idea of the Knight case, which had been de- 
cided by the United States Supreme Court in January, 
1895, with but one dissenting voice, 1 was that such a 
merger as that involved in the Northern Securities case 
could be reached only by the action of the States them- 
selves ; but by the decision of the same court in the ac- 
tual (i. c. the Northern Securities) case the nation might 
act and for this Roosevelt contended. He thus wrote : 
"By a vote of five to four the Supreme Court revere d 
its decision in the Knight case, and in the Northern Se- 
curities case sustained the Government. The power to 
deal with industrial monopoly and suppress it and to con- 
trol and regulate combinations, of which the Knighl case 
had deprived the Federal Government, was thus restored 
to it by the Northern Securitie " 2 



1 Chief Justioe Puller delivered the opinion of the Couxi Justice n.-ir- 
Ian dissented. 156 U. S. Reports, 1. The dtffiwfrffl *TM on the -M.-t. 

1 Autobiography, 469. I hive been much indebted to Meyer's ac- 
count, ante. 



Ch. VIII.] BOOKER WASHINGTON 227 

From the day of Knox's statement, the line was drawn 
between Roosevelt and the large financial interests of the 
country. A goodly part of the history of his adminis- 
tration is due to that conflict, and as Roosevelt was ef- 
fective as a fighter, he was ready to throw down the 
gauntlet. 

"The Northern Securities Suit," he wrote during Au- 
gust, 1904, "is one of the great achievements of my ad- 
ministration. I look back upon it with great pride for 
through it we emphasized in signal fashion, as in no other 
way could be emphasized, the fact that the most power- 
ful men in this country were held to accountability be- 
fore the law." 1 

Roosevelt had been in the White House only a little 
over a month when he set tongues to wagging both South 
and North, among negroes and whites, by having Booker 
Washington to dinner. His own account of the incident, 
written in a private letter of November 8, 1901, is an ac- 
curate relation: "When I asked Booker T. Washington 
to dinner I did not devote very much thought to the mat- 
ter one way or the other. I respect him greatly and be- 
lieve in the work he has done. I have consulted so much 
with him it seemed to me that it was natural to ask him 
to dinner to talk over the work, and the very fact that I 
felt a moment's qualm on inviting him because of his 
color made me ashamed of myself and made me hasten 
to send the invitation. I did not think of its bearing one 
way or the other, either on my own future or on anything 
else." 2 Roosevelt was exceedingly hospitable and it was 
entirely natural for him to invite a man with whom he 



Bishop, i. 325. * Bishop, i. 166. 



228 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1901 

had business to break bread and eat salt. Washington in- 
deed from his clear comprehension and unselfish advo- 
cacy made you forget his color. A North Carolinian, 
then editor of the Atlantic Monthly, had a similar ex- 
perience. Not having completed his business when lunch- 
eon time came, he naturally asked Washington to go 
along with him and was only reminded of the fact that 
his guest was a man of color from the attitude of the 
waiters and the gaze of other patrons in the public res- 
taurant. 

Washington was thoroughly tactful, and did his best to 
avoid having any public mention of the honor which was 
paid to him, and in fact throughout the whole affair, 
with one exception, acted the part which his well-wishers 
might have desired. The dinner incident was on Octo- 
ber 18. Five days afterwards Roosevelt and Washing- 
ton, attending the Bi-Centennial of Yale University, met 
in the Hyperion theatre at New Haven, the President on 
the platform where he was to receive the degree of Doc- 
tor of Laws and Washington in the body of the theatre as 
delegate from the Tuskegee Institute. Justice Brewer, 
an old Yale graduate, delivered the oration and during it 
said, "Thank God, there have always been in this coun- 
try college men able to recognize a true Washington 
whether his first name was George or Booker." 1 Booker 
was immensely popular io the North. Andrew Carnegie 
expressed a dominant opinion when he wrote, "We should 
all lake our hats off to the man who not only raised him- 
self from Blavery but helped raise millions I?] of his race 
to a higher Btage of civilization." 2 Echoing Justice 



1 Yak Aluinia Weekly. ' Autobiography, 'J7G. 



Ch. VIII.] THE BOOKER WASHINGTON INCIDENT 229 

Brewer's statement the theatre resounded with applause 
and Booker Washington got up and bowed. This of 
course was a jarring incident amid the best of behavior, 
but he may have been urged to this recognition by some- 
one at his side. 

The mischief of Roosevelt's action lay first, in his being 
looked upon by the negroes as a saviour. President Lin- 
coln had given them political freedom and now President 
Roosevelt was to raise them to social equality. And sec- 
ond, in its effect on the white people at the South. Their 
attitude is well expressed by the words of a Southerner 
living in Tuskegee who was full of praise for Washington's 
work, "Now when I meet the man who has done all this 
I can't call him Booker like I would an ordinary nigger, 
but thunder ! I can't call a nigger Mister, so I just say, 
Professor." A young Southerner said to Leupp : "I love 
that man [Theodore Roosevelt] ; I would do anything in 
the world for him, follow him anywhere. But the one 
thing in his career which I shall never get over is the 
Booker Washington incident. Understand me : I do not 
disparage Washington's work — I appreciate it as much 
as you do. I admit all that you say of his personal 
worth. He has been in my mother's parlor and invited 
to sit down there. I don't know that I should have had 
any feeling about the President asking him to lunch or 
dinner by themselves. But to invite him to the table 
with ladies — that is what no Southerner can brook!" l 

At the end of the letter already cited, Roosevelt on 
November 8, wrote, " As things have turned out I am very 



1 The Man Roosevelt, 230. This book has been of much use to me in 
writing of the Booker Washington incident. 



230 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

glad that I asked him [Booker Washington], for the clamor 
aroused by the act makes me feel as if the act was neces- 
sary." l This was a note of defiance but his mature opin- 
ion afterwards was different. He said to me that he had 
made a mistake in asking Booker Washington to dinner ; 
that among the Southerners there was prejudice against 
such action and, while he could not comprehend their 
feeling, it was there and had to be reckoned with. He 
began his administration with great consideration for the 
South in the matter of Federal appointments and while, 
after the Booker Washington incident there was criti- 
cism in regard to some of them, on the whole he stood 
pretty well at the South. "Half my blood is Southern," 
he wrote. 2 It was understood that he did not approve of 
the policy of forcing negro suffrage upon the Southern 
States involved in the Reconstruction Acts of Congress 
and the XV Amendment and he never repeated the Booker 
Washington incident. 3 In his Autobiography written 
in 1913 he made no mention of it. But his action did not 
injure him permanently in the South. When he came 
before the people for election in 1904 he carried Missouri 
by a handsome majority, the first time in her history 
since 18G8 when she had voted for the Republican can- 
didates. The result in Maryland was so close that he 
was adjudged one electoral vote. 4 

"The year 1902," wrote Bishop, "was one of incessant 
activity for Roosevelt." 5 How could it be otherwise 
with a man of his capacious brain, equal in action and 
study to that of three men! Henry Adams, who was on 



p, i. L66 Bishop, L L54 

'William K. Thayer's Roosevelt, 284 
• A History of the Presidency (1916),Stanwood, ii. 137. »P. 188, 






Ch. VIII.] THE CHARLESTON EXPOSITION 231 

terms of social intimacy, wrote: "Power when wielded by- 
abnormal energy is the most serious of facts and all Roose- 
velt's friends know that his restless and combative energy 
was more than abnormal. Roosevelt . . . was pure act." 
He might wield " unmeasured power with immeasur- 
able energy in the White House." * When he opened the 
South Carolina Interstate and West Indian Exposition in 
December, 1901, at Charleston it was an expansionist 
President who hoped "that it may prove of great and 
lasting benefit to our industries and to our commerce with 
the West Indies." 2 

"Of the making of expositions there is seemingly no 
end," wrote James B. Townsend. " The Pan-American 
at Buffalo had hardly closed its gates in November [1901] 
when the . . . Charleston Exposition threw open its 
doors. ... It is a far cry from Buffalo to Charleston — 
over a thousand prosaic miles in actual figures but in 
midwinter seemingly half the globe in climate and sur- 
roundings. The traveler who turned his back upon the 
deserted halls of the Pan-American, swept by the wintry 
blasts from the North and found himself thirty-six hours 
later in Charleston, her feet bathed in the almost tideless 
summer seas, her quaint old buildings recalling the far 
past, a warm sun making the city beautiful, and the Cher- 
okee roses blooming in its old gardens, felt himself in- 
deed the pleased victim of a transformation carried by 
magic 'from lands of snow to lands of sun.' " 3 The Ex- 
position opened on December 1, 1901, and continued 
until June 1, 1902, and on April 9, President Roosevelt 



1 Bishop, 152; Education, 417. 

2 Appleton's Annual Cyclopaedia, 1902, 644. 

3 Cosmopolitan Magazine, March, 1902, 523. 



232 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

was in Charleston and addressed the "Men and women 
of the South, my fellow-citizens of the Union." " Charles- 
ton," he said, "is a typical Southern city. . . . All of 
us, North and South, can glory alike in the valor of the 
men who wore the blue and of the men who wore the gray. 
Those were iron times and only iron men could fight to 
its terrible finish the great struggle between the hosts of 
Grant and Lee." I nominated as Vice-Governor of the 
Philippines, he said, an "ex-Confederate, General Luke 
Wright of Tennessee, who in the Civil War fought with 
distinction in a uniform of Confederate gray. ... Of 
course," he declared in conclusion, "we are proud of the 
South. ... I am proud of your great deeds, for you 
are my people." ' 

June, 1902, found the President attending the Com- 
mencement Exercises of Harvard University when his 
Alma Mater conferred upon him the degree of Doctor 
of Laws. President Eliot, in one of his famous charac- 
terizations, spoke of him as "a true type of the sturdy 
gentleman and the high-minded public servant of a dem- 
ocracy." 2 After Roosevelt's speech at the Alumni din- 
ner, Eliot said of him, in the hearing of John Hay, who 
was the recipient of the same honor, "What a man! 
Genius, force and courage and such evident honesty." 3 
In this speech Roosevelt complimented John D.Long 
and Senator Hoar, and referred to Henry Cabot Lodge 
as his "closest, Btanches! and mosl loyal personal friend." 
He spoke highly of Hay, Root, Taft and Leonard Wood, 



1 Eta Presidential Add r esses, etc. Tho Rmimc of Rct'iew* 

Co. (1910 .: L8«J •</ 
5 Washburn, 05, 
• I.. Say, Thayer, ii. 848; Washburn, 65. 



Ch. VIII.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 233 

and the talk merited the words which Hay, with becom- 
ing modesty, wrote, "It was the speech of a great ruler 
and a great gentleman." * It is an admirable trait in 
Roosevelt's character that, having accepted his assist- 
ants from his predecessor, he stood by them and gave 
them due credit. He never had any envy of his helpers 
from which some great men are not free. 

" I could do more to do Antonius good, 
But 'twould offend him," 2 

declared one of Mark Antony's officers. 

During the last of August and early in September 
Roosevelt made a number of speeches in the New Eng- 
land cities, the burden of which was that the general 
government must be given the power to regulate "great 
corporations which we rather loosely designate as trusts." 3 
It must be remembered that we are now, in the year 1902, 
before the decision of the United States Supreme Court 
in the Northern Securities case which was not rendered 
until March, 1904, and that neither Roosevelt nor the 
crowds that flocked to hear him were aware what the de- 
cision would be, but he was insistent that the general 
government should be given this power through legisla- 
tion by Congress. "At present," he declared in Boston, 
"we have really no efficient control over a big corpora- 
tion which does business in more than one State." 4 
"We must get power first, then use that power fearlessly 
but with moderation, with sanity, with self-restraint." 5 
"So far from being against property," he said during his 



1 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 349. The speech is printed in the Review 
of Reviews, Pub. 78. 

1 Antony and Cleopatra, hi. 1. 

* Current Lit. Pub., i. 40. 

4 Current Lit. Pub., i. 45. B Fitchburg, ibid., 55. 



234 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION 11902 

speech in Boston, "when I ask that the question of trusts 
be taken up, I am acting in the most conservative sense 
in property's interest. When a great corporation is sued 
for violating the Anti-Trust Law, it is not a move against 
property, it is a move in favor of property, because when 
we make it evident that all men, great and small alike, 
have to obey the law, we put the safeguard of the law 
around all men. ... I am advocating action to pre- 
vent anything revolutionary. . . . The first thing we 
want is publicity. . . . The publicity itself would cure 
many evils." ' 

During his tour he enunciated truths which showed 
that in his pursuit of the so-called trusts he would be ac- 
tuated by sound principles. "We are passing through a 
period of great commercial prosperity," he said in Provi- 
dence, "and such a period is as sure as adversity itself to 
bring mutterings of discontent. . . . The spirit of envy 
and jealousy springs up in the breasts of those who, 
though they may be doing fairly well themselves, see oth- 
ers no more deserving who do better. Wise laws and 
fearless and upright administration of the laws can give 
the opportunity for such prosperity as we see about us. 
But that is all that they can do. ... It is not true that 
the poor have grown poorer but some of the rich have 
grown very much richer." No State government and town 
can "by some queer patent device supply the lack of 
individual thrift, energy, enterprise, resolution." "The 
best laws that the wit of man can devise would not make 
a community of thriftless and idle men prosperous." * 



- I ,t. Pub., i 18, 17. -is. 
'('urrrnt Lit. Pub., i. 31, 83, 57, 91 T!i<' last two citations ar« from 
■pttohai i& Daiton, rfl», and in Logansport, Indiana. 









Ch. VIII. J THEODORE ROOSEVELT 235 

While at Pittsfield, Mass., he suffered a severe accident. 
A trolley car, going at a high rate of speed, ran into a 
carriage, in which he was riding; a secret service man 
who sat on the box with the driver was instantly killed ; 
the President was thrown forty feet and fell upon his 
right cheek which with his right leg was badly bruised. 
The accident took place on September 3, but nothing 
daunted he started on the day following from Oyster 
Bay on a speech-making tour through the South and 
West. 1 

The most notable speech was made in Chattanooga on 
September 8 to the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen. 
"I believe emphatically in organized labor," he declared ; 
and then he preached the gospel of work in words to fit 
the occasion: "Your work is hard. Do you suppose I 
mention that because I pity you? No; not a bit. I 
don't pity any man who does hard work worth doing. 
I admire him. I pity the creature who doesn't work at 
whichever end of the social scale he may regard himself 
as being. The law of Jworthy work well done is the law of 
successful American life. I believe in play too — play 
and play hard while you play ; but don't make the mis- 
take of thinking that that is the main thing. The work 
is what counts." 2 

An abscess developing on the injured leg, forced him to 
abandon his trip and return to Washington. 



1 Bishop, i. 196. 

1 Current Lit. Pub., i. 69, 70. 



CHAPTER IX 

In 1902 President Roosevelt was confronted with a 
strike in the anthracite coal regions, which until then 
was the greatest coal strike in American history. After 
many and futile negotiations the strike was declared on 
May 15, and this brought out all of the miners of anthra- 
cite coal. Three men of various education and walks 
in life were earnestly in favor of settling the strike, but 
their efforts, both before and after the declaration, were 
for a while unavailing. John Mitchell, the President of the 
miners' union, 1 was one of the three, and he wrote in his 
book published in 1903: "The average wage earner has 
made up his mind that he must remain a wage earner. 
He has given up the hope of a kingdom to come where 
he himself will be a capitalist and he asks that the reward 
for his work be given to him as a workingman. Singly, 
he has been too weak to enforce his just demands and he 
has sought strength in union and has associated himself 
into labor organizations. . . . There is no necessary hos- 
tility between labor and capital. Neither can do without 
the other; each has evolved from the other. Capital 
is labor saved and materialized ; the power to labor is 
in itself a form of capital. There is not even a necessary 
fundamental antagonism be! ween the laborer and the 
capitalist. Both arc men with the virtues and vices of 
men and each wishes at times more than his fair share." 2 



1 Tin- < > f 1 "l - i : i 1 title wwt United Mine Workers of America. 
1 Organunl LftbOT, Mitclu'll, ix. 

236 



Ch. IX.] MARK HANNA 237 

Mark Hanna was another. As owner of bituminous 
coal mines, he had had a large experience with striking 
miners. He had tried the old-fashioned lock-out, nego- 
tiation with the miners' union and the substitution of 
green men for the old miners, with the purpose of breaking 
up a strike or ending a lock-out. He had come to the 
conclusion that of all of them, negotiation with the min- 
ers' union was on the whole the best plan. His business 
experience was now joined to his political standing and 
he gave the benefit of both to the public. 

Then there was President Roosevelt. With a practi- 
cal agreement between the three it might have seemed as 
if a resolution were easy ; and they had to deal with only 
six organizations as through mining and railroad com- 
binations, the whole business of mining anthracite coal 
may have been said to be centered in these six, chief of 
whom was George F. Baer, President of the Philadelphia 
and Reading Coal and Iron Company as well as of the 
Railroad Company. Baer, a self-made man, a lawyer 
by profession, seems to have dominated all the rest and 
even for a time to have prevailed over J. P. Morgan who 
had great influence with all of the coal operators. 

The bituminous coal miners in session at Indianapolis 
during July, 1902, decided against a sympathetic strike, 
for the reason that they had a contract with the pro- 
ducers not expiring until the following April ; but al- 
though living up to their contract, they arranged to give 
to their brothers in the anthracite region the largest 
amount possible of material assistance which enabled 
them to prolong the strike. Thus affairs continued dur- 
ing the summer of 1902. There was a dead-lock between 
the miners and producers. When September came, 



238 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1902 

the public in eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New 
York and New England began to be alarmed regarding 
their supply of anthracite coal, as on that depended prac- 
tically their domestic use. Much pressure was brought 
to bear that in some way the matter be settled so that 
the public should have their usual supply. Of this pres- 
sure the greatest amount was on the President, who appre- 
ciated thoroughly the gravity of the situation, and on 
September 27 wrote to Senator Hanna : "What gives 
me the greatest concern at the moment is the coal famine. 
Of course we have nothing to do whatever with this coal 
strike and no earthly responsibility for it. But the pub- 
lic at large will tend to visit on our heads responsibility 
for the shortage in coal. . . . But I do most earnestly 
feel that from every consideration of public policy and 
good morals, the operators should make some slight con- 
cession." Y 

No one after the President bore so important a part 
in this matter as did Mark Hanna. He had temporarily 
settled the anthracite coal strike of 1900, had now be- 
come chairman of the Industrial Department of the Civic 
Federation, 2 whose object was to prevent strikes and lock- 
outs through trade agreements by means of collective 
bargaining. This position gave him an added influence 
with the men. He shared the President's ''anxiety in 
regard to the coal situation." Visiting him at Oyster 
Bay he went thence to New York City where he saw- 
Mitchell and Morgan. He obtained from Morgan a 
proposition of settlement which Mitchell, on behalf of 



' life of Banna, Cn.lv, 397. 

1 As to Hunua'fl connection with da' Civic Federation see Croly, 390 
el seq. 



Ch. IX.] ROOSEVELT — HANNA 239 

the miners, agreed to accept. "I really felt encouraged," 
he wrote to the President, "to think that I was about to 
accomplish a settlement. I went to Philadelphia and 
saw Mr. Baer and to my surprise he absolutely refused 
to entertain it." J 

Apparently at this time Baer was the master of the 
situation. He maintained that the operators must con- 
trol their own business and not allow any dictation from a 
miners' union. To the demand for arbitration their 
reply was, "We have nothing to arbitrate." Hanna 
felt that the operators were determined on starving the 
miners to submission which seemed to him difficult as 
they were "getting abundant supplies from their fellow- 
workmen all over the country." 2 

Roosevelt appreciated every point in the situation. 
On the same day that he wrote to Hanna, he wrote to 
Senator Lodge. The operators "have said that they 
are never going to submit again to having their labor- 
ers given a triumph over them for political purposes, 
as Senator Hanna secured the triumph in 1900. They 
are now repeating with great bitterness that they do 
not intend to allow Quay to bully them into making 
any concession for his political ends any more than they 
would allow Hanna to do it for his." 3 

Roosevelt, however, made up his mind to leave nothing 
undone. He invited representatives of the operators 
and miners to meet him in Washington on October 3, and 
on their assembling, he made them a brief address, telling 
them that he was impelled to his action by "the urgency 
and the terrible nature of the catastrophe impending 



1 Hanna's letter of Sept. 29, Croly, 398. 

8 Hanna's letter of Sept. 29, Croly, 398. 3 Bishop, i. 200. 



240 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

over a large portion of our people in the shape of a winter 
fuel famine." x The story of the Conference is told by 
the President in a letter of October 3 to Hanna. "Well ! 
I have tried and failed," he wrote. "I feel downhearted 
over the result both because of the great misery ensuing 
for the mass of our people and because the attitude of 
the operators will beyond a doubt double the burden on 
us who stand between them and socialistic action. . . . 
At the meeting to-day the operators assumed a fairly hope- 
less attitude. None of them appeared to such advan- 
tage as Mitchell, whom most of them denounced with 
such violence and rancor that I felt he did very well to 
keep his temper. Between times they insulted me for 
not preserving order." Mitchell proposed "that all 
matters in dispute be submitted to the arbitration of a 
tribunal selected by the President." 2 The President 
continued in his letter to Hanna, "If the operators had 
acceded to Mitchell's proposition, 1 intended to put you 
on the commission or board of arbitration. But the 
operators declined to accede to the proposition. ... A 
coal famine in the winter is an ugly thing and I fear we 
shall see terrible suffering and grave disaster." 3 

Now entered upon the scene Grover Cleveland. He 
read in the newspaper of October \ the account of the 
Conference of the preceding day and in a private letter 
to the President expressed himself as "especially dis- 
turbed and vexed by the tone and substance of the oper- 
ators' deliverances." Be suggested that for the moment 
the proprietors and miners sink their present controversy, 
produce coal sufficient "to serve the necessities of con- 

'Bahop, i. 208. 1 1 prised Labor, Mitchell, 887. 

•Croly, 8 



Ch. IX.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 241 

sumers" and afterwards "take up the fight again where 
they left off ' without prejudice.'" Roosevelt was glad 
to receive such a letter; he had been studying Cleve- 
land's and Olney's action in the Pullman car strike 1 and 
he expected to act with the same firmness that they had 
shown. Now he told Cleveland that the operators " re- 
fused point blank" to consider Mitchell's proposition 
of arbitration, and he had substantially adopted the sug- 
gestion of the letter. On October 6 the President pro- 
posed that if the men would go to work, he would appoint 
a commission to determine matters in dispute promising 
to do all in his power to have what legislation they pro- 
posed enacted. This offer was refused by Mitchell for 
what he deemed good and sufficient reasons. 2 

The President was not especially pleased that his plan 
to settle the trouble was thus rejected by Mitchell but 
this feeling was soon overcome by his irritation at the 
standpoint of the operators; he now proposed to ask 
Carroll D. Wright, United States Commissioner of Labor, 
and two eminent men to make a thorough investigation 
and to say how the dispute should be settled. He ear- 
nestly begged Cleveland to be one of the three. Re- 
ceiving the Ex-President's assent on October 13, he "im- 
mediately wrote to a certain Federal judge asking him 
to be the third member of the Commission." As the 
investigation would consume considerable time, the Pres- 
ident determined that operations should begin at once, 
so he arranged with Senator Quay to have the governor 
of Pennsylvania notify him that he could not keep order 
in the coal regions without Federal interference. Then 



1 See viii. 424. 2 Organized Labor, 388. 



242 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

Roosevelt decided to send thither Lieutenant-General 
John M. Schofield, who was on the retired list of the army, 
with a sufficient number of regular troops ; he should 
act as receiver, put down all violence, take full charge 
of the mines and operate them to supply the present de- 
mand. Secretaries Root and Knox, both being excellent 
lawyers, would not have advised this straining of the Con- 
stitution ; nevertheless they supported the President 
loyally. 1 

There was considerable violence in the coal regions 
but where the fault lay it was bootless to inquire. Cer- 
tainly Mitchell's advice was against anything of the sort 
and the President who knew all of the facts in the case, 
stated in a private letter to Bishop on October 13, the 
matter fairly: "I have been told, on excellent authority, 
that the disorder has been very great and of very evil 
kind. On equally good authority I am told the exact 
contrary. ... I stand against socialism, against anarchic 
disorder." 2 Soon after the conference of October 3, 
all of the national guard of Pennsylvania was sent to the 
coal regions to act toward the preservation of peace. 
It was frequently stated by the operators that, if men 
were properly protected, enough could be secured to man 
the mines, but this did not prove to be the case. 3 

The President s;iw accurately the probable course of 
things, writing thus to Robert Bacon: "The situation 
is bad, especially because it is possible it may grow in- 



1 On Aug. <>, 1908, ftoosi veil wrote :i letter to the Outlook in which he 

Rave a large part of the Cleveland oorreepondenoe. Hie Outlook, Aug. 
22, 1908, 881. it i- al o printed by Bishop, L 2M </ sag. For the Scho- 

fielil incident, Bishop, i. 211. T. Roosevelt, \n \utobiography, 514; 

Private I ition with the President, Nov. L6, 1905. 

Mitchell, Organized Labor, 3S9. 



Ch. IX.] ELIHU ROOT 243 

finitely worse. If when the severe weather comes on 
there is a coal famine I dread to think of the suffering, 
in parts of our great cities especially, and I fear there will 
be fuel riots of as bad a type as any bread riots we have 
ever seen. Of course, once the rioting has begun, once 
there is a resort to mob violence, the only thing to do is 
to maintain order." l 

Before adopting the drastic plan of making General 
Schofield a receiver of the mining companies, the Presi- 
dent again tried persuasion. By this time the operators, 
for some reason not disclosed, had become more placa- 
ble. Roosevelt requested Secretary Root to go to New 
York to see if he could not get Morgan to agree upon 
some plan of arbitration. Root spent the better part of 
a day with J. P. Morgan on his yacht Corsair and during 
this interview, so Root wrote to the President, "we 
drafted an agreement of arbitration for a commission 
to be appointed by you. Mr. Morgan got the signatures 
of the operators to this paper with a single modification. 
The modification required that the arbitrators appointed 
by you should belong to certain specified classes — an 
army engineer, a business man familiar with the coal busi- 
ness, a judge of the locality, a sociologist, etc. When 
this paper was presented to the miners, they in turn wished 
for some modification of the proposal and it appeared 
they would be satisfied to enter into the agreement if 
Bishop Spalding [the Roman Catholic bishop of Peoria, 
Illinois] could be added to the list of arbitrators and Mr. 
Clark could be appointed to the place which called for 
a sociologist." 2 The President was in constant consulta- 

1 Oct. 5, Bishop, i. 208. 

2 Letter of Root to the President, June 23, 1903, Bishop, i. 212. 



244 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

tion with Hanna and learned from him that he had sent a 
telegram to Mitchell assuring him that the miners "could 
depend on absolute fairness" at Roosevelt's hands. 1 

To clinch the business so that there could be no mis- 
understanding, Root desired that a member of Morgan's 
firm should come to Washington and confer with the 
President. Thereupon, two of the prominent partners 
came. The interview, which took place on October 15, 
is best described in a private letter of the President to 
Senator Lodge: "The operators had limited me down 
by a full proviso to five different types of men, including 
an 'eminent sociologist.' . . . The miners, on the other 
hand, wanted me to appoint at least two extra members 
myself, or in some fashion to get Bishop Spalding (whom 
I myself, wanted) and the labor union man on the com- 
mission. . . . The operators refused point blank to have 
another man added. . . . Finally it developed that what 
they meant was that no extra man should be added if 
he was a representative of organized labor. ... It took 
me about two hours before I at last grasped the fact that 
the mighty brains of these captains of industry had for- 
mulated the theory that they would rather have anarchy 
than tweedledum, but if I would use the word twecdledee 
they would hail it as meaning peace. In other words, 
that they had not the slightest objection to my appoint ing 
a labor man as an 'eminent sociologist ' and adding Bishop 
Spalding on my own account, but they preferred to see 
the Red Commune f<>n.r rather than to have me make 
Bishop Spalding or anyone else 'the eminenl sociolo- 
gist,' and add the labor man. 1 instantly told them that 



1 Life of llaiinn, Cruly, 399. 



Ch. IX.] ROOSEVELT — HANNA 245 

I had not the slightest objection whatever to doing an 
absurd thing when it was necessary to meet the objection 
of an absurd mind on some vital point, and that I would 
cheerfully appoint my labor man as the ' eminent sociolo- 
gist.' It was almost impossible for me to appreciate 
the instant and tremendous relief this gave them. They 
saw nothing offensive in my language and nothing ridicu- 
lous in the proposition, and Pierpont Morgan and Baer, 
when called up by telephone, eagerly ratified the absurd- 
ity; and accordingly at this utterly unimportant price 
we bid fair to come out of as dangerous a situation as 
I ever dealt with." l 

Roosevelt desired to appoint Grover Cleveland on the 
Commission in lieu of the army engineer, but to this the 
operators would not agree. In 1915 Roosevelt wrote 
to Charles Washburn, "I think the settlement of the coal 
strike was much the most important thing I did about 
labor from every standpoint." 2 The President wrote 
to Senator Hanna: "Last night when it became evident 
that we were going to get a Commission which would be 
accepted by both sides, I remarked, 'Well, Uncle Mark's 
work has borne fruit,' and everybody said 'yes.' The 
solution came because so many of us have for so long 
hammered at the matter until at last things got into shape 
which made the present outcome possible." 3 In effect- 
ing such a compromise the personality of men counted 
for much and Roosevelt and Hanna seemed the men of 
all men to bring about such a result. 



1 Bishop, i. 214; Private Conversation with the President, Nov. 16, 
1905. 

2 Roosevelt, Thayer, 246 ; Charles G. Washburn, 82. 

3 Oct. 16, Life of Hanna, Croly, 400. 



24G ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

The Commission was : Brigadier-General John M. 
Wilson, retired, formerly Chief of Engineers, U. S. A. ; 
E. W. Parker, expert mining engineer, chief statistician 
of the coal division of the U. S. Geological Survey and 
editor of the Engineering and Mining Journal; George 
Gray, Judge of the United States Circuit Court, Dela- 
ware; E. E. Clark, Chief of the Order of Railway Con- 
ductors, sociologist ; Thomas H. Watkins, practically 
connected with the mining and selling of coal ; Bishop 
John L. Spalding of Illinois; Carroll D. Wright, U. S. 
Commissioner of Labor, Recorder of the Commission. 1 
"Most of the miners were Roman Catholics" and "Mit- 
chell and the other leaders of the miners had urged me 
to appoint some high Catholic ecclesiastic." Bishop 
Spalding was "one of the very best men to be found in 
the entire country." 2 Judge Gray was chosen chairman 
of the Commission. 

The miners at once went to work. The relief felt in 
the eastern part of the country was very great. The 
well-to-do were spared much hardship, the poor, freezing. 
Coal, of which there was still a small stock, had advanced 
to fabulous prices. Now normal conditions obtained. 
Many homes accustomed to genial warmth blessed Roose- 
velt because he had used the high office of President to 
give them comfort. 

In five months the Commission made their report to 
the President, with their different awards. They ad- 
judged that the miners should have an increase of ten 
per cent in their wages; that their should be no dis- 
crimination againsl union or aon-union laborers; a slid- 

1 Bishop, i. 217. 

1 Roosevelt, Autobiography, 6U7, 600. 



Ch. IX.] SETTLEMENT OF THE STRIKE 247 

ing scale of wages was fixed which should increase the 
pay of the miners with any advance in the price of coal ; 
the award should continue for three years. The Com- 
mission further adjudged that any differences of opinion 
should be referred to a permanent joint committee to 
be called a Board of Conciliation, to consist of six persons, 
three of whom should be named by the mine workers 
and three by the operators. In the event that the six 
could not agree, the umpire should be "one of the circuit 
judges of the third judicial circuit of the United States, 
whose decision shall be final and binding in the premises." 1 
John Mitchell maintained that the Commission indirectly 
acknowledged the miners' union, writing, " While dis- 
claiming the wish to compel the recognition of the United 
Mine Workers of America, the Commission in actual 
practice made that recognition inevitable and imme- 
diate." 2 

"Time," wrote Joseph B. Bishop in 1920, "has com- 
pletely justified the President's course. Not only did 
the findings of the Commission secure peace in the anthra- 
cite mines during the three stipulated years, but perma- 
nently, for since 1902 there has been no strike there and 
no serious labor trouble." 3 

Germans living in Venezuela had claims against her 
which were assumed by the German Government ; there 
were also British and Italian claims which had been 
assumed respectively by Great Britain and Italy so that 
the question of indemnity became one between govern- 
ments. For our purpose, Italy may be left out of con- 



1 Report of Anthracite Coal Commission, 80 et seq. 

2 Organized Labor, 394. 3 Vol. i. 219. 



248 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

sideration and our attention directed to Germany and 
Great Britain, between which the printed records of For- 
eign Relations show a community of interest and feeling. 
In 1901 these two powers offered a number of times to 
submit the dispute to arbitration and especially by the 
note of the German Government of July 16, 190 1, 1 but 
Venezuela refused such an offer. In 1902 Germany and 
Great Britain had a squadron of war-vessels off the Vene- 
zuelan coast for the purpose of collecting what was due 
their citizens. The story would be no other than one 
of shiftiness on the part of a South American power in 
her diplomacy and action were it not that the proceeding 
of the German Government in 1902 gave the occasion 
of a bout between the President and the Kaiser. In 
December, 1902, Venezuela desired arbitration, which 
now Germany did not want, and the suspicion of Roose- 
velt became aroused that she "intended to seize some 
Venezuelan harbor and turn it into a strongly fortified 
place of arms on the model of Kiauchau [Kiaochow] - 
with a view to exercising some degree of control over the 
future Isthmian Canal, and over South American affairs 
generally." 

England and Germany at this time threatened a block- 
ade and on December 9, 1902, captured all of the Venezue- 
lan war-vessels in the port of Caracas, her capital ; and 
four days later, the united fleets bombarded the forts 



1 Foreign Relations, 1904, 507. 

: EGaoehow Bay, n hrur inlel in China, "was seised in November, 1^07, 
iiv tin- Qennaa Beet. , , , The bay and land on l">tli sides "t" the en« 

trance were leased to Germany for '.»'.) years. During the continuance of 

the lease Germany ww^wwf .ill the rights to territorial sovereignty, in- 
cluding the right to erect fortiGcations." Encyclopaedia Britannica, xv. 
788. 



Ch. IX.] THE GERMAN MENACE 249 

of the town of Puerto Cabello, the cause being an alleged 
insult to the British flag on a British merchant vessel. 1 
Germany favored a "pacific blockade" while Great Brit- 
ain did not believe there could be such a thing. "Has 
war been declared?" the Prime Minister, Mr. Balfour, 
was asked in the House of Commons, and he replied, 
"Does the honorable and learned gentleman suppose 
that without a state of war you can take the ships of an- 
other power and blockade its ports?" 2 

In October, 1915, William Roscoe Thayer writing a 
chapter, "The German Menace Looms Up," in his "Life 
of John Hay," gave the inside of Germany's ulterior pur- 
pose; this history aroused great interest. Roosevelt 
on August 21, 1916, wrote a letter to Thayer in which 
he told the whole story, 3 confirming what Thayer had 
already written and elaborating the incident. In his 
Message to Congress of December, 1901, the President 
had said, "The Monroe Doctrine is a declaration that 
there must be no territorial aggrandizement by any 
non-American power at the expense of any American 
power on American soil." To Roosevelt it seemed that 
the result of Germany's action would be a violation 
of the Monroe Doctrine and, if she refused to arbitrate 
the whole question, she would wage war against Venezuela 
and take possession of a seaport. "Germany," he wrote, 
"declined to agree to arbitrate the question at issue be- 
tween her and Venezuela and declined to say that she 
would not take possession of Venezuelan territory, merely 
saying that such possession would be 'temporary.' " 



1 Foreign Relations, 1903, 790, 797. 

2 Dec. 17, 1902, Foreign Relations, 1903, 455. 

3 Thayer printed this letter as an appendix to his second edition. 



250 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

The attitude of England was different. Henry White 
heard on December 16 Lord Lansdowne, the Foreign 
Minister, say in the House of Lords, "It is not intended 
to land a British force and still less to occupy Venezuelan 
territory." 1 The correspondence with Great Britain was 
conducted by Henry White, the first Secretary of Le- 
gation, who, seeing his own country's side with persist- 
ency could present it to a foreign power with the courtesy 
that obtains in diplomatic transactions — "the most 
useful man in the entire diplomatic service during my 
presidency, and for many years before was Henry 
White," 2 said Roosevelt. "I speedily became con- 
vinced," wrote Roosevelt, "that Germany was the leader 
and the really formidable party in the transaction and 
that England was merely following Germany's lead in 
rather half-hearted fashion." 

"I saw the Ambassador" [Holleben, of Germany] re- 
lated Roosevelt, "and explained that in view of the Ger- 
man squadron on the Venezuelan coast I could not 
permit longer delay in answering my request for an arbi- 
tration and that I could not acquiesce in any seizure of 
Venezuelan territory. The Ambassador responded that 
his government could not agree to arbitrate and that 
there was no intention to take 'permanent' possession 
of Venezuelan territory. I answered that Kiauchau 
was not a permanent possession of Germany — that I 
understood it was merely held by a 99 years' lease and 
that I did not intend to have another Kiauchau, held 
by similar tenure, on the approach to the Isthmian Ca- 



1 Foreign ReUtii L53. 

•Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography, 3S3. 



Ch. IX.] THE GERMAN MENACE 251 

nal." The President further said that if he did not re- 
ceive a favorable reply within ten days, he should order 
Dewey and his fleet thither to resist any attempt of the 
Germans to take possession of Venezuelan territory. 

Roosevelt was aware that he could back up the threat. 
Paying much attention to naval matters he knew that 
our Navy was in efficient condition. Dewey was at Cu- 
lebra, Puerto Rico, "in command of a fleet consisting of 
over fifty ships, including every battle-ship and every 
torpedo boat that we had, with orders from Washington to 
hold the fleet in hand and be ready to move at a moment's 
notice." 

A few days afterwards Holleben came to see the Presi- 
dent but said nothing in reference to Venezuela, and when 
he rose to go he was asked if he had heard anything from 
his government regarding the matter in dispute. The 
answer was no, whereupon the President said he would 
advance the time he had proposed and order Dewey to 
sail twenty-four hours previous to the expiration of the 
ten days. But before the President found it necessary 
to cable to Dewey, Holleben informed him that the German 
Emperor would consent to an arbitration and desired 
that Roosevelt should be arbitrator. This, after due 
consideration, was declined and the case went to the 
Hague Tribunal. 1 

This account is confirmed by a letter of President 
Roosevelt to Henry White dated August 14, 1906: "At 
the time of the Venezuela business I saw the German 
Ambassador privately myself ; told him to tell the Kaiser 
that 1 had put Dewey in charge of our fleet to maneuver 



1 Thayer, Life of Hay, ii. Appendix. , 



252 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

in West Indian waters; that the world at large should 
know this merely as a maneuver and we should strive 
in every way to appear simply as cooperating with the 
Germans ; but that I regretted to say that the popular feel- 
ing was such that 1 should be obliged to interfere, by force 
if necessary, if the Germans took any action which looked 
like the acquisition of territory there or elsewhere along the 
Caribbean ; that this was not in any way intended as a 
threat, but as the position on the part of the Government 
which the American people would demand, and that I 
wanted him to understand it before the two nations 
drifted into such a position that trouble might come. 
I do not know whether it was a case of post hoc or propter 
hoc, but immediately afterward the Kaiser made to me the 
proposition that I should arbitrate myself, which I finally 
got him to modify so that it was sent to The Hague." 

My authority for this bout between the President and 
the Kaiser is Thayer's account and Roosevelt's letters of 
August, 1906 and 1916. There seems to be no opposition 
between them and the printed diplomatic correspondence, 
Roosevelt's speech of April 2, 1903, cited by John Bassett 
Moore in his Review of Thayer's Life of Hay, 1 and the 
President's Message to Congress of December, 1903. It 
is well known that much diplomatic work is not set down 
in the printed Foreign Relations. Charles Francis Adams, 
who had occasion to investigate some phases of English 
diplomacy, was insistent on the part that private Letters 

played in certain negotiations J and in our own country 

the daily talk ami telephone communications must be 
considered. Therefore Roosevelt's recollection of this 



1 l V, had Science QwtrUrly, Mure!), 1917, ll l J. 



Ch. IX.] GERMANY ARBITRATES 263 

episode, although not given to the world until 1915 and 
1916, seems to me good historical evidence. In no way 
does the printed record contravene it. In fact, in a study 
of the correspondence with Germany one may well be 
convinced that the whole story is not therein told, as many 
of the despatches are simply given in "paraphrase." The 
differences regarding arbitration between Great Britain and 
Germany may be detected and it is easy to believe that Ger- 
many was forced in 1902 to an arbitration of the dispute. 
After the controversy with the Kaiser had ended with 
his submission, affairs proceeded smoothly. Both Great 
Britain and Germany made certain reservations that 
should not be submitted to the Tribunal. Both coun- 
tries blockaded the Venezuela ports from December 20, 
1902, to February 16, 1903, during which time negotiations 
went on which resulted in the arbitration. Both of these 
circumstances were apparently with the consent of Pres- 
ident Roosevelt. The Hague Tribunal made its award 
on February 22, 1904. 1 

President Roosevelt's action toward another European 
power demands attention. "I feel," he wrote to Finley 
Peter Dunne [Dooley] a a sincere friendliness for Eng- 
land ; but you may notice that I do not slop over about 
it, and that I do not in the least misunderstand England's 
attitude." 2 "I think more of England than of any other 
foreign country," the President said a year later. "She 
is more sincerely our friend. I detest the Anglophobists. 
Sometimes when discussing matters with the Irish I am 
tempted to become an Anglomaniac." 3 For an om- 



1 Foreign Relations, 1904, 506. 2 November 1904, Bishop, i. 348. 
3 Conversation with President Roosevelt, November 17, 1905. 



254 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

nivorous reader, as was Roosevelt, no other feeling was 
possible. The majority of the many books that he read 
were by English writers. He thoroughly believed in 
the high civilization expressed in her literature. To him 
that the two nations possessed the common language of 
Shakespeare and Milton was no unmeaning talk ; it was 
indeed ingrained in the fibre of his being and he was al- 
ways ready to acknowledge England as the predominant 
partner. One may see into his very thought in reading 
his letter to John Morley [Jan. 17, 1904] wherein he says, 
"Personally I feel that with all their faults Gibbon and 
Macaulay are the two great English historians." 1 This 
feeling toward England must therefore be taken into 
account in considering the Alaska boundary dispute. 

Every British map until 1884 shows the disputed Alaskan 
territory belonging either to Russia or to the United 
States according to which had dominion, and no claim 
was made by Canada to this territory until 1S98 when Lord 
Herschell, at the head of the Joint High Commission, ap- 
pointed to consider twelve subjects of difference between 
Canada and the United States, asserted it. eliciting this 
comment from John Hay, then Secretary of State. On Jan- 
uary 3, 1899, he thus wrote to Henry White : "In the ease 
of Alaska it is hard to treat with patience the claim set up 
by Lord Herschell, that virtually the whole coast belongs 
to England, leaving us only a few jutting promontories 
without communication with each other. Without going 
into the historical or Legal argument, as a mere matter 
of common Bense it is impossible that any nation should 
ever have conceded, or any other nation have accepted, 

1 Bishop, i. 269. 



Ch. IX.] ALASKA 255 

the cession of such a ridiculous and preposterous boun- 
dary line. We are absolutely driven to the conclusion that 
Lord Herschell put forward a claim that he had no be- 
lief or confidence in, for the mere purpose of trading it 
off for something substantial. And yet the slightest 
suggestion that his claim is unfounded throws him into 
a fury." 1 

It was not only, indeed I think not chiefly, due to the 
belief that the contested region might be gold-bearing, but 
rather to the desire to get ports contiguous to the Klondike. 
This was especially true of Skagway at the head of the 
Lynn Canal. It was the chief port for the Klondike and 
under the Canadian claim would be British territory. 

The reason of this claim is not far to seek. In 1896 
gold was discovered in the Klondike. British Columbia 
and Alaska went wild over the discovery. Gold might 
exist in this disputed territory so that it might be of value 
to either country. Herschell and the British members 
of the Commission would settle no other question unless 
the Alaska boundary was first determined, and as the 
Joint High Commission could not agree on that, they 
adjourned without arriving at any conclusion. It was 
therefore one of the foreign matters bequeathed to the 
Roosevelt administration. 

Then came the South African War [1899-1902] and out 
of friendship to England, the President did not want 
to press the matter; he was indeed in no hurry but, if 
gold were discovered, he intended to occupy the territory. 
The English proposed arbitration. Our Ambassador 
favored that disposition of the matter and possibly so 



1 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 205. 



256 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

did our Secretary of State. But the President said, no. 
It is no question for arbitration. Roosevelt indeed dis- 
trusted the opinion of our Ambassadors to England ; 
they were prone to see the English side of any question. 1 
James Bryce wrote in 1888 : "Even in these days of vig- 
ilant and exacting constituencies one sees many members 
of the House of Commons, the democratic robustness 
or provincial crudity of whose ideas melts like wax under 
the influence of fashionable dinner-parties and club smok- 
ing rooms." 2 Educated men know the charm of English 
society and can appreciate how our official representa- 
tives, recipients as they are of manifold attentions, fall 
victims to that charm. 

The President was firm. The result was the Conven- 
tion of January 24, 1903, which constituted a Tribunal 
of "six important jurists of repute," to determine the 
boundary line between Alaska and British Columbia. 
Three members were to be appointed by the President ; 
three by his Britannic Majesty. A majority should 
determine the award. 3 The President named Henry 
Cabot Lodge, Senator from Massachusetts, Elihu Root, 
Secretary of War, and George Turner, ex-Senator from 
Washington. Before these were definitely appointed the 
President endeavored to get a Justice <>f the Supreme 
Court, but he decline. 1 on the ground that the post was 
not in lino with his duties. Another Justice was ap- 
proached witli a like result. 1 The selections of the Presi- 



1 Conversation with the President, Nov. 17, L905; Life of Bay, Thayer, 
ii. 207, 208; Life of Roosevelt, Thayer, 17 I But see Life of Choate, 
Maiim. ii. 228, 235, 237, 238. 

'American Commonwealth, ii 230. 

3 Foreign Et lations, 1903, 188 

4 Diplomatic Memoirs, John W. Foster, ii. 109. 



Ch. IX.] THE ALASKA BOUNDARY 257 

dent were criticised, both in Canada and the United States, 
as not being according to the Treaty which called for 
"impartial jurists of repute." The editor of Hall's In- 
ternational Law (ed. 1904) spoke of the choice of the 
American members as a "serious blot on the proceed- 
ings." But the British government did not officially 
make any complaint. They named as members, Baron 
Alverstone, Lord Chief Justice of England, Louis A. Jette, 
Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec, and A. B. Aylesworth 
of the Toronto bar. 1 London was selected as the place 
for the sitting of the Tribunal. 

After the appointment of the Tribunal and before its 
decision, the President wrote to Justice Holmes a letter 
[July 25, 1903], which he might show "privately and un- 
officially" to Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secre- 
tary. He also wrote one of similar import to Henry 
White which as desired was shown to Arthur Balfour, 
Prime Minister. In the letter to Justice Holmes the 
President said: "Nothing but my very earnest desire 
to get on well with England and my reluctance to a break 
made me consent to this appointment of a Joint Com- 
mission [officially a Tribunal] in this case ; for I regard 
the attitude of Canada which England has backed, as 
having the scantest possible warrant in justice. How- 
ever, there were but two alternatives. Either 1 could 
appoint a commission and give a chance for agreement ; 
or I could do as I shall of course do in case this Commis- 
sion fails and request Congress to make an appropriation 
which will enable me to run the boundary on my own 
hook. . . . The claim of the Canadians for access to deep 



1 Diplomatic Memoirs, J. W. Foster, ii. 198. 



258 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

water along any part of the Canadian [Alaskan] coast 
is just exactly as indefensible as if they should now sud- 
denly claim the island of Nantucket. There is not a 
man fit to go on the Commission in all the United States, 
who would treat this claim any more respectfully 
than he would treat a claim to Nantucket. . . . But there 
are points which the Commission can genuinely consider. 
There is room for argument about the islands in the 
mouth of the Portland Channel. . . . The objection 
raised by certain Canadian authorities to Lodge, Root 
and Turner, and especially to Lodge and Root, was that 
they had committed themselves on the general propo- 
sition. No man in public life in any position of promi- 
nence could have possibly avoided committing himself 
on the proposition. . . . Let me add that I earnestly 
hope that the English understand my purpose. I 
wish to make one last effort to bring about an 
agreement through the Commission which will enable the 
people of both countries to say that the result represents 
the feeling of the representatives of both countries. But 
if there is a disagreement I wish it distinctly understood, 
not only that there will be no arbitration of the matter, 
but that in my Message to Congress I shall take a position 
which will prevent any possibility of arbitration here- 
after; a position, I am inclined to believe, which will 
render it necessary for Congress to give me the author- 
ity to run the line as we claim it , by our own people with- 
out any further regard to the attitude of England and 
Canada."' And Hay wrote to Foster on September 20, 
1903: "I hear the usual pessimistic foreoastfl — some 



Bishop, i. 259; Thayer, Life of Roosevelt, 176. 



Ch. IX.] ALASKAN TRIBUNAL 259 

from London — some from this side. But I shall not 
believe, until I am forced to, that Lord Alverstone can so 
shut his eyes to law and evidence as to give a verdict against 
us, especially as he must know that this is the last chance 
for an honorable and graceful retreat from an absolutely 
untenable position. I am sincerely sorry they have got 
themselves into such a fix ; but it is their own fault and 
they will make a fatal mistake if they refuse to avail them- 
selves of the opportunity we have given them to get out." * 
The decision of the Tribunal was made October 20, 
1903, and fixed the land boundary well back of all the 
inlets, as was the chief contention of the United States. 
This was done by a vote of four to two, Lord Alverstone 
siding with the Americans and the two Canadian members 
dissenting. The Tribunal was unanimous in giving to 
Canada two of the four uninhabited islands. 2 The two 
Canadian members not only did not sign the award but 
gave to the press "a carefully prepared interview in which 
they declared that the decision was not judicial in its 
character." John W. Foster, who criticised the appeal 
to the press by the Canadian members, did not share 
the censure meted out to them for their failure to sign 
the award. He wrote with the impartiality which dis- 
tinguishes his work : " A similar precedent is to be found 
in the Halifax Fisheries Arbitration of 1877, when the 
American member not only refused to sign the award 
but questioned its validity. A better practice was ob- 
served in the Fur-Seal Arbitration at Paris in 1893. The 
two American members, Justice Harlan and Senator 
Morgan, were outvoted on almost every one of the six 

1 Diplomatic Memoirs, John W. Foster, ii. 206. 

3 Foreign Relations, 1903, 543 ; Foster, Diplomatic Memoirs, ii. 203. 



260 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

points submitted to the Tribunal ; but, without with- 
drawing their votes they cheerfully united with their 
colleagues in signing the award." Foster went on to 
say, "The people of the United States were very angry 
at the Halifax award and were by no means pleased with 
the result of the Fur-Seal Arbitration at Paris." 1 

On June 8, 1911, Roosevelt wrote to Admiral Mahan : 
"The settlement of the Alaskan boundary settled the 
last serious trouble between the British Empire and our- 
selves as everything else could be arbitrated. ... I feel 
very differently towards England from the way I feel 
towards Germany." 2 

Roosevelt, shortly before his death [January 6, 1919], 
wrote to Mahan a letter that may be taken as his legacy 
to his countrymen : "I regard the British Navy as prob- 
ably the most potent instrumentality for peace in the 
world. I do not believe we should try to build a navy 
in rivalry to it but I do believe we should have the second 
navy in the world. Moreover I am prepared to say what 
five years ago I would not have said, I think the time has 
come when the United States and the British Empire 
can agree to a universal arbitration treaty. In other 
words I believe the time has come when we should say 
that under no circumstances shall there ever be a resort 
to war between the United States and the British Empire, 
and that no question can arise between them that cannot 
be settled in judicial fashion." 3 



1 Diplomatic Memoirs, ii. 201. - Life of Mahan, Taylor, 203. 

1 Life of Malum, Taylor, 224. In this aOOOUnt 1 have also consulted 

J. W. Poster's Article on tin- Alaskan Boundary, National Ooographie 
Af'H/dzine, Nov. 1899, printed as Doc. No. 2, 58th Cong., Special Session; 

The Com of die r. s. ; The Argument of the U. £>., both of which 

ure printed by the CJuv't Printing Ullieo. 



CHAPTER X 

"By far the most important action I took in foreign 
affairs during the time I was President," wrote Roose- 
velt, " relates to the Panama Canal." 1 At the time Hay 
became Secretary of State there was a feeling in the coun- 
try decidedly in favor of joining the two oceans by a ca- 
nal. Long existent, the feeling had been fostered by the 
events of the Spanish-American War and especially by 
the voyage of the Oregon around Cape Horn. As she 
was desired to reinforce the Atlantic fleet, it could not 
be ignored how much sooner she would have made the 
junction had there been a canal from the Pacific to the 
Atlantic. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty with England, 
made in 1850, 2 stood in the way. Hay set to work to 
supersede this and negotiated a Treaty which was signed 
by him and Lord Pauncefote, the British Ambassador, 
on February 5, 1900. Roosevelt, who was then Governor 
of New York, in a friendly letter to Hay criticised severely 
two points in the Treaty : the first was the prohibition 
of fortifying the canal, and the second was a virtual in- 
vitation to foreign powers to a joint guarantee that in 
his view would tend to invalidate the Monroe Doctrine. 3 

Hay was irritated that the Senate did not ratify the 
Treaty; he deemed it an " irreparable mistake of our 
Constitution" which put it into "the power of one- third 
+ 1 of the Senate to meet with a categorical veto any 
treaty negotiated by the President." 4 He spoke against 



1 Autobiography, 553. 2 Vol. i. 199. 

3 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 339. * To Choate. ibid., 219. 

261 



262 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1901 

the Senate "almost with ferocity." 1 His sayings re- 
ported by tale bearers did not help his cause with the 
senators and he was never popular with the Senate. Yet 
much more than anything of the sort, the ideas which 
lay at the bottom of Roosevelt's friendly criticism affected 
the Senate's action in regard to the Treaty and they made 
amendments to it which embodied tacitly these objec- 
tions. The British Government did not accept the 
amendments. Hay resigned his position as Secretary 
of State in the following words : "Dear Mr. President: 
The action of the Senate indicates views so widely diver- 
gent from mine in matters affecting, as I think, the na- 
tional welfare and honor, that I fear my power to serve 
you in business requiring the concurrence of that body 
is at an end. I cannot help fearing also that the news- 
paper attacks upon the State Department, which have 
so strongly influenced the Senate, may be an injury to you 
if I remain in the Cabinet." McKinley, in a very manly 
letter, refused to accept his resignation. 2 

Hay did not let his irritation prevent his going ahead 
with the project, and he took steps toward the negotia- 
tion of a new Treaty. Meanwhile Roosevelt had become 
President and the new Treaty, which is known as the sec- 
ond Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, was signed by Hay and 
Pauncefote on November 18, 1901, was ratified by the 
Senate on December 16 by 72 : 6 and concurred in by the 
British Government. Under this Treaty, the canal was 
built. It provided that it should supersede the conven- 
tion of 1850 and that the canal might be constructed 



1 Life of Haw Thuvrr, li. 2\i'3. 

■ Ibid., il 238. 



Ch. X.] THE PANAMA CANAL 263 

either by the United States or by corporations that it 
might aid. 1 A clear statement of its meaning on one 
disputed point is given by Shelby M. Cullom, who was 
then a member and soon to become chairman of the 
Committee on Foreign Relations. "The first and second 
Hay-Pauncefote treaties must be construed together; 
the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty contained a prohibi- 
tion against fortifications; the second Hay-Pauncefote 
Treaty neither prohibited nor in terms agreed to fortifi- 
cations, but was silent on the subject ; therefore, the legal 
construction would be that Great Britain had receded 
from the position that the canal should not be fortified." 2 

The canal was fortified. James Bryce wrote: "The 
visitor who sees the slopes where these forts and batteries 
are to be placed, asks who are the enemies whom it is 
desired to repel. Where is the great naval power that 
has any motive either of national enmity or of self- 
interest sufficient to induce it to face the risks of a war with 
a country so populous, so wealthy and so vigorous as 
the United States?" 3 The peace-loving American who 
gazes at the forts on the cliffs of Gibraltar might put pari 
passu the same question. 

Public sentiment had decided that there should be an 
inter-oceanic canal and that it should be constructed 
by the United States. The question was should it go 
by Nicaragua or across the Isthmus of Panama ? When 
Hay wrote on January 15, 1900, "The canal is going to 
be built, probably by the Nicaragua route," 4 he expressed 

1 Digest of International Law. John Bassett Moore, iii. 219. The 
Treaty is printed in full and the first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty is given 
on p. 210. 

2 Fifty Years of Public Service, 381. 3 South America, 32. 
* Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 222. 



264 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

the popular opinion. The Nicaragua canal "has become 
a sentiment," said Senator Hanna in his great speech 
advocating the Panama route. Three commissions had 
decided in favor of it. "I want to confess," declared 
Hanna, "that in common with all my fellow citizens I 
shared in that feeling and belief and, as the necessity- 
seemed to grow and demand an isthmian canal [through 
Nicaragua], I would have been prepared, under the in- 
fluences which then existed, to give my hearty support 
to that project." 

The advantage of Panama over Nicaragua was well 
put forward by Hanna in this speech. "The Panama 
Canal route," he said, "is 49 miles long as against 183 
miles of the Nicaraguan route." The New Panama 
Canal Company (French) which had previously offered 
to sell its plant, rights, privileges, franchises and con- 
cessions for 109 millions had now come down to 40 mil- 
lions. 1 Included in this offer were all of the existing 
shares of the Panama railway except about 1100; the 
total was 70,000 shares. The last Commission had, on 
receiving the new offer of the French company, made a 
supplementary report (January IS, 1902) recommend- 
ing the Panama route. The question of earthquakes, 
volcanic eruptions, of the cost of construction and opera- 
tion was all in favor of the canal by way of Panama. 2 

This was Hanna's greatest effort in the Senate. Ac- 
cording to Senator George F. Boar, QO mean judge, he 
eloquent as he <li the question in all of its 



•Jan. '.», L902 

ii. eh ini made June . r > and ,- '. 1002, is reported in the 

Congressional Record, 6817 ft < , o Life of Hanna, Croly, 379 

rt < 'J. 



Ch. X] THE PANAMA CANAL 265 

bearings. "He changed the whole attitude of the Sen- 
ate," wrote Cullom, "concerning the route for an inter- 
oceanic canal. We all generally favored the Nicaraguan 
route. Senator Hanna became convinced that the Pan- 
ama route was best and he soon carried everything be- 
fore him to the end that the Panama route was selected." 1 
A bill providing for the construction of the Nicaraguan 
canal had passed the House almost unanimously and 
to the bill as it came to the Senate, Spooner had added 
an amendment providing for the purchase of the rights, 
privileges, franchises, concessions, right of way, unfin- 
ished work, plants and property of the New Panama 
Canal Company of France for 40 millions, and the con- 
struction of the canal across the Isthmus of Panama, but 
if "the President be unable to obtain for the United States 
a satisfactory title to the property of the New Panama 
Canal Company and the control of the necessary terri- 
tory of the Republic of Colombia within a reasonable 
time and upon reasonable terms," then the President 



1 Fifty Years of Public Service, 281. "The United States had been 
committed for thirty years to an isthmian canal by the Nicaragua route. 
It came to be considered as 'the American line.' The resolution in its 
favor had passed the House. Senator Hanna gave to the study of the 
question, which was purely a business one, a mind long trained in con- 
struction contracts. He came to the conclusion that we should build on 
the Panama route. . . . He accomplished that rarest of triumphs, the 
command of a listening Senate." — Senator C. M. Depew. Senator 
Charles Dick who succeeded Hanna in the Senate said: "His greatest 
achievement in this body was in converting a hostile majority to favor 
the route for an isthmian canal which his judgment declared was the best. 
He came to this conclusion only after most thorough investigation. 
When he entered upon this contest few of the Members of Congress 
agreed with him. . . . He was told that his efforts would be futile. He 
entered upon the contest with all the zeal and energy of his strong nature. 
By personal appeals, by labors in committee and on this floor he urged 
his views." Memorial addresses, 104, 131. 



266 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

"might fall back to the Nicaragua route." l This passed 
the Senate by 42 to 34, 2 was accepted by the House, 
signed by the President and was entirely satisfactory 
to public opinion. 

On the basis of this act Hay negotiated what is known 
as the Hay-Herran Treaty, signed January 22, 1903. Dr. 
Herran was the charge d'affaires of Colombia in Wash- 
ington. Colombia's executive officer was Marroquin, a 
usurper who had been Vice-President and now assumed 
to be acting President. He was called a dictator by 
Roosevelt and those who supported his action, but his 
word was far from being law. At first really in favor of 
the Treaty, he succumbed to a popular sentiment, which 
was excited by the Finance Minister and the press of 
Bogota, and did not advocate strongly the Treaty before 
the Colombia Congress as Roosevelt and Hay thought 
he should have done. The Treaty was not valid unless 
approved by the Colombia Congress and the popular 
feeling, at least in Bogota, the capital, was that the ten 
million bonus and the $250,000 per year after nine years, 
which was what the United States had agreed to pay 
by the Hay-Herran Treaty, was not sufficient compen- 
sation for that which Colombia was conceding to the 
United States. It was thought that the provision of the 
Spooner Act that, unless proper arrangements could be 
made with the Republic of Colombia and the French 
Canal Company, the United States was empowered to 
construct the Nicaraguan Canal, was a mere bluff to make 
better terms; with Colombia which looked upon the Isth- 

i \.ts of Congren relating to the Panama Canal, 27. This included 
68,863 alums of the Panama llailroad Company out of a total of 70,000 
almre8. 

1 Life of liuuua, Cruly, 



Ch. X.] THE HAY-HERRAN TREATY 267 

mus of Panama "as a financial cow to be milked for the 
benefit of the country at large." l Therefore the Senate 
of Colombia in two different sessions, as a response to 
popular sentiment aroused largely by the press of Bo- 
gota, rejected the Treaty in August and postponed the 
consideration of it indefinitely in October. 2 

Unquestionably the Hay-Herran Treaty should have 
been ratified. The arguments of Roosevelt and Hay 
in its favor are unanswerable, but the idea of the Bogota" 
press and the Colombia Senate was that more money 
might be had. General Reyes, who was really a friend 
to a fair composition between the two countries, thought 
that ten millions from the French Company and an in- 
crease of five millions from the United States would in- 
sure the ratification of the Treaty. 3 The more radical 
pretended that the French concession expired in 1904 
and, if ratification were postponed, Colombia might re- 
ceive the whole forty millions which the United States 
had agreed to pay to the French Company. But this 
concession to the French Company had been extended 
to 1910, and to repudiate such a plain contract would 
hardly have been done even by a country so regardless 
of plighted faith as was Colombia. Take it all in all, the 
action of Colombia was blackmail and aroused all the 
fighting qualities in Roosevelt's nature. A true convert 
to the Panama Canal, he determined that the canal should 
there be built. 

Events now moved swiftly. Hay telegraphed on July 
13 to Beaupre, our Minister at Bogota: " Neither of the 



1 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 304. 

J August 12, October 30. As the Senate rejected it the House did not 
pass upon it. 3 July 9, Foreign Relations, 1903, 163. 



268 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

proposed amendments mentioned in your telegram 
[Reyes's suggestion ante] received to-day would stand 
any chance of acceptance by the Senate of the United 
States, while any amendment whatever or unnecessary 
delay in the ratification of the Treaty would greatly im- 
peril its consummation." 1 

It was bruited about in Bogota that, in the event of 
non-ratification of the Treaty, Panama would secede 
from Colombia, get the ten million bonus and the annual 
stipend herself, but as to that the Colombia Senate, backed 
by popular sentiment, was willing to take the chance. 
Colombia had a population of five millions divided into 
nine departments of which Panama was one, and the 
number of its inhabitants was about 250,000. The Co- 
lombian army consisted of 10, 000. 2 

Now appeared upon the scene Philippe Bunau-Varilla, 
a celebrated French engineer, who had been connected 
with the French Canal enterprise and was now much 
concerned in having the Panama route adopted and the 
French Company receiving actually the forty millions 
without any deduction in favor of the "corruptionists" 
of Bogota ; he therefore fomented with great skill a revolu- 
tion in Panama. It was practically a bloodless 3 revolution 
and resulted in a Treaty between the Republic of Panama 
and the United States, providing for the construction 
of the canal. While neither President Roosevelt nor 
Secretary Hay connived at the revolution, they sympa- 
thized with it. "No one," declared President Roosevelt 



' I - ,,-, i i, Ri ' itior I I, 164 
'Reyes, Foreign Relatione, 288. 

3 < )nc Chinaman was killed. D< patch of Ehnnao to Hay, Nov. 4. 
Ehrman irai ' on ul-Genera] in Panama. Foreign Relations, 1903, 232. 



Ch. X.] THE PANAMA REVOLUTION 269 

in his Message of January 4, 1904, " connected with this 
Government had any part in preparing, inciting, or en- 
couraging the late revolution on the Isthmus of Panama, 
and that, save from the reports of our military and naval 
officers, no one connected with this Government had any 
previous knowledge of the revolution except such as was 
accessible to any person of ordinary intelligence who 
read the newspapers and kept up a current acquaintance 
with public affairs." ! In August, wrote Roosevelt, "it 
began to appear probable that the Colombian legislature 
would not ratify the treaty. . . . Everyone knew that 
the revolution was a possibility but it was not until toward 
the end of October that it appeared to be an imminent 
probability. Although the Administration, of course, had 
special means of knowledge, no such means were nec- 
essary in order to appreciate the possibility and toward 
the end the likelihood, of such a revolutionary outbreak 
and of its success." 2 As Roosevelt said to William R. 
Thayer many years later, "The other fellows in Paris 
and New York had taken all the risk and were doing all 
the work. Instead of trying to run a parallel conspiracy 
I had only to sit still and profit by their plot — if it suc- 
ceeded." 3 

The President ordered naval ships to Colon (the port 
of Panama on the Caribbean Sea which was an arm of 
the Atlantic) and thus prevented the landing of a rein- 
forcement of Colombian troops that would have sup- 
pressed the revolution. How much the revolutionists 



foreign Relations, 1903, 272. Also Hay, ibid., 295, 310; T. Roose- 
velt, Autobiography (1913), 564. 

2 Message of January, 1904. Foreign Relations, 1903, 263, 264. 

3 Roosevelt, 190. 



270 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

were dependent on the United States is seen by a citation 
from Bunau-Varilla's book. "From the morning of the 
2d November (1903)," he wrote, "all the inhabitants 
of Colon were looking towards Kingston, hoping for the 
appearance of the ship symbolizing American protection. 
As the hours passed, disappointment gradually invaded 
all hearts. Towards nightfall despair was general, when 
suddenly a light smoke arose in the direction of the north- 
east. This was a ray of hope ! If it were the liberator ! 
Little by little, the smoke thickened, the ship emerged 
above the horizon and soon the Star-Spangled Banner 
dominated the Bay of Colon. A burst of delirious en- 
thusiasm shook the whole Isthmus. It was really true ! 
Bunau-Varilla had effectually obtained for the unfortu- 
nate country the protection of the powerful Republic ! 
At this moment, without one word having been uttered 
the revolution was accomplished in the hearts of all. . . . 
In the morning of the 3d of November General Tovar 
(of Colombia) arrived quietly with about 500 soldiers. . . . 
If these troops had arrived twenty-four hours earlier 
nobody would have made a move. . . . The Independent 
Republic of Panama was proclaimed. The revolution 
had been made without shedding a drop of blood." 1 
The ship which arrived so opportunely for Bunau-Va- 
rilla's scheme was the Nashville. It may therefore be 
said that unless President Roosevelt had ordered our 
vessels-of-war to Colon the Panama revolution would 






1 Panama, Hunaii-Varilla, 835. The incident is repeated in The 
Qieet Adventure of Panama (1920) in which Hunau-X 'anlla fclao .slate-, 
"All in Havnl [by the arrival < > f the N(uhoHl$\. . . . Colombia can say 
to-dav that the Republic of Panama was l>orn owing to American pro- 
tection." 2\;s, 347. 



Ch. X.] THE PANAMA REVOLUTION 271 

have been suppressed. 1 "I simply lifted my foot," af- 
firmed Roosevelt. "Oh, Mr. President," said Attorney- 
General Knox in Cabinet meeting, "do not let so great 
an achievement suffer from any taint of legality." 2 

It is probable that Roosevelt had better have exer- 
cised the virtue of patience as he was so advised by Sena- 
tor Hanna. 3 Many things might have happened with- 
out the secession of Panama. Popular sentiment in 
the United States was now in favor of the Panama route. 
Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, who although a 
Democrat had been made chairman of the Inter-Oceanic 
Canal Committee by a Republican Senate, on account 
of his enthusiasm for an Inter-Oceanic Canal, had made 
the Senate majority report in favor of the Nicaragua 
route. But Hanna was the "instigator of the minority 
report and became the leader in the Senate of the pro- 
Panama party," 4 and the successor of Morgan as the 
chairman of the committee. He was as enthusiastic 
for Panama as was Roosevelt, and could probably have 
influenced the Senate in its favor, despite the backing- 
down of Colombia. The eruption of Mont Pel6e in Mar- 
tinique during May, 1902, costing about 40,000 lives, was 
a powerful argument in favor of Panama, as it was well 
understood that the danger from volcanoes and earth- 
quakes was greater by the Nicaragua route. "Volcanoes 
and earthquakes," said Hanna in the Senate, "seem to 
be a burning question just now while Mount Pel6e is 
discharging its fire, and they have led to a more careful 
consideration of that matter." 6 



1 For the disposition of the vessels reinforcing the Nashville, see Roose- 
velt in Foreign Relations, 1903, 266. 

2 Impressions, Abbott, 139, 140. 

3 Bishop, i. 278. 4 Life of Hanna, Croly, 380. 6 Record, 6319. 



272 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

A mischief in Roosevelt's action was that it aggravated 
the suspicions of the Central and South American re- 
publics of the United States and led them to believe that 
the doctrine of might makes right prevailed in Yankee- 
dom ; so that if exercising the virtue of patience involved 
a delay of only twelve months, it better have been exer- 
cised. Moreover it may have been wise to nurse a co- 
terie in the Republic of Colombia in the hope that the 
violent public sentiment of Bogota might pass away. 
Marroquin, unpopular as he was in Bogotd, had appointed 
as governor of Panama Senator Obaldia. "Obaldia's 
separatist tendencies," wrote our Minister Beaupr6 to 
Hay, "are well known and he is reported to have said 
that, should the canal treaty not pass, the department 
of Panama would declare its independence and would 
be right in doing so. That these are his opinions there 
is of course no doubt." ' Reyes, the probable and actual 
successor of Marroquin, was well worth cultivating and 
his dignified correspondence with Secretary Hay during 
December, 1903, and January, 1904, manifest a man with 
whom one could bargain. 

"Such a scheme;" [that of the secession of Panama and 
itfl annexation to the United States), wrote \<ln . \s-i<tant- 
Secretary of State to Hay, "could, of course, have no 
countenance from us — our policy before the world should 
stand like Mrs. Cfflsar, without suspicion."' That the 
policy determined on was oof above suspicion is evident 
from Moorfield Storey's address at the Massachusetts 
Reform Club during December, L903; from Daniel II. 
Chamberlain's "Open letter t<> John Hay" in the New 



1 Foreign Relations, 1903, 193. 

1 Life (if Hay, Thayer, ii ' ; i I 



Ch. X.] THE PANAMA REVOLUTION 273 

York Times of October 2, 1904 ; from James C. Carter's 
criticism ; from George L. Fox's brochure of 1904, entitled 
"President Roosevelt's Coup d'Etat" ; from Leander T. 
Chamberlain's article entitled " A Chapter of National Dis- 
honor," reprinted from the North American Review of 
February, 1912, as a Senate document; and from George 
L. Fox's letter to the New York Nation of February 24, 
1916, reprinting the protest of many Yale professors of 
December 24, 1903, against the treatment of Colombia. 1 
Saddest of all was the attitude of Senator George F. 
Hoar. In a speech in the Senate on December 17, 1903, he 
said : "No man in this country desires more eagerly than I 
do to support the Administration and to act with my 
Republican associates in this matter. I desire the build- 
ing of the canal. It is one of the great landmarks, rarely 
found once in a century, in the progress of humanity, 
bringing nations together and making the whole world 
kin. I hope that it is a laudable ambition that this may 
be accomplished in my time by the party with which I 
have acted from my youth, and by the Administration 
of my choice. Nothing can be more delightful to me than 
that it shall be accomplished by the President of whom 
I have supposed I had the right to speak as an honored 
and valued personal friend. . . . Before the revolution 
broke out our Government instructed its man-of-war to 
prevent the Government of Colombia from doing any- 
thing in anticipation of the revolution to prevent it. . . . 
Colombia was a friendly nation. ... It is said that she 



1 The address of Storey and article of D. II. Chamberlain are preserved 
as pamphlets in the Boston Athenaeum. The article of L. T. Chamberlain 
is in a bound volume of "Tracts." In regard to James C. Carter see Life 
of Hay, Thayer, ii. 324. 



274 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 

negotiated a treaty with us by her Executive, and then 
that her Executive took no steps to persuade her Con- 
gress to ratify it. Indeed she did exactly what we did 
with Denmark thirty years ago in the case of St. Thomas, 
what we have done lately with several commercial treaties 
and what the present Administration did with Great 
Britain within a year in the matter of the Newfoundland 
fishery treaty." 1 

Senator Shelby M. Cullom was present at an interview 
between President Roosevelt and Senator George F. Hoar 
and has thus related the incident : "The President wanted 
the Senator to read a Message which he had already pre- 
pared in reference to Colombia's action . . . [probably 
the Message of January 4, 1904]. The President was 
sitting on the table, first at one side of Senator Hoar 
and then on the other, talking in his usual vigorous fash- 
ion, trying to get the Senator's attention to the Message. 
Senator Hoar seemed averse to reading it but finally sat 
down, and without seeming to pay any particular atten- 
tion to what he was perusing, remained for a minute 
or two, then arose and said 'I hope I may never live to 
see the day when the interests of my country are placed 
above its honor.' He at once retired from the room with- 
out uttering another word." 2 

It must not be forgotten however, that Roosevelt, 
Hay and Root who was Secretary of War at the time of 
taking Panama, are a powerful trio to combat. Roose- 
velt and Hay represented a common-sense view while 
Root's legal analysis is very strong. 3 Their action was 



1 Record , 316 ei seq. 

1 Fifty Years of Public Service, 212. 

8 Bishop, i. 301 el seq. 



Ch. XJ PANAMA 275 

in no way for self-aggrandizement but solely in the in- 
terest of the country that they represented. "The canal 
would not have been built at all save for the action I 
took," declared Roosevelt in 1913. J There is no question 
that he believed this sincerely to the day of his death, 
but for the moment in this statement he indulged in 
prophecy forgetting Hosea Biglow's remark, "Don't never 
prophesy — onless ye know." 

A Junta of the provisional government of Panama 
appointed Philippe Bunau-Varilla "Envoy Extraordi- 
nary and Minister Plenipotentiary near the Government 
of the United States with full powers for political and 
financial negotiations." On November 13 the Republic 
of Panama was recognized by the United States. This 
action was followed by like recognition of France, Ger- 
many, Denmark, Russia, Sweden and Norway, Nicara- 
gua, Peru, China, Cuba, Great Britain, Italy, Costa 
Rica, Japan and Austria-Hungary. 2 On November 18 
Hay and Bunau-Varilla signed the Treaty which goes 
under their names. It was soon ratified by Panama. 3 
The United States Senate ratified it on February 23, 1904, 
by a vote of 66 : 14. Under it the canal was built. 

"We were able to make with Panama a much more 
satisfactory treaty than we had with Colombia," wrote 
Cullom. 4 The United States guaranteed the indepen- 
dence of Panama. Panama granted to the United States 
a zone of land ten miles wide from which the cities of 
Panama and Colon (the Pacific and Caribbean seaports) 



1 Autobiography, 569 ; see also Fear God and Take Your Own Part, 
written in 1916, 305. 

2 Roosevelt, January 4, 1904. Foreign Relations, 276. 
* Panama, P. Bunau-Varilla, 349, 364, 367, 372, 384. 
4 Fifty Years of Public Service, 383. 



276 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 

were excepted, but the United States was given full power 
to enforce the sanitation and public order of those two 
cities. The United States was to pay to Panama ten 
millions in gold coin and, beginning nine years after the 
ratification of the treaty, an annual payment of S250,000. 
Panama granted to the United States authority to fortify 
the canal and "if it should become necessary at any 
time," to employ its land and naval forces at its discre- 
tion. 1 

" After paying $40,000,000 to J. P. Morgan & Co. for 
their subsequent transfer to the new company." so 
wrote Bunau-Varilla, "the American Government re- 
sumed on the 4th of May 1904, the work of completion 
of the great French undertaking after fifteen years, four 
months and twenty days practical suspension of activ- 
ity." 2 

James Bryce wrote about the canal in a manner to 
gratify the American heart, when the source is considered. 
"In these forty miles of canal," he said, "(or fifty if we 
reckon from deep water to deep water) the two most 
remarkable pieces of engineering work are the gigantic 
dam (with its locks) at Gatun and the gigantic cutting 
at Culebra, each the hugest of its kind that the world 
has to shew. . . . Nothing less than an earthquake will 



'Treaties relating to the Panama Canal, 13. 

1 Panama, 43(). I have used Foreign 1 . 1903, more than the 

citations to them ■ • on to warrant. All the despatches <>f our competent 
minister to Colombia, Beaupre*, are well worth reading. Theodore 
i; i-veit, Autobiography; Life of Hay, Thayer, ii.; do Roosevelt; 
Bishop; Life of Banna, Croly; Panama, Bunau-Varilla; <1". The Great 
Adventure of Panama. 1 have also used Boo evelt, Pear Qod and Take 
Your Own Part; Life of Bi Leupp; do. Lewis; The Panama 

Bishop; Life of Poraker, ii. : Bncyclopcedia Britannica; Senate 
•e i>ii To it. with Columbia, open e: il. 1921, 

(f Senator 1 i I tOTah arul .1"!.: 



Ch. X.J PANAMA 277 

affect them and of earthquakes there is no record in this 
region though they are frequent in Costa Rica, two hun- 
dred miles away. . . . There is something in the magni- 
tude and the methods of this enterprise which a poet 
might take as his theme. Never before on our planet 
has so much labor, so much scientific knowledge, and so 
much executive skill been concentrated on a work de- 
signed to bring the nations nearer to one another and 
serve the interests of all mankind. . . . The chief engi- 
neer, Colonel Goethals, is the head not only of the whole 
scheme of construction but of the whole administration, 
and his energy, judgment and power of swift decision 
are recognized to have been a prime factor in the progress 
of the work and the excellence of the administrative de- 
tails. The houses erected by the United States govern- 
ment are each of them surrounded on every floor by a 
fine wire netting which, while freely admitting the air, 
excludes winged insects. All the hospitals have been 
netted so carefully that no insect can enter to carry out 
infection from a patient. . . . The discovery, made while 
the United States troops were occupying Cuba after the 
war of 1898, that yellow fever is due to the bite of the 
Stegomyia, carrying infection from a patient to a healthy 
person, and that intermittent fevers are due to the bite 
of the Anopheles, similarly bearing poison from the sick 
to the sound, made it possible to enter on a campaign 
for the prevention of these diseases among the workers 
on the Isthmus. . . . One may be for days and nights 
on the Isthmus and neither see nor hear nor feel a mos- 
quito. To have made one of the pest houses of the world 
... as healthy as Boston or London is an achievement 
of which the American medical staff and their country 



278 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 

for them, may well be proud ; ' and the name of Colonel 
Gorgas, the head of that medical staff to whose unwea- 
ried zeal and care this achievement is largely due, deserves 
to stand on the roll of fame beside that of Colonel Goe- 
thals, the chief engineer and chairman of the Commis- 
sion, who has directed and is bringing to its successful 
issue, this whole great enterprise. . . . It is expected that 
the construction of the canal will be found, when it is 
finished, to have cost nearly §400,000,000." 2 

Bryce in 1921 disposes of what was at the time a 
mooted question. " It deserves to be noted," writes 
Bryce, "as a mark of Roosevelt's good sense and dis- 
cernment that he had, at an early stage in the long debates 
over the canal project, made up his mind that a sea level 
canal was practically out of the question. There was 
a grandiosity about the idea of an ocean highway with no 
locks which might have been expected to attract him. 
But his gift for weighing arguments and reaching the 
correct conclusion made him grasp and hold fast to the 
decision [that of a lock canal] which experience has abun- 
dantly approved." 3 

1 For a striking article on the sanitation of the Isthmus see Charles F. 
Adams, Massachusetts Historical Society, May 1911, 610. 

2 South America, '-'3 it seq. The coal up to 1916 according to 
Theodore KommvHi was $375,000,000, Fear Clod and Take Your Own 
Part, 311. 

Up to June 30, 1920, 1467,431,267.41 had been appropriated for the 
canal. Of this $379,840,741.92 was appropriated for the construction of 
the canal and its immediate adjuncts. The reel went to: fortifications, 
168,400.81; nine annual payments to Panama. 12,250,000; for opera- 
tion and maintenance, 150,51 1,91 L68. Dp t<> the same -laic $7,215,288 68 
had been repaid on tin- oosi of construction; I 31.67 had been 

collected in tolls. Other receipts besides those two make tin- total re- 
oeipts to June 30, 1920, $42,176,261.22. Report of Governor of the Pan- 
ama Canal. 1920, 155, I 

3 Review of ,i B. Bishop's Roosevelt. The Literary Soviets, N- ^ l- <■ 
Post, Feb. 19, L92L 



CHAPTER XI 

Henry White wrote in a private letter, "Roosevelt 
was the only man I have ever met who combined the 
qualities of an able politician at home with those of an 
equally good diplomatist abroad." We have seen some- 
thing of his work as diplomatist in Chapter IX and shall 
see more as the history goes on ; he was now to measure 
himself against the ablest politician in the United States, 
unless he himself were entitled to that designation, Mark 
Hanna. The stake was the Republican nomination for the 
presidency in 1904. Hanna did not approve of Roosevelt's 
action toward the large financial interests of the country, 
yet feeling that Roosevelt might have the country at his 
back did not act openly in opposition. On the contrary, 
to a certain extent, he worked with him and the President 
was grateful for his assistance. Writing to Taft, then 
Civil Governor of the Philippines, under date of March 
13, 1903, he said, "With both Hanna and Aldrich I had 
to have a regular stand-up fight before I could get them 
to accept any trust legislation, but when I once got them 
to say they would give in, they kept their promise in 
good faith and it was far more satisfactory to work with 
them than to try to work with the alleged radical re- 
formers." l 

Under this seeming harmony there was, however, a 
quiet opposition. Hanna had the support of the finan- 
cial and business interests of the country but he was 



1 Bishop, i. 237. 
279 



280 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

keen enough to know that something beside the backing 
of Wall Street and associated interests was necessary to 
the man who had political aspirations. He secured the 
support of the Labor Unions. During August, 1902, he 
declared: "The natural tendency in this country, ay, 
and in the world over, has been the selfish appropriation 
of the larger share by capital. As long as labor was in a 
situation which forced it to submit, that condition would 
to a very large degree continue. If labor had some griev- 
ance and each laborer in his individual capacity went 
to his employer and asked for consideration, how much 
would be shown to him? Not much. Therefore when 
they banded together in an organization for their own 
benefit which would give them power, if necessary, to 
demand a remedy, I say organized labor was justified. . . . 
It is truly astonishing to consider what trivial disagree- 
ments have occasioned some of the most serious strikes. 
I have seen two parties stand apart, each with a chip on his 
shoulder, defying his opponent to knock it off. . . . While 
labor unions may have proved a curse to England, I be- 
lieve that they will prove a boon to our own country. . . . 
Two factors contributed to the prosperity of our nation — 
the man who works with his hands ami the man who works 
with his head — part ners iii toil who ought to be partners in 
the profit of thai toil." And again in May, 1903, "I be- 
lieve in organize! labor and I believe in organized capital 
as an auxiliary." ' 

Collective bargaining was Hanna'e remedy for Labor 
troubles and this doctrine he thoroughly elaborated. By 
his famous "stand pat" Bpeech at Akron during Septem- 
ber, L902, he won the Bupporl of manufacturers and busi- 
1 Croly, 405 << ■ "/- : & ■<• Croly, 117, for i full Mootmf of it. 



Ch. XI. I ROOSEVELT — HANNA 281 

ness men who did not want the present tariff disturbed. 
That Roosevelt and Hanna seemed to be drifting apart 
troubled a supporter of Roosevelt who was likewise a 
thorough-going Republican; together, he said, their 
power among Republicans was immense ; should they 
openly differ and put up a fight they could smash the 
party. This was reported to Hanna who looked grave 
but said nothing. To a further remark that he seemed 
to have with him two inconsistent influences, the finan- 
cial interests and organized labor, he said simply, I have 
the support of both. Hanna had likewise the backing 
of the Roman Catholic Church and of the Salvation 
Army, so that he was not an opponent to be despised and 
he was not in any respect thought slightingly of by Roose- 
velt. 

The opposition between the two became public during 
May, 1903, and the occasion was the Republican State 
Convention of Ohio which met in June. Roosevelt de- 
sired ardently the presidential nomination ; he was popu- 
lar throughout the country evidenced by many official 
declarations in his favor. He kept himself before the 
public, travelling about the country, speaking constantly 
and was in the far West when this threatened disturb- 
ance in the relations between Roosevelt and Hanna be- 
came known. Foraker, who was senior Senator from 
Ohio, belonged to a different section of the party from the 
Hanna-McKinley section and felt that he had not re- 
ceived his share of the patronage under the McKinley 
administration. For this and from the antagonism that 
had grown up between him and Senator Hanna, he was 
willing to widen the breach between the President and 
the Senator. Prompted as he affirmed, by expressions 



282 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

from Hanna's henchmen, he gave out during the last of 
May, 1903, an interview in which he declared : "Roose- 
velt has made a good President. He has been alert, ag- 
gressive and brilliant and with it all he has been success- 
ful. ... He is to-day the best known and the most popu- 
lar man in the United States. . . . Many States indorsed 
and declared last year in favor of him as our candidate 
for 1904. Nearly all the Northern States will make sim- 
ilar declarations this year. I do not know of any reason 
why Ohio should not also declare in favor of him. ... I 
think it would be very wise for the Republicans of Ohio 
at the approaching State convention not only to indorse 
the administration of President Roosevelt, but also to 
declare their intention to support him next year as 
our candidate for the Presidency." ' On May 24 Hanna 
replied to this in a statement which was given to the press. 
"I am not, and will not be, a candidate for the Presiden- 
tial nomination. On account of my position as Chair- 
man of the Republican National Committee and the 
further fact that this year I am supposed to have a vital 
interest in the results in Ohio as bearing upon my reelec- 
tion to the United States Senate, it would be presumed 
that I might have some influence as to the policy or action 
of the State convention this year in national affairs. In 
that connection, it would seem apparent that whatever 
that influence might be it had been exerted in a direct inn 
which would cause just criticism on the part of any other 
person who ni'mht aspire to be a candidate for the Re- 
publican Domination for President in 1904. For these 
reasons I am opposed to the adoption of such a resolu- 
tion." 

1 Notei of u Busy Life, Foraksr, ii. no. 



Ch. XL] ROOSEVELT — HANNA 283 

On the same day Hanna telegraphed to the President 
who was at Seattle, Washington: "The issue that has 
been forced upon me in the matter of our State con- 
vention this year indorsing you for Republican nomina- 
tion next year has come in a way which makes it neces- 
sary for me to oppose such a resolution. When you know 
all the facts I am sure that you will approve my course." 
Roosevelt replied on the same day: "Your telegram 
received. I have not asked any man for his support. 
I have nothing whatever to do with raising this issue. 
Inasmuch as it has been raised, of course, those who favor 
my administration and my nomination will favor in- 
dorsing both, and those who do not will oppose." This 
brought from Hanna the rejoinder on May 26: "Your 
telegram of the 23d received. In view of the sentiment 
expressed I shall not oppose the indorsement of your 
administration and candidacy by our State convention. 
I have given the substance of this to the Associated 
Press." On May 29 in reply to a letter from Hanna 
Roosevelt wrote from Ogden, Utah: "Your interview 
was everywhere accepted as the first open attack on me, 
and it gave heart, curiously enough, not only to my oppo- 
nents but to all the men who lump you and me together 
as improperly friendly to organized labor and to the work- 
ing men generally. . . . The general belief was that this 
was not your move save indirectly ; but that it was really 
an attack by the so-called Wall Street forces on me, to 
which you had been led to give a reluctant acquiescence. 
. . . After thinking the matter carefully over I became 
sure that I had to take a definite stand myself. I hated 
to do it, because you have shown such generosity and 
straightforwardness in all your dealings with me that it 



284 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

was peculiarly painful to me to be put, even temporarily, 
in a position of seeming antagonism to you. No one but 
a really big man — a man above all petty considerations 
— could have treated me as you have done during the 
year and a half since President AIcKinley's death. I 
have consulted you and relied on your judgment more 
than I have done with any other man." ' Two days pre- 
viously Roosevelt wrote confidentially to Senator Lodge : 
"I decided that the time had come to stop shilly-shally- 
ing and let Hanna know definitely that I did not intend 
to assume the position, at least passively, of a suppliant 
to whom he might give the nomination as a boon. ... I 
rather expected Hanna to fight, but made up my mind 
that it was better to have a fight in the open at once than 
to run the risk of being knifed secretly. ... I am pleased 
at the outcome and it simplifies things all round, for in 
my judgment, Hanna was my only formidable opponent 
so far as the nomination is concerned." 2 

There can be no question that the President gained 
in this controversy. The adroit cartoonist of the N< w 
York Herald illustrated this in a picture of Hanna shak- 
ing his fist at Foraker and with not the best grace in the 
world, handing a bouquet, labelled "endorsement" to 
Roosevelt who expressed himself as "delighted." 3 Put 
no change in their personal relations followed. On June 
10 the President attended the marriage of Hanna's 
daughter Ruth to Joseph Medill McCormick, addressing 
in his hearty manner the Senator who met him at the 
railway station as "Uncle Mark." The Senator made 



1 Croly, 424 -< taq, 

i I'., hop, i. 246. 

* A Cartoon History of Ri relt'sCai . UbertShai 



Ch - XI -1 ROOSEVELT — HANNA 285 

the wedding a festive occasion and gathered together a 
number of personal and political friends. 

Mark Hanna's eye was on the Ohio political campaign 
of 1903 when the issue was fairly made. Should he be 
reelected to the senatorship over his Democratic oppo- 
nent? His party had carried Ohio the previous year by 
an immense majority but a strict personal issue was ab- 
sent. It may be said that he now [i. e., in 1903] dominated 
the campaign, carrying the State by over 100,000 for the 
Republican nominee for governor, Myron T. Herrick, 
and with a Republican majority on the joint ballot of 
91 in the legislature, a very gratifying result which put 
Mark Hanna to the fore again as a candidate for the 
presidential nomination. 

In the meantime the President had lost the support 
of a part at least of organized labor. On May 19, the 
Public Printer discharged William A. Miller; the' real 
reason was his expulsion from a local union. Miller 
contested his dismissal and carried the case to the Civil 
Service Commission that reported in his favor, where- 
upon the President ordered him to be reinstated. The 
American Federation of Labor took up the case and de- 
cided the action of the President unfriendly. Roosevelt 
gave their Executive Council, at the head of which was 
Samuel Gompers, their President, an interview in which 
he justified his action, writing in a private letter some- 
what before his talk to the labor representatives: "It 
is a sheer waste of time for those people, through such 
resolutions as those of the unions you quote, to threaten 
me with defeat for the Presidency next year. Nothing- 
would hire me even to accept the Presidency if I had to 
take it on terms which would mean a forfeiting of self- 



286 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

respect. ... I should refuse to take it at the cost of un- 
doing what I did in the matter of Miller and the Labor 
Union. The labor unions and the trust magnates may 
perhaps unite against me. If so, I shall do my level best 
to make the fight an open one and beat them — and I 
think I run a good chance of winning ; and if I fail I shall 
not regret the policy I have pursued." l The President 
thought that he had at his back the "one-suspender men," 
otherwise called by a sturdy democrat, "the dinner-pail 
men," the small shopkeepers and a large proportion of 
the farmers. 

The Wall Street men and Hanna are working together 
to prevent my nomination in Chicago, said the President. 
So far as Wall Street was concerned he was right. The 
financial interests were opposed to Roosevelt and they 
believed that anything to beat him was the correct policy. 
A reasonable amount of money could be raised to secure 
for Hanna the nomination and election, and they and 
certain politicians were at one in the conviction that 
Roosevelt if nominated could not be elected. But Hanna 
would give them no countenance, nor would he declare 
for Roosevelt. The breach widened. George B. Cortclyou, 
who had been McKinley's and Roosevelt's private sec- 
retary and was now Secretary of the new Department 
of Commerce and Labor, made an attempl to bring the 
two together. He wont to Bee the Senator, who declared 
that "he was not a candidate, that he had never been 
nor would be a candidate." So he had assured Roosevelt 
but lie was tired, he said, "of going to the White House 
every day, of putting bia hand on his heart and being 

1 Biihopi i 261. \ tl Miller ease, ibid., 240 M 

valt, Monnnffon Cvmni Lit. Pub Co , L 159 d 



Ch. XL] ROOSEVELT — H ANN A 287 

sworn in." Somewhat later Cortelyou went to see the 
President and found him in conference with three friends, 
one of whom was a member of the Cabinet and another 
a Senator. The President said in his emphatic way, 
"Yes, Mr. Hanna ought to make an unequivocal public 
statement of his position," when Cortelyou assured the 
President and his friends that "Mr. Hanna has no inten- 
tion of being a candidate for President." x 

Thus affairs continued during December, 1903, and Jan- 
uary, 1904. It is not difficult to understand Hanna's 
position. He did not believe in Roosevelt's policy toward 
the financial and business interests of the country and 
Hanna knew that he had their backing and also that of 
the Labor Unions; had he been ten years younger and 
in good health he would probably have made a fight 
against Roosevelt for the Republican nomination. But 
his health was poor, he was 66, he knew the power which 
the national administration could exert for the nomina- 
tion and he hesitated to take up the contest. With de- 
sign therefore, he let the golden moment slip when he 
was present at Columbus, making a brief speech of thanks 
to the Ohio legislature for the senatorship and failing to 
announce his candidacy for the presidential nomination. 
Late that month Cornelius N. Bliss said that Hanna had 
wittingly let pass the nick of time ; had he eighteen days 
previously declared himself a candidate, he and Roosevelt 
would have been competitors for the nomination. 2 

Some of Hanna's advocates were determined to force 



1 Croly, 437. According to Croly, James R. Garfield, then Commis- 
sioner of Corporations, and Theodore E. Burton, representative from the 
Cleveland district, were effective in preventing the breach from widening. 
See also letter of O. H. Piatt, cited by Croly, 441. 

2 The address in Columbus was Jan. 12, 1904; the talk of Bliss, Jan. 30. 



288 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 

the nomination upon him and argued that, as the call of 
States was in alphabetical order, Alabama and Arkansas 
would first be called, would vote for Hanna whence there 
would come a tidal wave that would result in his nomina- 
tion. Charles G. Washburn, a friend and college class- 
mate of Roosevelt, wrote : "I was a delegate to the Con- 
vention that nominated Roosevelt for President in 1904. 
A portrait, of heroic size, of Mark Hanna, hung over the 
platform. I said to a man who sat next to me 'What 
would happen if Hanna were living?' He said in reply, 
'He would be nominated here to-day.'" l 

By the end of January, 1904, Roosevelt was confident, 
writing thus to Shaw : "In confidence I can tell you that 
outside all the Southern States I am now as certain as 
I well can be that if Hanna made the fight (for the nomi- 
nation) and with all the money of Wall Street behind 
him, he would get the majority of the delegations from 
no State excepting Ohio; and from the South 1 should 
have from a third to a half of the delegates, and most of 
the remainder would have been pledged to me and would 
have to be purchased outright against me. I believe 
that the best advisers among my opponents themselves 
see this and have very nearly made up their minds to 
give up the contest. In a few weeks I think that most 
of the Wall Street Republicans will have concluded that 
they have to, however grudgingly, support me. . . . My 
Domination has become assured, in my judgment, be- 
fore they give up the contest." ■ 

Hanna wa capable of a high as] iration and tins took 

the form with him of a reconcilement between capital 



1 Roosevelt, 53. « Bishop, i. 311. 



Ch. XL] HANN A— ROOSEVELT 



289 



and labor to which he was willing to devote his business 
experience and political standing. Unquestionably he 
as leading Senator and Roosevelt as President might have 
accomplished much ; both loved their country and would 
make personal sacrifices for it ; both had personal morals 
above reproach; both had a high idea of service; but 
the two could not work sympathetically together. 
Shakespeare told why, "An two men ride of a horse, 
one must ride behind." l 

Now entered upon the scene the King of Terrors. 
Hanna died on February 15, 1904. While lying upon 
his death-bed in the Arlington Hotel, the President called 
to inquire after his condition and on February 5 received 
this pencilled note: "My dear Mr. President: You 
touched a tender spot, old man, when you called person- 
ally to inquire after [me] this a.m. I may be worse, 
before I can be better, but all the same such ' drops of 
kindness' are good for a fellow." To this Roosevelt 
replied: "Dear Senator: Indeed it is your letter from 
your sick bed which is touching, not my visit. May you 
soon be with us again, old fellow, as strong in body and 
as vigorous in your leadership as ever." 2 

His death was regarded as a calamity in Cleveland; 
and in his State of Ohio, it seemed as if a prop to the na- 
tion had been taken away. Roosevelt wrote to Root on 
the next day: "No man had larger traits than Hanna. 
He was a big man in every way and as forceful a person- 
ality as we have seen in public life in our generation." 3 
The Chaplain of the Senate, Reverend Edward Everett 
Hale, spoke thus over his dead body : "This man had at 

1 Much Ado, iii. 5. 2 Croly, 453, 454. 

3 Bishop, i. 315. 



290 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 

once as no other man had, the confidence of capital and 
labor. He could mediate between the men who provide 
the tools and the workmen who handle them." Later 
his senatorial associates paid him high tributes. Foraker 
said : "He was one of the really great men of his day and 
generation. . . . He had before him seven years of ser- 
vice." His personal friend, Senator Piatt of Connecti- 
cut, declared, "that when Marcus A. Hanna died all the 
people mourned with a grief that was deep and un- 
feigned." Senator Fairbanks said truthfully, "He pos- 
sessed in full degree the power of great initiative." Sena- 
tor Beveridge said that, "He was the man of affairs in 
statesmanship . . . ; he was the personification of our 
commercial age." 1 "The New York Evening Post 
crowd," as Roosevelt called them, could not join in these 
tributes. They may have taken their cue from their 
great progenitor who wrote, "I do not like the Western 
type of man." 2 In that they differed from Roosevelt 
who broke out, "I do like these Westerners." 

Between these eulogists and detractors of Hanna it 
is pleasant to hear from a moderator, Edward D. White, 
who as Justice of the Supreme Court was well acquainted 
with Hanna, admired and loved him, who one night in 
December, 1920, long after he had bun Chief Justice, 
could talk of naught else, testifying his high regard for the 
ability, honor and unselfishness of Hanna. 

Hanna was now out of the way. No man in public 
life took liis place in part ial antagonism to Roosevelt. 

The coast was clear. lie was nominated by acclamation 
at the Republican National Convention thai assembled 



'Memorial Addressee, pp. L5, 81, 49, 77, no. 

1 Life of Godkin, Ogden, ii. 



Ch. XL] HANNA 291 

in Chicago, June 21, 1904. Charles G. Washburn, later 
Congressman from the Worcester district, a keen judge 
of men, wrote in his book adding to what I have already 
cited: "Of course Hanna would not have been nomi- 
nated. . . . The old order which was incarnated in Hanna 
had not then passed away but it was passing. . . . When 
McKinley and Hanna died, the old dynasty fell." l 



1 Roosevelt, 54. 



CHAPTER XII 

In accepting the nomination for the presidency Roose- 
velt showed that he was a true partisan Republican as, 
in his speech of acceptance, he dilated on the "Record 
of the Republican party," on the currency and the tariff. 
"We have placed the finances of the Nation upon a 
sound gold basis," he said. "We have enacted a tariff 
law under which during the past few years the country 
has attained a height of material well-being never before 
reached." In his letter he elaborated his position on 
the tariff taking the ground of the educated man who 
had been led to believe in the virtue of protection. "The 
question of what tariff is best for our people is primarily one 
of expediency, to be determined not on abstract academic 
grounds but in the light of experience. It is a matter 
of business"; and he repeated the Republican stock 
argument against the Democratic tariff of 1894. 1 

The Democrats had nominated Alton B. Parker, Chief 
Justice of the Court of Appeals of the State of Now York, 
wlio, declining to run on a platform squinting in the di- 
rection of free silver, had eliminated from the contesl 
the money question. Nor was the tariff an issue to be 
decided. The issue of the campaign w:is Roosevelt. 
"Your personality lias been the Administration," wrote 
l-.lihu Root. 1 This meant largely what Roosevell had 
done in attacking the great financial interests of the eoun- 



1 The ipeeob tru July 27; the letter, September L2. Current Lit. Pub. 
Co , 108, 200, 218. - Bishop, i. 323. 

202 



Ch. XII.] ALTON B. PARKER 293 

try which, after much consideration, had selected Parker 
as their candidate. They had coquetted with Grover 
Cleveland. "It is evident," wrote Roosevelt to Senator 
Lodge on May 4, 1903, "Cleveland has the presidential 
bee in his bonnet, and it is equally evident that a large 
number of people are desirous of running him again." l 
Nevertheless his decision not to accept another nomina- 
tion became "unalterable." 

Toward its end Parker brought personalities into the 
campaign which must be considered. Roosevelt had se- 
lected as chairman of the Republican National Commit- 
tee George B. Cortelyou, after having vainly endeavored 
to secure Elihu Root, W. Murray Crane and Cornelius N. 
Bliss. Cortelyou had been Cleveland's executive clerk, 
private secretary of McKinley and Roosevelt, and was 
then Secretary of Commerce and Labor, appointed 
by Roosevelt. A fair inference from Judge Parker's 
speeches was that President Roosevelt and Cortelyou 
had used their official positions to induce corporations to 
contribute funds. Roosevelt, having a high regard for the 
dignity of his office, had held aloof from a public participa- 
tion in the campaign but these speeches of Parker gave him 
along-sought-f or opportunity of taking a hand in the contest 
as a fighter, and on November 4 2 he made this statement : 
"The assertion that Mr. Cortelyou had any knowledge 
gained while in an official position, whereby he was enabled 
to secure and did secure any contributions from any cor- 
poration is a falsehood. . . . The assertion that there 
has been made in my behalf and by my authority, by 



bishop, i. 241. 

2 The election was on November 8. Charles W. Fairbanks of Indiana 
was chosen Vice-President. 



294 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION 11904 

Mr. Cortelyou or by anyone else, any pledge or promise, 
or that there has been any understanding as to future 
immunities or benefits, in recognition of any contribu- 
tions from any source, is a wicked falsehood. ... As 
Mr. Cortelyou has said to me more than once during the 
campaign, if elected I shall go into the Presidency un- 
hampered by any pledge, promise or understanding of 
any kind, sort or description, save my promise made 
openly to the American people, that so far as in my power 
lies I shall see to it that every man has a square deal, no 
less and no more." l 

The Nation, which was an enthusiastic supporter of 
Parker, maintained that the gravamen of Parker's charges 
was that the beneficiaries of the tariff policy of the Re- 
publican party were to be recouped for their contribu- 
tions in the event of Republican success. But Roosevelt 
did not so interpret the charges. Indeed The Nation 
failed to iterate with its accustomed vigor Parker's charges 
against Roosevelt and Cortelyou, proposing apparently 
to shield him under the stock Democratic argument 
against the tariff and the Republican party. 2 

Of the same nature was the Harriman attack which 
was made public more than two years later and which 
was to the effect that Roosevelt had requested Harriman 
to raise $250,000 for the presidential campaign. Roose- 
velt denied this emphatically. "I never," he said, "re- 
quested Mr. Harriman to raise a dollar for the Presiden- 
tial campaign of 1904. On the contrary, our communi- 
cations as regards the campaign related exclusively to the 
fight being made against Mr. Higgins for Governor of 



' ( 'am nt LA Tub. Co., 222 <t ««• ■ The Nation, 1904, 24, 180, 250, 305. 



Ch. XII.] ROOSEVELT 295 

New York. . . . He was concerned only in getting me 
to tell Mr. Cortelyou to aid Mr. Higgins so far as he 
could, which I gladly did." l It was well known that at 
Republican headquarters, New York State was consid- 
ered in danger, not lest its electoral vote should fail Roose- 
velt, but whether the Republican candidate for governor 
should be elected. 

Roosevelt was triumphantly chosen. He was almost 
the only one among his supporters who doubted the re- 
sult 2 that went far ahead of his anticipations. "I am 
stunned by the overwhelming victory we have won," 
he wrote to his son. "I have the greatest popular ma- 
jority and the greatest electoral majority ever given to 
a candidate for President." 3 He carried the border 
slave States, of West Virginia and Missouri ; while having 
a popular plurality of 50 in Maryland, he received only one 
of her electoral votes. As a result of this election when 
Congress met December 4, 1905, there were in the Senate 
57 Republicans to 32 Democrats ; 4 in the House, 249 Re- 
publicans to 137 Democrats. 

On the night of election after it was known that he 
was triumphantly chosen, he gave out from the White 
House this statement, "The wise custom which limits 
the President to two terms regards the substance and 
not the form, and under no circumstances will I be a can- 
didate for or accept another nomination." 5 



1 Current Lit. Pub. Co., 427. 

1 See My Brother T. Roosevelt, Mrs. Robinson, 217. But Roosevelt 
was eager to be elected and anxious in regard to the result. 

3 Bishop, i. 335 ; see also letter to Henry White, 316, 332, and to Kip- 
ling, 332. 

* There was one vacancy. 

6 Life of Roosevelt, Lewis, 234. Bishop has "A" instead of "The," 
334. 



296 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1903 

Roosevelt had now received a mandate from the people 
with the House and Senate largely Republican. Before 
proceeding to tell what he accomplished during his second 
administration it will be well to recount what he had 
done when as Vice-President he succeeded to the presi- 
dency, that in the course of the narrative has not been 
considered. What exasperated the large financial in- 
terests was his so-called attack on them ; he was insist- 
ent on Federal regulation and did not believe that it 
could properly be left to the States. "The Sherman 
Anti-Trust Law [the Act of 1890. For Acts of 1887 and 
1890 see my viii. 288, 358] was a dead letter," wrote 
Cullom, "until Roosevelt instructed the Attorney Gen- 
eral to prosecute its violators, both great and small.'" 1 
Roosevelt said with truth, "Publicity and not secrecy, 
will win hereafter." 2 He had a Congress fairly obedient 
to his wish. He wrote during August, 1906: "By the 
enactment of the Elkins law and by the creation of the 
Department of Commerce and Labor including the Bu- 
reau of Corporations, Congress enabled us to make great 
strides in advance along the path of thus bringing the 
use of wealth in business under the supervision and regu- 
lation of the National Government — for, in actual prac- 
tice it has proved a sham and pn t< nee bo say that the 
several States can thus supervise and reguli te it." ■ The 
Elkins law, passed February 19, 1903, ft rbade rebates. 
Congr''>s passed on February l 1. L903, an act creating 
a Department of Commerce and Labor including :> Bu- 
reau of Corporations. Such action was due to the warm 



1 Fiftv Yfvirv of P i Bervioi 392 ■ Mi < ■ of Deoernber, 1904. 
: Letter to Jaim-a L. Watson. Current Lit. Pub, Co., 4u0. 



Ch. XII.] THE PENSION ORDER 297 

recommendation of the President, who appointed as its 
first Secretary George B. Cortelyou. 

During March, 1904, the President established by execu- 
tive order " a service pension for all veterans of the Civil 
War" between 62 and 70. * This was called by his op- 
ponents an unconstitutional exercise of power and a bid 
for the soldiers' vote as represented by the Grand Army 
of the Republic. But supporters of Roosevelt will adopt 
a defence of this action as exhibited in his private letters. 
In one written during May he said that the feeling in 
Congress "was overwhelmingly for a full service pension 
— that is $12.00 a month beginning at the age of 62." 
Such a measure would have cost the Government about 
fifty millions annually, while his order would carry 
only about five millions. "So much," he wrote, "for 
the technical argument." But "I hold that the ruling 
was absolutely right and proper. Most of our friends 
who live softly do not understand that the great majority 
of people who live by hard manual labor have begun to 



1 D. M. Matteson has prepared the following note : The order which 
is signed by the Commissioner of Pensions is dated March 15, 1904. It 
is based on the Act of June 27, 1890, which declared that the pension should 
be from $6 to $12 according to the degree of inability to earn a support. 
The order said, "old age is an infirmity the average nature and extent of 
which the experience of the Pension Bureau has established with reason- 
able certainty." As the Act of 1887 established an old age pension for 
Mexican War veterans 39 years after that war, and as 1904 is 39 years 
after the Civil War, therefore it is ordered that all veterans of the Civil 
War of 62 years or more shall be considered as "disabled one half in ability 
to perform manual labor" and entitled to $6 a month; after 65 years, 
to $8; after 68, to $10; and after 70, to $12. 

President Cleveland had issued an order making 75 years a complete 
disability and President McKinley one making 65 a half disability. 

Congress on Feb. 6, 1907, established a regular old age pension for Mex- 
ican veterans of a minimum of 60 days' service and Civil War veterans 
of a minimum of 90 days' service, giving $12 a month at 62 as the minimum 
and $20 at 75 as the maximum. 



298 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 

find their wage-earning capacity seriously impaired by the 
time they are sixty. . . . Now the average wage worker 
does not lay by enough money to keep him in his old age, 
and when he has fought in the Civil War I am entirely 
willing that he shall be cared for to the extent indicated 
in my order." ' 

The phrase "our friends who live softly" is a partial 
keynote to Roosevelt's administrative career. Assuredly 
he thought more highly of them if they were doing what 
he considered good work than of men devoted to the 
mere amassing of wealth, and he was willing to award 
them full credit ; but other letters written at about this 
time show that he did not look to them for his main sup- 
port. They were "the gentle folk," as he wrote to his 
friend Owen Wister after the election of 1904, "the people 
whom you and I meet at the houses of our friends and 
at our clubs ; the people who went to Harvard as we 
did." But I owed my election "above all to Abraham 
Lincoln's 'plain people,' to the folk who worked hard on 
farm, in shop, or on the railroads, or owned little stores, 
little businesses which they managed themselves." 2 In 
the same vein he wrote to Sir George Otto Trevelyan 
soon after his inauguration in 1905: "My supporters 
are to be found in the overwhelming majority among 
those whom Abraham Lincoln called the plain people. 
. . . The farmers, lumbermen, mechanics, ranchmen, 
miners of the North, East and West have felt that I was 
just as much in sympathy with them, just as devoted 
to their interests, and as proud of them ami as representative 
of them as if 1 had sprung from among their own ranks." s 

1 Biahop, i ::is tt seq. 

•Bishop, i. 345. * Ibid., 364. 



Ch. XII.] ROOSEVELT 299 

Yet Roosevelt was far from being a demagogue. He 
upheld without ceasing the right of private property; 
he was bitterly opposed to socialism and he agreed in 
the main with those who held to individual ideas; he 
enjoyed the companionship of men who lived softly and 
he liked a good dinner party. To those who appreciated 
the innate refinement of John Hay, his words come with 
peculiar force. "It is a comfort to work for a President 
who. . . happened to be born a gentleman." 1 As the event 
has shown, the financial interests and many of the men 
who lived softly — perhaps a majority — committed an 
error when they did not at this time hold up the hands 
of Theodore Roosevelt. Publicity was important for 
the investor, which he had through the Fourth Estate; 
the prohibition of rebates was necessary for the small 
business men; the watering of stock was a menace to 
the sterling interest of the country; the wage earners 
had their journals which kept them informed of the do- 
ings of Big Business. To them it seemed easy work to 
cut off coupons, to draw dividends, to take the air by 
riding about in automobiles, and they looked upon Roose- 
velt as a champion who was going to insure them a better 
time, although they had leaders like John Mitchell who 
interpreted for them correctly what the Roosevelt good 
time meant. In the state of public sentiment succeed- 
ing the Cleveland-McKinley r6gime the financial inter- 
ests should have looked upon Roosevelt as their best 
friend. It was true, as Elihu Root told many of the rep- 
resentatives of Big Business at the Union League Club 
during February, 1904: "You say Roosevelt is an un- 



Bishop, i. 263 



300 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1904 

safe man. I tell you he is a great conservator of property 
and rights." l 

The year 1904 must not be passed by without a men- 
tion of the St. Louis World Fair which celebrated the 
Louisiana Purchase. John Hay "grumbled when the 
President made him go to St. Louis to address" the rep- 
resentatives of the press. " The years of my boyhood," 
he said, "were passed on the banks of the Mississippi, 
and the great river was the scene of my early dreams." 2 
But Henry Adams remarked, "John Hay was as strange 
to the Mississippi River as though he had not been bred 
on its shores." Adams went with Hay and has thus 
described a part of their journey from Washington to 
St. Louis: "In this great region from Pittsburg through 
Ohio and Indiana, agriculture had made way for steam ; 
tall chimneys reeked smoke on every horizon, and dirty 
suburbs filled with scrap-iron, scrap-paper and cinders 
formed the setting of every town." 

Hay's address was a glorification of material progress, 
of the advance of America, of the great significance of 
the Louisiana Purchase, but the comment of his friend, 
Henry Adams, strikes more forcibly the student of affairs : 
"The St. Louis Exposition," he wrote, was the first crea- 
tion of the new American "in the twentieth century and 
for that reason acutely interesting. One saw here a third 
rate town of half-a-million people without history, edu- 
cation, unity, or art and with little capital . . . doing 
what London or New York would have shrunk from 
attempting. This new social conglomerate, with no tie 

but its steam power and QOl inueli of that, threw away 



hburn'fl Roosevelt, 67. 'Addresses, 244. 



Ch. XII.] THE ST. LOUIS EXPOSITION 301 

thirty or forty million dollars on a pageant as ephemeral 
as a stage flat." There were "long lines of white palaces 
exquisitely lighted by thousands on thousands of elec- 
tric candles." l 

But the correspondent of The Nation thought that in 
architectural beauty the St. Louis Exposition was in- 
ferior to that in Chicago and further said that in elec- 
trical display it had not the mighty Niagara for help. 2 

A feature was the "Congress of Arts and Science," the 
main purpose of which "was to place within reach of the 
investigator the objective thought of the world, so classi- 
fied as to show its relations to all similar phases of human 
endeavor, and so arranged as to be practically available 
for reference and study." To the disinterested and valu- 
able advice of President Nicholas Murray Butler and 
President William R. Harper the Congress was under 
heavy obligations. The teaching was in the form of 
lectures and the reading of papers and more than a hun- 
dred leading scholars of Europe assisted the American 
contributors "under conditions where academic fellow- 
ship on an equal footing was a necessary part of the work. 
It was a real feast of international scholarship." 3 



» Henry Adams, Education, 466. 2 The Nation, 1904. 
3 Congress of Arts and Science. Universal Exposition, St. Louis, 1904, 
i. 3, 133. H. J. Rogers, Hugo Munsterberg. 



CHAPTER XIII 

Before Roosevelt was inaugurated and before he began 
therefore the term which was his own, he showed his 
power as diplomatist. War between Russia and Japan 
began on February 10, 1904, and had in him an attentive 
observer. In his own words he tells the story. "During 
the early part of the year 1905," he wrote in his Auto- 
biography, "the strain on the civilized world caused by 
the Russo-Japanese War became serious. The losses of 
life and of treasure were frightful. ... If the war went 
on I thought it on the whole likely that Russia would be 
driven" farther west. " But it was very far from cer- 
tain. There is no certainty in such a war. Japan might 
have met defeat and defeat to her would have spelt over- 
whelming disaster ; and even if she had continued to 
win, what she thus won would have been of no value to 
her, and the cost in blood and money would have left 
her drained white. I believed therefore that the time 
had come when it was greatly to the interest of both com- 
batants to have peace, and when therefore it was possible 
to get both to agree to peace." 1 During January he "pri- 
vately and unofficially advised the Russian Government, 
and afterward repeated the advice indirectly through the 
French Government, to make peace." "The European 
powers want peace." But "it looks as if the foreign 
powers did not want me to act as peacemaker," 2 he 
wrote to Secretary Hay, who was in Europe on account 
of his physical condition. 

1 P. 583. ■ Bishop, L 878, 877. 

302 



Ch. XIIL] GERMANY— ENGLAND 303 

In the two chapters which Bishop has devoted to this 
subject one may well be amazed, from the confidential 
correspondence there disclosed, at Roosevelt's knowledge 
of European conditions and at his various characteriza- 
tions of European powers and their rulers. Talleyrand 
said of Alexander Hamilton that he had divined Europe. 
We may well affirm that Theodore Roosevelt in the early 
part of the twentieth century had divined Europe. 
"The Kaiser," he wrote, "has had another fit and is now 
convinced that France is trying to engineer a congress 
of the nations in which Germany will be left out. What 
a jumpy creature he is anyhow!" ! He is a "fuss-cat." 
He desired that peace should be made between the two 
warring powers but he wanted to have a hand in it and 
was willing to accept other people's ideas if he could call 
them his own. The Kaiser, he wrote to Hay on April 
2, "sincerely believes that the English are planning to 
attack him and smash his fleet, and perhaps join with 
France in a war to the death against him. As a matter 
of fact the English harbor no such intentions, but are 
themselves in a condition of panic terror lest the Kaiser 
secretly intend to form an alliance against them with 
France or Russia, or both, to destroy their fleet and blot 
out the British Empire from the map ! It is as funny a 
case as I have ever seen of mutual distrust and fear bring- 
ing two people to the verge of war." In the same letter 
to Hay he gave his opinion of the Russian Emperor. 
"Did you ever know anything more pitiable than the 
condition of the Russian despotism? The Czar is a pre- 
posterous little creature as the absolute autocrat of 

1 Biahop, i. 377. 



304 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 

150,000,000 people. He has been unable to make war 
and he is now unable to make peace." l 

Roosevelt told the Japanese, "it was in my judgment 
wise to build a bridge of gold for the beaten enemy " ; 
and they took his advice. On May 27 and 28, 1905, the 
Japanese annihilated the Russian fleet in the Sea of Ja- 
pan. Roosevelt, who was an excellent judge of naval 
matters, thus characterized the engagement, "Neither 
Trafalgar nor the defeat of the Spanish Armada was as 
complete — as overwhelming." 2 With amazing wisdom, 
directly on the heels of this great naval victory, the Jap- 
anese made overtures in writing for peace. Roosevelt 
saw at once the Russian ambassador and "told him to 
say to the Czar that I believe the war absolutely hope- 
less for Russia." Now he had the help of the Kaiser. 

Roosevelt wrote to Senator Lodge on June 16: "The 
more I see of the Czar, the Kaiser and the Mikado, the 
better I am content with democracy, even if we have to 
include the American newspaper as one of its assets — 
liability would be a better term. Russia is so corrupt, 
so treacherous and shifty, and so incompetent, that I 
am utterly unable to say whether or not it will make 
peace or break off the negotiations at any moment. Ja- 
pan is, of course, entirely selfish, though with a veneer 
of courtesy and with infinitely more knowledge of what 
it wants and capacity to get it." He wrote in a let t er 
later to Senator Lodge soon after the negotiations had 
begun: "The Russians are utterly insincere and treach- 
erous; they have no conception of truth, no willingness 
to look facts in the face, no regard for others of any sort 






'Bishop, i. 378, 37U. ■ Ibid., 351, 352. 



Ch. XIII.] THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 305 

or kind, no knowledge of their own strength or weakness ; 
and they are helplessly unable to meet emergencies." l 

As related by Bishop the tactfulness and patience of 
Roosevelt were unsurpassed. With the main point set- 
tled many questions of detail arose. There was natur- 
ally a conflict as to the place where the plenipotentiaries 
should meet, and after much debate Washington was 
fixed upon ; then, after that was decided, Russia desired 
to change the place of meeting to The Hague. She now 
ran up against a stone wall. Roosevelt, disgusted with 
so much shilly-shallying, sent this word to George von 
L. Meyer, our ambassador in Russia, with instructions 
to impart it to the Foreign Minister and if necessary to 
the Czar himself. "I notified Japan that Washington 
would be the appointed place and so informed" the Rus- 
sian ambassador. "I then gave the same announcement 
to the public. It is, of course, out of the question for me 
to consider any reversal of this action and I regard the 
incident as closed, so far as the place of meeting is con- 
cerned." 2 " Meyer," wrote Roosevelt, "who was, with 
the exception of Henry White, the most useful diplomat 
in the American service, rendered literally invaluable 
aid by insisting on his seeing the Czar at critical periods 
of the transaction when it was no longer possible for me 
to act successfully through the representatives of the 
Czar, who were often at cross purposes with one another." 3 
Roosevelt said in a private letter to Senator Nelson of 
Minnesota, "I have led the horses to water, but Heaven 



1 Bishop, i. 394, 395. 

2 Bishop, i. 391. 

3 Autobiography, 587; Life of Meyer, M. A. de Wolfe Howe, 196 et 



306 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 

only knows whether they will drink or start kicking one 
another beside the trough." x 

As the conference was to function during the summer, it 
was recognized that Washington would be too hot, there- 
fore the place of meeting was changed to the Portsmouth 
Navy Yard 2 near Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The 
plenipotentiaries were all men of distinguished capacity. 
Russia was represented by Witte, Secretary of State, 
and Baron Rosen, Russian ambassador to the United 
States; Japan by Baron Komura, Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, and Takahira, Japanese minister in Washington. 
The reception of the envoys by Roosevelt showed him a 
thorough man of the world accustomed to do the proper 
thing at the proper time. They went separately on two war 
vessels from New York to Oyster Bay, the summer resi- 
dence of the President, and were there received by him 
on board the United States steamer Mayflower. Noth- 
ing occurred to mar the meeting of the two hostile envoys. 
The President had a luncheon prepared but, as they all 
moved together into the saloon and as it was taken stand- 
ing, no question of preference could be raised. At its 
end the President proposed this toast: "I drink to the 
welfare and prosperity of the sovereigns and peoples of 
the two great nations whose representatives have met 
one another on this ship. It is my most earnest hope 
and prayer, in the interest of not only these two great 
powers but of all mankind, that a just and lasting peace 
may speedily be concluded between them." 3 The en- 



' Bishop, i. 398. 

* The Portsmouth Navy Yard was realty in Kittery, Maine. 

* Bishop, i. 405. 



Ch. XIII.] THE RUSSO-JAPANESE PEACE 307 

voys then went to Portsmouth and set about their im- 
portant work. 

The President needed all of his tact and influence to 
prevent the Conference from breaking up. By despatches 
to Japan and to Russia he was, as Bishop wrote, its "guid- 
ing and controlling force." Late in August the crisis 
occurred and it arose from the Japanese demand for an 
indemnity and the cession of the island of Saghalien. 
The President suggested, sending the suggestion at the 
same time to the Kaiser and the Mikado, that Russia 
should pay no indemnity whatever and should receive 
back the north half of Saghalien "for which it is to pay 
to Japan whatever amount a mixed commission may 
determine." This suggestion brought about the terms 
of peace. Japan with paramount wisdom accepted the 
suggestion. "The Emperor," so came the word to Roose- 
velt, "after presiding at a Cabinet Council, decided to 
withdraw the demand of money payment for the cost 
of war entirely, if Russia recognize the occupation of 
Saghalien Island by Japan, because the Emperor regards 
humanity and civilization far more than his nation's 
welfare." 1 "An agreement was reached on August 29, 
1905, on the terms laid down by the President and on 
September 5, 1905, a treaty of peace embodying them 
was signed." 2 

The President received praise from all sides. Baron 
Kaneko wrote to him: "Your advice to us was very 
powerful and convincing by which the peace of Asia was 
secured. Both Russia and Japan owe to you this happy 
conclusion." The Kaiser, the King of England, the 



1 Bishop, i. 412 et ante. * Ibid., 412. 



308 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 

Czar and the Mikado expressed their approval grace- 
fully. 1 On September 6 the President wrote to the Mi- 
kado a letter in which, in giving him high praise, he re- 
flected also his own ideas. "I express," he wrote, "as 
strongly as I can, my sense of the magnanimity, and above 
all of the cool-headed, far-sighted wisdom, you have 
shown in making peace as you did. . . . During the last 
eighteen months your generals and admirals, your sol- 
diers and sailors, have won imperishable renown for Nip- 
pon. . . . You have crowned triumphant war by a peace 
in which every great object for which you fought is se- 
cured, and in so doing you have given to the world a sig- 
nal and most striking example of how it is possible for a 
victorious nation to achieve victory over others without 
losing command over itself. ... A continuance of the 
war, no matter how damaging to Japan's opponent, would 
also have been necessarily of damage to Japan far beyond 
what could have been offset by any resulting benefit. 
The greatness of a people, like the greatness of a man, 
is often attended quite as clearly by moderation and wis- 
dom in using a triumph as by the triumph itself." 2 

Roosevelt was modest in regard to his part in the trans- 
action. He wrote to his daughter : "I am credited with 
being extremely long-headed. As a matter of fact I 
took the position I finally did not of my own volition 
but because events so shaped themselves that I would 
have felt a,s if I were flinching from a plain duty if I had 
acted otherwise." Thus ho wrote to Whitelaw Reid, 
our Ambassador in London, "The Kaiser stood by 
me like a trump"; but I got only "indirect assistance" 
from the English ( rovernmenl . ; 

1 Bishop, i. 112 at ante. Bi bop, L 415. 'Bishop, i. 115. 



Ch. XIII.] THE JAPANESE 309 

Roosevelt's ideas of nations and of men are always 
valuable. He wrote to Sir George O. Trevelyan on Sep- 
tember 12 : "I am bound to say that the Japs have im- 
pressed me most favorably, not only during these three 
months but during the four years I have been President. 
They have always told me the truth. ... I cannot say 
that I liked Witte, for I thought his bragging and bluster 
not only foolish but shockingly vulgar when compared 
with the gentlemanly self-respecting self-restraint of the 
Japanese." 1 Witte was much impressed with the great 
prosperity, wealth and industries of this country; the 
" barbaric strength" was what appealed to him. Why 
all this talk about corruption? he inquired. I ask what 
is this corruption and they tell me that Murphy, the boss 
of New York, helps great financiers and then accepts 
presents from them. Why shouldn't he? he asked. 
Witte, in Roosevelt's opinion, was thoroughly selfish; 
everything for himself, the country second ; while the 
Japanese were patriotic, so much so that they desired to 
withdraw that part of the correspondence in which they 
had made overtures for peace. This request Roosevelt 
denied and then they were surprised that he was going 
to make no mention of the matter in his message. 2 

Witte said of Roosevelt: "When one speaks with 
President Roosevelt he charms through the elevation 
of his thoughts. . . . He has an ideal and strives for 
higher aims than a commonplace existence presents." 
Rosen wrote that Roosevelt "had the moral courage to 
undertake the delicate and risky task of mediation"; 



bishop, 418. 

2 In this account, I have been assisted by my conversation with the 
President on Nov. 16, 1905. 



310 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 

he brought about "the Portsmouth Conference and the 
subsequent termination of the war by a peace of justice 
and conciliation." Martens, who was an adviser of the 
Russians, wrote, "The man who had been represented 
to us as impetuous to the point of rudeness displayed a 
gentleness, a kindness and a tactfulness mixed with 
self-control that only a truly great man can com- 
mand." 1 

For his services Roosevelt was awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize amounting to $36,734. 79. 2 

The negotiations were conducted entirely by the Pres- 
ident. He did not have the aid of his official Secretary 
of State, John Hay, who was in Nauheim, Germany, seek- 
ing a restoration of his health that never came, as on 
July 1, 1905, he passed away. Roosevelt paid a sincere 
tribute to the memory of his friend and showed an attach- 
ment to the refined gentleman from the West. 3 He had, 
so Roosevelt wrote to Senator Lodge, a "great career 
in political life" and has "also left a deep mark in litera- 
ture"; to Senator Beveridge, "Hay was a really great 
man." Hay wrote in his diary seventeen days before 
he died : "I say to myself that I should not rebel at the 
thought of my life ending at this time. ... I have had 
many blessings, domestic happiness being the greatest of 



'Bishop, i. 419 et scq. ; see also Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt, 
Abbott, 131. 

1 For the disposition of the money see Bishop, i 422; also Albert Shaw, 
Review of Review, 151, 152. The Brooklyn Timet says under the car- 
toon, "'Teddy the Good' in a new role, it is ■ very laudable purpose 
but would anybody bu1 Theodore Etoo svell ever think of dedicating a 
Christmas windfall of $40,000 fur such a purpose?" [Theoauseof indua 
trial peace.] 

5 It used to be said tint Hay ptm a Western man with Eastern culture, 
.••It an Raatern man with Western principles. 






Ch. XIII.] HAY — ROOT 311 

all. ... I have had success beyond all the dreams of my 
boyhood. My name is printed in the journals of the world 
without descriptive qualification, which may, I suppose, 
be called fame. By mere length of service I shall occupy 
a modest place in the history of my time. ... I know 
death is the common lot and what is universal ought 
not to be deemed a misfortune ; and yet — instead of 
confronting it with dignity and philosophy, I cling in- 
stinctively to life and the things of life as eagerly as if 
I had not had my chance at happiness and gained nearly 
all the great prizes." x 

Roosevelt appointed to the vacant position, Elihu 
Root. "I wished Root," he wrote to Senator Beveridge, 
" as Secretary of State partly because I am extremely fond 
of him and prize his companionship as well as his advice, 
but primarily because I think that in all the country he 
is the best man for the position, and that no minister of 
foreign affairs in any other country at this moment in 
any way compares with him." To Senator Lodge he 
wrote, "I hesitated a little between Root and Taft, for 
Taft, as you know, is very close to me." 2 

These expressions exhibit Roosevelt as a rare judge 
of men and how deeply he prized the counsel of his official 
advisers. With Root and Taft to be called on for ad- 
vice, he felt that he could not go far wrong ; they were 
both good lawyers and men of affairs. 

An opinion prevails among diplomatists that President 
Roosevelt averted a war between France and Germany 
in 1905. The story is told in a modest letter of the Pres- 



1 Life of Hay, Thayer, ii. 408. 

2 Bishop, i. 369 et seq. 



312 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1905 

ident to Whitelaw Reid dated April 28, 1906, and first 
printed by Bishop in 1920. Included in this is Roose- 
velt's attitude at the outset, which may be seen in a letter 
to W. H. Taft of April 20, 1905, who, while Roosevelt was 
on a bear hunt and Hay seeking recuperation in Europe, 
was acting Secretary of State, touching which Roosevelt 
wrote to him, "Dear Will : I think you are keeping the 
lid on in great shape!" Roosevelt further said: "The 
Kaiser's pipe dream this week takes the form of Mo- 
rocco. Speck [Baron Speck von Sternburg, German 
Ambassador to the United States] has written me an 
urgent appeal to sound the British Government and find 
out whether they intend to back up France in gobbling 
Morocco. ... I do not feel that as a Government we 
should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other 
fish to fry and we have no real interest in Morocco. I 
do not care to take sides between France and Germany 
in the matter. At the same time ... I am sincerely 
anxious to bring about a bettor stale of feeling between 
England and Germany. Each nation is working itself 
up to a condition of desperate hatred of the other; each 
from sheer fear of the other. The Kaiser is dead sure 
that England intends to attack him. The English Govern- 
ment and a large share of the English people are equally 
sure that Germany intends to attack England." On the 
same da}- ho wrote to Sternburg, "( >ur interests in Morocco 
are not sufficiently great to make me feel justified in en- 
tangling our Government in tin 1 matter." It would 
1 1 think) have been better for Roosevelt to adhere to his 
fir>t position and absoluti ly to refuse to interfere in a Eu- 
ropean dispute. "The ( Shlkt ian nations in Africa, " wrote 

Herbert Spencer in 1905, are "like hungry dogs around 



Ch. XIII.] MOROCCO 313 

a carcass ; they tear out piece after piece, pausing only 
to snarl and snap at one another." 1 

As long as a different view obtained, however, Roose- 
velt's action was wise and just. When he returned to 
Washington at the end of May, 1905, he found Jusserand 2 
and Sternberg "greatly concerned lest there should be 
a war between France and Germany." Therefore Roose- 
velt determined to do his best to avert so great a trouble. 
"It really did look," he wrote, "as if there might be a 
war and I felt in honor bound to try to prevent the war 
if I could, in the first place, because I should have felt 
such a war to be a real calamity to civilization ; and in the 
next place, as I was already trying to bring about peace 
between Russia and Japan, I felt that a new conflict might 
result in what would literally be a world conflagration; 
and finally, for the sake of France." 

To settle the Morocco difficulty, the Kaiser desired a 
Conference. He thought France's policy aggressive ; 
that France and Spain were a "political unity" who 
wished to divide up Morocco between themselves; and 
he feared England's support of France. Therefore, he 
deemed war with France a possibility. France finally 
gave way and accepted "the idea of a Conference in spite 
of serious reasons," as her Minister of Foreign Affairs 
wrote, "we had to entertain objections to such a project." 

1 Fortnightly, June, 1895. "Apart from the satisfaction of a somewhat 
childish pride, what does it matter to either France or Germany which of 
them owns Morocco. ... In order that the French might acquire 
Morocco, England and France in 1905 and again in 1911, were brought to 
the verge of war with Germany. . . . Viewed as a means of obtaining 
any tangible gain, a diplomatic contest, such as that waged over Morocco, 
is a childish absurdity." Bertrand Russell, Atlantic Monthly, March, 
1915, 371. 

2 Jusserand had been French Ambassador to the United States since 
1902. 



314 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

Meanwhile in Washington Roosevelt's efforts were 
entirely directed to the maintenance of peace. He had 
the confidence of both nations whose ambassadors to 
the United States were wise and peace-loving men. 
"Jusserand," wrote Roosevelt, "is a man of such ex- 
cellent judgment, so sound and cool-headed, and of so 
high a standard of personal and professional honor that 
I could trust him completely. Indeed it was only be- 
cause both Jusserand and Sternberg were such excellent 
men that I was enabled to do anything at all in so diffi- 
cult and delicate a matter." 

The Conference was held at Algeciras, Spain, and began 
on January 16, 1906. After it opened, the Kaiser by 
rattling his sword in the scabbard desired to sway its con- 
clusions. Nevertheless, they were on the whole against 
Germany although she accomplished all that she pro- 
fessed to want. The Kaiser was a sincere admirer of 
Roosevelt, who wrought earnestly for peace and who 
had as one of his representatives at Algeciras Henry 
White, then our Ambassador to Italy. White saw eye 
to eye with the President and operated at Algeciras as 
the other did in Washington with the view of preserving 
the peace. "Loyal though Sternberg was to his Govern- 
ment," Roosevelt wrote soon after the Conference opened, 
"both Root and I became convinced that down in his 
heart the honest, brave little gentleman did not really 
believe Germany was acting as she should act." Finally, 
however, a Treaty was accepted by the Kaiser and on 
April 6 was signed by all the powers represented. 1 



1 The authority for this account and the citations made are from 
Roosevelt's letter to Whitclaw Reid printed by Bishop, i. 467 et seq. See 
also La Conference d'Algeciras, Andr6 Tardieu. " Xo one can peruse 



Ch. XIII. J ROOSEVELT — THE KAISER 315 

It will be germane to make a contrast between Theo- 
dore Roosevelt and the German Emperor who were not 
infrequently compared. At this time Roosevelt was an 
admirer of the Kaiser, writing to Sternberg on June 25, 
1905, "I feel that His Majesty stands as the leader among 
the sovereigns of to-day who have their faces set towards 
the future, and that it is not only of the utmost impor- 
tance for his own people but of the utmost importance 
for all mankind that his power and leadership for good 
should be unimpaired." l Lapse of time and a personal 
acquaintance during 1910 modified this view. The only 
man of real ability I saw, speaking of his trip through 
Europe, he said, among the crowned heads was the 
German Emperor and he is superficial in his intelligence 
but has real executive ability. He was eager to get my 
opinion of himself and at last I said, If you were an Amer- 
ican and lived in America you would carry your own 
ward, which is more than I can say for any other of the 
crowned heads. The Kaiser understood perfectly the 
remark and knew that it was a compliment. And he 
treated all the other kings with disdain except the King 
of England. A year later Roosevelt expressed himself 
as not being friendly to Germany. I seem, he said, to 
feel less near to them than to any of the peoples I met 
while abroad. They are not capable of a broad humani- 
tarian impulse like the English, Americans and French. 



this correspondence without a wish that there were in the world more 
diplomatists of the Roosevelt type. Everything he wrote was clear and 
concise with none of the tedious formalisms and conventional phrases of 
the old fashioned diplomacy; and though it went straight to the point 
it was tactful and calculated to influence those for whom it was meant 
and whose idiosyncrasies he had considered and allowed for." James 
Bryce, Lit. Rev., Feb. 19, 1921. 
bishop, i. 485. 



316 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1910 

The German Emperor is a capable administrator of 
superficial knowledge, and a great bluffer; he is proud 
of the things in which he has a superficial knowledge and 
not very proud of the matters in which he excels. 1 

On Roosevelt's arrival in Berlin during May, 1910, he 
took luncheon with the Kaiser at Potsdam, who invited 
him next day to see some remarkable field manoeuvres, 
of which Henry White gave to Abbott an account. The 
Emperor was dressed in the uniform of a general of the 
army while Roosevelt was in a simple riding suit of khaki 
and wore a black slouch hat. During the review the 
Emperor surrounded by his body-guard of officers in bril- 
liant uniforms said in German, "Roosevelt, mein frcund, 
I wish to welcome you in the presence of my guards ; I 
ask you to remember that you are the only private citizen 
who has reviewed the troops of Germany." 2 

Punch, in a well known cartoon in 1904, pictured the 
two as talking to one another with defiant mien and la- 
belled it "Kindred spirits of the strenuous life." The 
page containing this was confiscated by the Berlin police, 
whereupon the same artist drew one respectable Berlin 
citizen and three soldiers looking at a representation 
of the same cartoon with amused expressions of laughter 
as they seemed to be asking, What are the Berlin police 
afraid of? 3 

The Kaiser resembled Roosevelt in being a wonderful 
talker. Reverend Francis G. Peabody kindly has given 
me this exact account of what took place: "At the Cen- 
tenary of the University of Berlin, the German Em- 



1 Conversations wit h Mr. Roosevelt in Dec. 1910 and l\>c. 1911. 

5 [mpn -us of Etooeovolt, Abbott, 248. 
'Autobiography, .v,s, 662. 



Ch. XIII.] ROOSEVELT — THE KAISER 317 

peror gave a state dinner to many delegates and after the 
dinner received them in a ' Gercle , ' passing from one 
to another with a hospitable word. President Hadley 
and I stood together as the Emperor approached and, 
after a few formal words, Dr. Hadley delivered a message 
of greeting which President Roosevelt had asked him 
to convey. Thereupon I added, in a lighter vein, that 
the question had been raised in America, in the light of 
President Roosevelt's extraordinary conversational gift, 
whether in the Emperor's interview with him there had 
been much opportunity for His Majesty to speak. The 
Emperor laughed heartily and replied, 'I'll tell you. 
Some of my people looked over toward the corner where 
we were talking and said it was like two windmills going 
around like this,' emphasizing his remark with a violent 
waving of his arm. The inference was that the conver- 
sational competition was practically a draw." 

The Emperor gave Roosevelt a photograph of the two 
on horseback talking one to the other with this inscrip- 
tion on the back, "The Colonel of the Rough Riders 
lecturing the chief of the German Army." 1 

Many Americans who visited Berlin, struck with the 
Emperor's "very marked attractiveness of personality 
and manner," 2 scouted before the Great War the sug- 
gestion that Roosevelt was his equal in ability. An emi- 
nent diplomatist, who was well acquainted personally 
with both, bore contrary witness ; he had not the least 
doubt that Roosevelt was a match for the other in in- 
tellectual power. Opinion in France at this time was 
that the two attracted more attention in Europe than 



1 Bishop, ii. 252. 

2 Impressions of Roosevelt, Abbott, 248. 



318 ROOSBVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1905 

any other men, but Roosevelt was trusted and the Kaiser 
was not. It is impossible to conceive of Roosevelt mak- 
ing such a shipwreck of his life and career as did the Ger- 
man Emperor when he precipitated or allowed to be 
precipitated the Great War. The Kaiser respected and 
partly feared Roosevelt, feeling that he had a great coun- 
try at his back. It is the opinion of some very well in- 
formed persons that had Roosevelt been President the 
Great War would not have occurred during his occupancy 
of the White House. 

Regarding San Domingo, Roosevelt acted simply as 
a policeman. The story was the usual one of the bor- 
rower getting more money than he could pay and of for- 
eign powers threatening to interfere for the payment of 
debts. Naturally Roosevelt's action convinced his op- 
ponents that he proposed following the example of Grant 
thirty-five years previous, and that the result would be 
the annexation of San Domingo. In regard to annexa- 
tion, he was entirely sincere when he wrote to Bishop, 
"As for annexing the island, I have about the same de- 
sire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have 
to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to." ' 

At the request of the San Domingo government, the 
President took charge of their custom-houses ; he was 
to turn over to them forty-five per cent of the receipts 
and distribute the rest to foreign powers that had claims ; 
he made a Treaty embodying these provisions and on 
February 15, 1905, submitted it to the Senate. The 
Senate did not immediately ratify the Treaty but the 
President administered San Domingo affairs by virtue 

1 Bishop, i. 431. 






Ch. XIII.] SAN DOMINGO 319 

of it on the principle that the President might do, not 
only what the Constitution authorized but what it did 
not distinctly forbid. Finally, during the spring of 1907, 
the Senate ratified the Treaty. In a speech to the Har- 
vard Union Roosevelt gave a true tale of the affair : "The 
arrangement has gone on for two years now, while the 
coordinate branch of the Government discussed whether 
or not I had usurped power in the matter, and finally 
concluded I had not and ratified the Treaty. Of the 
fifty-five per cent we have been able to put two and a 
half millions towards paying their debts; and with the 
forty-five per cent that we collected for them, they have 
received more money than they ever got when they col- 
lected one hundred per cent themselves ; and the island 
has prospered as never before." 1 

In diplomatic action, Roosevelt had an opportunity 
to show the true magnanimity of his soul. As a result 
of the Boxer rebellion of 1900, China had agreed to pay 
to the United States nearly 24 and a half million dollars 
as an indemnity for this action endangering American 
lives and property. It occurred to Dr. Arthur H. Smith, 
an American missionary residing in China, that the 
United States might remit a portion of her claim with 
the understanding that China should use the money, 
or the income from it, for the purpose of educating young 
Chinese in American institutions of learning, thereby 
fostering a spirit which should bear good fruit. Smith 
came to see Lyman Abbott, who was an intimate friend 
of the President, and who asked him to set a day for an 
interview. On the day appointed, early in March, 1906, 



1 Bishop, i, 435 ; Autobiography, 548 ; President's Messages to the 
Senate, Feb. 4, 1905. March 6, Review of Reviews Co., ed., iii. 241, 273. 



320 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

Lyman Abbott was unable to keep the appointment, 
therefore at Roosevelt's suggestion, Lawrence F., his 
son, went in his place with Dr. Smith to plead for the re- 
mission of a part of the indemnity. Their visit was at- 
tended with success. This story is interestingly told by 
Lawrence F. Abbott who refers for its sequel to the official 
document. 

By June 1, 1907, a little over six millions had been paid 
and on June 15 the Secretary of State, Elihu Root, wrote 
to the Chinese Minister that he was "authorized by the 
President to say that ... at the next session of the Con- 
gress he will ask for authority to re-form the agreement 
with China under which the indemnity is fixed by re- 
mitting and cancelling the obligation of China for the 
payment of all that part of the stipulated indemnity, 
which is in excess of the sum of SI 1,655,492.09 and in- 
terest at the stipulated rate." J This the President did 
in his Message of December/1907, and on May 25 follow- 
ing, Congress adopted a joint resolution providing "for 
the remission of a portion of the Chinese indemnity." 
While there is no specification in the joint resolution, 
it was a tacit agreement that the proceeds of the sum 
remitted were to be used in the education of Chinese in 
America. As one goes over diplomatic correspondence, 
in which so much of it seems a game of grab, it is agree- 
able to read the despatch of Prince Ch'ing to our Min- 



1 Tli is is the amount as Stated in H< >< >( - letter Imt :is given in the joint 
p olution and in the President's executive order of Dec. 28, 1908, it is 
113,666,492.69 and interest. The difference is explained in the resolution 
thus: "the Bum of two million dollars be reserved from the Chinese in- 
demnity . . . for the payment" of American olaims upon the Chinese 
indemnity which, having been rejected by the U. S. oommissionera may 
be submitted t> novo to the court of claims and approved by it. the bul- 
anoe out of the 12,000,000 to be returned to China. 



Ch. XIII.] CHINA 321 

ister in Peking. "I was profoundly impressed," he wrote, 
"with the justice and great friendliness of the American 
Government, and wish to express our sincere thanks." 
At such small cost was the friendship of a great Asiatic 
country purchased. 1 



1 Impressions of Roosevelt, Lawrence F. Abbott, 143 et seq. ; Doc. 
1275, House of Reps., GOth Cong. 2d Sess. 



CHAPTER XIV 

"America had reached the point," so wrote ex-Senator 
Albert J. Beveridge, "where a transition from an outworn 
to a modern economic and social order was indispensa- 
ble. . . . For a long time there was no labor congestion 
— first, because there was so much work to be done and 
secondly, because free land constantly drew people away 
from industrial centers. . . . Finally this outlet was 
closed. Free land was all gone." Labor troubles came. 
There was a "general unrest among the masses of the 
people." Then Theodore Roosevelt became President, 
tackled the question and, according to Beveridge, con- 
stituted "The Roosevelt Period." » 

Roosevelt appreciated fully the task. "At this mo- 
ment," he said, "we are passing through a period of great 
unrest — social, political and industrial unrest." 2 The 
railroads were the largest aggregate, of capital represent- 
ing fourteen and a half billions of dollars, and were the 
most salient object of attack by the reformer. For on 
the old theory, they were built on the King's highway 
.ill were subject to the State. But admitting this, with 
a power of generalization the envy of all, Senator Lodge 
said, "It is the railroads which have made the rapid yet 
solid development of the United States possible" ; they are 
a great "proof of the energy and intelligence of the Amer- 



1 Sat 1 \nr. S. 1010, 10. 

■ Apr 11, Ixciivr qf Rawi'tw, ed., < l.v 



Ch. XIV.] RAILROAD RATE LEGISLATION 323 

ican people." l The railroad rate legislation of 1905 
and 1906 was " stimulated by the aggressiveness of the 
Executive," 2 and it is a proper classification to call it 
Roosevelt's work, although by the progress of events he 
was led to a more radical stand than he at first proposed. 
On December 6, 1904, in his Annual Message to Congress 
he said, "While I am of the opinion that at present it 
would be undesirable, if it were not impracticable, finally 
to clothe the Interstate Commerce Commission with 
general authority to fix railroad rates, I do believe that, 
as a fair security to shippers, the Commission should be 
vested with the power, where a given rate has been chal- 
lenged and after full hearing found to be unreasonable, 
to decide, subject to judicial review, what shall be a rea- 
sonable rate to take its place ; the ruling of the Commis- 
sion to take effect immediately, and to obtain unless and 
until it is reversed by the court of review." 3 

But the House of Representatives was more radical 
than the President and by a very large majority passed 
a bill on the principle, "Resolved, That we don't like 
railroads and wish we knew some way to bang 'em good." 4 
This is known as the Hepburn bill fathered by William 
P. Hepburn, a representative from Iowa, and passed the 
House on February 9, 1905. There the matter rested, 
as it was the short session of Congress, expiring March 
4, 1905 ; therefore the Senate and the country had the 
opportunity to look at the question on all sides. 

Roosevelt held to his original position . ' ' My proposal , ' ' 
he wrote in his Message to Congress of December 5, 1905, 
"is not to give The Interstate Commerce Commission 



1 Feb. 12, 1906, Record, 2415. 2 Washburn's Roosevelt, 129. 

8 Review of Reviews, ed., iii. 134. * The Nation, Feb. 16, 1905, 126. 



324 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

power to initiate or originate rates generally, but to regu- 
late a rate already fixed or originated by the roads, upon 
complaint and after investigation." * Nevertheless, as 
it was a new Congress, the House repassed the bill on 
February 8, 190G, by a vote of 346:7. Three answered 
"present," and twenty-nine did not vote. 2 

The discussion in the Senate was illuminating. Sena- 
tor Philander C. Knox said, "The framers of this bill 
have succeeded in producing a measure which permits an 
administrative body to make orders affecting property 
rights, gives no right to the owners of the property to 
test their lawfulness in proceedings to enforce them and 
penalizes the owner of the property in the sum of $5000 
a day if it seeks a supposed remedy outside of the pro- 
visions of the bill by challenging either its constitutional- 
ity or the lawfulness of the acts performed under its pro- 
visions." Knox referred to two United States Supreme 
Court decisions, one of which was, "When we recall that 
as estimated over ten thousand millions of dollars are 
invested in railroad property, the proposition that such 
a vast amount of property is beyond the protecting clauses 
of the Constitution, that the owners may be deprived 
of it by the arbitrary enactment of any legislature, State 
or nation, without any right of appeal to the courts is 
one which cannot for a moment be tolerated." 3 Then 
Senator Knox went on to say: "From the decisions of 
the Supreme Court it will be seen that railroads have a 
constitutional right to just compensation for Bervices 
rendered, and that by direct act of legislation i r indirectly 
through an administrative body, as tlinui<j;li the [nter- 



> lieriew qf h\ . it i , ad . iv. ■' . ' Record, 2808. 

' LOGO, 176 1 '. S. L67, 172. 



Ch. XIV.] FIXING OF RAILROAD RATES 325 

state Commerce Commission, they cannot be deprived 
of this right. They are entitled to their day in court." x 
Senator John C. Spooner said on the day that the bill 
passed the Senate, "The bill as it came to us from the 
House failed to provide affirmatively for a judicial re- 
view of the order of the Commission fixing rates. That 
objection has been eliminated." 2 The Senate made 
such an amendment and by its other action improved 
the bill. It passed on May 18 by a vote of 71 : 3 ; not 
voting, 15. Among the yeas were Knox and Lodge. For- 
aker made one of the three nays. Aldrich and Burton 
were among the "not voting." 3 As the Senate and House 
disagreed, the bill went to a Committee of Conference 
and the report of the Committee was adopted by both 
houses. The bill was approved by the President on June 
20, 1906, and therefore became a law. 

The important difference between advocates and op- 
ponents of this legislation lay in the question : Should the 
Government have the right to fix rates through the Inter- 
state Commerce Commission? Roosevelt who began 
with tentative recommendations was finally brought to 
the position that the Interstate Commerce Commission 
should have that power. It is a quality of great minds 
that when they set out on a reform the bent of their think- 
ing runs to action in the same direction and carries them 
further than they at first intended. I would not venture 



1 March 28, 190G, Record, 4377, 4381. 

2 May 18, 1906, Record, 7065. In addition to other authorities cited 
see Foraker, Notes of a Busy Life, ii. 210 et seq. ; Cullom, Fifty Years of 
Public Service, 330. 

1 Record, 7088. Aldrich was absent. The statement was made that 
he would have voted yea; his general pair, Teller, voted yea. Burton 
evidently had no pair ; no statement was made in his behalf. Depew was 
silent. Tom Piatt was "unavoidably absent" ; he would have voted yea. 



326 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

to differ with so great a man as Roosevelt were I not but- 
tressed by the opinion of Henry Cabot Lodge, Roosevelt's 
intimate and faithful personal and political friend. If 
one will compare the German assertions favoring com- 
plete action by the State, freely indulged in before the 
Great War of 1914, with Roosevelt's arguments in favor 
of the Interstate Commerce Commission, one will be 
struck by their similarity in their ascription of power 
respectively to the State and a creation of the State. It 
was asserted that the Hepburn Act led to socialism but 
any such result was resisted by Roosevelt. "Public 
ownership of railroads," he declared, "is highly undesir- 
able and would probably in this country entail far-reach- 
ing disaster." 1 As to this result the President and the 
Senator were at one, the Senator referring to Govern- 
ment ownership as "the worst of all disasters." 2 Nor 
did Roosevelt alter his conviction. In a speech delivered 
on October 4, 190G, he spoke of Government ownership 
of railroads as "a policy which would be evil in its re- 
sults from every standpoint." "Great corporations," 
he said in his Message of 1904, "are necessary, and only 
men of great and singular mental power can manage such 
corporations successfully, and such men must have great 
rewards." 3 "The corporation has come to stay just as 
the trade union has come to stay," he said a year later. 
"We must all go up or go down together." I have no 
"hostility to the railroads. . . . On the whole our rail- 
roads have done well ami not ill. . . . The question of 
transportation lies at the rool «»f all industrial success." 4 



1 Mcssii^c of Deo. 5, 1906, Bt taM, ad . iv. 570. 

1 Feb. 12, 1906, Eli ord, 2422. J Review <•} u- * w . ad., iii L28, v. 837. 

4 lici'icw a/ Jicvicwa, ud., iv. 502, 572, 573, 57o. 



Ch. XIV.] HENRY CABOT LODGE 327 

Before dilating on the differences between Roosevelt 
and Lodge it will be well to have the President's opinion 
of the Senator which he wrote on February 23, 1906. 
"Lodge has violent enemies. But he is a boss or the 
head of a machine only in the sense that Henry Clay and 
Daniel Webster were bosses and heads of political ma- 
chines ; that is, it is a very great injustice to couple his 
name with the names of those commonly called bosses. 
... He and I differ radically on certain propositions, 
as for instance on the pending rate bill; . . . but I say 
deliberately that during the twenty years he has been 
in Washington he has been on the whole the best and 
most useful servant of the public to be found in either 
house of Congress. . . . Lodge is a man of very strong 
convictions. ... He has a certain aloofness and cold- 
ness of manner that irritates people who don't live in 
New England. But he is an eminently fit successor of 
Webster and Sumner in the Senatorship of Massachu- 
setts. He is a bigger man than Sumner." x 

Eleven days previous to this letter Lodge had made 
a great speech in the Senate opposing in the main the 
rate-making power of the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion. He began his speech by a citation from Coleridge's 
Table Talk in reference to a bill before Parliament: "I 
have heard but two arguments of any weight adduced 
in favor of passing this reform bill, and they are in sub- 
stance these: 1. 'We will blow your brains out if 
you don't pass it. 2. We will drag you through a 
horsepond if you don't pass it ' ; and there is a good deal 
of force in both." Lodge in this citation undoubtedly 

1 Impressions of Theodore Roosevelt, Abbott, 97 ; Bishop, ii. 6 ; see 
Autobiography, 383. 



328 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1906 

referred to the public sentiment which demanded that 
in some way the railroads be shorn of the power which 
they possessed. Such a sentiment was powerful in the 
country. It was shared by most shippers who desired 
lower rates on their products and who were apprehensive 
lest large competitors had in some way intrigued for 
greater advantages. Farmers thought that their grain 
and meat were debarred from markets by a high railroad 
tariff. Small business men could see greater profits if 
a reduction of rates were secured. The proletariat looked 
upon Wall Street with suspicion and thought that a blow 
at the railroads was one at the evil centre that might in- 
sure them a greater share of the good things of life. All 
together it formed a potent sentiment that had great 
sway in the House of Representatives. And the Presi- 
dent deemed it necessary to warn his followers that an 
act of Congress could not do everything. "The most 
perfect laws," he said, "that could be devised by the wit 
of man or the wit of angels would not amount to anything 
if the average man was not a pretty decent fellow. . . . 
Nothing can take the place of the individual factor, of 
the average man's quality and character, his industry, 
his energy, his thrift, his decency, his determination to 
be a good man in his own home, a good neighbor and a 
good citizen in his relations to the State." ' 

To return to Senator Lodge's speech. "I have the 
gravest doubts," he said, "as to the wisdom of govern- 
ment rate 1 1 1 .■ i k i 1 1 li even in the mosl Limited form." "We 
should not go too far in rate making by the government. 
The Lessons to be Learned from the experience of other 



1 Fork, Pa. Oct 4, 1 '.«'»« i li, ,<j Reviews, cd., v. 843. 



Ch. XIV.] WHO SHOULD MAKE THE RATES ? 329 

nations confirm this view and admonish us to proceed 
in this direction with the utmost caution." "In the 
desire to have rates fixed in some form by an executive 
commission, exercising powers delegated to it by Con- 
gress, we shall fail to give an effective remedy for the 
worst evil which has arisen, that known as 'personal 
discriminations.'" J 

What was proposed by the President and by the House 
was to have rates determined and prescribed by seven 
men who should constitute the Interstate Commerce 
Commission and receive an annual salary of ten thousand 
dollars. They were to be appointed by the President 
who would naturally be governed by political considera- 
tions ; and these seven men, so far as rate making was 
concerned, were to take the place of experts who were 
fitted by training and long experience to perform that 
duty. If it were true that he who makes the rate would 
own the road, these experts who had risen to their posi- 
tion by merit and advancement were to be displaced by 
appointees of the President. Among the ablest men in 
the country were those at the head of railroads and to 
secure the proper amount of traffic that should insure 
the payment of interest and dividends was work that 
demanded fitness. "Our railroad freight rates are the 
lowest in existence," declared Senator Lodge. "The 
prosperity of the country is knit up with the well-being 
of the railroads, but it is also to be remembered that the 
profitable existence of the railroads depends upon the 
prosperity of the country. There is no body of people 
— and they constitute one-seventh of our population — 



1 Feb. 12, 1906, Record, 2422, 2423. 



330 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

so profoundly interested in the prosperity of the United 
States as the people, great and small, who own our rail- 
roads, who operate them, and who work for them. It 
is preposterous to suggest that the railroads of the coun- 
try are hostile to its well-being and eaten up by a short- 
sighted selfishness which would lead them to destroy 
any industry or injure any locality." ! 

Railroad men and the financiers of Wall and State 
streets who wrought with them had been guilty of grave 
evils which were fully expanded by the press. These 
were due to their greed for money and power, or in short 
to selfishness. But selfishness is a common attitude of 
humanity, possessed by members of the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission as well as by the managers of rail- 
roads and by those engaged in high finance. As it was 
finely put by Senator Lodge on the day that the vote 
was taken in the Senate: "The Interstate Commerce 
Commission desire power. They would like to take the 
powers of the legislature and of the courts alike. They 
would like to take all the power that is possible." - 

The remedy for the evils was, under slight limitations, 
the natural working of economic forces. As Senator 
Lodge stated it, "My own belief is that the natural eco- 
nomic forces will set lie rates so far as an excess is con- 
cerned by the competition of the markets, by the play 
of natural forces, and by the certainty that if rates are 
put up to a point where it would make it profitable for 
someone else to come in, lie will eonie in." 3 

It is remarkable that at one as Roosevelt and Lodge 
seemed in their public utterances they should differ so 

1 February 12, 1906, 2417, 2421. 

1 May 18, L906, & ...I'l, 7068. 3 Reonl, I , '■■ u. 1900, 2123. 



Ch. XIV.] ROOSEVELT AND THE RAILROADS 331 

widely when their professions came to be translated into 
legislative action. Both were strongly opposed to gov- 
ernment ownership ; and they agreed also in Roosevelt's 
statement, that this Government should not be one by 
a plutocracy nor one by a mob. We must avoid, he 
said "a contest between the brutal greed of the 'have- 
nots' and the brutal greed of the 'haves.'" l 

The President said that the small investors in rail- 
roads deserved consideration, 2 apparently ignoring that 
to some extent their interests were bound up in Big Busi- 
ness, as their living expenses, their deeds, not infrequently 
of benevolence, depended upon the interest and dividends 
from the railroads that Roosevelt attacked. When he 
made the comparison between members of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and those of the United States 
Supreme Court, 3 he was not fair to the Supreme Court 
whose members, although appointed by the President, 
received their appointments largely through the influence 
of the bar and formed a body of highly trained public 
servants. The likeness to the National Bank Examiners 
was more apposite, but the scope of the Interstate Com- 
merce Commission was far greater than that of the Bank 
Examiners. The work of the one was positive while 
that of the other was negative, being largely the decision 
whether certain banks were solvent, in which they were 
directly or indirectly assisted by competing and far- 
seeing bankers who had attested suspicions due to their 
machinery of operations. 

The President was severe on E. H. Harriman, who is 
properly called by Thayer "the railroad czar of the United 



1 Review of Reviews, ed., 585, 719. 2 Ibid., 572. 3 Ibid., 406. 



332 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

States," l and who was indignant at the railway rate 
bill and the general course of the administration. This 
came out when J. S. Sherman, a Republican member of 
Congress from New York State, asked him for a contri- 
bution to the autumn campaign, when in 1906 Charles 
E. Hughes was running against Hearst for governor of 
New York. I do not care in the least, said Harriman, 
whether the Hearst crowd is triumphant or not ; those 
people are crooks and I can buy them. Whenever I 
want legislation from a State legislature I can buy it. 
I can buy Congress and if necessary I can buy the judi- 
ciary. 2 "At the same time," so wrote Roosevelt in a 
private letter, "the Standard Oil people informed Pen- 
rose that they intend to support the Democratic party 
unless I call a halt in the suits begun against the Standard 
Oil people . . . ; and they gave the same reason as Har- 
riman, namely, that rather than have an administration 
such as the present they would prefer to have an adminis- 
tration of Bryans and Hearsts, because they could make 
arrangements with them. But they did not use the 
naked brutality of language which Harriman used." 3 
"The Standard Oil Company," the President asserted 
in a Message to Congress on May -1, 190G, "has benefited 
enormously up almost to the present moment by scent 
rates, many of these secret rates being clearly unlawful. 
. . . The Standard also profits immensely by open 
rates. . . . It lias, largely by unfair or unlawful methods, 

crushed out home competition." 4 The President also 

attacked the so-called sugar and tobacco trusts. 



1 P. 234 • >p, ii. 32. 

' .. , ecL, 740, 7ii,7 L3, 71.".. 



Ch. XIV.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 333 

"There is plenty of iniquity in business, in politics, 
in our social life," he said. But that is no reason why we 
should follow the "wild apostles of unrest" in "their 
campaign of hysterical excitement and falsehood." Al- 
though "the reactionaries and the violent extremists 
show symptoms of joining hands against us," this legis- 
lation was enacted in no spirit of "hysteria and rancor." 
"Better no legislation at all than legislation couched in 
a vindictive spirit of hatred towards men of wealth." 
The Hepburn Act drew the line plainly between Big Busi- 
ness and Roosevelt. High Finance thought that he had 
inaugurated a campaign of hysteria, w T hile he himself 
deemed that he had pursued a middle course between 
the reactionaries and those who looked with favor on 
socialism. 1 So might anyone be convinced who, affected 
by the magnetism of his presence, listened to his argu- 
ments in private conference, and so may anyone now 
think who bases his judgment on his messages to Con- 
gress and other public utterances. He had the country 
at his back; "the plain people who think — the me- 
chanics, farmers, merchants, workers with head or hand." 2 
Members of Congress, who while in Washington toward 
the end of the session swore that they would no longer 
be swayed or dictated to by Theodore Roosevelt, re- 
turned at the commencement of the next session ready 
to follow whither he led because meanwhile they had 
been in contact with their constituencies. Men west 
of the Missouri River said when we hear that a week has 



1 Renew of Reviews, ed., 573, 794, S35, 837, 917, 931. 

2 Review of Reviews, ed., 919. The Minneapolis Journal gave the title 
to their cartoon: "The country is back of him. Go ahead, Teddy," 
whichever path you choose you have U. S. back of you." See also Auto- 
biography, 383. 



334 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

passed and that "Teddy" has smashed no evil we think 
he must be ill because, owing to his activity, he must 
be crushing something that bodes no good to the body 
politic. No wonder he said, I love those Westerners. 1 
A veteran senator declared that he had only one objection 
to the President — with his restless mind he was always 
doing something. 

"We passed a law," wrote Roosevelt speaking of the 
work of Congress and himself regarding the Hepburn 
Act, "giving vitality to the Interstate Commerce Com- 
mission, and for the first time providing some kind of 
efficient control by the National Government over the 
great railroads." 2 

President Roosevelt might have said to Senator Lodge, 
"The ill that's done ye can compute but never what's 
resisted" ; and the Senator could have replied, "Nature's 
patient ways shame hasty little man." 

Whatever criticism may be meted out to the President 
for his action giving the Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion the power to fix railroad rates cannot obtain as we 
consider the Meat Inspection Act and the Pure Food law. 

By special message to Congress of June 4, 190G, he trans- 
mitted the report of a special committee and urged the 
"need of immediate action by the Congress in the direc- 
tion of providing a drastic and thorough-going inspection 
by the Federal Government of all stock yards and (lack- 
ing houses and of their products, so far as the latter enter 

'1 have said this previously. The Tot* '<> Bladt cartoon en- 

titled Roosevelt "ia pretty good at 'winning the Weet' himself." Al- 
l.crt Shaw, Review of Review, 172. 

1 Bishop, ii. 131. Sec the cartoon "Then and Now. The lt.nilro.ids 
mm'I Roosevelt (Before and after the loim struggle for anti-rebate lcgis- 
lation)," Albert 8haw, Review of Revii 166. 



Ch. XIV.] MEAT INSPECTION ACT 335 

into interstate or foreign commerce. The conditions 
shown," he added, "to exist in the Chicago stock yards 
are revolting. It is imperatively necessary in the in- 
terest of health and of decency that they should be radi- 
cally changed. . . . The stock yards and packing houses 
are not kept even reasonably clean and the method of 
handling and preparing food products is uncleanly and 
dangerous to health." 1 Senator Albert J. Beveridge 
had offered an amendment to the appropriation act of 
the Department of Agriculture and the President urged 
that this be substantially enacted. It is a mark of Roose- 
velt that he never claimed credit unless it was his due 
and an evidence of this is seen in a letter to Beveridge 
on the day after he had signed the bill. "You were the 
man," he said, "who first called my attention to the 
abuses in the packing houses. You were the legislator 
who drafted the bill which in its substance now appears 
in the Amendment to the Agricultural bill and which 
will enable us to put a complete stop to the wrong-doing 
complained of." 2 

Senator Beveridge who had read much and travelled 
much and was yet to write his magnus opus, "The Life 
of Chief- Justice Marshall," which could have been written 
only by a man of letters and the law, was not outdone 
in generosity, declaring in open Senate that the act "we 
owe to the courage, determination and the absolutely 
unselfish devotion to the interest of the people of President 
Roosevelt." 3 Of the same mind when he penned his 
eulogy, he wrote, " that important reform never would 



1 Review of Reviews, ed., 772. 

2 July 1, 1906. The Sat. Eve. Post, Apr. 5, 1919. 
'June 20, Record, 8766. 



336 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

have had the slightest chance of accomplishment had 
not President Roosevelt thrown himself into the fight 
with every ounce of his personal power and all the re- 
sources of the Administration." "The fight over that 
measure," he said, "was one of the most desperate in 
our legislative history." l 

"The enactment of the pure food bill," so Roosevelt 
wrote to Congressman Watson on August 18, "and the 
passage of the bill which rendered effective the control 
of the Government over the meat packing industries 
are really along the same general line as the passage of the 
interstate commerce law and are second only to it in im- 
portance." 2 The title of the pure food law was, "An 
act for preventing the manufacture, sale or transporta- 
tion of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or de- 
leterious foods, drugs, medicines and liquors and for regu- 
lating traffic therein." This applied of course only to 
foreign and interstate commerce and was approved by 
the President on June 30. The act defined precisely what 
should be understood by adulterated drugs, confectionery 
and food. In the case of food it forbade the addition of anj 
poisonous or deleterious ingredient "which may render 
such article injurious to health." In brief the act was 
in the interest of the health of the community and was a 
protection to the purchaser of food and drugs. 

"Partly by law and partly by executive order," Roose- 
velt wrote, "we have completely reorganised the consular 

service of the United States." s As President, he was as 
true to the cause of Civil Service Reform as he was as Civil 



1 The Sat I • r ■ t, Apr. a, 1019. 
■Currmi Lit Pub. Co. 101. 
P, u 181. 



Ch. XIV.] MUCKRAKING 337 

Service Commissioner. "In my opinion," wrote in 1919 
William D. Foulke, a veteran in the cause, "Roosevelt 
was more consistent and energetic than any other Presi- 
dent in advancing the reform." 1 

An employers' liability act for corporations engaged 
in interstate commerce was passed. Declared uncon- 
stitutional by the United States Supreme Court, a law 
which met the objections of the Court was enacted at 
a subsequent session of Congress. 2 

"Do come on and let me see you soon," Roosevelt wrote 
to Dooley on June 18. "I am by no means as much alone 
as in Cuba, because I have an ample surrounding of 
Senators and Congressmen, not to speak of railroad men, 
Standard Oil men, beef packers and venders of patent 
medicines, the depth of whose feelings for me cannot 
be expressed in words." 3 

Roosevelt's muckrake speech attracted much attention 
from the people and from the press. The verb to muck- 
rake was speedily coined, obtained wide currency and 
finds a place in Webster's New International Dictionary 
published in 1909 with a direct reference to this very 
address. The speech was delivered at the laying of the 
corner-stone of the office building of the House of Repre- 
sentatives on April 14, 1906. "In Bunyan's 'Pilgrim's 
Progress,'" 4 he said, "you may recall the description 



1 Fighting the Spoilsmen, 257. 

2 Bishop, ii. 80, 131. The original act was passed June 11, 1906; it 
was declared unconstitutional on Jan. 6, 1908. The amended act was 
passed April 22, 1908, and upheld by the Court on Jan. 15, 1912. The 
objection to the original act was that it was not limited to injuries in- 
curred in interstate commerce. 

3 Bishop, ii. 34. 

4 " Bunyan's ' Pilgrim's Progress ' is to my mind one of the greatest books 
that was ever written." Roosevelt to Dr. Milner, Bishop, ii. 115. 



338 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

of the Man with the Muckrake, the man who could look 
no way but downward with the muckrake in his hand ; 
who was offered a celestial crown for his muckrake but 
who would neither look up nor regard the crown he was 
offered but continued to rake to himself the filth of the 
floor." Muckraking leads to slander that may untruth- 
fully "attack an honest man or even assail a bad man 
with untruth. An epidemic of indiscriminate assault 
upon character does not good but very great harm," de- 
clared the President. He had found an important deterrent 
to the entrance to the public service of able men of normal 
sensitiveness, in the gross and reckless assaults on their 
character and capacity both without and within Congress. 
"Hysterical sensationalism is the very poorest weapon 
wherewith to fight for lasting righteousness," he said. 
"There is mighty little good in a mere spasm of reform." 
Sanity as well as honesty is needed. Mud slinging is as 
bad as whitewashing. 1 

That Roosevelt should know his Shakespeare and his 
Burke is not surprising ; that this preachment should be 
on a text from Bunyan is more surprising ; but it is really 
amazing that one of his illustrations should be from the 
"Ecclesiastical Policy" of "that fine old Elizabethan 
divine," Bishop Hooker, who, one might suppose, was 
read only by students of terse and expressive English. 

The Constitution makes the President Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army of fche United States and Roosevelt 
manifested thai this was to him an earnest provision. 

Near midnight on August 13, 1906, the city of Browns- 
ville, Texas, near Fort Brown, was shot up; one person 



Poc the muckrake speech, see Review of Reviews, cd., 712. 



Ch. XIV.] THE BROWNSVILLE AFFRAY 339 

was killed, a number were assaulted with the intent to 
kill, women and children were fired at and nearly every 
one in the city was frightened. As Roosevelt said in his 
second Message to the Senate, "These crimes were cer- 
tainly committed by somebody." x After making a thor- 
ough investigation of the subject through officers in whom 
he had confidence, he and the Secretary of War, William 
H. Taft, came to the conclusion that "from nine to fifteen 
or twenty of the colored soldiers" belonging to B. C. and 
D. colored of the 25th regular infantry took part in the 
attack. The "original crime," declared the President, 
was "supplemented by another ... in the shape of a 
successful conspiracy of silence for the purpose of shield- 
ing those who took part in the original conspiracy of mur- 
der." 2 Therefore "1 ordered the discharge of nearly 
all the members of Companies B.C. and D. of the 25th 
infantry by name in the exercise of my constitu- 
tional power as Commander-in-Chief of the United States 
Army." 3 

"It appears that in Brownsville," the President said, 
"the city immediately beside which Fort Brown is sit- 
uated, there had been considerable feeling between the 
citizens and the colored troops of the garrison companies. 
Difficulties had occurred, there being a conflict of evidence 
as to whether the citizens or colored troops were to 
blame." But "any assertion that these men were 
dealt with harshly because they were colored men is ut- 
terly without foundation." "I condemned in unstinted 
terms the crime of lynching perpetrated by white men, 



1 Jan. 14, 1907, Review of Reviews, ed., 1097. 
■ Dec. 19, 1906, Review of Reviews, ed., 1065, 1070. 
3 Ibid., 1063. 



340 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

and I should take the instant advantage of any oppor- 
tunity whereby I could bring to justice a mob of lynchers. 
In precisely the same spirit I have now acted with refer- 
ence to these colored men who have been guilty of a black 
and dastardly crime." l "The evidence shows beyond 
any possibility of honest question that some individuals 
among the colored troops whom I have dismissed com- 
mitted the outrages mentioned." 

Roosevelt's private letters support his public view. 
"I have been amazed and indignant," he wrote, "at the 
attitude of the negroes and of shortsighted white senti- 
mentalists as to my action. . . . There has been great 
pressure, not only by the sentimentalists but by the 
Northern politicians who wish to keep the negro vote. . . . 
I believe in practical politics . . . but in a case like this 
where the issue is not merely one of naked right and 
wrong but one of vital concern to the whole country, I 
will not for one moment consider the political effect." 2 

Awarding equal sincerity to Senator Foraker, I have 
read carefully the three chapters in his book which he 
has devoted to the "Brownsville Affray" ; but I am not 
convinced that he has made out his case. The contest be- 
tween him and the President had become embittered 
from some other cause, and his sarcasm directed against 
the President and the Secretary of War does not add to 
the cogency of his i Military matters in any case 

require prompt decisioi] and the despotic quality nat- 
urally inheres in any executive action. Hut a calm re- 
view of the whole matter cannot fail to convince the Im- 



: Bm • / R ; L079, 1097. 

J Biahop, ii 

Iter's Notes ->f :i Busy I. iff, ii. ; also Fifty Vein, Cullom, 350. 



Ch* XIV.] THE PRESIDENT AND JAPAN 341 

partial observer that the President was right and acted on the 
best evidence, both legal and human, that was obtainable. 

The President's tribute to Japan in his Message to 
Congress of December 3, 1906, represented fully the senti- 
ment of the American people as it was during the war 
between Japan and Russia, when public opinion was 
largely on the side of Japan. Since that time, however, 
an "attitude of hostility" has developed which though 
" limited to a very few places, is most discreditable to 
us as a people and may be fraught with the gravest con- 
sequences to the Nation. . . . Since Commodore Perry, 
by his expedition to Japan over half a century ago, first 
opened the islands to western civilization, the growth 
of Japan has been literally astounding." Then, "Japan's 
development was still that of the Middle Ages ; now she 
stands as one of the greatest of civilized nations ; great 
in the arts of war and in the arts of peace ; great in mili- 
tary, in industrial, in artistic development and achieve- 
ment. . . . We have as much to learn from Japan as 
Japan has to learn from us. . . . Throughout Japan 
Americans are well treated and any failure on the part 
of Americans at home to treat the Japanese with a like 
courtesy and consideration is just so much a confession 
of inferiority in our civilization. ... I ask for fair treat- 
ment for the Japanese as I would ask fair treatment for 
Germans or Englishmen, Frenchmen, Russians or Ital- 
ians. ... I ask it as due to humanity and civilization. 
I ask it as due to ourselves because we must act uprightly 
toward all men." l 

No lover of peace can feel otherwise than thrilled when 

1 Review of Reviews, ed., 957, 958, 960, 961. 



342 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1906 

he reads that part of the President's Message of Decem- 
ber, 190G, which is devoted to Secretary Root's visit to 
South America. The third International Conference was 
held at Rio Janeiro from July 23 to August 29 and the 
Secretary of State was sent as our delegate. It was con- 
sidered a great honor by the South American republics 
that we should send so high an official and one of such 
distinction. He was cordially received and made an 
honorary President. How well Roosevelt understood 
the value of such a meeting is seen in the words of his 
Message. "The example," he wrote, "of the representa- 
tives of all the American nations engaging in harmonious 
and kindly consideration and discussion of subjects of 
common interest is itself of great and substantial value 
for the promotion of reasonable and considerate treat- 
ment of all international questions." After the Con- 
ference Root "visited Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, 
Peru, Panama and Colombia. He refrained from visit- 
ing Paraguay, Bolivia and Ecuador only because the 
distance of their capitals from the seaboard made it im- 
practicable with the time at his disposal. He carried 
with him a message of peace and friendship, and of strong 
desire for good understanding and mutual helpfulness ; and 
he was everywhere received in the spirit of his message." 
There was a misunderstanding in regard to the Monroe 
Doctrine. The prevalent idea was that it involved an 
assumption of superiority and the right to exercise some 
kind of protectorate by the United States over the 
South American republics. "That impression/' Baid the 
President, "continued to be a serious barrier to good 
understanding, to friendly intercourse, to the introduction 
of American capital and the extension of American trade.'' 



Ch. XIV.] THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 343 

"It was part of Secretary Root's mission to dispel this un- 
founded impression" ; and he therefore made an address 
at Rio on July 31, in which he said : "We wish for no vic- 
tories but those of peace ; for no territory except our own ; 
for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves. 
We deem the independence and equal rights of the small- 
est and weakest member of the family of nations entitled 
to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and 
we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty 
of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We 
neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers 
that we do not freely concede to every American Re- 
public. . . . Let us preserve our free lands from the bur- 
den of such armaments as are massed behind the frontiers 
of Europe." 

The arches which spanned the streets in the city of 
Buenos Ayres had the names inscribed on them of Wash- 
ington, Jefferson and Marshall and also those of James 
Monroe, John Quincy Adams, Henry Clay and Richard 
Rush, a silent testimony to the friends of South America 
who had labored for them in the greater republic. It 
was a "graceful courtesy" on the part of the Government 
of Brazil that the building in which the Conference was 
held was labelled "Palacio Monroe." 

The President said, "Our grateful acknowledgments 
are due to the Governments and the people of all the coun- 
tries visited by the Secretary of State for the courtesy, 
the friendship and the honor shown to our country in 
their generous hospitality to him." l 

In these words the President represented the senti- 
ment of the American people. 

1 Renew of Reviews, ed., 960, 907, 908, 909, 970. 






CHAPTER XV 

Nineteen hundred seven may be called the Panic Year. 
In making a study of the panic of 1857 I wrote, "The 
reason of panics lies deep in the human heart." Pass- 
ing through the panic of 1873 as a business man, those 
of 1893 and 1907 as an investor, I have seen no reason 
to change this opinion. Accepting the theory of perio- 
dicity of panics it is unnecessary to explain fully why the 
period is not always the same ; sixteen years elapsed be- 
tween 1857 and 1873, twenty between 1S73 and 1893, 
and fourteen between 1893 and 1907. But the cause is 
always the same. If men were always wise, if they them- 
selves or corporations in which they held stock never 
ran into debt, if there were never fluctuations in the prices 
of produce — in short if all business was done for cash, 
if men never incurred obligations which they could not 
at once meet, if they did not spread out with the idea 
that every extension, every conversion of liquid into fixed 
capital meant a larger income from their enterprise, finan- 
cial panics would never occur. But a society of that kind 
would lack commercial energy, would cease ite material 
progress and, in fact, would be impossible in one based on 
European ci\ ilization. 

Taking into account the actual state of affairs debt 

seems a necessary adjunct. Certain men have more 
energy than money; others more money than enenj 
It was entirely Datura! then thai ou1 of this condition 

should be developed on the one >ide the manager and the 






Ch. XV.] THE PANIC OF 1907 345 

promoter and on the other the investor. Banks are the 
basis of all financial affairs and they are deeply in debt 
to their depositors. It is a commonplace that the func- 
tion of a bank is to lend money to borrowers at a higher 
rate of interest than it pays its depositors. Finan- 
cial panics mean a loss of confidence, and one of its marks 
is that Savings Banks depositors start a run on banks 
where their savings are placed. This puts a strain on 
National Banks which have a large amount of Savings 
Bank money and besides have their own troubles to face in 
the vain endeavor to collect their loans and to meet the 
demands of their own depositors. So far as I know such 
have been the characteristics of the panics of '57, '73 and 
'93. Theodore Marburg in his business dissertation 
attempted to show that "each recurring panic has its 
own special causes" l but to my mind he in no way trav- 
erses the general law. It is true enough that 1857 and 
1873 were caused by the too rapid building of railroads, 
that the operation of the silver purchase provision of the 
Act of 1890 was a contributing cause to the panic of 1893, 
but if one needs one word to describe the cause of all these 
he finds it in "overtrading." 

A Boston banker found in a printed description of the 
panic of 1857 substantially the same characteristics as 
were passing before his eyes in 1907. A. Piatt Andrew, 
Assistant Professor of Economics at Harvard University, 
in an article printed in the New Year's number of the 
New York Journal of Commerce on January 2, 1907, found 
a close parallel between the situation at the begin- 
ning of the year 1907 with that of 1857, and wrote further 

1 Address before the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 
April 10, 1908. 



> 



316 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1907 

that a financial panic might occur during the year as it 
had a half a century earlier. 1 

The devotees of high finance ascribed the panic wholly 
to the Roosevelt policies both "legislative and execu- 
tive." 2 A cartoon in Life pictured Roosevelt emerging 
from a bear hunt in the South with the usual eyeglasses, 
showing his front teeth on the broad grin, dancing in 
high glee and shooting to the death "Big Game" labelled 
"prosperity." 3 The cartoon represented the general 
feeling among financial men as is shown in Roosevelt's 
speeches and messages, in his private letters and in varied 
recollections of the period. Everywhere that these men 
congregated, the conversation was Roosevelt and the 
financial ruin which he had brought upon the country. 

A glance at Roosevelt's own description will be useful. 
"We have our ups and downs," he said on October 22, 
"no law and the administration of no law can save any 
body of people from their own folly. If a section of the 
business world goes a little crazy, it will have to pay for 
it ; and being excessively human, when it does pay for 
it, it will want to blame someone else instead of itself. 
If at any time a portion of the business world loses its 
head, it has lost what no outside aid can supply. If there 
is reckless overspeculation or dishonest business manage- 
ment, just as sure as fate there will fellow a partial col- 
lapse. There has been trouble in the stock market, in 
the high financial world during the past few months. 

The statement has frequently been made that the policies 
for which I stand, Legislative and executive, are responsi- 

1 Letter of A. Rati Andrew, Oct I". L921 ; Boeton Daily AdMrtUtr, 
Nov. 2, 1907. 

■ Rooeevelt, Speech, Oct. 22, 1907, /.'- 

• Lxfe, Oct. 31. 



Ch. XV.] THE PANIC OF 1907 347 

ble for that trouble." • In another speech Roosevelt 
admitted that his policies might have possibly been a 
contributory cause to the panic ; 2 but in a special Mes- 
sage to Congress of January 31, 1908, he said, "So far 
as the business distress is due to local and not world wide 
causes and to the actions of any particular individuals, 
it is due to the speculative folly and flagrant dishonesty 
of a few men of great wealth who seek to shield them- 
selves from the effects of their own wrong-doing by ascrib- 
ing its results to the actions of those who have sought to 
put a stop to the wrong-doing." 

The panic began with a "flurry in stocks" in March, 
it gained new strength in August 3 and reached its height 
during October and November. On the 22d of October 
the Knickerbocker Trust Company failed; the Electric 
and Manufacturing Company, of which George Westing- 
house was President, applied for the appointment of 
receivers. 4 General Electric stock which had sold at 
162 during the year went to 90, and other shares suffered 
a like decline. Banks in all of the large cities issued 
clearing-house certificates of which 84 million dollars 
were emitted in New York City alone. There were runs 
on many of the banks and practically all of the banks 
in large cities requested their customers to make their 
cheques through the clearing house only and to draw 
no currency unless absolutely needed. Currency went 
to a premium of 4| per cent, which lasted from the first 
day of November through the first half of December. 
Money on call, if it could be had during the days before 



1 Oct. 22, Review of Reviews, ed., 1464. 2 Oct. 1, ibid., 1377. 

3 Bishop, ii. 43; Review of Reviews, ed., 1358. 

* Oct. 23, Life of George Westinghouse, Leupp, 208. 



348 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

the banks issued clearing-house certificates, was lent at 
125 per cent. Summoned from the General Episcopal 
Convention in Richmond, where he was a diligent reader 
of the newspapers, J. P. Morgan arrived on the scene and 
took command. Indeed the financiers desired a general 
and he was one in whom all had entire confidence. Back 
of Morgan were the old and experienced men of finance, 
who had regarded with no favor the operations of the 
new school of financiers who had been conspicuous in 
the overtrading that brought on the panic. They might 
have said with Prometheus, "Youthful pilots rule Olym- 
pus." ' The new school had originated the system of 
"chain banking" which meant the buying up of the ma- 
jority of shares of any one bank, then hypothecating these 
shares and with the proceeds purchasing the control of 
another bank which was dealt with in a similar manner and 
so on until a coterie controlled a number of banks which 
assisted them in their wild speculations that were those of 
"infatuated promoters and grumbling millionaires." 2 

Nightly meetings were held in Morgan's library and 
methods were devised to allay the panic. The Secretary 
of the Treasury, George B. Cortelyou, came to New York 
and gave his timely aid. The President took a hand 
in the same direction and acted with his usual prompt- 
ness. One evening he was informed that two representa- 
tives of the United States Steel Corporation desired to 
see him early next morning, when in company With Sec- 
retary of State Root lie saw them and nave this account 

of the interview dated November 1. 

"Judge E. 11. Gary and Mr. 11. C. Frick, On behalf 

1 Lawton, Atlantic Monthly, 62, 215. 
1 Noyat, Forum, Jan. 1908, 313. 



Ch. XV.] THE PRESIDENT— STEEL CORPORATION 349 

of the Steel Corporation, have just called upon me. They 
state that there is a certain business firm (the name of 
which I have not been told but which is of real impor- 
tance in New York business circles), which will undoubt- 
edly fail this week if help is not given. Among its assets 
are a majority of the securities of the Tennessee Coal and 
Iron Company. Application has been urgently made to 
the Steel Corporation to purchase this stock as the only 
means of avoiding a failure. Judge Gary and Mr. Frick 
informed me that as a mere business transaction they do 
not care to purchase the stock ; that under ordinary cir- 
cumstances they would not consider purchasing the stock, 
because but little benefit will come to the Steel Corporation 
from the purchase ; that they are aware that the purchase 
will be used as a handle for attack upon them on the ground 
that they are striving to secure a monopoly of the business 
and prevent competition — not that this would represent 
what could honestly be said, but what might recklessly and 
untruthfully be said. 

"They further informed me that, as a matter of fact, 
the policy of the company has been to decline to acquire 
more than sixty per cent of the steel properties, and that 
this purpose has been persevered in for several years past, 
with the object of preventing these accusations, and, as 
a matter of fact, their proportion of steel properties has 
slightly decreased, so that it is below this sixty per cent, 
and the acquisition of the property in question will not 
raise it above sixty per cent. But they feel that it is 
immensely to their interest, as to the interest of every 
responsible business man, to try to prevent a panic and 
general industrial smash up at this time, and that they 
are willing to go into this transaction, which they would 



350 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

not otherwise go into, because it seems the opinion of 
those best fitted to express judgment in New York that 
it will be an important factor in preventing a break that 
might be ruinous ; and that this has been urged upon 
them by the combination of the most responsible bankers 
in New York who are now thus engaged in endeavoring 
to save the situation. But they asserted that they did 
not wish to do this if I stated that it ought not to be done. 
I answered that, while of course I could not advise them 
to take the action proposed, I felt it no public duty of 
mine to interpose any objections." l 

The President acted wisely, and was completely vindi- 
cated by the Courts ; first by the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey and then by the 
United States Supreme Court. 2 Judge Gary and Frick 
had told the President the truth. Gary had then begun 
to gain the confidence of the newspaper reading com- 
munity that with the years has been largely augmented. 
Henry Clay Frick had worked up from the bottom, was 
truthful, cool and shrewd. The action of the President 
which was announced on the Stock Exchange at its open- 
ing that morning did much toward allaying the disturbed 
confidence. 

Notwithstanding the financial stress, the pressure of 
various kinds brought to bear upon him, Roosevelt pro- 
posed to pursue his policies. If they, he declared, have 
been a contributory cause to the panic they "must be 

accepted as a disagreeable but unavoidable feature in a 

course of policy which as Long as 1 am President will not 



1 Autobiography, its 

'Tin Court di - in 1020 and it stood 4 to 3. The 

I by Justioe MoKenn*. 



Ch. XV.] THE PRESIDENT — THE PANIC OF 1907 351 

be changed." l ''Everyone," he said in his special Mes- 
sage to Congress of January 31, 1908, "must feel the 
keenest sympathy for the large body of honest business 
men, of honest investors, of honest wage-workers who 
suffer because involved in a crash for which they are in 
no way responsible. At such a time there is a natural 
tendency on the part of many men to feel gloomy and 
frightened at the outlook." 2 But he wrote in his Annual 
Message of December 3, 1907, "swindling in stocks, cor- 
rupting legislatures, making fortunes by the inflation 
of securities, by wrecking railroads, by destroying com- 
petitors through rebates — these forms of wrong-doing 
in the capitalist" must be stopped. 3 "If it were true," 
he said to Congress on January 31, 1908, "that to cut out 
rottenness from the body politic meant a momentary 
check to an unhealthy seeming prosperity, I should 
not for one moment hesitate to put the knife to the cor- 
ruption." 4 "Our main quarrel," he said in the same 
Message, "is not with the representatives of the interests. 
They derive their chief power from the great sinister 
offenders who stand behind them. They are but puppets 
who move as the strings are pulled. It is not the pup- 
pets, but the strong cunning men and the mighty forces 
working for evil behind and through the puppets with 
whom we have to deal. We seek to control law-defying 
wealth." 5 

Roosevelt's own comment is highly interesting. Thus 
he wrote to his brother-in-law during November: "Of 
course I am gravely harassed and concerned over the 



1 Oct. 1, Review of Reviews, ed., 1377. 

2 Review of Reviews, ed., 1636. s Ibid., 1528. 4 Ibid., 1637. 
6 Ibid., 1619. 



352 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

situation. ... I am doing everything I have power to 
do ; but the fundamental fact is that the public is suffer- 
ing from a spasm of lack of confidence. Most of this 
lack of confidence is absolutely unreasonable and there- 
fore we can do nothing with it. There is a part for which 
there is a substantial basis however. There has been 
so much trickery and dishonesty in high places ; the ex- 
posures about Harriman, Rockefeller, Heinze, Barney, 
Morse, Ryan, the insurance men and others have caused 
such a genuine shock to people that they have begun to 
be afraid that every bank really has something rotten 
in it. In other words they have passed through the pe- 
riod of unreasoning trust and optimism into unreasoning 
distrust and pessimism. I shall do everything I can up 
to the very verge of my power to restore confidence, to 
give the banks a chance to get currency into circula- 
tion." « 

Roosevelt was especially severe in his criticism of Rocke- 
feller whom I have already considered ; but Rockefeller 
would have been astonished to know that he was classed 
with men of evil intent ; on the contrary he was at this 
time working at the back of Morgan and with the same 
purpose in view as that of the President "to restore con- 
fidence." It was, it is true, a selfish purpose, as to dis- 
turb the complex arrangements of business and of finance 
was worse, so far as the amount of loss is concerned, for 
the large financiers than for the wage-earner and small 

shop-keeper. 

By February I, L908, confidence was practically re- 
stored. On the last day of 1007 the premium on cur- 

1 Bishop, ii. 48. 



Ch. XV.] THE PANIC OF 1907 353 

rency was only \ of one per cent. But the strain had 
been great. One week during November the deficit in 
the legal reserve was 54 millions ; this was when the 
weekly statements were made on the old basis before 
the passing of the Federal Reserve Act. One hundred 
million dollars of gold were imported from Europe. At 
the close of the year the Bank of England rate was the 
highest for thirty-four years. So far as New York City 
was concerned the panic according to Alexander D. Noyes 
was not approached in 1893 and hardly paralleled in 
1873 ; although the remark would hardly hold true of 
the West. 1 

In the West was a large amount of so-called desert 
land. But "the very condition of aridity," wrote George 
Wharton James in his useful book, "is an assurance of 
great fertility when water is applied. . . . The most fer- 
tile countries are the arid ones, and not the humid and 



1 An excellent authority is Alex. D. Noyes whose articles in the Forum 
for July, Oct. 1907, and Jan., April, 1908, give a true and exact account of 
the panic. I have also consulted The Nation for Oct. and Nov. 1907, the 
financial articles in which were probably written by Noyes; also the N. Y. 
Tribune for Oct. 21, 22, 23, 24 and Nov. 5. 

"During the panic of 1893 no bank failure of any consequence occurred 
in New York City. In October, 1907, one national bank, four trust com- 
panies and six state banks closed their doors in that locality and in the 
closing week of January the suspension was announced of four banks do- 
ing business in Manhattan Island. These were not institutions of the 
first importance but at the start they threatened complications to the 
general situation. ... All of these January bank failures represented 
the cleaning up process which followed an experiment in reckless and un- 
usual banking undertaken during the recent boom. These banks, directly 
or indirectly, had been involved in the process known as 'chain bank- 
ing.' " — Noyes. The Forum, April, 498. 

In July, 1893, in New York City only one national bank suspended with 
assets of $800,000 and one state bank with assets $400,000. During 
August, 1893, two more state banks and during December another state 
bank closed their doors. 



354 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1902 

well watered ones." l And water was plenty but it came 
from the mountains, partly from the melting of snow, 
and during the late winter and spring rushed down the 
river-beds in torrents, frequently overflowing the plains 
and sometimes carrying destruction to farms, villages and 
towns. The rain descended and the floods came and the 
winds blew. The problem was to chain this force, to 
store the water when it was plenty and let it loose during 
the intense heat of the summer and whenever wanted. 
The method to be applied was well known ; the money 
and the ability properly to spend it were necessary fac- 
tors. Something had been done by private companies 
and by State and other official organizations but they 
could not furnish the means to operate irrigation on a 
large scale. Soon after Roosevelt became President, 
GifTord Pinchot and Frederick H. Newell called upon 
him and presented "their plans for National irrigation 
of the arid lands of the West." They found in Roosevelt 
a ready listener and one thoroughly comprehending. As 
a young man he had passed much time on a ranch 2 and 
understood the marvels of irrigation, so that no argument 
was needed to convert him to the scheme which he ad- 
vocated in his first Message to Congress. "The forest 
and water problems," he declared, "are perhaps the most 
vital internal problems of the United States. 3 On June 
17, 1902, he had the satisfaction of signing the bill which 
provided for the work being done by the Nation. This is 
known as the Newlaiuls Art from it- author, Senator New- 
lands, who had wrought strenuously to effect its passage. 



1 Reclaiming the An i 

My Brother. T. Roosevelt, Mrs. Robinson, chap. vi. 
'Autobiography, 431. 



Ch. XV.] IRRIGATION 355 

Part of James's book reads like a magical romance. 
"For a life-time," he wrote, "I have sung the majestic 
chorus of Mendelssohn from Elijah, 'Thanks be to God; 
he laveth the thirsty land.' Again and again have I 
thrilled to its passionate power, but never did I dream 
of its full significance until I saw water pouring through 
the irrigation canals of our thirsty West; the gentle 
murmuring of the flowing waters suggesting the music 
made by the land as it soaked up, absorbed, drew into 
every thirsty pore, the life-giving, stimulating, seed- 
growing fluid." 1 

When one thinks that the United States is, according 
to European opinions, a loosely administered country, 
one reads with satisfaction James's tribute to the "knowl- 
edge, skill, ingenuity, tact, patience and equanimity of 
the officials, engineers and managers of the Reclamation 
Service" ; 2 and one cannot help thinking that nowhere else 
could so large an undertaking have been more efficiently 
conducted. James is not a Californian, possessed with 
the idea that his is the greatest country on earth and 
full of blind enthusiasm for the Western States, as he 
is fully conversant with the English work in Egypt and 
India and the irrigation system of Argentina. 3 Roose- 
velt, on the completion of the Roosevelt Dam in Arizona, 
thanked the engineers present "for their admirable work, 
as efficient as it was honest and conducted according to 
the highest standards of the public service. As I looked," 
he said, "at the fine, strong, eager faces of those of the 

1 Reclaiming the Arid West, 34. 

2 James dedicates his book to John W. Powell, Francis G. Newlands, 
Charles D. Walcott, Frederick H. Newell, William E. Smyth, George H. 
Maxwell, Arthur P. Davis, Franklin K. Lane. 

» Reclaiming the Arid West, 11, 37, 390. 



356 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION (1902 

force who were present and thought of the similar men 
in the service, in the higher positions, who were absent 
and who were no less responsible for the work done, I 
felt a foreboding that they would never receive any real 
recognition for their achievement." 1 

Roosevelt had a clear comprehension of what was 
needed when he became President. "The idea that our 
natural resources were inexhaustible," he wrote, "still 
obtained, and there was as yet no real knowledge of their 
extent and condition. . . . Our magnificent river sys- 
tem with its superb possibilities for public usefulness 
was dealt with by the National Government not as a 
unit but as a disconnected series of pork-barrel problems. 
... On June 17, 1902, the Reclamation Act was passed. 
It set aside the proceeds of the disposal of public lands 
for the purpose of reclaiming the waste areas of the arid 
West by irrigating lands otherwise worthless and thus 
creating new homes upon the land. The money so ap- 
propriated was to be repaid to the Government by the 
settlers, and to be used again as a revolving fund contin- 
uously available for the work." 2 

The storage dam, called after Roosevelt, at the canyon 
of the Salt River — "a wild, ragged and picturesque spot," 
is an excellent example of irrigation. "To create a dam 
here of sufficient power to stop and tame the Salt River, 
especially at flood time, meant a gigantic piece of solid 
engineering." 1 Such a one was constructed and the 
result is best told by a citation by Charles (1. W:u?hburn 

1 Autobiography, i-'ifi. The men whom Roosevelt held up especially 
for honor w.rc Gifford Pinchot, John W. Powell, P. ll Newell, Charles 
D. Waloott, I'r.mris c. Newlands, <; ll. Maxwell, Dr. .!. \Y. McGee, 

■Autobiography, 480, i:;i. 

- Reclaiming thr W'.-t, James, 71. Bee that book for ■ tin.- account. 



Ch. XV.] THE ROOSEVELT DAM 3S7 

from an Arizona newspaper printed probably about 1916 : 
"Ten years ago farm land in the Salt River Valley was 
worth from thirty-five to a hundred dollars per acre. It is 
now worth from seventy-five to five hundred dollars. . . . 
What effected the change? The credit should be given 
to the Roosevelt Reservoir. . . . The Roosevelt Reser- 
voir right now has more water in it than it ever had be- 
fore, giving positive insurance of crops in the Salt River 
Valley for years to come. It is three-fourths full and 
will be entirely filled before the snow stops melting this 
spring." 1 The Roosevelt Dam was nearly five years 
in construction, 2 and was opened by ex-President Roose- 
velt in March, 1911. 

The Colorado River is the Nile of America, only it is 
not navigable ; it was dammed at Yuma, 251 miles south- 
east of Los Angeles. 3 The results were excellent and 
made for civilization. "Every item," wrote Roosevelt 
in 1913, "of the whole great plan of reclamation now 
in effect was undertaken between 1902 and 1906. By 
the spring of 1909 the work was an assured success and 
the Government had become fully committed to its con- 
tinuance." 4 

James, in his chapter entitled "A Vision of the Future," 
the last one of his book published in 1917, wrote, "Who 
that is familiar with the destructive floods of, say, three 
Western rivers alone, the Columbia, Colorado and Sac- 
ramento, does not understand that the real conquest of 
these rivers has not yet even begun." There are 80 



1 Washburn's Roosevelt, 126. 

2 Sept. 20, 1906 to March, 1911, James, 80. 
5 For a full account, ibid., 97. 

4 Autobiography, 432. 



358 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

million acres of swamp lands and 400 million acres of 
deserts, mostly public domains, in the United States. 
' ! Our swamp and overflow lands, ' ' he continued, ' ' embrace 
an area greater than the whole superficial area of the 
Philippines. Their reclamation would give employment 
for years to hundreds of thousands of laborers and later 
would afford opportunities for the establishment of 
approximately two and a half million families in homes 
of their own. Two or three harvests from these lands 
would suffice to pay the entire cost of reclamation. . . . 
The Man of Destiny is the hydraulic engineer." l 

Theodore Roosevelt was no engineer but he appre- 
ciated fully the material interests of his country. "A 
primeval forest," he wrote while governor, "is a great 
sponge which absorbs and distils the rain water. And 
when it is destroyed the result is apt to be an alternation 
of flood and drought. Forest fires ultimately make the 
land a desert." "I was a warm believer in reclamation 
and in forestry," he wrote while President. 2 Forestry 
is the science of caring for and cultivating forests. "Con- 
cerned over the destruction of the forests," Roosevelt 
as President did what he could for their preservation. 
He was attracted to Gifford Pinchot to whom he paid a 
warm tribute. "He led," so Roosevelt wrote, "and in- 
deed during its most vital period embodied the fight for 
the preservation through use of our forests." 3 The 
enemies of the foresl were fires, the sawmill and other 
inventions for getting timber and wood-pulp. By legis- 
lation which he furthered and by executive action the 
President had always in mind that a fight must be made 

1 Pp. 3S<J, 890, 893. : Autobiography, 33 l J, 431. 

1 Autobiography, 429. 



Ch. XV.] THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER 359 

for the preservation of the forests. They are, he told 
the people of Memphis, on October 4, 1907, "the most 
effective preventers of floods ; . . . the loss from soil wash 
is enormous. ... It is computed . . . that one billion 
tons in weight of the richest soil matter of the United 
States is annually gathered in storm rivulets, washed 
into the rivers and borne into the sea. . . . We are con- 
suming our forests three times faster than they are being 
reproduced. . . . Yet forests, unlike mines, can be so 
handled as to yield the best results of use, without ex- 
haustion, just like green fields." 1 

The President's trip down the Mississippi River on a 
steamboat was a notable occurrence. At St. Louis on 
October 2, 1907, he said, "I am taking a trip on the great 
natural highway which runs past your very doors — a 
highway once important now almost abandoned." In 
other parts of the country the railroad development had 
been at the expense of the rivers and of canals, natural 
and artificial waterways. In mercantile traffic we must 
follow the prime example of the Great Lakes as "the 
commerce that passes through the Soo far surpasses in 
bulk and value that of the Suez Canal." 2 At Memphis 
during the speech from which I have already quoted, 
he said, "The Mississippi Valley is a magnificent empire 
in size and fertility." In it there are "12,000 miles of 
waterway now more or less fully navigable." "This 
vast stretch of country lying between the Alleghanies 
and the Rockies, the Great Lakes and the Gulf will largely 
fix the type of civilization for the whole Western Hemi- 
sphere." 3 

1 Review of Reviews, ed., 1429 et seq. 2 Ibid., 1390. 

3 Ibid., 1420. 



360 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

An important incident on this voyage was that the 
Inland Waterways Commission, appointed by the Presi- 
dent during March, 1907, asked him to call a conference 
on the conservation of natural resources in Washington. 
Roosevelt carried out their request and wrote to the gov- 
ernors of the several States and to prominent men sum- 
moning them to Washington to attend such a conference. 
"The conservation of our natural resources," he wrote 
in a special Message to Congress of March 25, 1908, "is 
literally vital for the future of the Nation." 1 To the 
imposing conference assembled in tl e East Room of the 
White House he said in his address of welcome: "So 
vital is this question that for the first time in our history 
the chief executive officers of the States separately, and 
of the States together forming the Nation, have met to 
consider it." Men, "chosen for their special acquaint- 
ance with the terms of the problem that is before us, 
the Senators and Representatives in Congress, the Su- 
preme Court, the Cabinet and the Inland Waterways 
Commission have likewise been invited to the confer- 
ence." 2 A friendly criticism was that such an assem- 
blage was perfectly obvious. But no President had ever 
initiated it before and it remained for Roosevelt, in this 
case as in many others, to make the precedent. 

The Convention of Governors as it was called was an 
interesting assembly. It was of course presided over 
by the President who, as he stepped into the East Room, 
took his place at the presiding officer's table and called 
the meeting to order by a rap of the gavel, could not help 



1 Review of Rerievoa cd., 1687. 
' Ibid., 1739. 



Ch. XV.] WILLIAM J. BRYAN 361 

reminding one of the Homeric Council at which Aga- 
memnon, King of men, was at the head. Verily Roosevelt 
was in this assemblage "King of men." It was notable 
to an onlooker from the East to see the representative 
men of the South and West gathered together. After 
much discussion the Conference adopted a report and 
the debate on it was instructive. The governors of the 
Southern States were well to the fore and seemed to en- 
joy speaking of the President as a man of large brain 
and great heart — a man of " inside" views and generous 
ideas. He was always received with enthusiasm, and 
next to this, though below it in intensity, was that 
awarded to William J. Bryan, who came by invitation 
as one of the delegates. The Southern governors re- 
ferred often to the indissoluble union of indestructible 
States, and their discussion of centralization and State 
rights was significant. Bryan read his paper and the on- 
looker thought he was a poor reader and was disappointed 
that he did not speak those words of silver eloquence, of 
which report was common. Bryan said: "I am a strict 
constructionist, if that means to believe that the Federal 
Government is one of delegated power and that constitu- 
tional limitations should be carefully observed. There 
is no twilight zone between the nation and the State in 
which exploiting interests can take refuge from both, and 
my observation is that most — not all but most — of 
the contentions over the line between nation and State 
are traceable to predatory corporations which are trying 
to shield themselves from deserved punishment or en- 
deavoring to prevent needed restraining legislation. The 
first point which I desire to make is that earnest men 
with an unselfish purpose and controlled only for the 



362 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

public good will be able to agree upon legislation which 
will not only preserve for the future the inheritance which 
we have received from a bountiful Providence but pre- 
serve it in such a way as to avoid the dangers of cen- 
tralization." 

Roosevelt made this impromptu reply: "Just a word 
on what has been called the 'Twilight Land' between 
the powers of the Federal and State governments. My 
primary aim in the legislation that I have advocated 
for the regulation of the great corporations has been to 
provide some effective popular sovereign for each cor- 
poration. I do not wish to keep this twilight land one 
of large and vague boundaries, by judicial decision that 
in a given case the State cannot act and then a few years 
later by other decisions that in practically similar cases 
the nation cannot act either. I am trying to find out 
where one or the other can act, so that there shall always 
be some sovereign power that on behalf of the people 
can hold every big corporation, every big individual to an 
accountability. . . . Give an ample reward to the cap- 
tain of industry; but not an indeterminate and infinite 
reward. ... It is eminently right that he should be al- 
lowed to make ample profit from his development of the 
privilege ; but make him pay something for it and make 
the grant for a fixed period so that when the conditions 
change, as in all probability they will change, our chil- 
dren, the Nation of the future, shall have the right to 
determine the condition upon which thai privilege shall 
be enjoyed. In these cases the State has not acted or 
cannot ac1 ; therefore I hold the Nation should act. 
Where the policy 1 advocate can be carried out host by 
the State, let it be carried OUt by the State; where it 



Ch. XV.] CONSERVATION MOVEMENT 363 

can be carried out best by the Nation, let it be carried 
out by the Nation." l 

"The conservation movement was a direct out-growth 
of the forest movement," wrote Roosevelt. 2 For the 
results of this Conference on the conservation of natural 
resources, the reader is referred to Roosevelt's Auto- 
biography, to the chapter on Conservation in Lewis's 
Life, and to the public documents. The actual effect 
on public sentiment was great. It directed men's atten- 
tion to the subject and made them feel that they had 
been wasting Nature's heritage and that henceforward 
economy and not waste should be the rule. 

"The business management of the Forest Service be- 
came so excellent . . . that it was declared by a well- 
known firm of business organizers to compare favorably 
with the best managed of the great private corporations, 
an opinion which was confirmed by the report of a Con- 
gressional investigation and by the report of the Presi- 
dential Committee on Departmental method. The area 
of the National Forests had increased from 43 to 194 
million acres; the force from about 500 to more than 
3000. There was saved for public use in the National 
Forests more Government timberland during the seven 
and a half years prior to March 4, 1909, than during all 
previous and succeeding years put together." 3 

"The United States Supreme Court," wrote Lewis, 
"has upheld every single action of Roosevelt for con- 
servation that has been brought before it. With one 
exception all these decisions were unanimous." 4 



1 Washington Post, May 16, 1908; Rericiu of Reviews, ed., 1754. 

2 Autobiography, 444. 

3 Ibid., 441. 4 Life of Roosevelt, 299. 



CHAPTER XVI 

At a luncheon given to Roosevelt, when he was still 
Vice-President, at the Algonquin Club in Boston, the 
President of the Club, Charles H. Taylor, who was like- 
wise the presiding officer of the feast, said, that if by any 
chance Roosevelt became President, men would lie uneasy 
in their beds with sleepless nights finding it impossible 
to get it out of their heads that he was a Jingo and would 
involve us in trouble ; if the opportunity did not come 
he would make it. Roosevelt became President and had 
an excellent chance to " gobble" Cuba when an insurrec- 
tion broke out there during August, 1906. The story 
is best told in Roosevelt's own words : "For seven years 
Cuba has been in a condition of profound peace and of 
steadily growing prosperity. For four years this peace 
and prosperity have obtained under her own independent 
government. Her peace, prosperity and independence 
are now menaced ; for of all possible evils that can be- 
fall Cuba the worst is the evil of anarchy, into which 
civil war and revolutionary disturbances will assuredly 
throw her." ! When he met the Congress in December, 
190C, he told the whole story. "Last August," he wrote, 
"an insurrection broke out in Cuba which it speedily 
gn-w evident that the existing Cuban government was 
powerless to quell. This Government was repeatedly 
asked by the then Cuban government to intervene, and 
finally waa notified by the President of Cuba that he in- 

/ /,'-■■ taps, ed., 821. 



Ch. XVI.] CUBA 365 

tended to resign ; that his decision was irrevocable ; that 
none of the other constitutional officers would consent 
to carry on the government and that he was powerless 
to maintain order. It was evident that chaos was im- 
pending. . . . Thanks to the preparedness of our Navy, 
I was able immediately to send enough ships to Cuba 
to prevent the situation from becoming hopeless; and 
I furthermore despatched to Cuba the Secretary of War 
[William H. Taft] and the Assistant Secretary of State 
[Robert Bacon] in order that they might grapple with 
the situation on the ground. All efforts to secure an 
agreement between the contending factions by which 
they should themselves come to an amicable understand- 
ing and settle upon some modus vivendi — some pro- 
visional government of their own — failed. Finally the 
President of the Republic resigned. The quorum of 
Congress assembled failed by deliberate purpose of its 
members, so that there was no power to act on his resigna- 
tion and the government came to a halt. In accordance 
with the so-called Piatt amendment, which was embodied 
in the constitution of Cuba, I therefore proclaimed a 
provisional government for the island, the Secretary of 
War acting as provisional governor until he could be re- 
placed by Mr. Magoon, the late minister to Panama and 
governor of the Canal Zone on the Isthmus ; troops were 
sent to support them and to relieve the Navy, the expedi- 
tion being handled with most satisfactory speed and 
efficiency. The insurgent chiefs immediately agreed that 
their troops should lay down their arms and disband and 
the agreement was carried out. The provisional govern- 
ment has left the personnel of the old government and 
the old laws, so far as might be, unchanged, and will thus 



366 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

administer the island for a few months until tranquillity 
can be restored, a new election properly held and a new 
government inaugurated. Peace has come in the island, 
and the harvesting of the sugar-cane crop, the great crop 
of the island, is about to proceed." J 

"In Cuba," he told the Harvard Union in February, 
1907, "I am doing my best to persuade the Cubans that 
if only they will be good they will be happy ; I am seeking 
the very minimum of interference necessary to make 
them good." 2 During April, 1907, he wrote to Andrew 
Carnegie, "The United States Army is at this moment 
in Cuba, not as an act of war, but to restore Cuba to the 
position of a self-governing republic." 3 Roosevelt was 
exactly right. He lived up fully to his promise. Cuba 
was turned over again to its inhabitants in January, 1909, 
the last months of his two administrations. 4 

Next to his fight against high finance and his work 
for the conservation of resources, Roosevelt is associated 
in the public mind with his attitude to the Navy. "The 
United States Navy," he wrote in his Message of Decem- 
ber, 190G, "is the surest guarantor of peace which this 
country possesses." This declaration must be borne in 
mind as we recount his constant urging, care and atten- 
tion to this branch of the service. He would be a rare 
man in the Navy, whet her officer, midshipman, marine or 
seaman, who did uol regard Roosevelt with veneration and 
was not willing to follow whither he led. Such unstinted 
confidence in a civilian is remarkable and as the same 
feeling was shared by the Army it is the sort of enthusi- 



1 Rteieu <>f Review, ed., 962. : [bid., L178. 

» Ibid., 1198. 4 Life of Roosevelt, Lewi . 24 I 



Ch. XVI.] THE WAR OF 1812 367 

asm evoked by a great military leader. Roosevelt was 
a profound student of naval operations, writing his first 
book on the subject at twenty-four, so that his advice 
to study our failures was the result of scholastic inquiry 
as well as practical observation. There was only one 
way, he affirmed, in which the War of 1812 could have 
been avoided as is well shown in Captain Mahan's his- 
tory. "If," Roosevelt wrote, " during the preceding 
twelve years, a navy, relatively as strong as that which 
the country now has, had been built up and an army 
provided relatively as good as that which the country 
now has, there never would have been the slightest neces- 
sity of fighting the war ; and if the necessity had arisen, 
the war would under such circumstances have ended 
with our speedy and overwhelming triumph. But our 
people during those twelve years refused to make any 
preparations whatever regarding either the Army or the 
Navy. They saved a million or two of dollars by so do- 
ing ; and in mere money paid a hundredfold for each 
million they thus saved during the three years of war 
which followed — a war which brought untold suffering 
upon our people, which at one time threatened the gravest 
national disaster, and which, in spite of the necessity of 
waging it, resulted merely in what was in effect a drawn 
battle, while the balance of defeat and triumph was al- 
most even." l 

In 1906 he asked Congress ''for the building each year 
of at least one first-class battle-ship." 2 But one year 
later he had changed his opinion and asked for four battle- 

1 Review of Reviews ed., 983. 

2 Annual Message, ibid., 984. The American Navy at that time had 
nine battleships and eight more in course of construction. Life of Roose- 
velt, Lewis, 201. 



368 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

ships. The second Hague Conference, that held from 
June to October, 1907, meanwhile had declined to limit 
naval armaments; therefore "it would be most unwise 
for us to stop the upbuilding of our Navy. To build one 
battle-ship of the best and most advanced type a year 
would barely keep our fleet up to its present force. This 
is not enough. . . . The only efficient use for the Navy 
is for offence. The only way in which it can efficiently 
protect our own coast against the possible action of a 
foreign navy is by destroying that foreign navy." ' 

"This is a very rough-and-tumble, workaday world," 
Roosevelt wrote in a private letter ; 2 and we peace-lovers 
must admit that he comprehended Europe in 1907 better 
than we did. Nobody could assert that he foresaw the 
terrible conflict which began in 1914, but he believed in 
being ready for any emergency and was less trustful of 
our European contemporaries than were we who sat in 
comfortable libraries and constructed theories. 3 There- 
fore the years have demonstrated that he was supremely 
right when he asked for four battleships, and we wore 
wrong when we cut him down to two. 4 "Our army and 
navy," he wrote, "and above all our people learned some 
lessons from the Spanish War and applied them to our 
own uses. During the following decade the improvement 
in our army and navy was very great ; not in material 
but also in personnel, and, above all, in the ability to 
handle our forces in good-sized units. By 1908 . . . the 
navy had become in every respect as fit a fighting instru- 



1 Message of 1907, Review of Reviews ed., 1573. 
1 Bishop, ii. 28. 
' [bid 

4 ,\<t of May 13, 1908, "to coet, ezolunre of armoi and armament, 
not exceeding six million dollars each." 



Ch. XVI] THE VOYAGE AROUND THE WORLD 369 

ment as any other navy in the world, fleet for fleet. Even 
in size there was but one nation, England, which was 
completely out of our class ; and in view of our relations 
with England and all the English-speaking peoples, this 
was of no consequence." l For the efficient use of the 
money which Congress gave him Roosevelt could be 
thoroughly trusted when he comprehended matters — 
and it is amazing the number that he did comprehend — 
and in his work, as we look at it now, he was above criti- 
cism when it is understood with what materials he had 
to work. 2 But he always had at his back the rank and 
file of the Navy and Army whose attitude toward him 
was almost one of worship. He was now to give the 
greatest proof of the efficiency of the Navy in the voyage 
around the world. 

This was so stupendous a feat that it is well that Roose- 
velt himself should tell the story. "In my own judg- 
ment," he wrote in his Autobiography, "the most im- 
portant service that I rendered to peace was the voyage 
of the battle fleet round the world. I had become con- 
vinced that for many reasons it was essential that we 
should have it clearly understood, by our own people 



1 Autobiography, 276. On March 9, 1905, he wrote to General Leonard 
Wood: "When I became President three years ago I made up my mind 
that I should try for a fleet with a minimum strength of forty armor clads ; 
and though the difficulty of getting what I wished has increased from 
year to year I have now reached my mark and we have built or provided 
for twenty-eight battle-ships and twelve armored cruisers. This navy 
puts us a good second to France and about on a par with Germany ; and 
ahead of any other power in point of material, except, of course, England." 
Bishop, i. 366. 

2 "I have had on occasions to fight bosses and rings and machines; 
and have to get along as best I could with bosses and rings and machines 
when the conditions were different." And he wrote to Sir George Trevel- 
yan on May 13, 1905, "In practical life we have to work with the instru- 
ments at hand." Bishop, ii. 13, 150. 



370 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

especially, but also by other peoples that the Pacific was 
as much our home waters as the Atlantic and that our 
fleet could and would at will pass from one to the other 
of the two great oceans. It seemed to me evident that 
such a voyage would greatly benefit the navy itself ; 
would arouse popular interest in and enthusiasm for the 
navy ; and would make foreign nations accept as a matter 
of course that our fleet should from time to time be gath- 
ered in the Pacific just as from time to time it was gath- 
ered in the Atlantic, and that its presence in one ocean 
was no more to be accepted as a mark of hostility to any 
Asiatic power than its presence in the Atlantic was to 
be accepted as a mark of hostility to any European 
power." 1 On July 4 the Secretary of the Navy in a 
speech at Oakland, California, said the Pacific coast 
would shortly receive a visit from the Navy. 2 But a 
letter to Secretary Root from Oyster Bay nine days later 
showed a further reaching program in Roosevelt's busy 
brain and also the most important reason for his deter- 
mination. 

"I am more concerned," he wrote to Secretary Root, 
"over the Japanese situation than almost any other. 
Thank Heaven we have the Navy in good shape. It 
is high time however that it should go on a cruise around 
the world. In the first place I think it will have a pacific 
effect to show that it can be (lone 1 ; and in the next place, 
after talking thoroughly over the situation with the naval 
board I became convinced thai it was absolutely neces- 
sary for us to try in time of peace to see just what we 
could do in the way of putting a big battle fleet in the 



• P. 592. 'LifoofRoosev.lt, Lewis, 266. 



Ch. XVI.] THE JAPANESE QUESTION 371 

Pacific and not make the experiment in time of war. 
Aoki and Admiral Yamamoto were out here yesterday 
at lunch. . . . Yamamoto, an ex-Cabinet Minister and 
a man of importance, evidently had completely misunder- 
stood the situation here and what the possibilities were. 
I had a long talk with him through an interpreter. He 
kept insisting that the Japanese must not be kept out 
save as we keep out Europeans. I kept explaining to 
him that what we had to do was to face facts ; that if 
American laboring men came in and cut down the wages 
of Japanese laboring men, they would be shut out of 
Japan in one moment ; and that Japanese laborers must 
be excluded from the United States on economic grounds. 
I told him emphatically that it was not possible to admit 
Japanese laborers into the United States. ... I pointed 
out that under our present treaty we had explicitly re- 
served the right to exclude Japanese laborers. I talked 
freely of the intended trip of the battle-ship fleet through 
the Pacific, mentioning that it would return home very 
shortly after it had been sent out there ; at least in all 
probability. 1 also was most complimentary about 
Japan." 1 

The fleet of sixteen battleships, all of them commis- 
sioned since the Spanish-American War, sailed from 
Hampton Roads on December 16, 1907. Their officers 
and crews numbered about 12,000 men. They were re- 
viewed before their departure by President Roosevelt, 
when it was generally supposed that they were going 
to San Francisco and possibly as far north as Seattle. 
But after Roosevelt had returned to the White House 

1 Bishop, ii. 64. 



372 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

"it was announced that the fleet would continue on to 
our insular possessions and return home by the Suez 
Canal." 1 

"I determined on the move," wrote Roosevelt, "with- 
out consulting the Cabinet. ... A council of war never 
fights and in a crisis the duty of a leader is to lead and 
not take refuge behind the generally timid wisdom of a 
multitude of councillors. At that time as I happen to 
know, neither the English nor the German authorities 
believed it possible to take a fleet of great battle-ships 
round the world. They did not believe that their own 
fleets could perform the feat and still less did they believe 
that the American fleet could." In 1910 he had a con- 
firmation of this which he related in his celebrated letter 
to Sir George O. Trevelyan : "Von Tirpitz [Secretary of 
the Imperial Admiralty] was particularly interested in 
the voyage of the battle fleet round the world and he 
told me frankly that he had not believed we could do it 
successfully and added that the English Naval Office and 
Foreign Office had felt the same way. ... He then Baid 
that he expected that Japan would attack us while the 
fleet was on its way round and asked me if I had not also 
expected this. I told him that I had not expected such 
an attack but that I had thought it possible; in other 
words that I thought the chances were against it, but 
there was a chance for it. . . . I had been doing my best 
to be polite to the Japanese, and had finally become un- 
comfortably conscious of a very, very Blight undertone 
of veiled truculence in their communications in connec- 
tion with things that happened on the Pacific Slope; 



1 Life <>f Room vrit, I 



Ch. XVI.] THE JAPANESE QUESTION 373 

and I finally made up my mind that they thought I was 
afraid of them. ... I found that the Japanese war party 
firmly believed that they could beat us, and, unlike the 
Elder Statesmen, thought I also believed this." l 

During 1907 and possibly a part of 1908 the friction 
between California as the leader of the Pacific coast 
and Japan became acute. The question of excluding 
the Japanese from the public schools was to the fore and 
there was also a hostile feeling regarding the Japanese 
possession of land. The opposition to the immigration 
of the Japanese was not on account of their inferiority 
as being of the yellow race, but on account of their su- 
periority. They could live for less, work for less than 
the Caucasian and did they become actual possessors of 
land could cultivate it better and get more from it. Any- 
one who will take the trouble to compare the square miles 
and population of Japan with the area of California, 
Oregon and Washington and their number of inhabitants 2 
can see at once the reason of the covetousness of Japan 
and the resistance of the Caucasian. It was fortunate 
that in the presidential chair was a man of culture who 
appreciated the Japanese civilization and at the same 
time was a true American full of sympathy for the West 
and who understood the view of the Calif ornians. 

To continue the story from the Autobiography: "I 
made up my mind that it was time to have a show down 
in the matter; because if it was really true that our 
fleet could not get from the Atlantic to the Pacific it was 
much better to know it and be able to shape our policy 

1 Bishop, ii. 249. 

2 Japan, 148,000 square miles, population over 48 millions ; California, 
Oregon and Washington, 318,000 square miles, estimated population in 
1907, three millions. 



374 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 

in view of the knowledge. Many persons publicly and 
privately protested against the move on the ground that 
Japan would accept it as a threat. To this I answered 
nothing in public. In private I said that I did not be- 
lieve Japan would so regard it because Japan knew my 
sincere friendship and admiration for her and realized 
that we could not as a Nation have any intention of at- 
tacking her. . . . When in the spring of 1910 I was in 
Europe I was interested to find that high naval authori- 
ties in both Germany and Italy had expected that war 
would come at the time of the voyage. They asked me 
if I had not been afraid of it, and if I had not expected 
that hostilities would begin at least by the time that the 
fleet reached the Straits of Magellan? I answered that 
I did not expect it ; that I believed that Japan would 
feel as friendly in the matter as we did ; but that if my 
expectations had proved mistaken, it would have been 
proof positive that we were going to be attacked anyhow 
and that in such event it would have been an enormous 
gain to have had the three months' preliminary prepara- 
tion which enabled the fleet to start perfectly equipped. 
In a personal interview before they left, I had explained 
to the officers in command that I believed the trip would 
be one of absolute peace, but that they were to take ex- 
actly the same precautions against sudden attack of any 
kind as if we were at war with all the nations of the earth ; 
and that no excuse of any kind would be accepted if there 
were a sudden attack of any kind and we were taken 
unawares. . . . 

"The cruise did make a very deep impression abroad. . . . 
But the impression made on our own people was of far 
greater consequence. No Bingle thing in the history of 



Ch. XVI.] THE VOYAGE AROUND THE WORLD 375 

the new United States Navy has done as much to stimu- 
late popular interest and belief in it as the world cruise. 

"I first directed the fleet of sixteen battle-ships to go 
round through the Straits of Magellan to San Francisco. 
From thence I ordered them to New Zealand and Aus- 
tralia, then to the Philippines, China and Japan and 
home through Suez. . . . Admiral Evans commanded 
the fleet to San Francisco ; there Admiral Sperry took 
it. . . . The coaling and other preparations were made 
in such excellent shape by the Department that there 
was never a hitch, not so much as the delay of an hour, 
in keeping every appointment made. All the repairs 
were made without difficulty, the ship concerned merely 
falling out of the column for a few hours, and when the 
job was done steaming at speed until she regained her 
position. Not a ship was left in any port; and there 
was hardly a desertion. As soon as it was known that 
the voyage was to be undertaken men crowded to enlist, 
just as freely from the Mississippi Valley as from the 
seaboard, and for the first time since the Spanish War the 
ships put to sea overmanned — and by as stalwart a 
set of men-of-war's men as ever looked through a port- 
hole, game for a fight or a frolic, but also self-respect- 
ing and with such a sense of responsibility that in all the 
ports in which they landed their conduct was exemplary. 
The fleet practised incessantly during the voyage both 
with the guns and battle tactics and came home a much 
more effective fighting instrument than when it started 
sixteen months before. l . .. . 

"It was not originally my intention that the fleet should 
visit Australia but the Australian Government sent a 

1 For the torpedo boat destroyers incident see Autobiography, 596. 



370 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 

most cordial invitation which I gladly accepted. . . . The 
reception accorded the fleet in Australia was wonderful 
and it showed the fundamental community of feeling 
between ourselves and the great commonwealth of the 
South Seas. The considerate, generous and open-handed 
hospitality with which the entire Australian people 
treated our officers and men could not have been sur- 
passed had they been our own countrymen. . . . 

"The most noteworthy incident of the cruise was the 
reception given to our fleet in Japan. In courtesy and 
good breeding, the Japanese can certainly teach much 
to the nations of the Western world. I had been very 
sure that the people of Japan would understand aright 
what the cruise meant and would accept the visit of our 
fleet as the signal honor which it was meant to be, a proof 
of the high regard and friendship 1 felt and which I was 
certain the American people felt for the great Island Em- 
pire. The event even surpassed my expectations. I 
cannot too strongly express my appreciation of the gen- 
erous courtesy the Japanese showed the officers and crews 
of our fleet and I may add that every man of them came 
back a friend and admirer of the Japanese. On October 
28, 1908, Admiral Sperry wrote me that in Yokohama as 
many as a thousand English-speaking Japanese college 
students acted as volunteer guides. ... In Tokyo there 
were a great many excellent refreshment places, where 
the men got excellent meals and could rest, Himke and 
write letters and in none of these places would they allow 
the men to pay anything though they were more than ready 
to do so. The arrangements were marvellously perfect." l 

1 Autobiography, .?.!_' <-t •</ This citation and the other citations 
which I have made from the Autobiography are from the Macmillan 



Ch. XVI.] THE JAPANESE QUESTION 377 

On the return of the fleet from their voyage round the 
world President Roosevelt on February 22, 1909, ten days 
before he was to give up the cares and delights of office, 
reviewed the fleet, addressing the officers and men in 
fitting words. 1 

President Roosevelt was fully alive to the Japanese 
situation. We cannot let in the Japanese, he said in 
private conversation during May, 1908, while the fleet 
was on its way round the world but before it visited Ja- 
pan. I once thought that we could but I have given up 
that idea. My efforts have been to get the Japanese to 
stop emigration. The agreement which I now have is 
working fairly well but not perfectly. An exclusion Act 
may have to come and that may cause trouble. One 
reason for my desire of the increase of the Navy was the 
Japanese situation. We know what the Japanese are 
saying in their cups and there is a desire on the part of 
a certain class in Japan to go to war with us. But the 
Elder Statesmen are opposed to it. The sending of the 
fleet to the Pacific stopped the Japanese talk of war. 



Co. edition of 1913. George P. Brett wrote to me under date of Dec. 23, 
1921, that the Macmillan Company parted with their publishing rights 
in the Roosevelt Autobiography some two years ago and the reference 
in my manuscript to that book should therefore credit its publication to 
the Messrs. Scribner instead of to the Macmillan Company. 
1 Autobiography, 602. 



CHAPTER XVII 

Nineteen hundred eight was the year for the election 
of a President and it seemed almost a foregone conclusion 
that the Republican candidate could be chosen, and he 
would be named by the Republican Convention which 
met in Chicago during June. No man stood so strong 
with the people as Theodore Roosevelt and no doubt 
remains that he could have been nominated and elected 
by an overwhelming majority. But he insisted publicly 
and privately that on no account whatever would he be 
a candidate. "There has never been a moment," he 
wrote to Lyman Abbott on May 29, "when I could not 
have had the Republican nomination with practical una- 
nimity by simply raising one finger." l There can be no 
question that this statement was absolutely true. Roose- 
velt would not accept the presidency because he had a 
high regard for Washington's example which had dictated 
his pronouncement on election day, 1904, and for the fur- 
ther reason that, as he felt now that the people were back 
of him, they might say that he had prevailed upon their 
support in order to further his own ends should he now 
stand for a third term. But he was in no respect tired 
of his job. "I have had an exceedingly good time," he 
wrote to William Allen White; "I have beeo exceedingly 
well treated by the American people; and I have en- 
joyed the respect of those for whose respect 1 care most." 2 
He would have liked to remain President. He loved 



i Bishop, n. 88. ' Nov. 26, 1907, Bishop, ii. 61. 

378 






Ch. XVII.] ROOSEVELT CHOSE TAFT 370 

power and place and was in no way ashamed to own it. 
"I have finished my career in public life," he wrote to 
E. S. Martin, the editor of Life. "I have enjoyed it 
to the full ; I have achieved a large proportion of what 
I set out to achieve." 1 

Despite many and various influences that were brought 
to bear upon him he was inflexible and resisted every 
attempt to induce him to stand for a third term. But 
as he would not be a candidate himself he could within 
certain limits name his successor. He had an unbounded 
admiration for Elihu Root and thought he would be 
exactly the sort of man he would like to follow him. 
I have never been so impressed with the praise of one 
great man by another as when I have heard Roosevelt 
speak of Root and I may add that this praise was con- 
curred in by the Ambassador of Great Britain to the 
United States, James Bryce. But as Roosevelt wrote 
to Lawrence F. Abbott in 1912, "I found that the West- 
erners would not stand Root." 2 It was exceedingly 
improbable that Root could be nominated and, were he 
placed before the people, his election against Bryan was 
doubtful. Therefore Roosevelt dropped Root. Two 
other men were prominent as candidates, William H. Taft 
and Charles E. Hughes. "I could not have nominated," 
wrote Roosevelt to Abbott in 1912, "an extreme pro- 
gressive or an extreme conservative but I could by a turn 
of the hand have thrown the nomination to either Taft 
or Hughes. The only way to prevent my own nomina- 
tion was for me actively to champion and to force the 
nomination of someone else; I chose Taft rather than 



Bishop, ii. 123. 2 Impressions, 65. 



380 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [190S 

Hughes," ' with the result that there were only two candi- 
dates really at the Chicago convention, Taft and Roose- 
velt. "As a matter of fact," he wrote to Lyman Abbott 
on May 29, "I doubt if Taft himself could be more anx- 
ious than I am that Taft be nominated and that any 
stampede to me be prevented." 2 

The Convention was held in Chicago and was presided 
over with dignity and force during his chairmanship 
by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. 3 Roosevelt wrote to 
Mrs. Lodge on June 19, after Taft's nomination was made : 
"In point of judgment, taste and power it would be 
literally impossible to better either Cabot's words or his 
actions. He was in a peculiar sense the guardian not 
only of the national interests but of my own personal 
honor ; and to do his full duty as guardian it was necessary 
for him effectively to thwart the movements not merely 
of my foes but of the multitude of well-meaning friends 
who did not think deeply or who were not of very sensi- 
tive fiber. It was absolutely necessary that any stam- 
pede should be prevented and that I should not be nomi- 
nated." 4 Five days later he wrote to Senator Lodge 
himself, "On every side I hear of the great success you 
made as chairman. . . . You rendered a great public 
service and you rendered me a personal service." 6 

On June 19 he wrote a letter to Sir George 0. Trevelyan, 
a copy of which he sent to me that shows his intimate 
thought at the time. 



1 Impressions, 66. 2 Bishop, ii. 87. 

1 It met Jump Hi. Lodge mi permanenl chairman. 

* Bishop, ii. 91. James B. Sherman of New York was nominated for 
\ toe President. 
1 Ibid., 92. 



Ch. XVII.] ROOSEVELT AND TAFT 381 

"Well," so Roosevelt wrote, "the convention is over 
and Taft is nominated on a platform which I heartily 
approve. No one can prophesy in politics, and so I can- 
not be sure that we shall elect him, but the chances I 
believe favor it, and most certainly it will show unwisdom 
in the country if he is not elected. For, always except- 
ing Washington and Lincoln, I believe that Taft as Presi- 
dent will rank with any other man who has ever been 
in the White House. 

" It has been a curious contest, for I have had to fight 
tooth and nail against being renominated myself, and 
in the last three weeks it has needed very resolute effort 
on my part to prevent a break among the delegates, which 
would have meant a stampede for me and my nomination. 
I could not have prevented it at all unless I had thrown 
myself heart and soul into the business of nominating 
Taft and had shown to the country that he stood for ex- 
actly the same principles and policies that I did, and that 
I believed with all my heart and soul that under him we 
should progress steadily along the road this administra- 
tion has traveled. He and I view public questions ex- 
actly alike. In fact, I think it has been very rare that 
two public men have ever been so much at one in all the 
essentials of their beliefs and practices. 

" When I made my announcement three years ago last 
November, just after the election, that I would under 
no circumstances again be a candidate, I of course acted 
on a carefully-thought-out and considered theory. Hav- 
ing made it and having given my word to the people at 
large as to what I would do, and other men, including 
Taft, having entered the field on the strength of this 
statement of mine, I never felt the slightest hesitancy, 



382 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 

the slightest wavering, as to the proper course to follow. 
But the developments of the last year or two have been 
so out of the common that at times I have felt a little 
uncomfortable as to whether my announced decision 
had been wise. Yet I think it was wise ; and now I want 
to give you my reasons in full. 

"In the first place, I will freely admit what there is to 
say against it. I do not like any man who flinches from 
work, and I like him none the better if he covers his 
flinching under the title of self-abnegation or renuncia- 
tion or any other phrase, which may mean merely weak- 
ness, or also that he is willing to subordinate great and 
real public interests to a meticulous and fantastic moral- 
ity, in which he is concerned chiefly for the sake of his 
own shriveled soul. There is very much to be said in 
favor of the theory that the public has a right to demand 
as long service from any man who is doing good service 
as it thinks will be useful ; and during the last year or 
two I have been rendered extremely uncomfortable both 
by the exultation of my foes over my announced inten- 
tion to retire, and by the real uneasiness and chagrin 
felt by many good men because, as they believed, they 
were losing quite needlessly the leader in whom they 
trusted, and who they believed could bring to a successful 
conclusion certain struggles which they regarded as of 
vital concern to the national welfare. Moreover, it was 
of course impossible to foresee, and 1 did not foresee, 
when I made my public announcement of my intention, 
thai the leadership I then possessed would continue (as far 

as I am able to tell) unbroken, as lias actually been the 
oe e ; and that the people who believed in me and trusted 
me and followed me would three or four years later still 



Ch. XVII.] ROOSEVELT AND THIRD TERM 383 

feel that I was the man of all others whom they wished 
to see President. Yet such I think has been the case ; 
and therefore, when I felt obliged to insist on retiring 
and abandoning the leadership, now and then I felt ugly- 
qualms as to whether I was not refusing to do what I 
ought to do, and abandoning great work on a mere fan- 
tastic point of honor. 

"These are strong reasons why my course should be 
condemned ; yet I think that the countervailing reasons 
are still stronger. Of course when I spoke I had in view 
the precedent set by Washington and continued ever 
since, the precedent which recognizes the fact that, as 
there inheres in the Presidency more power than in any 
other office in any great republic or constitutional mon- 
archy of modern times, it can only be saved from abuse 
by having the people as a whole accept as axiomatic the 
position that one man can hold it for no more than a lim- 
ited time. I don't think that any harm comes from the 
concentration of power, in one man's hands, provided the 
holder does not keep it for more than a certain, definite 
time, and then returns to the people from whom he 
sprang. In the great days of the Roman Republic no 
harm whatever came from the dictatorship, because 
great as the power of the dictator was, after a compara- 
tively short period he surrendered it back to those from 
whom he gained it. On the other hand, the history of 
the first and second French Republics, not to speak of 
the Spanish-American Republics, not to speak of the 
Commonwealth, in Seventeenth Century England, has 
shown that the strong man, and even the strong man 
who is good, may very readily subvert free institutions 
if he and the people at large grow to accept his continued 



384 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 

possession of vast power as being necessary to good gov- 
ernment. It is a very unhealthy thing that any man 
should be considered necessary to the people as a whole, 
save in the way of meeting some given crisis. Moreover, 
in a republic like ours the vital need is that there shall 
be a general recognition of the moral law, of the law 
which, as regards public men, means belief in efficient 
and disinterested service for the public rendered with- 
out thought of personal gain, and above all without the 
thought of self-perpetuation in office. J regard the mem- 
ories of Washington and Lincoln as priceless heritages 
for our people, just because they are the memories of 
strong men, of men who cannot be accused of weakness 
or timidity, of men who I believe were quite as strong 
for instance as Cromwell or Bismarck, and very much 
stronger than the Louis Napoleon type, who, neverthe- 
less, led careers marked by disinterestedness just as much 
as by strength ; who, like Timoleon and Hampden, in 
very deed, and not as a mere matter of oratory or fine 
writing, put the public good, the good of the people as 
a whole, as the first of all considerations. 

"Now, my ambition is that, in however small away, 
the work I do shall be along the Washington and Lincoln 
lines. While President I have been President, emphat- 
ically; I have used every ounce of power there was in 
the office and I have not cared a rap for the criticisms of 
those who spoke of my 'usurpation of power'; for I 
knew that the talk was all nonsense and that there was 
no usurpation. I believe that the efficiency of this Gov- 
ernment depends upon its possessing a strong central 
executive, and wherever I could establish a precedent 
for Btrength in the executive, as 1 did for instance as re- 



Ch. XVII.] ROOSEVELT'S IDEA OF THE PRESIDENCY 385 

gards external affairs in the case of sending the fleet 
around the world, taking Panama, settling affairs of 
Santo Domingo and Cuba ; or as I did in internal affairs 
in settling the anthracite coal strike, in keeping order in 
Nevada this year when the Federation of Miners threat- 
ened anarchy, or as I have done in bringing the big cor- 
porations to book — why, in all these cases I have felt 
not merely that my action was right in itself, but that 
in showing the strength of, or in giving strength to, the 
executive, I was establishing a precedent of value. I be- 
lieve in a strong executive ; I believe in power ; but I 
believe that responsibility should go with power, and that 
it is not well that the strong executive should be a per- 
petual executive. Above all and beyond all I believe 
as I have said before that the salvation of this country 
depends upon Washington and Lincoln representing the 
type of leader to which we are true. I hope that in my 
acts I have been a good President, a President who has 
deserved well of the Republic ; but most of all, I believe 
that whatever value my service may have comes even 
more from what I am than from what I do. I may be 
mistaken, but it is my belief that the bulk of my country- 
men, the men whom Abraham Lincoln called ' the plain 
people ' — the farmers, mechanics, small tradesmen, 
hard-working professional men — feel that I am in a 
peculiar sense their President, that I represent the democ- 
racy in somewhat the fashion that Lincoln did, that is, 
not in any demagogic way but with the sincere effort 
to stand for a government by the people and for the 
people. Now the chief service I can render these plain 
people who believe in me is, not to destroy their ideal 
of me. They have followed me for the past six or seven 



386 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 

years, indeed for some years previously, because they 
thought they recognized in me certain qualities in which 
they believed, because they regarded me as honest and 
disinterested, as having courage and common sense. 
Now I wouldn't for anything in the world shatter this 
belief of theirs in me, unless it were necessary to do so 
because they had embarked on a wrong course, and I 
could only be really true to them by forfeiting their 
good will. For instance, if they made up their minds 
that they would repudiate their debts, or under a gust 
of emotion decided to follow any course that was wrong, 
1 could show loyalty to them only by opposing them tooth 
and nail, without the slightest regard to any amount of 
unpopularity or obloquy. But this of course isn't what 
I mean when I say I do not want to shatter their belief 
in me. What I mean is that I do not want to make them 
think that after all I am actuated by selfish motives, 
by motives of self-interest, that my championship of 
their cause, that my opposition to the plutocracy, is 
simply due to the usual demagog's desire to pander to 
the mob, or to the no more dangerous, but even more 
sinister, desire to secure self-advancement under the 
cloak of championship of popular rights. Of course I 
may be wrong in my belief, but my belief is that a great 
many honest people in this country who lead hard lives 
are helped in their efforts to keep straight and avoid envy 
and hatred and despair by their faith in me and in the 
principles I preach and in my practice of these principles. 
I would not for anything do the moral damage to these 
people that might come from shattering their faith in 
my personal disinterestedness. A few months ago three 
old back-country farmers turned up in Washington and 



Ch. XVII.] ROOSEVELT AND THE PEOPLE 387 

after awhile managed to get in to see me. They were 
rugged old fellows, as hairy as Boers and a good deal of the 
Boer type. They hadn't a black coat among them, and 
two of them wore no cravats ; that is, they just had 
on their working clothes, but all cleaned and brushed. 
When they finally got to see me they explained that they 
hadn't anything whatever to ask, but that they believed 
in me, believed that I stood for what they regarded as 
the American ideal, and as one rugged old fellow put it, 
'We want to shake that honest hand.' Now this anec- 
dote seems rather sentimental as I tell it, and I do not 
know that I can convey to you the effect the incident 
produced on me ; but it was one of the very many in- 
cidents which have occurred, and they have made me 
feel that I am under a big debt of obligation to the good 
people of this country, and that I am bound not by any 
unnecessary action of mine to forfeit their respect, not 
to hurt them by taking away any part of what they have 
built up as their ideal of me. It is just as I would not 
be willing to hurt my soldiers, to destroy my influence 
among men who look up to me as leader, by needlessly 
doing anything in battle which would give the idea that 
I was not personally brave ; even though some given 
risk might seem a little unnecessary to an outsider. 
However certain I might be that in seeking or accept- 
ing a third term I was actuated by a sincere desire to 
serve my fellow countrymen, I am very much afraid 
that multitudes of thoroughly honest men who have be- 
lieved deeply in me (and some of them, by the way, until 
I consented to run might think that they wished me to 
run) would nevertheless have a feeling of disappoint- 
ment if I did try to occupy the Presidency for three 



388 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 

consecutive terms, to hold it longer than it was deemed 
wise that Washington should hold it. 

"I would have felt very differently, and very much more 
doubtful about what to do, if my leaving the Presidency 
had meant that there was no chance to continue the work 
in which I am engaged and which I deem vital to the 
welfare of the people. But in Taft there was ready to 
hand a man whose theory of public and private duty is 
my own, and whose practice of this theory is what I hope 
mine is ; and if we can elect him President we achieve 
all that could be achieved by continuing me in the office, 
and yet we avoid all the objections, all the risk of creating 
a bad precedent." 

The President used the utmost exertion for Taft's 
election consistent with the dignity of his office. Taft's 
Democratic opponent was William J. Bryan. But he 
was elected receiving 321 electoral votes against 162 for 
Bryan and a plurality of over 1,269,000 in the popular 
vote. 

"Toward the end of his term (the second) the relations 
between Roosevelt and Congress became somewhat 
strained," wrote Charles G. Washburn, a member of the 
House at this time and a devoted friend of Roosevelt's. 
"This was due to a variety of causes. The President was, 
very properly, constantly pressing an elaborate pro- 
gramme of legislation. Congress could inner meet his 
expectations or the expectations oi the people, and the 
legislative body came to feel that its efforts were not 
properly appreciated and thai the Executive held a place 
in the confidence of the people thai properly belonged 
to Congress. The President preferred pretty direct 



Ch. XVIL] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 389 

methods to the arts of diplomacy. I think that the coun- 
try rather enjoyed his controversies with Congress and 
as a rule sided with him." 1 

Whoever writes the story of Roosevelt's seven and 
one-half years of administration must necessarily re- 
count that part of his life, for he so pervaded the admin- 
istration that the two are essentially one. At the outset 
we must bear in mind what William H. Taft wrote of 
him in 1919: Theodore Roosevelt was "the most com- 
manding, the most original, the most interesting and 
the most brilliant personality in American public life 
since Lincoln." 2 He was all of that and a man also of 
signal ability. One gets an idea of a man from a long 
personal and friendly acquaintance and in bearing my 
testimony I represent simply that of a thousand others 
in writing that in all my life I have never met one per- 
sonally with whose ability I have been so impressed. 

Roosevelt was a loveable man. He loved children 
and children were at once attracted to him; he gained 
their confidence and made on them a lasting impression. 
His letters to his own children show the relation of a 
father that many would gladly imitate, but imitation 
of Theodore Roosevelt was impossible. The President 
playing bear with his youngest daughter in an upper 
hall of the White House surprised a martinet on a visit 
who could not comprehend how a man dealing with the 
most serious affairs of life could so unbend. Roose- 
velt could do it in the most natural manner but it is im- 
possible to conceive any other President who occupied 
the White House indulging in such a playful episode. 



1 P. 133. 

1 Life of Roosevelt, Lewis, xxii. 



390 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 

Children are better than books, he said. He preached 
continually to women their duty of bearing children. 
In a noble tribute to the farm and farmer he pleaded that 
the life of the farmer should be made happier and so the 
drift to the city stopped ; nevertheless he declared, 
"There is plenty that is hard and rough and disagreeable 
in the necessary work of actual life." He laid emphasis 
on the fact that the men who tilled the soil fed and clothed 
the towns and cities; but "the best crop is the crop of 
children." 1 

Roosevelt was, in the most appropriate sense of the 
word, a bookish man. "I find reading a great comfort," 
he wrote to Sir George O. Trevelyan. 2 The list of books 
that he had read within two years that he furnished Dr. 
Nicholas Murray Butler and his discussion with Sir 
George 0. Trevelyan of Ferrero's "La Grandeur et 
Decadence de Rome" are amazing from a man in the 
presidential office. He joined in the present of a silver 
loving cup to Trevelyan inscribed, "To the Historian 
of the American Revolution from his friends — Theodore 
Roosevelt, Henry Cabot Lodge and Elihu Root." Tre- 
velyan's History struck him as one of the very few his- 
tories that can be called great and after a re-reading of 
it he came to the conclusion that the historian "had 
painted us a little too favorably." 3 Roosevelt, wrote 
Lawrence F. Abbott, who knew him intimately, "was a 
voracious and omniverous reader." 4 Ho was likewise 



1 Review of Reviews ed., 1201 d onto; also 1681. 
1 Bishop, ii. 142. 

3 Bishop, i. 266, ii. Mi. 168, 166. 

'Impressions, 1S3. He published a1 least 30 book'v 1 1 i -= life of 

• Mi- ur Morris contains about 60,000 words j his African G • Trails, 

about 200,000. Making an i • I 76,000 word , he wrote 2,260,000 



Ch. XVII.] ROOSEVELT OMNIVOROUS READER 391 

a rapid one but his quick perusal did not prevent his 
seizing upon the salient points of any book. He dis- 
cussed Henry Osborne Taylor's "Mediaeval Mind" with 
a scholar in terms common to them both. He desired 
to read all that was written about the Mongols. He was 
a great admirer of Morley's "Gladstone." 1 He was fond 
of Milton, being especially attracted to his prose. He 
told Sir George Trevelyan that he had been reading Taci- 
tus and further said, " You who are so blessed as to read 
all the best of the Greeks or Latins in the original must 
not look down too scornfully upon us who have to make 
believe that we are contented with Emerson's view of 
translations." Apparently he knew well Greek life, as 
he was disposed to agree with Galton in placing the aver- 
age Athenian in point of intellect "above the average 
civilized man of our countries." 2 An author knows his 
own book best and I confess my delight at his knowledge 
of my fifth volume which I knew he had thoroughly read 
amid many distractions. 3 His reference to Martin Chuz- 
zlewit in a speech at Cairo, Illinois, on October 3, 1907 
exhibited the fullness of the presidential mind. The 
region where we are now standing, he said, was the seat 
of Dickens's forlorn "Eden." "It would be simply silly 
to be angry over 'Martin Chuzzlewit,' on the contrary, 
read it, be amused by it, profit by it ; and don't be misled 
by it." I was surprised at his knowledge of a recent "Life 
of Fessenden" whence he derived an animated and full 
account of the Cabinet crisis of 1862. 



words in permanent literary form. It is estimated that during his 
governorship and Presidency he wrote 150,000 letters ; on an average of 
100 words to the letter this amounts to 15 million words. Ibid., 169. 
1 Bishop, i. 268. 2 Bishop, ii. 154, 160. 3 See Mrs. Robinson, 219. 



392 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1908 

This was in 1908 when I was invited to make him a 
visit to hear his criticism of my vi and vii volumes. 
After luncheon at the White House he asked his cousin 
W. Emlen Roosevelt, Francis D. Millet, Clifford Rich- 
ardson and myself to accompany him on the rear veranda 
of the White House. In your last work, he said, you have 
stepped down from your impartial judgment seat of 
the earlier volumes and become something of an advocate. 
During the Civil War you held the scales even, and while 
you have perhaps properly criticised the North for her 
Reconstruction policy you have not blamed the South 
for the course she took that made radical measures possi- 
ble. Her conduct prevented any proper policy. I am 
inclined to think that the XIV amendment plan was 
the best proposed. 

It was a fine day and stimulated by the air and the 
success of his Conservation Conference, which was just 
ending, he talked freely and well. I blame E. L. Godkin 
and Carl Schurz, he declared, because after having sup- 
ported the negro suffrage policy, they condemned the 
results of it. It was all right if they had avowed their 
mistake but that they did not do. They still held to 
the negro suffrage policy as being the best. Even now 
the Evening Post condemns the President's action in the 
Brownsville, Texas matter from purely sentimental rea- 
sons. The negro has been hurt, therefore the President 
is wrong. But Carl Schurz and The Nation never stimu- 
lated the best young men to go into politics and they 
never had any Influence with the crowd. 

It was perhaps all right, he continued, for you to say 
that Carl Schurz was almost an ideal senator, but on that 
level you failed to do justice to Oliver P. Morton. Roose- 



Ch. XVII.J ROOSEVELT, PERSONALLY 393 

velt then told with great spirit and enthusiasm Morton's 
course during the Civil War, speaking of the Copperheads 
as bitterly as if he had been their personal antagonist. 
It was the appreciation of one fighter by another. The 
men at the East, he said, have books written about them 
in good literary style; they receive the adulation of 
writers and so get a larger share of commendation than 
they are entitled to. When talking of Morton the Pres- 
ident said to his cousin, Because Winslow, Lanier & Co. 
advanced money to Morton in his time of trouble I am 
disposed to forgive a member of their firm for saying that 
I am crazy, indulge immoderately in drink and further- 
more that I am an opium fiend. 

There is no foundation whatever for any of the finan- 
cier's alleged charges ; that of immoderate indulgence in 
drink has lasted the longest but has finally been set to 
rest. The truth is that he rarely drank at luncheon and 
that when he drank wine at dinner, he drank with the 
moderation of a gentleman and never to excess. 1 

Next morning the President continued his talk : I 
have not gained the support of the cultivated class and 
there are points where I should have done so. But I 
have received the support of the plain people, of the "one 
suspender men." And yet I have done things that might 
have aroused a demagogic feeling. I have shut the people 
out from the White House grounds in the rear ; I have 
stopped the public receptions and have done a great deal 
in the limitation of others. 

The relations of some of the cultivated class with men 
of wealth were close and it may be regretted that so much 



1 See Bishop, ii. 118. 



394 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1909 

acerbity developed in the conflict which Roosevelt had 
with high finance. He came at them, they thought, 
"with axe and crowbar." l But the fault was more with 
the financial interests than with the President. They 
should have cooperated with him to a certain extent and, 
when expediency would not permit them to go further 
they might have managed matters so that the fighting 
instinct would not have developed in Roosevelt. They 
opposed his re-nomination and re-election in a manner 
irritating and yet the results were abortive. For they 
accomplished naught but an increase of the bitterness, 
as Roosevelt was human and did not love his personal 
opponents. And, on the other hand, it did not contrib- 
ute to the amenity of the discussion for the rich men to 
be told that they were corrupt and if they did not behave 
they would be sent to jail. Nor were they pleased with 
his invention of the Ananias Club in which he put all men 
who, according to him, did not tell the truth. It was 
abundantly easy in the way of retort to point out the 
inconsistencies of Roosevelt himself. No man could 
speak as often and as much as he did covering a series 
of years and be absolutely consistent ; but he was always 
truthful and sincere and the discovery of his inconsisten- 
cies did not in any way affect his hold upon the mass. 

Elihu Root was a good medium between the President 
and the financial interests. Devoted to Roosevelt he 
could at the same time see the point of view of high fi- 
nance and when he said to a wealthy crowd in Now York 
City that the President was "really the great conserva- 
tor of property and rights," • he spoke with B wise fore- 



1 Emerson. Representative Men, Lecture iv. 
■ I am aware that thifl is a quasi-repetition. 



Ch. XVII.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 395 

sight of the future. No stronger statement of the right 
of private property can be found than in Roosevelt's 
public and private utterances. He thoroughly believed 
that the protection of private property and the family 
were the bases of civilization. Thoroughly opposed to 
socialism, the difference between him and the financial 
men was that they believed in a more intense form of 
individualism than he did. He thought that the State 
had certain powers which they denied. He also believed 
that the President did not require a specific authorization 
of the Constitution to act in a manner that he conceived 
to be the welfare of the public. When he talked of bad 
corporations and good corporations, of good men of 
wealth and bad men, the question who should decide 
between the two arose. Roosevelt arrogated to himself 
the decision but at the same time he said, "Our judges, 
as a whole, are brave and upright men." x He believed 
that the reason of the failure of the Grecian, Roman, 
and Italian republics was that when the rich got the 
power, they exploited the poor, and when the poor got 
the power they plundered the rich. He was to stand 
midway between the two and prevent excess. A favor- 
ite expression of his was he desired to give everybody a 
square deal. He quoted from Burke with the assurance 
that such was his policy: "If I cannot reform with 
equity, I will not reform at all. . . . There is a state to 
preserve as well as a state to reform." Roosevelt added, 
"The bulk of our business is honestly done;. . . the 
great mass of railroad securities rest upon safe and solid 



1 Special Message to Congress, Jan. 31, 1908. Review of Reviews ed., 
628. 



396 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1907 

foundations." ' As high finance and Roosevelt agreed 
upon these general propositions they ought to have made 
a basis for a certain cooperation. Of course it is difficult 
to say how far men will cooperate when they apply 
general truths to concrete cases. The President was 
thoroughly satisfied with the Speaker, Joseph Cannon, 
for his work in the Congress that adjourned in 1906, writ- 
ing, "With Mr. Cannon as Speaker the House has accom- 
plished a literally phenomenal amount of good work" 2 ; 
but two years later he was far from being content with 
the Speaker. 

So far as I know his liking for Andrew Jackson first be- 
came public during his trip down the Mississippi River in 
the autumn of 1907, but at the Hermitage where Jackson 
lived and died it became enthusiasm. "Andrew Jackson 
was an American," he said. "I draw a sharp distinction 
between Old Hickory and a great many other Presidents. 
The Hermitage was the home of one of the three or 
four greatest Presidents this Union has ever had. . . . 
Andrew Jackson was a mighty National figure." 3 From 
this time on Roosevelt was possessed with this admira- 
tion that he many times set forth. Before 1907 he con- 
trasted the Washington-Lincoln theory of the presiden- 
tial powers with the Jefferson-Buchanan ; but afterwards 
it became the Jackson-Lincoln example to justify his 
use of the office. He may have been attracted to Jack- 
sou on account of his war agaiusl the financial magnates 
of the country, and through his forceful personality, 4 



1 May 80, 1907, Review oj I . 1266, 1263. 

'Aug. 18, 1906, ibid., 501. 

a Review <•/ /,'• i u w» i d . i 168. 

* See life "f .l.'tokson, BtMett, <hap x.wii ; Charming, History of the 
356, 379, 388, I 11. 



Ch. XVII.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 397 

but it was inconsistent with his admiration for Jackson 
to remark, "I think the worship of Jefferson a discredit 
to my country, " as in my opinion he was, "not even ex- 
cepting Buchanan, the most incompetent chief executive 
we ever had." But Roosevelt always stuck to Lincoln. 
"I like to see in my mind's eye," he said in the White 
House, "the gaunt form of Lincoln stalking through these 
halls." l 

Roosevelt was a broad-minded man. Intensely de- 
voted to the Northern cause he could see the other side. 
Of Lee he said, "General Lee has left us the memory not 
merely of his extraordinary skill as a general, his daunt- 
less courage and high leadership in campaign and battle, 
but also of that sound greatness of soul characteristic 
of those who most readily recognize the obligations of 
civic duty." 2 Many would have joined him in this trib- 
ute to Lee but it was noteworthy that a Republican 
President should speak of Jefferson Davis as the favorite 
son of the South, and should add, "The whole country 
grows to feel the same stern pride in the deeds alike of 
those who fought so valiantly for what they believed to 
be right and triumphed, and of those who fought so val- 
iantly for what they, with equal sincerity, believed to 
be right, and lost." 3 

John Morley,who spent a number of days with Roose- 
velt at the White House, said of him, "He has many of 
Napoleon's qualities — indomitable courage, tireless per- 
severance, great capacity for leadership — and one thing 



1 Historical Essays, 235 ; Life of Roosevelt, Thayer, 273. Regard- 
ing Jefferson see Channing, History of the United States, iv, 248; v. 453; 
John T. Morse, Jefferson, 215, 264, 302. 

2 Bishop, h, 69. 

* Vicksburg, Oct. 21, 1907, Review of Reviews ed., 1442. 



398 ROOSEVELT'S ADMINISTRATION [1909 

that Napoleon never had — high moral purpose!" 
James Bryce said that he had "never in any country 
seen a more eager, high-minded and efficient set of public 
servants, men more useful and creditable to their country 
than the men then doing the work of the American Gov- 
ernment in Washington and in the field." i 

Roosevelt was rarely, if ever, impulsive in action. Sen- 
ator Eugene Hale, who was generally among the Repub- 
lican opposition, said that "in all his very long experience 
in public life he had never known a man who sought coun- 
sel so much as did President Roosevelt. And yet," 
he added, "most people think he is impulsive and won't 
even listen to advice, much less take it." 2 

He was a lover of beauty as his association with Saint 
Gaudens, Francis D. Millet and Charles McKim abun- 
dantly shows. 

Albert J. Beveridge, who knew Roosevelt intimately 
said, "Had he lived in the age of chivalry he would have 
been called Great Heart." 3 More than ten years pre- 
viously Roosevelt himself had written, "Abraham Lin- 
coln is the ideal Great Heart of public life." 4 

Taking him by and large Roosevelt was a great man. 
He would have made an ideal war President. But as 
he himself wrote : "When I left the Presidency I finished 
seven and a half years of administration, during which 
not one shot had been fired against a foreign foe. We 
were at absolute peace and there was no nation in the 
world with whom a war-cloud threatened, no nation in 



1 Life of Roosevelt, Lewis, 258. 

1 A. J. Beveridge's Eulogy, Sat. Eve. Post, Apr. 5, 1919 ; see Henry 
Cabot Lodge's address, Feb. 9, 1919. 47. 

1 Feb. 10, 1919. Boston Ercmng Tr.mtcnpt. * Bishop, u. 115. 



Ch. XVII.] THEODORE ROOSEVELT 399 

the world whom we had wronged, or from whom we had 
anything to fear." His carrying out of "the homely 
old adage," "Speak softly and carry a big stick: you 
will go far" had proved effective during his administra- 
tion. 1 

Roosevelt had a wonderful brain; an indomitable 
capacity for work. His mistakes were few ; his accom- 
plishments many. Rudyard Kipling wrote thus to 
Brander Matthews in 1910: "I saw him for a hectic 
half hour in London and a little at Oxford. Take care of 1 
him. He is scarce and valuable. " 2 



1 The first mention that Bishop found was while he was governor, i. 240. 

2 Bishop, ii. 259. 

I am much indebted to Edward L. Burlingame, Charles Scribner's Sons, 
Joseph B. Bishop and William R. Thayer. 

D. M. Matteson has rendered me valuable assistance in historical re- 
search. I acknowledge the aid of my secretary, Miss Wyman, that of 
Charles K. Bolton, librarian, Miss Wildman, Miss Fowle and Miss Gerald, 
assistants of the Boston Athenaeum. I am indebted to George A. Myers 
of Cleveland for useful suggestions. 



INDEX 



Abbott, L. F., and Boxer indemnity 
fund, 320; on Roosevelt as reader, 
390. 
Abbott, Lyman, and Boxer indemnity 

fund, 319. 
Adams, C. F., on private letters on 

foreign affairs, 252. 
Adams, Henry, on Roosevelt's energy. 
231; on Hay, on St. Louis World 
Fair, 300. 
Adee, A. A., on Panama Revolution, 

272 
Agriculture, and election of 1896, 27 ; 
prosperity, 118; corn crop (1901), 
155 
Aguinaldo, Emilio, and surrender of 
Manila, 96- insurrection, 111, 139, 
192 ; capture, 201 ; takes oath, 
advises peace, 202. 
Alaska, British boundary claim, reason 
for it, 254, 255; Roosevelt and ar- 
bitration, 255 ; convention, Tribunal, 
personnel, 256; Roosevelt's attitude 
and intentions, 257-259; decision, 
conduct of Canadian members, 259. 
Aldrich, N. W., and Dingley Bill, 38; 
Roosevelt on, and trust legislation, 
279, and Hepburn Bill, 325. 
Algeciras Conference, Morocco im- 
broglio, 312 ; Roosevelt's good offices, 
conference, 313, 314; results, 314. 
Alger, Russell, and Spanish War, 59; 
on call for volunteers, 81 ; as scape- 
goat, 83. 
Alverstone, Baron, Alaskan Boundary 

Tribunal, 257, 259. 
American Bridge Company, and 

merger, 145 n. 
American Line, combine, 156. 
Ananias Club, 394. 
Andrew, A. P., on panics, 345. 
Andrews, Samuel, patent and begin- 

ing of Standard Oil, 158. 
Anthracite coal, strike and election of 
1900 140, 239; strike (1902), 236; 



efforts of Mitchell, Hanna, and 
Roosevelt to settle, 236, 237, 245; 
operating companies and leaders, 
bituminous workers and strike, 237 ; 
threatened famine, 238; operators 
refuse to treat, 238, 239 ; Roosevelt's 
futile conference, 239; Cleveland's 
suggestion, 240 ; miners and return 
pending a commission, 241 ; pro- 
posed federal investigation and 
extra-constitutional action, 241 ; vio- 
lence, state troops in region, 242 ; 
commission agreed to, personnel, 
243-246 ; return of miners, 246 ; re- 
port of commission, recognition of 
union, 246, 247; premanent results 
of commission, 247. 

Arbitration, McKinley and British 
treaty, 40; rejected by Senate, 41. 

Arid lands. See Reclamation. 

Army, Brownsville affair, 338-340; 
and Roosevelt, 366, 369 ; Roosevelt 
and preparedness, 367, 368. See 
ateo Philippines ; Spanish War. 

Art, Roosevelt and, 398. 

Atlantic Transport Company, combine, 
156. 

Australia, and American battleships, 
375. 

Austria-Hungary, and American-Span- 
ish crisis, 64. 

Aylesworth, A. B., Alaskan Boundary 
"Tribunal, 257, 259. 

Bacon, Robert, in Cuba, 365. 

Baer, G. F., and coal strike, 237, 239, 

245. 
Baker, R. S., on agricultural prosperity, 

118. 
Balfour, Arthur, on Venezuelan affair, 

249 ; and Alaskan boundary, 257. 
Banks, chain banking and panic of 

1907, 348. 
Barney, C. T., and panic of 1907, 

362. 



401 



402 



INDEX 



Beaupre, A. M., and canal treaty, 267, 
272. 

Beveridge, A. J., on Hanna, 290; on 
rise of Roosevelt Period, 322 : and 
Meat Inspection Act, Life of Mar- 
shall, 335 ; on Roosevelt as Great 
Heart, 398. 

Bigelow, John, on battle of San Juan 
Hill, 85. 

Bill of Rights, Philippine, 199. 

Bishop, J. B., on Roosevelt and coal 
strike, 247 ; acknowledgment to, 
399 n. 

Blanco, Ramon, Cuban policy, 52; 
and Cervera's fleet, 88, 89, 95. 

Bland, R. P., presidential candidacy 
(1896), 17. 

Bliss, C. N., on Hanna's presidential 
candidacy, 287 ; and campaign of 
1904, 293. 

Blount, J. H., on Philippines, 212. 

Bolton, C. K., acknowledgment to, 
399 n. 

Boston Herald, on Standard Oil and 
big business, 157. 

Boutelle, C. A., on Congress and war 
feeling, 55, 60. 

Boxer uprising, Boxer society, progress, 
127 ; siege of legations at Peking, 
128-130; relief, 130; attitude and 
achievement of American adminis- 
tration, 130, 131 ; southern viceroys 
and, 131 ; partial cancellation of 
American indemnity, 319-321. 

Brewer, D. J., Northern Securities 
decision, 224 ; on Booker Washington 
incident, 228. 

Bridge, J. H., on Jones, 152. 

Brooklyn, battle of Santiago, 91, 92. 

Brown, H. B., in Northern Securities 
decision, 224 n. 

Brownsville affray, Roosevelt's action, 
338-340. 

Bryan, W. J., free-silver speech 
presidential nomination (1896), 18; 
campaign, 20-22, 2S ; and disoon- 
tent as issue, 27 ; defeat. 29 ; and 
Spanish peace treaty, 111, 136; and 
issues in 1900, 135; renominati on, 
136; in campaign, anti-Imperialism, 
136-138. 112: defeat, 143; at 
Governors' Convention, on "twi- 
light zone," 361 ; defeat (1008), 888 

Bryce, James, on peoplo as final in 
bunul, 61 ; and Root, 214 ; on Etool 



215 n. ; on social influences on 
politics, 256 ; on fortification of 
Panama Canal, 263 , on Canal as 
achievement, 276-278 ; on Roose- 
velt as diplomatist, 315 n. ; on 
Roosevelt's administration, 398. 

Buenos Ayres, Root's visit, 343. 

Buffalo, Exposition, assassination of 
McKinley, 169-171. 

Bunau-Varilla, Philippe, and Panama 
Revolution, 268 ; on United States 
and Revolution, 270 ; canal treaty, 
275 ; on work on canal, 276. 

Bureau of Corporations, creation, 296. 

Burlingame, E. L., acknowledgment 
to, 399 n. 

Burton, T. E., and offer of senatorship 
(1897), 34; and Hepburn Bill, 325. 

Bushnell, Asa, and senatorial appoint- 
ment of Hanna, 34, 35. 

Butler, N. M., and Congress of Arts 
and Science, 301. 

Butterworth, Benjamin, and Hanna, 10. 

CABINET, Hanna and portfolio, 30, 34 ; 
Sherman's appointment, 31-34, 41 ; 
Hay in, 124; Root in, 184, 195, 
311; Roosevelt and, 219. 233, 311; 
Department of Commerce and Labor, 
296. 

California, Japanese question, 341, 371, 
373, 377. 

Cainbon, Jules, and American-Spanish 
crisis, 63 ; and protocol of Spanish 
War, 97, 100, 101 ; Root on, 97 n. 

Canada. See Alaska. 

Cannon, J. G., and Roosevelt. 396. 

Carlisle, J. G., on postponement of 
gold standard measure, 36. 

( 'arnegie, Andrew, as iron master. 1 Is ; 
career and character, 145-148; and 
merger, 148, 153; and his subor- 
dinates, 152, 152 'i.; and peace, 153; 
it 1 lies of career, 168; on Booker 
Washington, 228. 

Carnegie Steel Company, and merger, 
145, 148. 

Carter ( J. C, on Panama Revolution, 
273. 

Cervera, Pasqual, cruise, at Santiago. 
82 ; sortie and battle, 88-94 ; on 
conduct of Americans. 94. 

Chadwiek, F. E.. en Cuban insurgents, 

46; value .if book, •*>»> si '... 

on Main* inquiry, 50; on Spanish 



INDEX 



403 



procrastination, 54 ; on Santiago 
expedition, 85 n., 86 n. ; on the 
Oregon voyage, 98 n. ; on acquiring 
Philippines, 105. 

Chain banking and panic of 1907, 348. 

Chamberlain, D. H., on Panama 
Revolution, 272. 

Chamberlain, Joseph, and Alaskan 
boundary, 257. 

Chamberlain, L. T., on Panama Revo- 
lution, 273. 

Charles Scribners' Sons, acknowledg- 
ment to, 399 n. 

Charleston, Exposition, Roosevelt at, 
231. 

Chicago, Hanna on stump in, 141. 

Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy Rail- 
road. See Northern Securities. 

Chichester, Sir Edward, at Manila 
Bay, 80. 

China, foreign attitude, American trade 
and spheres of influence, 125 ; Hay 
and open door, 126 ; Boxer uprising, 
127-131 ; partial concellation of 
American indemnity, 319-321. 

Ch'ing, Prince, on American Boxer 
indemnity reliquishment, 320. 

Civic Federation, Hanna in, 238. 

Civil Service reform, Hanna's attitude, 
3, 175; McKinley and, 174, 175; 
under Roosevelt, 336. 

Clarendon, Lord, on Spanish procras- 
tination, 58. 

Clark, C. E., Oregon voyage, 98 n. 

Clark, E. E., Anthracite Coal Com- 
mission, 243, 246. 

Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, abrogation, 
261. 

Cleveland, Grover, on postponement 
of gold standard measure, 36 ; and 
McKinley, 36, 39; and Cuban 
Insurrection, 44, 45 ; and Hawaii, 
113 ; and anthracite coal strike, 240, 
241, 245 ; and candidacy (1904), 293 ; 
and old-age pension, 297 n. 

Cleveland, Hay and the Vampire Club, 
120, 121 ; oil refineries, development 
of Standard Oil, 158-160. 

Coal. See Anthracite. 

Coin's Financial School, 22, 23. 

Colombia, rejection of canal treaty, 
266-268. See also Panama Canal. 

Colonies. See Imperialism. 

Commerce, American invasion of 
Europe, 117; increase of exports, 



118: American, in China and open 
door, 125, 126 ; Morgan's steamship 
combine, 156; Department created, 
296. See also Railroads ; Tariff ; 
Trusts. 

Concas y Palau, V. M., on naval battle 
of Santiago, 95. 

Conger, E. H., and Boxer siege of 
Peking, 12S-130. 

Congress, Fifty-fourth: and Cuba, 44. 
— Fifty-fifth: Hanna's appointment 
as senator, 30-35 ; extra session, 
silver in, 36; tariff, 37-39; and 
British arbitration treaty, 41 ; 
Cuban belligerency, 46 ; Proctor's 
Cuban speech, 51-53 ; war feeling. 
54, 55 ; Cuban intervention resolu- 
tions, Teller Amendment, 65-67; 
and Cuban Republic, uproar, 68; 
declaration of war, 69 ; thanks to 
Dewey, 74 ; war finances, 82 ; 
treaty of peace, 110, 136; Hawaii, 
113. 

Fifty-sixth: gold standard act, 
119 ; Puerto Rico, Foraker Act, 176; 
Cuba, Piatt Amendment, 179-181 ; 
Philippines, Spooner Amendment, 
185, 200, 201 ; Hay-Pauncefote 
draft treaty, 261, 262. 

Fifty-seventh: Philippines, 201 
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 262 
isthmian canal route, 263-266 
reclamation, 354. — Fifty-eighth 
Cuban reciprocity, 183 ; canal treaty 
with Panama, 275 ; railroads, Elkin 
Act, 296, 323; Department of 
Commerce and Labor, 296. 

Fifty-ninth: complexion, 295; old- 
age pension, 297 n. ; railroads, Hep- 
burn Act, 323-334 ; meat inspection 
and pure food, 334-336 ; employers' 
liability, 337. — Sixtieth: and 

Roosevelt, 388. 

Congress of Arts and Science, 301 n. 

Conservation, Governors' Convention 
on conserva tion, 360, 363 ; division 
of powers and control, 361-363; 
judicial support of policy, 363. See 
also Forest reserves ; Reclamation. 

Consular service, reform, 336. 

Coolidge, A. C, on Puerto Rico, 176; 
on Cuba, 177 ; on lack of exploitation 
of Philippines, 1S6; on results of 
American rule in Philippines, 215. 

Coolidge, L. A., on Piatt, 160. 



404 



INDEX 



Corn, crops (1900-2), 155 n. ; export 
(1870-1900), 162 n. 

Corporations, Bureau created, 296. 
See also Trusts. 

Cortelyou, G. B., and Hanna's presi- 
dential candidacy, 286 ; as campaign 
manager, and contributions, 293 ; 
Secretary of Commerce and Labor, 
297 ; and panic of 1907, 348. 

Cotton, export (1870-1900), 162 n. 

Cox, J. D., on probabilities (1896), 28; 
and Spanish mission, 42 ; and 
Spanish War, 56. 

Crane, W. M., and campaign of 1904, 
293. 

Crist6bal Col6n, battle of Santiago, 
91, 92. 

Croly, Herbert, as Hanna's biographer, 
8 ; on campaign of 1896, 26 ; on 
Hanna on stump, 140 ; on mandate 
of election of 1900, 144. 

Cuba, Teller Resolution on, American 
renunciation, 66, 70, 71 ; Spain 
relinquishes, 97, 99, 110; war debt 
in peace negotiations, 101, 110; 
American attitude and admini-tni- 
tion, 177, 182, 183; sanitation. 178; 
population, education, training for 
self-government, 179 ; relations with 
United States, Piatt Amendmenl 
179-181, 183; inauguration of civil 
government, Root on results, l^L' 
reciprocity with, 182, 183; dis- 
turbances, American intervention 
and control, 364-366. <S'ee also 
Spanish War. 

Cullom, S. M., on MeKinley and Con 
gress, 172; on Hsy-Pauneefote 
treaties, 263 ; on Hanna and Panama 
tali 265; on Hoar and Panama 
Revolution, 274; on Roosevell and 
trust regulation, 295. 

Cunard Line, and combine, 156. 

Dalzei.l, John, and tariff, 38. 

Davis, A. P., and reclamation, 355 n 

Davis, C. K., peace commissioner, 101 , 
and Philippines. L02. 

Davis, K. II., on Puerto Rico expedi- 
tion. 06, 

Day, W. R., as Assistant Secretary oi 
State, 41, bcci. mrs Secretary, i_', 

on de LAnie incident, 42; and 
Proctor's Cuban tpeeoh, 68; dis- 
patch oil raoonoentration, 53; on 



ultimatum, 54 ; and protocol, 97, 
100; peace commissioner, 101; and 
Plulippines, 104, 108 ; in Northern 
Securities decision, 224 n. 

Debt, public, Spanish War loan, 82. 

Democratic Party. See Congress ; 
Elections. 

Denby, Charles, Philippine Commis- 
sion, 191, 193. 

Department of Commerce and Labor, 
creation, Bureau of Corporations, 
296. 

Department of State. See Day, W. R. ; 
Hay, John; Root, Elihu, Sherman, 
John. 

Depew, C. M., on Hanna and Panama 
Canal, 265 n. ; and Hepburn Bill, 
325 n. 

Dewey, George, appointment to 
Asiatic Squadron, 69, 70; war 
preparations, 70, 71 ; battle of 
Manila Bay, 71-74 ; honors, 74, 78 ; 
on his officers and men, 75; effect 
of victory, 75-78; blockade of 
Manila, and Germans, 78-80; sur- 
render of city, 96 ; and acquisition 
of Philippines, 103 ; on insurrection, 
111; Philippine Commission, 191, 
193; and Venezuelan affair, 251. 

Dick, Charles, on Hanna and Panama 
Canal, 265 n. 

Diedrichs, Otto von, at Manila Bay, 
79. 80. 

Dingley, Nelson, tariff bill, 37-39; 
and Treasury portfolio, 38; and up- 
roar in House, 68; war finances, s.'. 

Dingley Tariff Act, 37-39 ; rates under, 
39; reciprocity under, 173. 
itent, as issue in wo, 27. 

Division of powers, Bryan and Roose- 
velt on "twilight /.one," 361-363. 
Dolliver, J, !'., on Hanna on stump, 141. 

Dominion Line, combine, 156. 

"Dooley," on Buffalo Exposition, 170; 

on Imperialism. 206. 
Donne, P. I*. N<< "Dooley." 

EdONOinc <■ SUITION8, revival and 

! m | L887 22), hi ; revival of 

industry, 117; as issue in 1200, 138, 
140, 148; speculative mania (1201), 

164, 165, l ">7 ; depression of L203, 

157; McKinley's second inaugural 

162; rise of ElooseveH Period, 

823 meat inspection and pine food 



INDEX 



405 



laws, 334-336. See also Agricul- 
ture ; Commerce ; Conservation ; Fi- 
nances ; Labor ; Trusts. 

Education, in Cuba, 179 ; promotion 
in Philippines, 199. 

Edward VII., on Roosevelt and Russo- 
Japanese peace negotiations, 307. 

El Caney, battle, S5-87. 

Elections, 189G: Hanna and Mc- 
Kinley's candidacy, 4 ; McKinley's 
candidacy and financial failure, 11 ; 
Hanna 's efforts for McKinley's nom- 
ination, 12 ; silver question in Re- 
publican Convention, 13-16 ; Re- 
publican nominations, 16 ; Hanna's 
attitude toward campaign, 17, 18 ; 
Democratic Convention, free silver 
and Bryan's nomination, 17, 18 ; 
silver and tariff as issues, 18-20 ; 
party secessions, 19 ; Bryan's cam- 
paign, 20-22 ; free silver literature, 
22 ; Hanna's conduct of campaign, 
23 ; Republican campaign and litera- 
ture, 24, 26; McKinley in campaign, 
24-26 ; period of Republican 
doubt, 26, 27 ; sectarian attitude, 
influence of crops, discontent as 
issue, 27 ; period of Republican 
ascendancy, 28 ; results, 29. 

1900: Republican platform, 

Philippines, McKinley's renomina- 
tion, 132, 133 ; Roosevelt's nomina- 
tion for Vice-President, 133-135; 
Democratic Convention, free silver 
and anti-Imperialism, 135, 136 
issues, Imperialism, 136-139 
Hanna as campaign manager, 139 
and coal strike, 140, 238, 239 
Hanna on stump, 140, 141 ; Roose- 
velt on stump, 141 ; Bryan on 
stump, Democratic strange bed- 
fellows, 142 ; influence of economic 
conditions, results, 143 ; mandate 
for business expansion, 144 ; and 
Philippine Insurrection, 201. 

1904' Hanna as timber, his 
support, 279-281, 286-288; Ohio 
indorsement incident, 281-284 ; 
labor and Roosevelt, 285 ; Hanna's 
attitude toward candidacy, 286-288, 
291 ; Roosevelt's confidence in 
renomination, 288; Hanna's death, 
289; Roosevelt nominated, hie 
letter of acceptance, Democratic 
nomination, issue, 292 ; campaign 



contribution personalities, 293-295; 
results, 295; as trust regulation 
mandate, 296. 

1908: Roosevelt's disclaimer of 
candidacy (1904), 295; his refusal 
to be a candidate, his reasons, 378- 
388; Republican Convention, Taft 
as Roosevelt's candidate, 379-381 ; 
result, 388. 

Electricity, and Buffalo Exposition, 
169. 

Eliot, C. W., and Cuban teachers, 
179 ; on Roosevelt, 232. 

Elliott, C. B., on beginning of Philip- 
pine Insurrection, 111 7J. ; litera- 
ture on Philippines, 183 n. 

Employers' liability, interstate 
commerce acts, 337. 

Evans, R. D., on battle of Santiago, 
91; at the battle, 94; command in 
battleship voyage, 375. 

Exports, increase, 118; development of 
petroleum, 162; grain, cotton, and 
petroleum (1870-1900), 162 n. 

Fairbanks, C. W., on Hanna, 290. 

Finances, big interests and Roosevelt, 
224, 227, 296, 299, 333, 351-353, 
394-396. See also Economic condi- 
tions ; Money ; Panics ; Trusts. 

Flagler, H. M., and beginning of 
Standard Oil, 158. 

Flour, export (1870-1900), 162 n. 

Food, pure food law, 336. 

Foraker, J. B., and silver, 13; and 
Bushnell, 34 ; Puerto Rico bill, 
176; and Hanna, 281; on Hanna, 
290; and Hepburn Bill, 325; and 
Brownsville affair, 340. 

Foraker Act, 176. 

Forbes, W. C, on American rule in 
Philippines, 212. 

Forest reserves, creation, 358 ; ad- 
ministration, 363. 

Foster, J. W., and Spanish mission, 
42; on Spanish War as unnecessary, 
64 n. ; on Hawaii, 112, 113 ; on Alas- 
kan boundary, 259; on Panama 
Revolution, 273. 

Foulke, W. D., on McKinley and 
Civil Service reform, 174 ; on reform 
under Roosevelt, 337. 

Fowle, Miss, acknowledgment to, 399 n. 

Fox, G. L., on Panama Revolution, 
273. 



406 



INDEX 



France, Anatole, on battle of Manila 
Bay, 77, 78. 

France, and American-Spanish crisis, 
64; and Spanish War, 76-78; and 
blockade at Manila, 79 ; and open 
door, 126. See also Algeciras Con- 
ference. 

Friars' lands in Philippines, 206. 

Frick, H. C, as iron master, 118, 153 ; 
and Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. 
purchase, 348-350. 

Frye, W. P., peace commissioner, 101 ; 
and Philippines, 102. 

Fuller, M. W., Northern Securities 
dissent, 225 n. ; Knight case, 226 n. 

Funston, Frederick, captures Agui- 
naldo, Roosevelt on, 201. 

Gage, L. J., Treasury portfolio, 34 ; 
retirement, 219 n. 

Garfield, J. A., and silver, 14. 

Gary, E. II., as head of steel trust, 151 ; 
and Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. 
purchase, 348-350. 

General Electric, and panic, 347. 

Gerald, Miss, acknowledgment to, 
399 n. 

Germany, and American-Spanish crisis, 
64 ; and Spanish War, 76 ; and 
Manila blockade, 79, HO; and 
Philippines, 110; and open door. 
126; Kiaochow Bay, 248 n. See 
also Algeciras Conference ; Vene- 
zuela ; Wilholm II. 

Gibbs, Philip, on war, 57. 

Gloucester, in battle of Santiago, 91, 92. 

Godkin, E. L., and Reconstruction, 
392. 

Goethals, G. W., and Panama Canal, 
277. 

Gold Democrats in campaign of 1896, 
19. 

Gold standard, naming in Republican 
platform, 15; McKinley'a post- 
ponement <>f measure, 86, 119; act, 

119. See also Silver. 

Gompor;. Samuel, and Roosevelt, 286. 

Cordis, W. C.i and conquest of yellow- 
fever, 178; sanitation of Canal 
278. 
Governors' Convention, 360; effect, 
363. 

W. I! , and -tril merger, 154. 
Robert, OH BufTulu Exposition, 
109. 



Gray, George, peace commissioner, 
101; and Philippines, 104, 105, 110, 
1S9 ; opinion on American rule in 
Philippines, 205 ; Anthracite Coal 
Commission, 246. 

Great Britain, Democratic denuncia- 
tion (1896), 18, 23 ; and international 
bimetallism, 37 ; draft general ar- 
bitration treaty, 40 ; and Ameri- 
can-Spanish crisis, 64 ; and Spanish 
War, 76 ; and Manila blockade, 78 ; 
and Philippines, 109, 110; and open 
door, 126 ; Venezuelan affair, 247- 
250, 253 ; Roosevelt's attitude, 253, 
260 ; Roosevelt on navy as peace 
factor, 260 ; abrogation of Clayton- 
Bulwer Treaty, 261-263; and 
Russo-Japanese peace negotiations, 
308 ; and Algeciras Conference, 
mutual fear of Germany, 312. See 
also Alaska. 

Great Northern Railroad. See 
Northern Securities. 

Great Heart, Roosevelt as, 398. 

Greene, F. V., and acquiring Philip- 
pines, 103. 

Guam, ceded to United States, 97, 
99, 110. 

Hadley, A. T., at Berlin University 
Centenary, 316. 

Hague Tribunal, Venezuelan case, 251, 
253. 

Hale, E. E., on Henna, 289. 

Hale. Eugene, and Philippines, 111; 
on Roosevelt, 398. 

Halifax Fisheries Arbitration, 259. 

Hamburg-American Line, and combine, 
156. 

Hanna, M. A., career and character, 
1—10 ; early years in politics, 2. I 
business man, 2, 4 ; and Civil Sen - 
ice reform, 3, 175 ; in national 
conventions, 4 ; and money in 
Polities, 5-7; temperance, 6; and 
literature. 7; morals, biography, 

8 . persona] relations with McKinley, 
9, in. L3; and tariff, 10; Large- 
heartedness, 10; and MeKinley's 

financial failure. 11; efforts for 
McHinlsy'a nomination. 12, 13; 

and silver Question, 13-16; En 

Campaign, SJ chairman of National 
Committee, L7 19, 23. 26. 30; and 

silver as issue, 19; and Cabinet, 



INDEX 



407 



30, 34 ; senatorship and Sherman's 
Cabinet appointment, 30-35 ; 
McKinley's visit (1897), 42; and 
war sentiment, 56, 64 ; and Hay and 
English mission, 123 ; and Roose- 
velt's nomination for Vice-President, 
133, 134; in campaign of 1900, 
chairmanship, on stump, 139-141 ; 
and coal strike (1900), 140, 238, 239 ; 
advice to Roosevelt, 220, 221 ; and 
organized labor, 237, 280, 288, 290 
and coal strike (1902), 238, 244, 245 
and route of isthmian canal, 264 
265; and Panama Revolution, 271 
and Roosevelt's trust attitude, 279 
labor and other political support, 
279-281, 286, 288; Ohio indorse- 
ment incident, 281-284 ; personal re- 
lations with Roosevelt, 2S4 ; reelec- 
tion to Senate, 285 ; attitude toward 
presidential candidacy, 286-288, 291 ; 
and Roosevelt as leaders, 288 ; 
death, Roosevelt and last illness, 
289; tributes, 289, 290; end of a 
dynasty, 291. 

Harlan, J. M., Northern Securities 
decision, 224 ; in Knight case, 226 n. ; 
as arbitrator, 259. 

Harper, W. R., and Congress of Arts 
and Science, 301. 

Harriman, E. H., contest for Northern 
Pacific, 155 ; and campaign of 
1904, 294 ; and rate legislation, on 
venal government, 331 ; and panic of 
1907, 352. 

Harrison, Benjamin, and Hawaii, 112. 

Hart, Sir Robert, on Boxer uprising, 
127. 

Harvard University, and Cuban teach- 
ers, 179 ; Roosevelt at Commence- 
ment, 232. 

Hawaii, revolt and annexation treaty, 
112; area and population, 112 n. ; 
withdrawal of treaty, republic, 113; 
annexation by joint resolution, 113. 

Hay, John, on McKinley in campaign 
of 1896, 25 n. ; on Hanna as cam- 
paign manager, 30; on Sagasta, 47 
and war, 58 ; on Spanish procrasti- 
nation, 59 ; on Dewey's victory, 74 
and acquisition of Philippines, 102 
106, 110; Secretary of State, 102 n. 
124; on Hawaii, 114; character 
120, 300 ; Vampire Club, 120, 121 
as historian, 121-123; in politics. 



English mission, 123 ; and McKinley, 
124, 125 ; culture, 124 ; open door 
policy, 126 ; and Boxer uprising, 
129-131 ; in campaign of 1900, 139, 
143 ; Roosevelt's tributes, 232, 310; 
on Roosevelt, 233 ; on Alaskan 
boundary, 254, 258 ; and abrogation 
of Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 261-263 ; 
and Senate, attempt to resign, 261, 
262 ; on canal route, 263 ; canal 
treaty with Colombia, 266 ; and 
rejection of it, 267 ; and Panama 
Revolution, 274 ; canal treaty with 
Panama, 275 ; on Roosevelt as 
gentleman, 299 ; and St. Louis World 
Fair, 300 ; death, on his own career, 
310. 

Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, 275. 

Hay-Herran Treaty, Colombia's re- 
jection, 266, 267. 

Hay-Pauncefote treaties, first, criticism 
and rejection, 261 ; second, fortifica- 
tion of canal, 262, 263. 

Hearst, W. R., Harriman on, 332. 

Heinze, F. A., and panic of 1907, 352. 

Henry of Prussia, Prince, on Cuba, 
70. 

Hepburn, W. P., railroad rate legisla- 
tion, 323. 

Hepburn Act, 323-325; justice of it, 
325-331 ; big business and, 331-333; 
public support, 333. 

Herrick, M. T. f and McKinley's 
financial failure, 11 ; election as 
governor, 285. 

Herschell, Lord, and Alaskan boundary, 
254. 

Higgins, F. W., campaign for governor, 
294. 

Hill, J. J., contest for Northern Pacific, 
155; Northern Securities, 221-226; 
and Roosevelt, 222, 223. 

Hoar, G. F., and acquisition of Philip- 
pines, 103, 111 ; on Bryan and 
Imperialism, 136 ; as anti-Imperial- 
ist, 189; Roosevelt on, 232; on 
Hanna and Panama Canal, 264; 
and Panama Revolution, 273, 274. 

Hobart, G. A., vice-presidential nomi- 
nation, lfi; elected, 29; and war, 
60, 63; death, 133. 

Hobson, R. P., exploit, 98 n. 

Holleben, Barnn von, and Venezuelan 
affair, 250, 251. 

Holmes, O. W., appointment and 



408 



INDEX 



Northern Securities decision, 225 ; 
and Alaskan boundary, 257. 

Hooker, Richard, Roosevelt's knowl- 
edge, 338. 

Hughes, C. E., candidacy for governor, 
332 ; and presidential candidacv 
(1908), 380. 

Ide, H. C, Philippines Commission, 
196. 

Imperialism, development of decision 
to acquire Philippines, 100-107 ; 
Commissioner Gray's argument 
against, 104, 105 ; justice of decision 
considered, 107-110, 112; Repub- 
lican platform on Philippines, 132 ; 
as issue (1900), 13G-139 ; McKinley's 
aim, 184-1S7; anti-Imperialists 
considered. Ls7-190; Root as colo- 
nial minister, 195 ; constitutionality, 
206. See also Philippines. 

Indiana, battle of Santiago, 91. 

Industry. See Economic conditions. 

Infanta Maria Teresa, battle of 
Santiago, 91, 92. 

Inland Waterways Commission, 360. 

Interstate Commerce Commission, 
and railroad rates, 323-325 ; justice 
of power, 325-334. See also Rail- 
roads. 

Iowa, battle of Santiago, 91. 

Ireland, John, and Spanish War, 62. 

Iron and steel, revival of industry, 117 ; 
American steel rails, 117; Carnegie 
ae master, l is ; effects of competitive 
system. Ill; inception of m 
145 ; career and character of < iarne- 

gie, 145 148; ('anionic Works and 

merger 148; terms of merger, n 
149, L56; results of merger, 150- 
153, 156 ; Rod efeller interest 
merger, ore fields, 157. 

Irrigatii in. >'> ■ 1 1 I' nrition. 

Isthmian fcran it. See Panama I 
Italy, and American-Spanish cri 

I open door, 120; Venezuelan 
affuir, 247. 

im \\i>n w I' iosei alt's appreci- 
ation 
Jamas, G. vl . on reclamation, 853, 

Japan, ai 'I Manila bloel ada 7fl 
and open door, 126; attitude and 

VOyaga of American batti- 



370-374, 377; reception of fleet, 

376. See also Russo-Japanese War. 
Japanese, Roosevelt and, in United 

States, 341, 371, 372, 377; basis of 

problem, 373. 
Jefferson, Thomas, and Imperialism, 

200 ; Roosevelt on, 397. 
Jette. L. A., Alaskan Boundary 

Tribunal, 257, 259. 
Jingoism, fear of Roosevelt's, 364. 
Joint High Commission, and Alaskan 

boundary, 254, 255. 
Jones, W. B., as iron master, 152. 
Judiciary, Roosevelt on, 395. 
Jusserand, J. J., and Morocco, 314. 

Kansas, prosperity, 118. 

Kasson, J. A., reciprocity treaties, 

173. 
Keneko, Baron, on Roosevelt and 

peace negotiations, 307. 
Kentucky, in election of 1896, 29. 
Ketteler, Baron von, murdered, 128. 
Keystone Bridge Works, beginning, 

i if.. 
Kiaochow Bay, German lease. 248 n. 
Kipling, Rudyard, on Roosevelt, 399. 
Klondike, gold discovery and Alaskan 

boundary, 255. 
Knickerbocker Trust Company, failure, 

347. 
Knox, P. C, and Northern Securities, 
224 ; and coal strike, 241 ; and 

Panama, 271 ; on railroad rate 

legislation, 324; vote on Hepburn 

Bill, 325. 
Kohlsaat, H. H., and McKinley's 

financial failure, 11. 
Komura, Baron, peace conference, 

306, 307, 309. 

Labor. Roosevelt on organized, 235; 

Mitchell on orj 1,2 6; Sanna'a 

mi 288, 290; political 

support of H i Roosevelt 

igonisea organised, 285 ; Depart- 

I lyera' lia- 
bility in interstate oommeroe, 337. 
Set ite coal 

Ladroni v • I hiam. 

Lake Superior Consolidated Iron Mines, 

and merger, ] 

r K., and n lamat 

Lansdowne, Lord, on Venezuelan affair, 
250. 



INDEX 



409 



Latan6, J. H., on Cuba, 178 ; on 
constitutionality of colonial govern- 
ment, 206. 

Lazear, J. W., martyr in cause of 
humanity, 178. 

Lee, Fitzhugh, and the Maine, 47 ; 
and delay in war message, 61. 

Lee, R. E., Roosevelt on, 397. 

Leo XIII., and Spanish War, 62. 

Le Roy, J. A., on beginning of Philip- 
pine Insurrection, 111 n. 

Lewis, W. D., on Roosevelt and con- 
servation, 363 n. 

Leyland Line, combine, 156. 

Life, on Roosevelt and panic, 345. 

Lincoln, Abraham, Roosevelt on, 298, 
381, 384, 397, 398. 

Lloyd, H. D., on Standard Oil, 165. 

Lodge, H. C, and silver, 13, 15 ; and 
war feeling, 58 ; on Congress and 
diplomacy, 60 ; on battle of Manila 
Bay, 73 ; on battle of San Juan Hill, 
86 ; on Washington and Santiago ex- 
pedition, 87 ; and Imperialism, 139 ; 
as chairman of Philippine Committee, 
193 n. ; on administration of Philip- 
pines, 200 ; Alaskan Boundary 
Tribunal, 256-259 ; on railroads and 
national development, 322 ; vote on 
Hepburn Bill, 325 ; Roosevelt on, 327 ; 
on power to fix railroad rates, 327- 
330 ; as chairman of Republican 
Convention (1908), 380; and Tre- 
velyan, 390. 

Lome, E. D. de, indiscretion and recall, 
48. 

London Times, on Boxer uprising. 129. 

Long, J. D., on destruction of the 
Maine, 50 ; on MeKinley and war, 
61 ; order to Dewey, 71 ; and 
Santiago, 90 ; on credit for Santiago 
naval victory', 93 n. ; on the Oregon's 
voyage, 98 n. ; retirement from 
Cabinet, 219 n. ; Roosevelt on, 232. 

Low, Seth, and Spanish mission, 42. 

Lowell, J. R., on Spanish procrastina- 
tion, 58. 

MacArthtjh, Aethur, on Spain and 
Philippines, 109 n. 

McGee, J. W., and reclamation, 356 n. 

McKenna, Joseph, in Northern Securi- 
ties decision, 224 n. ; Tennessee 
Coal and Iron Co. decision, 350 n. 

McKim, Charles, and Roosevelt, 398. 



MeKinley, William, Hanna and presi- 
dential possibility, 4 ; temperance, 
6 ; personal relations with Hanna, 
9, 10, 13 ; financial failure, rescue. 
11; Hanna and nomination cam- 
paign, 12, 13 ; and silver question in 
convention, 13-16; nomination, 10; 
and silver as issue, 19 ; in campaign, 
"front-porch" speeches, 24-26; pre- 
pared to stump, 27 ; election, 29 ; 
and Hanna for Cabinet, 30, 34 ; and 
appointment of Sherman, 31-35; 
inauguration, address, 35, 40; tariff 
priority over gold standard, 36 ; 
and international bimetallism, faith- 
fulness to gold standard, 36, 37, 119; 
and Cleveland, 36, 39; and British 
arbitration treaty, 40 ; and Cuban 
problem, Day and Sherman, 41 ; 
and Spanish mission, 42; trips 
(1897), popularity, 42; waiting at- 
titude toward Cuba, 46, 48 ; and 
de Lome incident, 48 ; and Proctor's 
speech, 52 ; ultimatum to Spain, 
53, 54 ; war pressure on, 59 ; averse 
to war, 60; yields, unnecessary war 
message, 60-65 ; reply to powers, 
64 ; and Teller Amendment, 67, 99 ; 
blockade order, no privateering, 
calls for volunteers, 81 ; and Philip- 
pine insurgents against Spain, 96 ; 
and protocol, 97 ; first and later 
attitudes on acquiring Philippines, 
100, 102-110, 1S4, 191, 197; and 
peace negotiations, 101 ; and Hawaii, 
113; gold standard act. 119; and 
Hay, 124, 125, 262; and Boxer up- 
rising, 129-131 ; renomination, 132, 
133; and Roosevelt's nomination, 
134, 135 ; letter of acceptance and 
Imperialism, 138 ; reelected, 143 ; 
second inaugural, enjoyable fruits 
of office, 169; assassination, 170, 
171 ; Roosevelt and continuance of 
policies, 171, 218-221; and Con- 
gress, popularity, 172, 196 ; and 
reciprocity, 173 ; and Civil Service 
reform, 174, 175 ; and Piatt Amend- 
ment, 181 ; aim in Philippines, 184- 
1S7; and Hoar, 189; first Philip- 
pine Commission, 190; and Root, 
195 ; second Commission, 196, 201 ; 
instructions to Commission, 107 ; 
and old-age pensions, 297 n. 
Magoon, C. E., in Cuba, 365. 



410 



INDEX 



Maine, sent to Havana, 48 ; destruc- 
tion, cause, influence, 49-51, 55-58, 
65. 

Manila, surrender, 96; population, 101. 

Manila Bay, Dewey's appointment and 
preparations, 69-71 ; battle, 71—73 ; 
credit for victory, 73-75 ; moral 
effect on American people, 75 ; 
diplomatic effect, 76-78 ; blockade, 
conduct of Germans, 78-80 ; troops 
sent, surrender of city, 96. 

Marburg, Theodore, on panics, 345. 

Marroquin, Jos6, and canal treaty, 
266, 272. 

Martens, Frederic de, on Roosevelt, 
310. 

Marvland, in election of 1896, 29 ; of 
1904, 295. 

Massachusetts, and battle of Santiago, 
91. 

Matteson, D. M., on old-age pensions, 
297 n. 

Matthews, Brander, on attic nights, 
121. 

Maxwell, G. H., and reclamation, 
355 n., 356 n. 

Meat Inspection Act, 334-336. 

Merritt, Wesley, at Manila, 96; and 
acquisition of Philippines, 103. 

Methodist Church, in campaign of 
1896, 27. 

Meyer, G. von L., and Russo-Japanese 
peace negotiations, 305. 

Miller, W. A., discharge and reinstate- 
ment, 285. 

Millet, F. D., and Roosevelt, 398. 

Mississippi River, Roosevelt's trip and 
speech, 359. 

Missouri, in election of 1904, 295. 

Mitchell, John, and coal strike (1902), 
236, 238, 241, 242; on orgi 
labor, 236; on Commission and or- 
ganized labor, 247; a-- interpreter of 
Roosevelt to labor. 299. 

Mommsen.Theodor.on Spanish War, 76. 

Money. 8et Cold standard ; Silver. 

Monroe Doctrine, and acquisition of 

Philippines, 109: and Venezuelan 

ir, 249; South America and. 342 

igue, Q. H . on effect of Standard 

Oil. 165. 

Morgan. J. P., character, 115; and 
railwnv combinations, 116; steel 
margi - L44, 145, L48 LSI, 154. 156, 
157, contest for Northern Pacific, 



155; ship combine, 156; on crisis 
of 1903, 157 ; and Roosevelt and 
Northern Securities, 222, 223 ; and 
anthracite coal strike, 237, 238, 
243-245 ; and panic of 1907, 348. 

Morgan, J. S., and "bulling" on 
America, 116. 

Morgan, J. T., as arbitrator, 259; and 
isthmian canal, 271. 

Morley, John, on Roosevelt, 397. 

Morocco. See Algeciras Conference. 

Morse, C. W., and panic of 1907, 352. 

Morton, O. P., Roosevelt on, 392. 

Moses, Bernard, Philippine Commis- 
sion, 196. 

Muckraking, Roosevelt's speech on, 
337. 

Municipal government, as preparation 
for self-government in Cuba, 179 ; 
and in Philippines, 198. 

Mutsuhito, on Roosevelt and peace 
negotiations, Roosevelt's letter prais- 
ing Japan, 308. 

Myers, G. H., acknowledgment to, 
399 n. 

Napoleon I., Roosevelt and, 397. 

Nashville, and Panama Revolution, 
270. 

Nation, on Hanna and money in politics, 
6 ; on Sherman, 33 ; on Standard Oil, 
166, 167; on McKinley and reci- 
procity, 174 ; on campaign con- 
tributions, 294 ; on St. Louis World 
Fair. 301. 

Natural resources. Sec Conservation. 

Navy, American, preparedness (1S9S), 
83; and Roosevelt, 366, 369; 
Roosevelt's building programme, 
367-369; purpose of world voyage, 
and Japan, 369-374, 377; effect of 
voyage 374; its suooess, receptions. 
375. 37fi : review on return. 377. 

Navy, British, rmd peaoe, 260. 

Nebrs il a prosperity, 1 18. 

1 i •',■. Roosevelt on, 392. 

Negroe , and Booker Washington 
incident. 229; Brownsville affair, 
340. 

\,-ir York, and battle of Santiago, 91. 

New York City, Bryan's speech (1896\ 

20. 

fork Ermine Pott, in campaign 
of 1R96. 24; Roosevelt on "crowd," 
290. 



INDEX 



411 



Neweli, F. H., and reclamation, 354. 
355 n., 356 n. 

Newlands, F. G., and reclamation, 354, 
355 n., 356 n. 

Newlands Act, 354, 356. 

Newspapers, yellow, and war feeling, 
55 ; Roosevelt on American, 304. 

Nicaragua, and route for canal, 263- 
266, 271. 

Nicholas II., Roosevelt's characteriza- 
tion, 303 ; on Roosevelt and peace 
negotiations, 308. 

Nicolay, J. G., as historian, 122. 

Nobel Peace Prize, award to Roose- 
velt, 310. 

Northern Pacific Railroad, contest for 
control, 155. See also Northern 
Securities. 

Northern Securities Company, forma- 
tion, 221, 222; Roosevelt's opposi- 
tion, financiers' misunderstanding 
of it, 222-224 ; dissolution ordered, 
224 ; decision considered, 225. 

Noyes, A. D., in campaign of 1896, 24 ; 
on revival of prosperity, 114, 115; 
on speculative mania, 154 ; on 
panic of 1907, 353. 

Obaldia, J. D. de, and canal treaty, 
272. 

Ohio, in campaign of 1896, 28, 29; 
Republican indorsement incident 
(1903), 281-284; Republican suc- 
cess (1903), 285. 

Olcott, C. S., on Congress and war, GO. 

Olney, Richard, and Cuban Insur- 
rection, 44, 45. 

Olympia, Dewey's flagship, 70. 

Omaha Trans-Mississippi Exposition, 
103. 

"Open door," Hay and policy in China, 
126. 

Oquendo, battle of Santiago, 91, 92. 

Oregon, battle of Santiago, 91, 92; 
voyage, and Panama Canal, 98 n., 
261. 

Osier, William, on conquest of yellow 
fever, 178. 

Ostrogorski, Moisei, on national con- 
ventions, 132. 

Otis, E. S., command in Philippines, 
184; Philippine Commission, 191, 
193. 

Pacific Coast, Japanese question, 
341, 371-373, 377. 



Panama Canal, abrogation of Clayton- 
Bulwer Treaty, fortification, 261- 
263 ; public support, 263 ; route 
question, Hanna and choice of 
Panama, 263-266, 271 ; draft treaty 
with Colombia, Colombia's rejection, 
266-268 ; Panama Revolution, 
Roosevelt and, 268-275 ; construc- 
tion treaty with Panama, provisions, 
275 ; construction, Bryce on, as 
achievement, sanitation, 276-278 ; 
bibliography, 276 n. ; lock type, 278 ; 
cost, 278 n. 

Panama Republic, revolt, Roosevelt 
and, 268-275 ; recognition, guaran- 
tee, 275. See also Panama Canal. 

Pan-Americanism, Root's visit and, 
342, 343. 

Panics, periodicity, 114; little, of 
1903, 157; cause, 344-346; Roose- 
velt's policies and (1907), 346, 350- 
352; events in 1907, 347; and 
chain banking, administration and, 
348 ; Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. 
incident, 348-350 ; restoration of 
confidence, 352 ; severity, 353 ; 
compared with 1903, 353 n. See also 
Economic conditions. 

Parker, A. B., nomination for President, 
and silver, 292 ; campaign personal- 
ities, 293 ; defeat, 295. 

Parker, E. W., Anthracite Coal Com- 
mission, 246. 

Pauncefote, Lord, canal treaties, 261, 
262. 

Pavne, S. E.. and tariff, 38. 

Peabody. F. G., on Wilhelm II., 316. 

Peace, Carnegie's advocacy, 153 ; 
Roosevelt and, 39S. 

Peckham, R. W., Northern Securities 
dissent, 225 n. 

Peking, Boxer siege and relief, 128-131. 

Penrose, Boies, and Standard Oil, 332. 

Pensions, old-age liability order. 297. 

People, the, and Roosevelt, 298, 333, 
385-3SS, 393. 

Percy, Eustace, on Puerto Rico, 176. 

Petroleum. See Standard Oil. 

Philip, J. W., at battle of Santiago, 94. 

Philippine Government Act, 201. 

Philippines, insurgents and American- 
Spanish War, 96; Spanish War 
protocol on, McKinley's first at- 
titude. 98, 100; area and popula- 
tion, 101 ; development of decision to 



412 



INDEX 



acquire, 102; Commissioner Gray'e 
opposition, 104 ; justice of acquisition 
considered, 1U7-110, 112; in peace 
treaty, payment for, debt not 
assumed, 110; beginning of insur- 
rection, cost of insurrection, 111 
responsibility for beginning, 111 n. 
Republican platform on (1900), 132 
as issue, 136-139; diverse literature 
on, 183; Root as authority on, 184; 
American aim, no exploitation, 184- 
187 ; anti-Imperialists considered, 
1 s~-190 ; first Commission, purpose, 
190, 191 ; progress and reason for 
insurrection, Ag as leader, 

191-194 ; findings of first Commis- 
sion, 193 ; Root as minister, 195, 
201, 204 ; appointment <>f - 
Commission, Taf t, 196 ; instructions 
to Commission, government, 197- 
200 ; education, language, 199 ; prece- 
dents of rule, 200 ; cong v 
proval of government, 201 ; guerilla 
warfare and election of 1900, ca 
of Aguinaldo, 201 ; his peace procla- 
mation, 202 ; inauguration and 
progress of civil government, 202, 
205; end of insurrection, conduct of 
American soldiers, 202-204 ; friars' 
lands, 206; Taft as Governor. 207 
212; cost of ruling, 212; t ults of 
American rule, 212-216 ; peace army 
in, 212 n. ; economic disasters. 21."> n. ; 
future. 216; bibliography, 217 n. 
Pinchot, Gifford, and reclamation, 
354, 356 n. ; and forest reserves, 

Pipe lines, development of oil, 164. 

11.. and Piatt Amendment, 
180, 181; and' Cuban reciprocity, 
i on du1 in Philip] 
i 
Piatt, T. C.i and MoE 

r_' and Rooi evelt's nomination as 
President, 133, 134 ; and Hep- 
burn Bill. 325 n. 

provisions and 
authorship, L79 181 

■ Banna i •! oommen Lai spirit, 
5-7 i on acpomph-linnTii* 
under practical, 369 n. See also 

■ ;nnn. 

Polo y Ilornabo, Luis. on Proctor'; 

Population. Philippines, 101. 101 . 



Hawaii, 112 n. ; Cuba, 179 ; density 

in Orient, 191 n. 
Portsmouth Navy Yard, peace negotia- 
tions at. 306. 307. 
Powell, J. W., and reclamation, 355 n., 

356 n. 
Preparedness, contrast of navy and 

army (1898), 82-85; Roosevelt's 

advocacy, 367. 
President, Roosevelt's interpretation of 

powers, 242, 319, 383-385, 388, 395. 
Pritchett, H. S., on Hanna, 5. 
Proctor, Redfield, speech on Cuba, 51- 

53 ; and Dewey, 69, 70 ; on Dewey 

as diplomatist, 78. 
Propertv, Roosevelt and rights, 299, 

395. 
Property. See Economic conditions. 
Public debt. See Debt. 
Public lands. See Forest reserves; 

Reclamation. 
Publicity, Roosevelt and, as weapon, 

296, 299. 
Puerto Rico, occupation, 95 ; ceded, 

97, 99, 110; and free trade, 173; 

American rule, Foraker Act, 176; 

cor 206. 

. on acquisition of Philippines, 
109; on Roosevelt and the Kaiser, 

316. 
Pure food law, 336. 

Quay, M. S., and McKinley's candi- 
,12; and coal strike, 241. 

Railroads, Morgan and combinations, 
116; American rails. 117; contest 
for control of Northern Pacific, 155; 
oil rebatec 160; Elkina Act for- 
bidding i < 296 ; problem, and 
national devel 22; Roose- 
velt's original position on rate 
328; Hepburn Act, 
23-325 ; justice 
-.fit 325 331,334 : public ownership. 
lie opinion on. 32S ; Big 
Bu Hepburn Act. 331-333; 
public support of act, 333; ero- 
liability, 337. See also 
Northern Securities. 

McKinley's advocacy. 

173; Cuban. 182, 183. 

Reclamation, problem of arid lands, 

t. Xcwlands 

t sffldenoy of Service, 

355-357 ; future. 357. 



INDEX 



413 



Reconstruction, Roosevelt on, 392. 

Reed, T. B., presidential candidacy 
(1896), 12, 16; Speaker, 37; and 
Cuba, 46 ; and war feeling, 63. 

Reed, Walter, and conquest of yellow 
fever, 178. 

Red Star Line, combine, 156. 

Reid, Whitelaw, peace commissioner, 
101 ; and Philippines, 102. 

Republican Party. See Congress ; 
Elections ; Hanna ; McKinley ; 
Roosevelt. 

Reyes, Rafael, and canal treaty, 266, 
272. 

Rhodes, D. P., and Hanna, 11 n. 

Rio Janeiro, Pan-American Conference, 
Root at, 342. 

Robertson, J. A., on American rule in 
Philippines, 216. 

Rockefeller, J. D., and steel merger, 
157 ; business methods, 160-164 ; 
judge of men, 162 ; suppression of 
middlemen, 163 ; and pipe lines, 164 ; 
public ethics of career, 165-168 ; 
and panic of 1907, 352. 

Roman Catholic Church, in campaign 
of 1896, 27 ; in Philippines, 102 n. ; 
friars' lands there, 206 ; support of 
Hanna, 281. 

Roosevelt, Theodore, on Hanna, 10, 
289; and war feeling (1898), 57; and 
appointment of Dewey, 69, 70 ; on 
Dewey's victory, 74 ; on war panic, 
76 ; on military unpreparedness and 
mismanagement, 82-84 ; in Spanish 
War, Rough Riders, 84 n. ; battle of 
San Juan Hill, 86 ; and Shafter's 
demoralization, 87 ; on credit for 
Santiago naval victory, 93, 93 n. ; 
and McKinley's renomination, 133 ; 
nomination for Vice-President, 133- 
135 ; on stump, 141 ; election, 143 ; 
becomes President, 171 ; and con- 
tinuation of McKinley's policies, 171, 
218-221 ; and Cuban reciprocity, 
on American conduct toward Cuba, 
183 ; and Philippines, on Funston's 
capture of Aguinaldo, 201 ; on con- 
duct of soldiers in Philippines, 204 ; 
and Taft and justiceship, 20S-211 ; 
on Taft as colonial administra- 
tor, 212; on rule and future of 
Philippines, 216 ; Hanna's advice, 
218, 220 ; political attitude on 
assuming presidency, 218 ; and 



McKinley's Cabinet, attitude to- 
ward advisers, 219, 233, 311; and 
tariff, 220, 292 ; and trusts, 221, 222 ; 
fight against Northern Securities, 
222-227 ; and opposition of large 
financial interests, 224, 227, 299, 333, 
351-353, 394-396 ; Booker Washing- 
ton incident, 227-230; restless 
energy, 230 ; at Charleston, expan- 
sionist, 231 ; on the South, 232, 361, 
397 ; at Harvard, tribute to assist- 
ants, 232 ; speeches on regulation 
of trusts, 233, 234 ; on legislation and 
thrift, 234, 328; accident, on or- 
ganized labor, gospel of work, 235 
and anthracite coal strike, 237, 23S 
futile conference on strike, 239 
proposed commission and investiga- 
tion, 241 ; and extra-constitutional 
action, and violence, 242 ; and 
personnel of commission, 243-246 ; 
and credit for settlement of strike, 
245-247 ; Venezuelan incident, 248- 
253 ; on Henry White, 250 ; attitude 
toward England, 253, 260; and 
Alaskan boundary, 255-260 ; on 
British navy and peace, 260 ; on 
importance of Panama action, 
on first Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 
261 ; and Colombia's rejection 
of canal treaty, 267; and Panama 
Revolution, 268-275; and lock- 
type canal, 278 ; Hanna and trust 
legislation, 279 ; Hanna and Ohio 
indorsement incident, 281-284 ; per- 
sonal relations with Hanna, 284 ; 
antagonism of organized labor, 285 ; 
and Hanna's presidential candidacy, 
286 ; confidence in renomination. 
288 ; and Hanna as leaders, 289 ; 
and Hanna's last illness, 289 ; on 
Westerners, 290, 334 ; renomination, 
290; partisan letter of acceptance, 
292 ; as issue, 292 ; and campaign 
manager, 293 ; and campaign con- 
tributions, 293-295 ; reelected, dis- 
claimer of third-term candidacy 
(1904), 295; trust-regulation man- 
date, on publicity as trust-regulation 
weapon, Elkins Act and Department 
of Commerce and Labor, 296 ; and 
old-age pension liability, 297 ; and 
"common people," 298, 333, 385- 
388, 393 ; and property rig' 
395; and Russo-Japanese War, 302; 



414 



INDEX 



knowledge of European conditions, 
characterization of Kaiser and Czar, 
303 ; on battle of Sea of Japan, on 
character of warring nations, 304 ; 
and arranging of peace conference, 
305 ; reception of envoys, 306 ; and 
negotiations, 307 ; credit and praise, 
307, 308 ; letter on wisdom of 
Japan, 30S ; on envoys, envoys on, 
309; Peace Prize, disposal, 310; 
tribute to Hay's memory, 310; 
appointment of Root, on it, 
311; and Morocco imbroglio, 311— 
314; compared with Wilhelm II., 
315-318; Bryce on, as diplomatist, 
315 n. ; would have prevented 
World War, 318 ; and San Domingo, 
318 ; interpretation of presidential 
powers, 319, 383-885, 388, 395; 
and Boxer indemnity fund, 319-321 ; 
Roosevelt Period on economic prob- 
lems, 322 ; original position on 
railroad rate legislation, 323 ; and 
Hepburn Act, 325, 330-334; on 
public ownership of railroads, 
325; on Lodge, 327, 380; and 
meat inspection and pure food 
legislation, 334-336 ; and Civil Serv- 
ice reform, 336; on oppon 
muckrake speech, 337; on Pilgrim's 
Progress, 337 n. ; literary knowledge, 
338; and Brownsville incident, 
338-341 ; and Japanese question. 
341, 371, 377; on Root's visit and 
Pan-Americanism, 342, 343; policies 
and panic of 1907, 346-348, 350 
and Tennessee Coal and Iron Co. 
incident, 348-350 ; and reclam- 
354-357; and forest reserves, 
trip on .' ; I River, 359, 

and conservation, Governors' Con- 
vention, 360, 363; on division of 
powers and twilight zone. 862; and 
jingoism, 364; and intervention in 
Cuba, 364—366; Navy and Arms 
and, 366, 369 ; and pn 
naval building programme 887 
369; on acoomplishmei ts under 
pr.e tioal polities, 869 *.; put 
of world voyage of Beet, and Japan. 

369-374, 377; on success of vo 
874 876 . r e view on return, 377 . 
ns for refusing to be a candidate 
(190S), 378-388; enjoyment 
pr*Mdr>n<-v. 378 ; choice of SUOCI ■ 



379, 381 ; on Lodge as chairman of 
Convention, 380 ; later relations 
with Congress, 388 ; personality, 
ability, 389, 399 ; and children, 389 ; 
bookishness, 390 ; literary labors, 
390 n. ; criticism of Rhodes's His- 
tory, on Reconstruction, 392; tem- 
perance, and cultivated classes, 393 ; 
appreciation of Jackson, 396 ; on Jef- 
ferson, 397; on Lincoln, 397, 398; 
Napoleonic traits, 397; deliberation, 
seeks counsel, and art, Great Heart, 
398 ; greatness, and peace, 398, 399. 

Roosevelt Dam, 356. 

Root, Elihu, on Cambon, 97 n. ; on 
McKinley, 172. 190; and Cuba. 177; 
on sanitation there, 178; and Piatt 
Amendment, 181 ; on success in 
Cuba, on commercial relations with 
her, 182 ; as Cabinet officer, 184 ; 
as colonial minister, 19.5. 201, 204; 
instructions to Philippine ( iommis- 
sion, 198-200 ; address to soldiers 
in Philippines, 202 ; on peace 
army in Philippines, 212 n. ; 
on results in Philippines, 213 ; 
character, 214 ; Bryce on, 215 n. ; 
Roosevelt's tribute, 232 ; and 
coal strike, 241. 243; Alaskan 
Boundary Tribunal, 256-259; and 
Panama Revolution. 274 ; on Roose- 
velt as issue, 292; and campaign of 
1904, 293; on Roosevelt and 
property rights. 299, 394 ; appoint- 
ment to State portfolio, Roosevelt 
on, 811; South American tour, 312, 
343 ; and presidential candidacy 
(190S),379; and Trevelyan. 390. 

. Baron, pcaee conference, 306, 
307, 309 ; on Roosevelt, 309. 

Rough Ridei B4 a.; in battle of San 
Juan Hill 

Russell, Bert rand, on control of 
COO, 313 n. 

Russia, and American-Spanish crisis. 
64; and open d'"ir. 126; Roosevelt 
on the Caar, 303. See also J.' 
W :ir 

Russo-Japanese W'.ir, Roosevelt's 
interest. 302; Japan's victories and 

peace overtures. 804 108 I 
velt on character tints. 

304 ; Roosevelt and arranging for 
98 conference. "01 306 ; his 
recc;'ti..n of envoys, 806; nopotia- 



INDEX 



415 



tions, Roosevelt's influence, 307 ; 
credit to Roosevelt, 307, 308; 
Roosevelt on envoys, 309. 
Ryan, T. F., and panic of 1907, 352. 

Sagasta, P. M., and Cuba, character, 
47. 

Saint Gaudens, Augustus, and Roose- 
velt, 398. 

St. Louis World Fair, 300, 301 ; Con- 
gress of Arts and Science, 301. 

Salvation Army, support of Hanna, 
281. 

Sampson, W. E., Maine inquiry, 50 
war command, 81 ; and Shafter 
absence at battle of Santiago, 89,90 
blockade, 90 ; and the victory, 92 
93 n. ; on rescue of prisoners, 94 
on the Oregon's voyage, 98 n. 

San Domingo, Roosevelt and financial 
administration, 318. 

San Juan Hill, battle, 85-87. 

Sanitation, in Cuba, 178 ; at Canal 
Zone, 278. 

Santiago, Cuba, Cervera at, 82 ; 
American military expedition, mis- 
management, 82-87 ; battle of El 
Caney and San Juan Hill, 85-87 ; 
demoralization of American com- 
mander, 87 ; sortie of Spanish fleet, 
88, 89; friction between American 
naval and military forces, 89, 90 ; 
American blockade and naval orders, 
90; naval battle, 91, 92; credit for 
naval victory, 92, 93 ; decisiveness 
of naval victory, results, 93, 95 ; 
American humanity, 94 ; surrender 
of city, 95. 

Schofield, J. M., and coal strike, 
242. 

Schurman, J. G., Philippine Commis- 
sion, 190, 193. 

Schurz, Carl, in campaign of 1896, 24 ; 
of 1900, 142 ; as anti-Imperialist, 
188, 190, 194 ; and Reconstruction, 
392. 

Schurz nuggets, 24. 

Schwab, C. M., on American steel 
rails, 117; and steel merger, 151; 
and Carnegie, 152 n. 

Scott, T. A., and Carnegie, 146. 

Sectionalism, disappearance, 169. 

Shafter. W. R., expedition command, 
unfitness, 85 ; demoralized, 87, 90 n. ; 
and Sampson, 89. 



Sherman, J. S., and Harriman, 332; 
nomination for Vice-President, 380 n. 

Sherman, John, Hanna's support (1884, 
1888), 4; appointment as Secretary 
of State, unfitness, 31, 41 ; candor of 
appointment, 32-34 ; appointment 
and Spanish War, 35 ; relegation, 
resignation, 41, 42. 

Sherman Anti-Trust Act. See North- 
ern Securities ; Trusts. 

Silver, question in Republican Con- 
i vention (1896), 13-16; Democratic 
plank for free, 17, 18; as issue in 
campaign, 18-20 ; Bryan's campaign 
presentation, 20-22, 28 ; Democratic 
campaign literature, 22, 23 ; Re- 
publican literature, 24-26 ; Senate 
resolution for payment of bonds in, 
36 ; failure of international bi- 
metallism, 37 ; in campaign of 1900, 
132, 136; eliminated as issue (1904), 
292. See also Gold standard. 

Skagway, as port for Klondike, 255. 

Smith, A. H., and Boxer indemnity 
fund, 319. 

Smith, C. E., retirement from Cabinet, 
219 n. 

Smith, Goldwin, on Bryan, 22, 28. 

Smyth, W. E., and reclamation, 355 n. 

South, and Booker Washington inci- 
dent, 229, 230 , Roosevelt's attitude, 
232, 361, 397. 

South America, Root's tour, 342, 343. 

South Carolina Interstate and West 
Indian Exposition, 231. 

South Improvement Company, 160 n. 

Spalding, J. L., Anthracite Coal 
Commission, 243, 244, 246. 

Spanish War, and appointment of 
Sherman, 35 ; McKinley and Cuban 
problem, 41 ; appointment of minis- 
ter to Spain, 42 ; Cuban Insurrec- 
tion, Weyler'sreconcentration policy. 
44 ; Cleveland and Cuban belligor- 
ency, 44, 45 ; Congress and belliger- 
ency (1907), conduct of insurgents, 
46 ; McKinley's waiting policy, 
46, 48 ; Sagasta's reform measures, 
47 ; disturbances in Havana, send- 
ing of the Maine, 47, 48 ; de Lome's 
indiscretion, 48 ; destruction of 
the Maine, cause, influence, 49-51. 
55-58. 65 ; Proctor's speech on 
Cuban conditions, 51-53 ; Day's 
dispatch on reconcentration, 



416 



INDEX 



McKinley's ultimatum, 53 ; Spanish 
procrastination, 54, 58, 59 ; Day's 
warning against delay, 54 ; public 
attitude, influence of yellow press, 
54-56 , attitude of leaders, 56-58 ; 
pressure on McKinley, 59 ; his 
attitude and war message, 60 ; 
evidences of Spanish submission, 
McKinley's yielding to war con- 
sidered, 61-65 ; McKinley's reply 
t . t he powers, 64 ; intervention rest ilu- 
tions, 65, 66; Teller Amendment 
renouncing Cuba, 66, 70, 71 ; 
question of recognizing Cuban Re- 
public, 68 ; declaration, 69 ; Dewey's 
appointment to Asiatic Squadron, 
70; his preparations, 70. 71 ; battle 
of Manila Bay, credit for victory, 
71-75; effect of victory on Ann 
morale, 75 ; diplomatic effect. 75 
78; blockade of Manila, conduct 
of Germans, 78-80 ; blockade of 
Cuba, no privateering, calls for 
volunteers, Sampson's command, 81 ; 
finances, 82 ; Cervcra's cruise to 
Santiago, 82; American Santiago 
expedition, lack of preparation, 
mismanagement. 82 ^7; battle of 
El Caney and Sail Juan Hill, 85- 
87 ; demoralization of American 
commander, gloom at Washington, 
87, 90 n. ; sortie of Cervera's fleet, 
Santiago, naval battle, 88-92; 
credit for naval victory at Santiago, 
92, 93; decisiveness of \ id i- . 
results, 93, 95; American bum 

surrender of Santiago, 95 ; 
occupation of Puerto Rico, 95; 
Spanish reserve fleet, 96, troops 
to Manila, surreml 96; 

protocol, terms, 97-101 ; b 
raphy. 98 n.; McKinL - first 
attitude on Philippines. 100 
oomm Burners, 101 ; developmenl 
ol decision to acquire Philip 
100-107; Cuban di 
of decision t<. acquire Philippines 
considered, 107-110; treaty of 
••o, Senate's ratification, 110, 

•'..st. Ill- 
Speck von Sternhurg. Baron, and 
sdoroooo, 813, 814 

llation, mania (1001), and contest 
for Northern Pacific, 1.S4, 157. See 
nUo Panic*. 



Spencer, Herbert, on business and war, 
158, 161. 

Sperry, C. S., command in battleship 
voyage, 375, 376. 

Spooner, J. C, Philippine amendment, 
201 ; and isthmian canal route, 265 ; 
and railroad rate legislation, 325. 

Spooner Amendment, 185, 201. 

Standard Oil, and Big Business, 157 
and steel merger, 157; beginning 
158-160 ; development, rebates 
business methods, 160-162 ; develop 
ment of export, efficiency, 162 
suppression of middleman, success 
and dictation, 163 ; pipe lines, 164 
litigation, 105; economic effect 
ethics, 165-16S ; and rate legislation 
Roosevelt on, 332. 

St an wood, Edward, on Dingley Bill. 39. 

Steamship combine, 156. 
See Iron. 
. Moorfield, as anti-Imperialist, 
188; on Panama Resolution, 27_'. 

Sumner, W. G., on government, 166 n. 

Supreme Court, on constitutionality 
of colonial government, 206 ; Taft 
declines appointment, 208-210; 
Northern Securities decision. 224 
226; on Tennessee Coal and Iron 
Co. purchase, 350 ; and conserva- 
tion, 363. 

Taft. YV. H., on Spanish War as altru- 
istic, 66 ; appointment to Philippines 
Commission. 190; as head of Com- 
mission, 201 ; Civil Governor 
202 ; character as Governor, 206 
1 211; and friars' lands. 20fi 
puts aside judicial honors. 208-211 
on results of American rule. 212 
Roosevelt on, 232, 381 ; and 
Brownsville affair, 339 ; in Cuba, 
36S; Roosevelt's choice as presi- 
dential candidate, 379-381; elected, 
888; on Roosevelt. 389. 

Takahira, Kogoro, peace conference, 
306, 307. 309. 

Talmagi T ds \Y . on distress, 21. 

I -uniiKiiiv Hall, in election of 1900. 142. 
Santiago expedition at, 83. 
84 n. 

11. I. M., on awe of Rockefeller. 
161 ; as historian of Standard Oil. 
L66. 

Tariff, Hanna's attitude, 10; in cam- 



INDEX 



417 



paign of 1896, 12, 19, 20; priority 
over gold standard, 30 ; Dingley 
Act, 37-39 ; Silverites and, rates 
under Dingley Act, 39 ; McKinley 
and reciprocity, 173 ; Puerto Rico 
and free trade, 173 ; Cuban reci- 
procity, 182, 183 ; Roosevelt's atti 
tude, 220, 292. 

Taussig, F. W., on Dingley Act, 
39 n. 

Taxation. See Tariff. 

Taylor, C. H., on Roosevelt and 
jingoism, 364. 

Teller, H. M., and free silver, secedes 
from Republican Convention, 16 ; 
Cuban resolution, 66 ; and Hepburn 
BUI, 325 n. 

Teller Amendment, 66 ; adhered to, 
99. 

Tennessee Coal and Iron Company 
incident, 348-350. 

Texas, battle of Santiago, 91. 

Thayer, W. R., on Hay and China, 
131; on Roosevelt on stump, 142; 
on Venezuelan affair, 249 ; acknowl- 
edgment to, 399 n. 

Tirpitz, A. P. F. von, and American 
battleship voyage, 372. 

Tovar, General, and Panama revolt, 
270. 

Townsend, J. B., on Charleston Ex- 
position, 231. 

Trevelyan, Sir G. O., Roosevelt's 
appreciation, 390. 

Trusts, as issue (1900), 136; steam- 
ship combine, 156 ; Roosevelt's 
attitude, 221 ; Roosevelt's speeches 
on regulation, 233 ; election of 
1904 as mandate for regulation, 296 ; 
publicity as remedy, Bureau of 
Corporations, 296 ; Roosevelt and 
property rights, 299, 395; "twilight 
zone" and regulation, 361-363. 
See also Finances ; Iron and steel ; 
Railroads ; Standard Oil. 

Turner, George, Alaskan Boundary 
Tribunal, 256-259. 

"Twilight zone," Bryan and Roose- 
velt on, 361-363. 

United States Steel Corporation, 
and Tennessee Coal and Iron Co., 
348-350. See also Iron and steel. 

United States t>. Knight, and Northern 
Securities case, 226. 



Vampire Club, 120, 121. 

Vanderbilt, W. II., financial position, 
160; on Standard Oil, 161. 

Venezuela, European claims, 247 ; 
coercion, Roosevelt's suspicions of 
Germany, 248-250; British attitude, 
250 ; Roosevelt's demand and threat 
to Germany, 250-252 ; arbitration, 
settlement, 251, 253 ; accuracy of 
Roosevelt's account, 253. 

Vizcaya, battle of Santiago, 91, 92. 

Walcott, C. D., and reclamation, 355 
n., 356 n. 

Wall Street, crisis (1901), 155. See 
also Finances; Panics. 

War of 1812, and lack of preparedness, 
367. 

Washburn, C. G., on Hanna's presi- 
dential candidacy, 288, 291 ; on 
Roosevelt Dam, 356 ; on Roosevelt 
and Congress, 388. 

Washington, Booker, White House 
dinner incident, 227-230. 

Washington, George, Roosevelt and 
third-term precedent, 377, 383 ; 
Roosevelt on, as President, 381, 384. 

Water-cure in Philippines, 203. 

Watkins, T. H., Anthracite Coal 
Commission, 246. 

West, in campaign of 1896, 17, 19, 29 ; 
Roosevelt and, 290, 334. 

West Virginia, in election of 1896, 
29 ; of 1904, 295. 

Westinghouse, George, and panic, 347. 

Weyler, Valeriano, policy in Cuba, 44. 

Wheat, export (1S70-1900), 162 n. 

White, A. D., on Germans and Spanish 
War, 76. 

White, E. D., Northern Securities 
dissent, 225 n. ; on Hanna, 290. 

White, Henry, and Venezuelan affair, 
250 ; Roosevelt on, 250 ; and Alaskan 
boundary, 257 ; on Roosevelt, 279 ; 
and Algeciras Conference, 314; on 
Roosevelt at Potsdam, 316. 

White Star Line, combine, 156. 

Wildman, Miss, acknowledgment to, 
399 n. 

Wilhelm II. of Germany, and Philip- 
pines, 188; Roosevelt's characteriza- 
tion, 303 ; and Russo-Japanese peace 
negotiations, 304, 308 ; and Roosevelt 
and peace, 307 ; and Morocco, 312- 
314 ; mutual fear of Geat Britain, 



418 



INDEX 



312 ; compared with Roosevelt, 
315-318. 

Williams, D. R., on friars' lands, 
206 n. 

Willoughby, W. F., on Hawaii, 112 n. ; 
on l'oraker Act, 177. 

Wilson, H. W., on naval battle of 
Santiago, 93. 

Wilson, J. M., Anthracite Coal Com- 
mission, 246. 

Win.slow, Lanier & Co., and Morton, 
and Roosevelt, 393. 

Witte, Count, peace conference, 306, 
307 ; Roosevelt on, on America, on 
Roosevelt, 309. 

Wood, Leonard, Rough Riders, 84 n. ; 
brigade command, 86 n. ; as Gover- 
nor of Cuba, 178, 179, 182 ; Roose- 
velt's tribute, 232. 

Woodford, S. L., minister to Spain, 42 ; 
and American ultimatum, 53, 54 ; 



on Spanish yielding, 61-63 ; conduct 

of negotiations, 63 n. 
Worcester, D. C, first Philippine 

Commission, 191, 193; second 

Commission, 196. 
Work, Roosevelt on gospel, 234, 235. 
Wright, C. D., and coal strike (1902), 

241, 246. 
Wright, L. E., Philippine Commission, 

196, 232. 
Wu Ting Fang, and Boxer uprising, 

129, 131. 
Wvman, Miss, acknowledgment to, 

399 n. 

Yale University. Booker Washington 

at Bi-Centennial, 228. 
Yamamoto, Gombei, and Japanese in 

America, 371. 
Yellow fever, conquest in Cuba, 178. 
Yellow press, and Spanish War, 55. 



This Index was made for me by D. M. Matteson. 



31+77-1 



I . - 



